AfricaFocus Bulletin
October 26, 2016 (161026)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

Central Africa’s largest and most populous country, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), is bordered by nine countries: the
Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, South Sudan,
Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Angola. With the
exception of Zambia and Tanzania, none can claim to be a
consolidated competitive democracy. But most have at least managed
to hold presidential elections within the last two years. In
contrast, with this month’s postponement of the scheduled election
for 2016, the DRC has joined South Sudan and Angola in extending a
“no elections” scenario.

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Few, if any, observers would venture to predict the next few months
and years, as domestic protest plus international criticism and
mediation has been met with state violence and continued stalling.
But the consensus view is “not good”; veteran commentator on central
Africa Colette Braeckman, for example, notes that “the milk has been
spilled” and warns that there is danger of “breaking the bottle” or
even “butchering the cow.”

This issue of AfricaFocus contains a diverse set of recent articles
and other links providing summaries, analyses, and background on the
current situation, without venturing into predictions or solutions.
Included below is an editorial from The Observer, the very short
commentary by Braeckman (in French), a report on a $413 million
bribery case judgement against the New York hedge firm Och-Ziff,
brief excerpts from an extensive Washington Post feature article on
“The cobalt pipeline: From dangerous tunnels in Congo to consumers’
mobile tech,” and a commentary from African Arguments raising the
question whether President Joseph Kabila can trust his security
forces.

Breaking News

Poll shows Kabila support at only 7.8%, October 25, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/jpzvg77

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/congokin.php

Other sources particularly worth following for updates and
commentary

http://reliefweb.int/country/cod

http://allafrica.com/congo_kinshasa/

http://congoresearchgroup.org/category/congo-siasa/

http://www.lemonde.fr/congo-rdc/

Additional links of related interest

UN Human Rights Report, October 21, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/hl7b8xr

Statement by European Union, October 17, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/jsho57n

MONUSCO statement to UN Security Council, October 11, 2016
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55266

Le Monde background on violence in September, September 21, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/j84nb46

Reviews of The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Hope and Despair,
by Michael Deibert. African Arguments, 2013.
http://tinyurl.com/zt4t2jm and http://tinyurl.com/j39mhj2

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

The Observer view on Congo and the failure of democracy in Africa

Observer editorial

The Democratic Republic of Congo is the latest country
disintegrating because a leader wants to hang on to power

22 October 2016

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree – Direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/hx8mrtk

Two decades ago, the Democratic Republic of Congo, sub-Saharan
Africa’s largest country, was engulfed in what became known as
Africa’s Great War, a conflict that drew in half-a-dozen
neighbouring countries and raged for five years from 1998.

The conflict and its aftermath cost the lives of an estimated 5.4
million people, mainly from starvation and disease. This epic
disaster was largely ignored outside Africa, even though it was the
developed world’s insatiable demand for the DRC’s mineral riches
that helped to fuel it.

The war was halted, in part, by the introduction of a new
constitution and a democratic system of governance, replacing
decades of Mobutu Sese Seko’s brutal dictatorship. In 2006 Joseph
Kabila was confirmed as DRC president by popular vote, although the
fairness of the election was widely disputed. In 2011 he was re-
elected. Again, the results were hotly contested. A key factor in
their acceptance was his pledge to honour the constitution and
refrain from seeking a third term.

The DRC’s next presidential election is due next month. It isn’t
going to happen. A court last week upheld a request by the election
commission that the poll be postponed, ostensibly because voter
rolls are incomplete. A “national dialogue” by the ruling coalition
and involving fringe parties and civic groups, but boycotted by the
main opposition and Catholic church, also agreed a delay until at
least April 2018. In effect, Kabila and his security force backers
have compromised the constitution and the judiciary and engineered a
silent coup. His solemn 2011 promise has been broken.

This shameless subversion of the democratic process (parliamentary
and provincial polls have also been put off) was condemned by the
main opposition party, the UDPS, as a “flagrant violation”.
Rassemblement (Gathering), the multi-party opposition organisation,
reacted with fury and called a general strike last Wednesday.
Kabila’s attempt to cling to power threatens the DRC’s hard-won and
still precarious stability. Worse, it risks a return to national and
regional upheaval, violence and war. At least this time the world is
paying more attention. Maman Sambo Sidikou, the senior UN official
in the country, warned the UN security council last week that
“large-scale violence is all but inevitable” if the impasse is not
resolved. “The tipping point could be reached very quickly.” After
related clashes in Kinshasa last month, in which at least 50 people
died, the US imposed limited sanctions on army generals implicated
in human rights abuses. On Monday EU foreign ministers also agreed
to pursue possible punitive measures.

Matters are not as clear cut as they might seem. Kabila denies he
wanted the delay. Analysts suggest the president, thrust into office
after his father was assassinated in 2001, is a frontman for the
security apparatus. The opposition is fragmented and its readiness
to resort to protests often leads to violence. Concerns over
stability by countries such as France and Belgium are not wholly
disinterested, commercially speaking. But that the leadership of
another African country appears ready to ride roughshod over
democracy and laws is clear. The DRC has never had a peaceful
transition of power since independence in 1960. This is why term
limits are so important. Last year the presidents of Burundi, Rwanda
and Congo-Brazzaville overrode constitutional requirements that they
step aside. In Burundi’s case, violence and displacement resulted.
In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni looks determined to go on for ever.
Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwean “presidency for life” and José Eduardo
dos Santos’s Angolan ascendancy provide further examples of endemic
disregard for democratic principles.

It would be a mistake to think Africans care less about self-
serving, corrupt and irresponsible politicians than Europeans or
Americans. The African Union has repeatedly stressed peaceful
political transitions in embedding democratic habits. Studies show
African voters value democratic systems but are increasingly
frustrated at their malfunctioning and wilful subversion.

Nigeria demonstrated last year how it could be done. But South
Africa, ruled since apartheid’s end by a single, overpowerful party,
is less of a shining light. Its reported decision to renounce the
International Criminal Court is another sign that too many African
politicians would rather jettison democratic and legal norms than
subject themselves to scrutiny and public judgment.

***********************************************************

Le Carnet de Colette Braeckman, Le Soir

Le lait est renversé

http://blog.lesoir.be/colette-braeckman/ – Direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/hrvsb8y

October 18, 2016

On le pressentait, c’est désormais confirmé: le lait est renversé.
Les élections n’auront pas lieu cette année, ni même l’an prochain.
Ce qui a manqué? L’argent peut-être, la préparation sérieuse sans
doute, mais surtout la volonté politique. Le pouvoir est à blâmer
car tout a été fait (ou pas fait … ) pour qu’il soit impossible
d’organiser le scrutin dans les délais constitutionnels et qu’un
‘rabiot’ de deux ans au moins soit accordé au président Kabila.

Le lait est renversé, car la population gronde, qu’en septembre déjà
le sang a coulé. Poussés dans la rue, des jeunes ont brûlé vifs deux
policiers et entamé des pillages. Appelés en renfort, des militaires
ont tiré à bout portant et fait, au moins 50 morts. Et demain, que
va-t-il se passer? Le dialogue qui vient de se conclure avec une
partie de l’opposition fera-t-il rentrer le lait dans la bouteille,
réussira-t-il à calmer les esprits, repartira-t-on comme si de rien
n’était ? Certainement pas: les délais sont inacceptables, les
signataires ne représentent pas la totalité de la classe politique
et même l’inclusion des absents ne garantira l’apaisement. Comment
croire que l’association d’Etienne Tshisekedi, qui, l’été dernier
encore, négociait pour son fils le poste de Premier Ministre et qui
fut depuis Mobutu l’homme de toutes les volte face, suffirait à
calmer le jeu ?

Ce qui est sûr, c’est que si le lait est renversé, la confiance
rompue, il faut aujourd’hui veiller à ne pas briser la bouteille. Et
surtout ne pas risquer de dépecer la vache elle-même, ce Congo si
convoité, qui n’a pas encore échappé aux risques d’implosion et de
rebellions diverses. Les progrès enregistrés depuis quinze ans sont
loin d’être irréversibles, les acquis peuvent encore être annulés,
par la révolte populaire sinon par la guerre.

La tâche du futur Premier Ministre s’apparentera à celle de Sisyphe:
auprès du président Kabila, il devra exiger un engagement clair,
avec une promesse de retrait assortie de dates précises, et surtout
il devra avoir les mains libres pour diriger en toute indépendance.
Ce qui supposerait, au minimum, que des technocrates sans allégeance
politique soient nommés aux postes clés: les finances, l’économie,
l’Intérieur, la banque nationale. Rétablir la confiance, c’est aussi
assécher les réseaux mafieux, redistribuer plus équitablement les
ressources, privilégier le ‘social’. Même au bord du précipice, il
n’est pas interdit de rêver.

***********************************************************

The Och-Ziff Files: Who are The Congolese Who Benefitted?

Congo Research Group | Groupe d’Etude Sur le Congo

September 30, 2016

http://congoresearchgroup.org/ – Direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/jopx7xg

This week, big news from the financial world. Och-Ziff, a leading
New York hedge fund that at its height managed $48 billion, has been
fined $413 million for over $100 million in bribes it paid to
government officials in Libya, Guinea, Chad, Niger, and the DR
Congo. Yes, that seems a paltry fine given the abuse involved and
how much it affected the countries involved––its CEO Daniel Och, who
is worth several billion dollars, will pay a mere $2.2 million, and
no one except a consultant will face jail time for now.

The story is huge for several reasons: It is a rare occasion the US
government is enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for
corruption in the Congo, and it is a huge blow to one of the
behemoths of the hedge fund world. It is also the first time, to my
knowledge, that we have a solid paper trail proving that the senior
Congolese officials, including the Congolese president himself, were
direct beneficiaries of over $100 million in bribes from foreign
companies.

As part of their deal with the US Justice Department, Och-Ziff
provided a public plea of guilt (aka “deferred prosecution
agreement.”) You can read it at http://tinyurl.com/je3lhmr (please,
read it). It include Hollywood-ready details of how Och-Ziff dealt
with Congolese officials. It features three protagonists: DRC
Partner, DRC Official 1 and DRC Official 2 and says they both
received millions in bribes from Och-Ziff. For reasons that will
become obvious, you can substitute those names with Dan Gertler,
Joseph Kabila, and Katumba Mwanke.

Here’s an example of the detail of the document. In 2008, when Dan
Gertler was trying to wrest control of a mining concession from
Africo, a Canadian firm, one of Gertler’s associates texted him:

Hi [DRC Partner], … im with the main lawyer … in the Africo
story, he has to arrange with supreme court, attorney gemal [sic]
and magistrates, he wants 500 to give to all the officials and 600
for 3 lawyers cabinets that worked on the file in defense[lawyer]and
batonnier [lawyer]. the converstaion is vey tough. (while talking I
said to ask money to [one of the Akam shareholders], [the Akam
shareholder]said he cant because most of the money has to go to
·[DRC Official 2] . . . i dont know if he wants to provoke me or it
was something [the Akam shareholder]invented …) but they are now
at 1. 1 in total.

He’s talking about about thousands of dollars.

Shortly afterward, Gertler responds: “We can’t ‘accept a mid result
… Africo must be screwd and finished totally!!!!”

All in all, the legal document says that Gertler transferred $23.5
million of Och-Ziff’s money to Katumba Mwanke between 2008 and 2012,
and $10.75 million to a person who is most likely Joseph Kabila.
Bloomberg reported that Gertler (“DRC Partner”) paid a total of over
$100 million in bribes to Congolese officials.

How do I know that those are the people involved?

Bloomberg’s article clearly identifies Gertler through other sources
familiar with the case, and the document itself is fairly clear: “an
Israeli businessman [with] significant interests in the diamond and
mineral mining industries in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

It says that “DRC Official 2,” was “a senior official in the DRC and
close advisor to DRC Official 1. Since at least 2004, DRC Official 2
was an Ambassador-at-Large for the DRC government and also a
national parliamentarian.” It goes on to say, citing an Och-Ziff
employee, that he was Gertler’s “guy in the DRC.” Finally, it says
he died on February 12, 2012. There is no doubt that is Katumba
Mwanke.

As for DRC Official 1, it says that Katumba was his closest aide and
advisor. When Katumba died, Gertler sent a text message to an Och-
Ziff employee saying: “I’m fine … sad but fine … I will have to
help [DRC Official 1] much more now … tomorrow the burial will
take· place.” Again, I cannot imagine that being anyone but
Kabila––Katumba was not an aide to anyone else in the Congolese
government during this time. In private, US government officials
have confirmed this to me.

***********************************************************

The cobalt pipeline: From dangerous tunnels in Congo to consumers’
mobile tech

By Todd C. Frankel

The Washington Post

September 30, 2016

Direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/zo63cws

The sun was rising over one of the richest mineral deposits on
Earth, in one of the poorest countries, as Sidiki Mayamba got ready
for work.

Mayamba is a cobalt miner. And the red-dirt savanna stretching
outside his door contains such an astonishing wealth of cobalt and
other minerals that a geologist once described it as a “scandale
geologique.”

This remote landscape in southern Africa lies at the heart of the
world’s mad scramble for cheap cobalt, a mineral essential to the
rechargeable lithium-ion batteries that power smartphones, laptops
and electric vehicles made by companies such as Apple, Samsung and
major automakers.

But Mayamba, 35, knew nothing about his role in this sprawling
global supply chain. He grabbed his metal shovel and broken-headed
hammer from a corner of the room he shares with his wife and child.
He pulled on a dust-stained jacket. A proud man, he likes to wear a
button-down shirt even to mine. And he planned to mine by hand all
day and through the night. He would nap in the underground tunnels.
No industrial tools. Not even a hard hat. The risk of a cave-in is
constant.

“Do you have enough money to buy flour today?” he asked his wife.

She did. But now a debt collector stood at the door. The family owed
money for salt. Flour would have to wait.

Mayamba tried to reassure his wife. He said goodbye to his son. Then
he slung his shovel over his shoulder. It was time.

The world’s soaring demand for cobalt is at times met by workers,
including children, who labor in harsh and dangerous conditions. An
estimated 100,000 cobalt miners in Congo use hand tools to dig
hundreds of feet underground with little oversight and few safety
measures, according to workers, government officials and evidence
found by The Washington Post during visits to remote mines. Deaths
and injuries are common. And the mining activity exposes local
communities to levels of toxic metals that appear to be linked to
ailments that include breathing problems and birth defects, health
officials say.

The Post traced this cobalt pipeline and, for the first time, showed
how cobalt mined in these harsh conditions ends up in popular
consumer products. It moves from small-scale Congolese mines to a
single Chinese company — Congo DongFang International Mining, part
of one of the world’s biggest cobalt producers, Zhejiang Huayou
Cobalt — that for years has supplied some of the world’s largest
battery makers. They, in turn, have produced the batteries found
inside products such as Apple’s iPhones — a finding that calls into
question corporate assertions that they are capable of monitoring
their supply chains for human rights abuses or child labor.

[For continuation of this feature story: http://tinyurl.com/zo63cws]

**************************************************************

DR Congo in crisis: Can Kabila trust his own army?

September 20, 2016 by James Barnett

African Arguments

http://africanarguments.org – Direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/jopdtcy

James Barnett is currently a Boren Scholar in Tanzania, having
previously researched at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at
the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. You can follow
him on Twitter @jbar1648. All views expressed are his own.

Despite protests intensifying with outbreaks of violence and deaths,
President Joseph Kabila has yet to call on his armed forces to
maintain order. He might regret it if he did.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is in the midst of a
protracted political crisis as President Joseph Kabila manoeuvres to
stay in power past the end of his second term, which expires this
December.

Kabila’s undemocratic machinations – most notably le glissement
(‘slippage’) or delaying of elections due to “logistical” issues –
have drawn the ire of much of the population with frequent protests
and strikes rocking the country since early 2015.

Yesterday, these reached a new pitch as protesters took to the
streets, angry at Kabila’s recent efforts to promote a “national
dialogue” – a move the opposition sees as a cynical ploy to
legitimise le glissement. In Kinshasa and Goma, violence erupted as
heavily armed police confronted protesters, leading to the deaths of
at least 17 according to the government and more than 50 according
to the opposition. Four people also reportedly died when the
headquarters of three different opposition parties were burnt down
in the night.

With further protests sure to follow and the possibility of
continued violence looming large, it is worth asking why Kabila has
yet to deploy the military. The answer lies in a deep history of
mistrust.

Preferred instruments of intimidation

The DRC is among the most heavily militarised states in Africa, with
its 70,000-strong Congolese armed forces (FARDC) deployed within the
country to combat various low-intensity threats. However, thus far
it has not been the army that Kabila has called upon on to “restore
public order” but the national police (PNC), the civilian
intelligence service (ANR), and, most notably, the Republican Guard
– Kabila’s personal security outfit.

According to an October 2015 report by the UN’s Joint Human Rights
Office, there were 142 human rights violations against members of
the political opposition that year. Tellingly, 69 of these were
carried out by the PNC, 24 by the ANR, and just 9 by FARDC. The
actual number of FARDC violations is lower, however, as the report
fails to note that the Republican Guard operates outside the army’s
chain of command.

Since he came to office in 2001, Kabila has steadily built up
civilian security forces, over which he exercises direct control, at
the expense of FARDC, the loyalty and effectiveness of which are in
doubt.

He has built the PNC into a veritable paramilitary force, most
notably in the capital city and opposition stronghold of Kinshasa
where the police chief, Kabila’s longtime ally Celestin Kanyama, has
earned the moniker espirit de mort (‘spirit of death’). He has
managed to effectively purchase the ANR’s loyalty, which has its
roots in the intelligence agencies of Mobutu Sese Seko’s rule
(1965-97).

And, most crucially to the survival of his regime, Kabila has
buttressed his presidency with a disproportionately formidable
Republican Guard. Nominally a simple presidential security outfit,
the Republican Guard enjoys full-division strength and receives
superior weapons and training than FARDC. The unit’s top officers
hail from the president’s home state of Katanga, an obvious ploy to
ensure the unit’s loyalty.

The existence of a disproportionately sized and financed
presidential guard is generally considered to be indicative of a
weak security sector and poor governance, and Kabila’s Republican
Guard is no exception.

FARDC’s patronage politics

The Congolese military took its current name and structure in 2002
in the midst of the Second Congo War. As part of the Sun City
Agreement, which sought to end the conflict through a power-sharing
arrangement, the largest rebel groups were incorporated into the
armed forces, including the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma, the Ugandan-
backed RCD-Kinsangani and MLC groups, and various Mayi-Mayi ethno-
nationalist militias. In 2009 the CNDP, a formidable rebel group
formed to defend Congolese Tutsis, joined FARDC’s ranks as well.

FARDC thus acts as an instrument of political patronage to co-opt
rivals more than as a fighting force to provide security. By one
estimate, 65% of the FARDC are officers, 26% of whom are high-
ranking, creating an absurdly top-heavy organisation that begets
unnecessary bureaucracy and promotes impunity.

Combined with poor training, low pay, a critical lack of espirit de
corps, and a culture of corruption and politicisation that dates
back to independence – the Congolese military has attempted nine
coups since 1960 – the result is one of the least professional
armies in Africa.

Furthermore, despite pledging loyalty to the president, former
rebels brought into FARDC have frequently maintained separate chains
of command. The danger of this arrangement came to a head in April
2012, when former CNDP rebels defected en masse and took up arms
against the government, calling themselves the M23 movement.

With the help of the Force Intervention Brigade – the first UN
peacekeeping force in history with a strong offensive mandate –
FARDC eventually defeated the rebels in October 2013, but the
counterinsurgency highlighted strong turf wars within FARDC which
frequently hampered operational effectiveness.

Speculation remains that one of the FARDC’s most competent officers,
Col. Mamadou Ndala, was assassinated by rival commanders during the
counterinsurgency, highlighting the mistrust that permeates FARDC’s
ranks.

Wary of another rebellion, Kabila ordered a significant reshuffle of
FARDC in October 2014. The reshuffle is unlikely, however, to have
significantly tightened the president’s grip on the fractious
military. Many of those who benefited from the reshuffle were former
rebel commanders who had remained loyal to FARDC during the M23
rebellion. But these commanders sided with government not because
they felt any strong allegiance to Kabila, but rather because the
M23’s grievances were very specific to former CNDP combatants.

In the reshuffle, some of Kabila’s fellow Katangans also secured top
commands. Such moves exacerbate the debilitating patronage which
lies at the core of FARDC’s institutional weakness. Members of the
Republican Guard reportedly even threatened to stage a coup out of
disapproval of their new commander, forcing the president to hastily
reassign the general in question.

Who can restore order?

This week’s events suggest that Kabila will not be able to maintain
the status quo through half-hearted “dialogue”. This being the case,
we can expect the opposition to seek to resolve matters on the
streets through protests of a more frequent, widespread, and violent
nature than the country has heretofore experienced.

Regardless of whether Kabila can fully trust the Republican Guard
(and history from Caligula to Kabila’s late father teaches us not to
depend too heavily on bodyguards), the force would be too small to
confront a nationwide crisis, even with support from the police and
ANR. Indeed, reports indicate that in the latest round of clashes,
protestors managed to overwhelm police barricades, killing two
officers.

Kabila may thus be left with little choice but to call on the armed
forces. Such a deployment is liable to make matters worse for
everyone. Given the abysmal record of human rights abuses by FARDC
in the eastern Congo, such a deployment would almost inevitably lead
to wanton bloodshed. Given the fractious state of the Congolese
military, it could also backfire on Kabila’s regime itself.

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
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AfricaFocus Bulletin
October 18, 2016 (161018)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“Ghana is in a debt crisis. Despite having had significant amounts
of debt canceled a decade ago, the country is losing around 30% of
government revenue in external debt payments each year. Such huge
payments are only possible because Ghana has been able to take on
more loans from institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), which are used to pay the interest on debts to previous
lenders, whilst the overall size of the debt increases. ”

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/gh1610.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=
http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/gh1610.php

The downward spiral of debt, whether for individuals or for
countries, is commonly driven by loans that are risky and
unrealistic, a phenomenon for which both lenders and borrowers bear
responsibility. Structural vulnerability and misleading expectations
fuel a cycle in which interest payments increase the debt while
payments become increasingly difficult. A new report from the
Jubilee Debt Campaign, UK, with a coalition of non-governmental
organizations in Ghana, provides a clear illustration from a country
that is in many other respects a positive model for African
political and economic progress.

Nevertheless, the report documents, Ghana is again falling into a
debt trap. The causes include 1) continued dependence on primary
commodities with volatile pricing on international markets and (2)
bad judgement by both the Ghanaian government and by international
lenders pitching high-interest loans which can only be paid under
optimistic and unrealistic economic scenarios for the period of the
loan. For example, according to the report, there were three
successive $1 billion bond issues from 2013 to 2015, the latest at
an interest rate of 10.75%. Strikingly, the World Bank provided a
guarantee for the latest bond despite its own rules blocking such
risky loans.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin includes selected excerpts from the press
release, executive summary, and full report. The full report is
available at  http://tinyurl.com/zb8rm7u

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Ghana, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/ghana.php

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on debt and related issues of
international capital flows, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/intro-iff.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

“World Bank broke its own rules over high-interest loans to Ghana,”
Excerpt from Jubilee Debt Campaign, UK, press release, October 9,
2016

http://tinyurl.com/hcgx8mg

According to Sarah-Jayne Clifton, Director of the Jubilee Debt
Campaign, UK:

“The underlying causes of Ghana’s new debt crisis are that neither
borrowers nor lenders have learned from past mistakes, and that its
economy remains reliant on primary commodities, leaving it extremely
vulnerable to the recent global commodity price crash. The people of
Ghana should not have to suffer through yet another debt crisis
while lenders who speculated on their economy reap huge profits out
of high interest loans guaranteed by the World Bank.

Ghana’s debts need to be reduced or restructured to escape another
prolonged debt trap, while regulation of lending, more responsible
borrowing, and tax justice are essential to end this cycle of debt
crises once and for all.”

******************************************************

The fall and rise of Ghana’s debt : How a new debt trap has been set

October 2016

Integrated Social Development Centre Ghana, Jubilee Debt Campaign
UK, SEND Ghana, VAZOBA Ghana, All-Afrikan Networking Community Link
for International Development, Kilombo Ghana and Abibimman
Foundation Ghana.

[Full report and executive summary available for download at
http://jubileedebt.org.uk – direct URL:  http://tinyurl.com/zb8rm7u]

Executive Summary [excerpts]

Ghana is in a debt crisis. Despite having had significant amounts of
debt canceled a decade ago, the country is losing around 30% of
government revenue in external debt payments each year. Such huge
payments are only possible because Ghana has been able to take on
more loans from institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), which are used to pay the interest on debts to previous
lenders, whilst the overall size of the debt increases.

Ghana’s crisis is the result of a gradual increase in lending and
borrowing off the back of the discovery of oil and high commodity
prices. More money was then borrowed following the fall in the
price of oil and other commodities since 2013, to try to deal with
the impact of the commodity price crash, whilst the relative size
of the debt also grew because of the fall in the value of the
Ghanaian currency (the cedi) against the dollar ($).

The underlying causes of the return to a debt crisis are therefore
the continued dependence on commodity exports, as well as borrowing
and lending not being responsible enough, meaning that new debts do
not generate sufficient revenue to enable them to be repaid.

At the moment, all the costs of the crisis are being born by the
people of Ghana, and none by the lenders. This is unfair. Lenders
should carry their share of the cost of any irresponsible lending,
and of the change in circumstance caused by the fall in commodity
prices.

Additional action is also needed in order to prevent a repeat of
Ghana’s crisis, including changes on the part of the government and
lenders to ensure that loans are well used, and that more of the
revenue generated by the economy is turned into government revenue
by taxation.

Commodity dependence

Ghana’s dependence on commodities dates back to colonialism. …
[almost 60 years after independence] the country’s economy remains
dependent on the export of just three primary commodities – gold,
cocoa and now oil, which together make up over 80% of Ghana’s
exports.

Debt crisis and debt cancellation

This dependence on commodities was the central factor underlying a
debt crisis which was common to much of the global South in the
1980s and 1990s. Global commodity prices fell at the start of the
1980s, rapidly increasing the size of foreign debt payments which
could only be paid out of foreign earnings such as exports. As
commodity producers across the world expanded production in order
to pay debts, on the advice of the IMF and World Bank, commodity
prices stayed low for over 20 years.

From the mid-1990s the global Jubilee movement called for debt
cancellation, which led to the creation and enhancement of two debt
relief schemes run by the IMF and World Bank, the Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative.

As a result of this debt cancellation, Ghana’s government external
debt fell from $6.6 billion in 2003 to $2.3 billion in 2006.
Significant improvements in education and healthcare followed, due
to money being saved and invested, alongside good government
policies, enhancing basic service provision. …

Commodity and lending boom, and manufacturing decline

However, Ghana’s dependence on commodities continued, and as prices
rose, this created more willingness for lenders to give loans off
the back of a growing economy.

Gold and cocoa prices began to increase from the mid- 2000s, as part
of a global boom in primary commodity prices heavily influenced by
Chinese growth and demand, on top of continued high consumption in
rich North American, European and Asian economies. Furthermore,
Ghana discovered oil, and began to produce and export it from 2011.
Collectively these changes led to a booming economy. Between 2006
and 2013 Ghana’s GDP per person grew by 44%. However, over the same
time period the number of people living below the national poverty
line only fell by 10%, a slower rate than in the previous seven
years when growth had been far lower. The reason was that much of
the proceeds of growth went to those with the highest incomes. For
every 1 cedi increase in income for the poorest 10%, the incomes of
the richest 10% increased by more than 9 cedi.

This rapid economic growth led to an increased willingness and
desire of various institutions to lend to Ghana, with a
corresponding willingness to borrow. Loans increased steadily from
2008 to 2011. In total, between 2007 and 2015 there were $18.2
billion of external loans and $8.7 billion of debt payments,
leaving $9.5 billion of the additional borrowing to be spent within
Ghana.

There is little transparency on what the loans were used for, from
both the government and lenders. The IMF figures on public capital
formation show no relationship with the increase in lending,
suggesting that whilst some loans could have been used for
investment, the increase in lending did not lead to an increase in
investment.

One of the more transparent lenders is the World Bank. Whilst they
provide little information before loans are agreed – preventing
civil society, media and politicians from holding the government
and the World Bank to account – they do publish details during and
after projects. Our analysis of these reports shows that 25% of
outstanding debt from Ghana to the World Bank is for projects where
the World Bank judged its own performance to be less than
satisfactory.

Moreover, between May 2007 and February 2015 Ghana was assessed by
the IMF and World Bank to be at moderate risk of debt distress, and
since March 2015 of high risk. The World Bank is only meant to give
half its support to moderate-risk countries as loans, and the other
half as grants; to high-risk countries it is only meant to make
grants. Yet between May 2007 and February 2015, 93% of World Bank
funding to Ghana was in the form of loans. And since March 2015
when the World Bank was meant to stop giving Ghana loans, it has
agreed $1.16 billion of new loans or loan guarantees.

With high commodity prices and the beginning of oil production,
export revenues increased rapidly from 2008 to 2012. Yet there is
evidence that manufacturing was crowded out. As a share of GDP,
manufacturing production halved from over 10% in 2006 to 5% by
2014.

Commodity price crash and the new debt trap

A combination of the recent fall in the price of commodities and the
loans not being used well enough to ensure they could be repaid has
now pushed Ghana back into debt crisis.

In early 2013 the price of gold fell significantly, as did the price
of oil from the start of 2014. Since the start of 2013 the value of
the cedi against the dollar has fallen by 50%. This has caused the
dollar-denominated size of Ghana’s economy to fall from $47.8
billion in 2013 to $36 billion in 2015.  Because external debts are
owed in dollars or other foreign currencies, this has in turn
increased the relative size of the debt and debt payments. External
debt has grown from $14.7 billion in 2013 to $21.1 billion in 2016
(an increase of 44%), yet because of the depreciation external debt
has gone up from 30% of GDP in 2013 to an expected 56% in 2016 (an
increase of 87%). One response to these economic shocks has been
for the government to borrow more money, most visibly through $1
billion of bond issues each in 2013, 2014 and 2015, all under
English law. This money has mainly been used to make external and
domestic debt interest and principal payments, and to fund ongoing
government costs, plugging the gap created by dollar revenue being
lower than expected. Less visibly, there has also been significant
borrowing directly from external financial institutions.

The interest rates on the new debts are high, rising from 7.9% for
the 2013 bond issue to 10.75% for the October 2015 one. For the
October 2015 bond issue, the World Bank once again broke its own
rules by guaranteeing $400 million of payments if the Ghanaian
government fails to make them. The World Bank is not meant to give
such guarantees for governments assessed as at high risk of debt
distress, which Ghana had been for the previous seven months. The
high interest rate and guarantee mean that if the Ghanaian
government were to pay the interest every year until 2024, then
default on all other payments from 2025, including the principal,
the bond speculators would still have made $90 million more than if
they had lent to the US government. This means that the speculators
lent to Ghana believing that there was a high chance they would not
be fully repaid.

However, for the moment those speculators are being paid, in part
because since April 2015 the IMF has been lending more money which
is being used to meet debt payments, effectively bailing out
previous lenders. In return, the Ghanaian government has to cut
government spending and increase taxes, a process which is expected
to intensify further after the December 2016 elections. Under
current plans, government spending per person (adjusted to account
for inflation) will fall by 20% between 2012 and 2017.

The IMF estimates the Ghanaian government’s external debt payments
in 2016 will be 29% of revenue, well above the 18-22% it normally
regards as the upper limit of sustainability. Payments are expected
to stay well above 20% of revenue until at least 2035. This is only
considered possible due to a combination of very optimistic
expectations and requirements for large spending cuts and tax
increases, the very things the IMF has been criticising the
European Union for in the case of Greece.

The IMF predicts:

* Dollar GDP growth averaging 8.2% a year from now until 2035. Yet,
from 2008 to 2015 Ghana’s economy grew at less than half this rate
despite the discovery of oil. * Growth in government revenue in
line with GDP, collecting 19-21% a year. Yet, Ghana has only once
collected 19% of GDP in government revenue in a year (in 2011)
since IMF records began in 1980. …

* A fall in the average interest rate paid on external debt from
5.1% to 4.1%. Yet, interest rates on external private and
multilateral debt have been increasing, and dollar interest rates
are expected to increase as and when the US Federal Reserve
continues to raise rates. * A large primary budget surplus by 2017,
and continuing surpluses from then on. Yet, this will mean
continuing government spending cuts and tax increases, and will
take demand out of the economy, thereby reducing growth and risking
a classic debt trap where austerity leads to less growth, which in
turn increases the relative size of the debt, which leads to more
austerity and less growth, and so on.

Escapes from the trap

Debt is already placing a significant burden on Ghana’s economy and
society, and the country is at risk of falling back into an
extended debt trap, with an economic stagnation and possible
increases in poverty rates and failure to implement the Sustainable
Development Goals. Today’s crisis has resulted from a multitude of
factors: failure to diversify away from commodities, the government
and lenders failing to ensure loans were used productively enough,
falling global commodity prices, particularly gold and oil, and the
opportunism of speculators lending at high interest rates seeking
large profits.

The people of Ghana should not have to bear all the suffering of a
crisis caused by government policy, irresponsible lenders, and
global economic shocks, especially when speculators continue to
extract large profits from the country.

…

Additional excerpts from full report

Slowing progress in reducing poverty and increased inequality

During the ‘boom’ up until 2013, progress in reducing poverty slowed
down, and inequality increased.

The most recent data on poverty and inequality in Ghana comes from
the Ghana Living Standards Survey in 2013. This shows that the
number of people living in poverty fell from 7 million in 2006 to
6.3 million in 2013. The proportion of people living in poverty
fell from 31.9% to 24.2%. Poverty is defined as not having enough
income to meet all basic food and non-food needs, and was set at
1,314 cedi per adult per year for 2013 ($1,460 a year in Purchasing
Power Parity terms, 32 or $4 a day). According to a report for
Unicef, this means the average annual rate of poverty reduction
slowed to 1.1 percentage points a year from 2006 to 2013, down from
1.8 percentage points in the 1990s.

In total, the number of people living in poverty fell by 10% between
2006 and 2013. In contrast, over the same time period GDP per
person grew by 44%. In the previous seven-year period from 1999 to
2006, the number of people living in poverty fell by 14% whilst the
economy only grew by 18%. There has been an increasing divergence
between the pace of economic growth and the pace of poverty
reduction.

This divergence is because more of the financial benefits of growth
have been going to richer people. Average adult consumption for
Ghana’s richest 10% increased by 1,246 cedi between 2006 and 2013,
almost ten times more than the increase of 135 cedi for the poorest
10%. The ‘richest’ 10% is still a relative term however – the
average income of the richest 10% in 2013 of 5,789 cedi a year was
equivalent to $6,500 in Purchasing Power Parity terms. Within the
richest 10% there are still huge disparities in income and wealth.
Overall, inequality has been increasing on almost all measures (see
Table 1 below).

…

The New Debt Trap

Ghana is now at risk of entering an extended debt trap in which
government spending continues to fall with negative impacts on
poverty, inequality and economic growth, while debt stays high.
Meanwhile, high interest rates on private loans mean speculators
continue to take large profits out of the country.

The fall in oil prices from the middle of 2014 led to significant
falls in expectations of government revenue collection in Ghana, on
the part of the government, foreign speculators and the IMF. This
in turn led to sharp falls in the value of the cedi against the
dollar, thus increasing the relative size of debt payments.

Meanwhile, external debt payments began to increase from 2012 as
interest payments needed to be made on the recently taken out
private external debt, whilst interest and principal payments on
the multilateral and bilateral loans increased because of the
increase in such debts, and because grace periods 80 on loans given
after HIPC and MDRI came to an end (see Graph 14 below).

Initially these increased debt payments were met by more borrowing
of both external and domestic debt. In addition, in April 2015, an
agreement was reached with the IMF for $930 million of loans from
2015 to 2018, all of which are effectively being used to help meet
debt  payments, including the interest to private speculators.
These have been added to by other similar loans from the World Bank
and African Development Bank.

…

Projections beyond 2017.

The IMF is only able to predict that Ghana will be able to keep
paying its debt by making very optimistic predictions about the
future.

The IMF and World Bank DSA projects that external debt service will
continue to stay high for many years, still being almost one-
quarter of government revenue in 2035. However, it also projects
that overall external debt and total public debt will gradually
fall as a percentage of GDP. This assumes that growth in GDP
measured in dollars is high, averaging over 8% in nominal terms. It
also assumes there is a primary surplus every year, from a height
of 2.3% of GDP in 2017 to 0.9% by 2025 and 0.1% in 2035.

However, the predictions for dollar-GDP growth in the DSA have
already proven over-optimistic compared to the more recent April
IMF World Economic Outlook for 2016 and 2017, which, as noted
above, indicates that external debt will continue to rise.

The only way the IMF can predict Ghana’s debt will keep being paid
is by assuming:

* high growth in dollar GDP, averaging 8.2% a year

* the government collecting around 19-21% of GDP in revenue every
year, ie, revenue growing in line with GDP

* a fall in the average interest rate paid on external debt from
5.1% to 4.1% over the medium term

* a large primary surplus by 2017 of 2.3%, and continual surpluses
after, albeit at a falling proportion of GDP

Any significant failure in these assumptions could cause debt to
increase further out of control, ultimately costing the people of
Ghana more if it continues to be paid. Yet all of these assumptions
are either optimistic or require significant sacrifices.

…

Escapes from the debt trap

Urgent action is needed to ensure Ghana does not fall into a debt
trap in which government spending continues to fall with negative
impacts for poverty, inequality and economic growth, while debt
stays high.

To avoid this trap debt payments need to be cut. At the moment, all
the costs from irresponsible lending and borrowing, and the decline
in oil and other commodity prices, are falling on the people of
Ghana, and none of them on the lenders. Below we make
recommendations on how the debt trap can be avoided through lenders
sharing in the burden of failed lending and the external economic
shock of falling commodity prices.

In addition, to prevent this trap being created again, there needs
to be greater transparency and accountability in relation to debt
on the part of the government of Ghana and lenders, tax justice to
ensure that more of the revenue generated in Ghana stays in the
country and is available for social spending and public investment,
and a reorientation of the Ghanaian economy away from reliance on
primary commodities.

Below are proposals which we believe the government, political
parties and lenders should discuss with civil society both before
and after the elections in December 2016.

Conduct a debt audit

In this report we have attempted to identify how much debt there is,
who the loans were given by, what they were for and on what terms.
However, the lack of transparency with many loans means this is
difficult to do and much information is not publicly available.
Both the government and all lenders should release details of how
much is owed, to whom, on what terms, and what the money was meant
to be used for (if specified). This could be done through
establishing an independent debt audit commission.

…

Make lending and borrowing more productive and accountable

Ghana’s debt has increased rapidly without it being clear what the
loans were for, and how projects they were funding were being
monitored and evaluated.

…

Make adjustment fair

Any reduction in debt payments from measures below will help prevent
Ghana getting further stuck in a debt trap. But government finances
will still need to be improved to ensure sustainable finances which
allow poverty and inequality to be reduced and the Sustainable
Development Goals to be met.

The Ghanaian government should:

* Protect all vital public spending, such as on healthcare and
education, social services and welfare protections, and key
economic infrastructure.

* Increase tax revenues from large companies and rich individuals,
including by ceasing to grant tax waivers, including for public-
private partnership projects, and increasing the capacity of tax
collection authorities to ensure existing laws relating to issues
such as transfer mispricing are implemented.

…

Hold a debt conference

The change in oil price means that Ghana cannot make debt payments
wthout significant cuts in vital government expenditure, high
economic growth and continued high borrowing. It is unfair for the
suffering caused by the change in global economic conditions to be
born entirely by the people of Ghana and none by the lenders.

The Ghanaian government could call a conference of all its creditors
to negotiate the debt down to a level consistent with meeting the
Sustainable Development Goals. A UN body such as UNCTAD could be
contracted to advise on what a sustainable level of debt would be.
Negotiations have been held between the government and local banks
and some power sector debts, 98 but a much more comprehensive
approach is now needed across external debt.

…

Default or threaten to default on some of the debt

The Ghanaian government could stop paying some or all of the debt.
For most if not all creditors, it is the threat (or reality) of not
paying which will incentivise them to renegotiate the terms of the
debt. For instance, if some lenders did not respond to requests for
a debt conference, threatening to default or defaulting could make
them more willing to do so. Defaults on different types of debt
come with different implications which we discuss below.

…

Cancel unjust debts

The details of many loans are unknown, so no assessment can yet be
made of how well the money was spent and how responsibly the
lenders acted to ensure it was invested well. However, this report
has uncovered that the World Bank broke its own rules by disbursing
93% of its money to Ghana as loans when it should have been giving
half grants and half loans. Furthermore, at least $540 million of
debt owed to the World Bank is for projects where the World Bank
itself has said its performance was less than satisfactory (25% of
debt where there is an assessment).

…

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
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mentioned. For a full archive and other resources, see
http://www.africafocus.org

AfricaFocus Bulletin
October 11, 2016 (161011)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“The high proportion of immigrants with criminal records who are
targeted for immigration enforcement is the result of an intentional
and pervasive reliance on the machinery of the criminal enforcement
system to identify people for deportation. The criminal enforcement
system–each stage of which has been shown to target Black people
disproportionately–has become a funnel into the immigration
detention and deportation system. ” – The State of Black Immigrants
2016

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/migr1610.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=
http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/migr1610.php

A report from the Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI) and
the Immigrant Rights Clinic, New York University School of Law,
released in September, provides new well-documented data and policy
analysis on Black immigrants in the United States, primarily
Caribbean and African immigrants. Based on the latest available
statistical data and a careful analysis of migration policies and
their implementation, this report is a basic resource for scholars
and for activists. It includes an informative and detailed glossary
that is essential for those of us who are not specialists in
immigration law and related issues.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains brief excerpts. The full report,
including footnotes, tables, and more detailed analysis and specific
policy recommendations, is available in two parts on-line in pdf
format (http://tinyurl.com/jvaqolo and http://tinyurl.com/jzg9d97).

Two recent articles with related reflections on African immigrants
in the United States are:

“Intersecting Criminalization: What Killed Ugandan Refugee Alfred
Olango,” Michelle Chen, Truthout, October 6, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/h3y6vhg

“African immigrants and race in America,” Anakwa Dwamena, Africa is
a Country, October 9, 2016 http://tinyurl.com/j2z2wvj

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on migration issues, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/migrexp.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

The State of Black Immigrants

Black Alliance for Just Immigration

Immigrant Rights Clinic, New York University School of Law

Juliana Morgan-Trostle, Kexin Zheng, and Carl Lipscombe

[Brief excerpts only: full text available at
http://tinyurl.com/jvaqolo (Part I) and http://tinyurl.com/jzg9d97
(Part II)]

Introduction

In an era where #BlackLivesMatter and #Not1More have become rallying
cries for racial justice and immigrants’ rights activists
respectively, it’s important that we uplift the common challenges
that cross both movements – mass incarceration, policing, immigrant
detention, deportations, deprivation of civil rights and civil
liberties, economic inequality, and the destruction of families and
communities. These problems are prevalent in all communities of
color in the U.S. But unlike Black Americans and immigrants of other
backgrounds, Black immigrants face the aforementioned challenges in
ways that are unique and consequential.

For over a decade, the Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI)
has sought to raise the public consciousness around issues impacting
Black immigrants through education, advocacy, grassroots organizing,
and storytelling. Despite our successes, which include consolidating
Black immigrant power and mobilizing the Black diaspora around the
human rights issues that transcend our communities, Black Americans
and Black immigrants remain at the margins of society.

When it comes to Black immigrants, terms such as “marginalization”
and “oppression” understate the difficulties faced by this
community. Simply put, Black immigrants are invisible. They are
absent from the mainstream and media representation of immigrants.
Their narratives are merged with the stories of other communities of
color in the United States. Research and readily available data on
Black immigrants is scant.

Even the notion of “Black immigrants” as an identity group is
foreign to most. For this reason, we recognized that any research
report about Black immigrants – and this report in particular – must
serve two purposes: (1) to provide basic demographic information
about Black immigrants and (2) to highlight the unique social and
economic challenges facing this immigrant group.

This report confirms our hypothesis: Black immigrants, one of the
fastest growing demographic groups in the U.S., face a myriad of
challenges that parallel those of Black Americans. While this report
is substantive, it is only the beginning. Our hope is that we will
be able to build on the body of research available on the Black
immigrant experience in the U.S. and that this report, in particular
the recommendations toward the end, will lay the groundwork for a
Black immigrant policy agenda over the coming years.

**************************************************************

Part I: A Statistical Portrait of Black Immigrants in the United
States

The last four decades have represented a period of significant
demographic change in the United States. Now more than ever, Black
immigrants compose a significant percentage of both immigrant and
Black populations in the U.S. overall. This report presents a
statistical snapshot of the Black immigrant population, drawing upon
recent studies and original analysis.

I. Size and Growth of Black Immigrant Population

Size and growth of the overall population.

The number of Black immigrants in the United States has increased
remarkably in recent decades. Population data on Black immigrants is
difficult to ascertain, as the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services does not track immigration data by race. Some studies
suggest that there are as many as 5 million Black immigrants in the
U.S. According to our analysis of the 2014 American Community Survey
(ACS) data, a record estimate of 3.7 million Black immigrants live
in the United States. While this analysis is conservative, it still
represents a four-fold increase when compared to the number of Black
immigrants who lived in the U.S. in 1980 (which was only about
800,000) and a 54% increase from 2000 (roughly 2.8 million).

Percentage of Black population.

The overall growth of the Black immigrant population represents a
significant change in the demographics of both the Black population
and the immigrant population more broadly in the United States.
First, Black immigrants represent an increasing percentage of Black
people in the United States as a whole. The ACS data shows that
while Black immigrants accounted for only 3.1% of the Black
population in the U.S. in 1980, Black immigrants now account for
nearly 10% of the nation’s Black population. This growth is
particularly significant in states with the largest number of Black
immigrants. For example in New York, Black immigrants make up almost
30% of the total Black population in the state, making it the top
state for Black immigrants in the U.S. Florida seconds the list with
over 20% of its Black population being foreign-born. The Census
Bureau projects that by 2060, 16.5% of America’s Black population
will be foreign-born.

Percentage of the foreign-born population.

Second, Black immigrants make up a significant portion of the
overall immigrant and non-citizen population in the U.S. According
to the 2014 one-year estimates from ACS, the estimated total of
foreign-born population in the U.S. was 42 million, within which
8.7% were Black immigrants. In addition, about 22 million of the
U.S. foreign-born population were non-citizens, among whom 7.2% were
Black.

II. Characteristics of the Black Immigrant Population

Diversity based on country or region of origin.

While Black immigrants in the U.S. come from diverse backgrounds and
regions of the world, immigrants from African and Caribbean
countries comprise the majority of the foreign-born Black
population. According to the 2014 ACS data, Jamaica was the top
country of origin in 2014 with 665,628 Black immigrants in the U.S.,
accounting for 18% of the national total. Haiti seconds the list
with 598,000 Black immigrants, making up 16% of the U.S. Black
immigrant population.

Although half of Black immigrants are from the Caribbean region
alone, African immigrants drove much of the recent growth of the
Black immigrant population and made up 39% of the total foreign-
born Black population in 2014. The number of African immigrants in
the U.S. increased 153%, from 574,000 in 2000 to 1.5 million in
2014, with Nigeria and Ethiopia as the two leading countries of
origin. Besides African and Caribbean regions, an estimated 4% of
Black immigrants are from South America, another 4% are from Central
America, 2% are from Europe and 1% from Asia.

Length of residency in the U.S.

Black immigrants tend to have lived in the U.S. for long periods of
time, although there are some regional differences in length of
residency. As more African immigrants are recent arrivals, those
from the Caribbean have generally lived in the U.S. longer. …

Geographic dispersion in the U.S.

The geographic dispersion of Black immigrants is highly
concentrated. New York State is home to 846,730 (23%) Black
immigrants, making it the top state of residence. Florida has the
second largest foreign-born Black population (18%), followed by
Texas (6%) and Maryland (6%). Some Black immigrant communities tend
to cluster together around certain metropolitan areas. For example,
according to the Pew study of 2013 ACS data, New York City is home
to nearly 40% of all foreign-born black Jamaicans in the U.S.; Miami
has the nation’s largest Haitian immigrant community; Washington
D.C. has the largest Ethiopian immigrant community; and Somalian
immigrants concentrate in metropolitan areas of Minnesota and
Wisconsin.

III. Educational Background of Black Immigrants

A significant percentage of Black immigrants have obtained degrees
through higher education, but the percentage remains lower than the
U.S. population as a whole. According to the ACS 2014 data, more
than a quarter (27%) of Black immigrants age 25 and older have a
bachelor’s degree or higher, three points below the percentage of
the overall U.S. population. However, the proportion with an
advanced degree is similar among all Americans (11%) and Black
immigrants (10%). When comparing Black immigrants with Asian and
Hispanic immigrants, the differences are more apparent. About 30% of
Asian immigrants age 25 and older have completed at least a four-
year degree, whereas only 11% of Hispanic immigrants have done so.
Within Black immigrants, educational attainment also varies among
different regions of birth. About 34% of African immigrants age 25
and older have at least a bachelor’s degree, including 14% with an
advanced degree. In comparison, only 6.2% of Caribbean immigrants
age 25 and older have an advanced degree. Nonetheless, education
attainment for Black immigrants from Africa is still lower than
those from Europe and Asia, with 16.7% and 18.6% of them have an
advanced degree respectively.

IV. Economic Snapshot of Black Immigrants Household income.

Black immigrants have a lower median annual household income than
the median U.S. household and all immigrants in the U.S. Based on
the Pew study of ACS 2013 data, the median annual household income
for foreign-born blacks was $43,800. That’s roughly $8,000 less than
the $52,000 median for American households and $4,200 less than that
of all U.S. immigrants. While the median household income for Black
immigrants is higher than it is for Hispanic immigrants ($38,000),
both groups’ numbers are substantially below that of Asian
immigrants, whose median household income is $70,600. …

According to a 2011 study by the Economic Policy Institute,
Caribbean women earn 8.3% less than U.S. born non-Hispanic white
women; African women earn 10.1% less. When we consider subsets of
Black immigrants, the differences become even more dramatic. For
example, Haitian women earn 18.6% less than U.S. born non-Hispanic
white women.

Similarly, Black immigrant men earn lower wages than U.S. born non-
Hispanic white men. Caribbean men earn 20.7% less than U.S. born
non-Hispanic white men and African men 34.7%. Notably, as of 2011
Black immigrant men also earned lower wages than African American
males. While earnings for Caribbean men were just 1% less than those
of African-Americans, African men earned nearly 15% less than US
Born Black men.

Black Immigrants in the Workforce.

Black immigrants are more likely to participate in the labor force
than the overall immigrant population. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics reports that 70.8% of Black immigrants participate in the
civilian labor force.

Black immigrants maintain higher rates of employment in service and
sales positions than their counterparts of other immigrant
backgrounds. Other areas of employment for Black immigrants include
management, finance, and construction.

Unionization.

The percentage of unionized Black immigrants has nearly doubled over
the last 20 years from 7% in 1994 to 15.4% in 2015. Black immigrants
are more likely than Black Americans to be unionized. 16.9% of Black
immigrants are union members, compared to 13.8% of Black Americans.
Unionization has proven to have a positive impact on the livelihood
of Black workers. On average Black union members, earn nearly $7
more per hour than non-union Black workers. 71.4% of Black union
members have employer-provided health care, compared to 47.7% of
non-union Black workers. 61.6% of Black union members have employer-
sponsored retirement plans, compared to 38.2% of non-union Black
workers.

V. Immigration Status and Means of Entry

The majority of Black immigrants are living in the U.S. with formal
immigration authorization. According to a Pew study, about 84% of
the Black immigrant population are living in the U.S. with
authorization. This section of the report presents details about
Black immigrants by immigration status.

A. Undocumented Community Members

When compared with the overall share of undocumented immigrants in
the country–about a quarter of the total immigrant population–
Black immigrants are less likely to be in the U.S. unlawfully. An
estimated 575,000 Black immigrants were living in the U.S. without
authorization in 2013, according to the Pew Research Center study,
making up 16% of all Black immigration population. Among Black
immigrants from the Caribbean, 16% are undocumented immigrants and
as are 13% of Black immigrants from Africa. …

When compared with the increase of undocumented immigrant population
from other regions of the world, African and Caribbean unauthorized
immigrants are growing at a lower rate since 2000 than those from
Central America (194% without Mexico) and Asia (202%), but faster
than those from South America (39%) and Europe (62%).

************************************************

Part II: Black Immigrants in the Mass Criminalization System

I. Targeting Immigrants with Criminal Convictions

“Good” vs. “Bad” Migrants

In creating a “good” versus “bad” migrant binary, President Obama
sought to justify a detention and removal campaign that oversaw the
deportation of a record 438,421 immigrants in fiscal year 2013 –an
increase that has led some to refer to President Obama as “deporter-
in-chief.” Since the start of Obama’s administration in 2008, 2.9
million immigrants have been deported from the United States, a
majority of whom (58%) have a criminal record.

“Felons” vs. “Families”

In a national address in November 2014, President Obama announced
that he would focus immigration enforcement resources on individuals
with criminal records–“felons, not families.” This phrase has been
widely criticized as devaluing and dehumanizing individuals with
criminal convictions. After all, “felons” have families, too.

Anti-Blackness

The government’s increasing focus on immigrants with criminal
records disproportionately impacts Black immigrants, who are more
likely than immigrants from other regions to have criminal
convictions, or at least to be identified through interactions with
local law enforcement, because of rampant racial profiling.

Tougher Enforcement

President Obama’s address to the nation coincided with the
Department of Homeland Security’s release of a memo outlining new
immigration enforcement priorities. DHS noted that it would continue
to prioritize national security, border security, and public safety,
and went on to rank certain classes of immigrants in order of
enforcement priority, with a significant focus on targeting people
with criminal records.

Intensification of ICE Removals

Following the November 2014 DHS memo, ICE implemented the revised
Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities (CIEP) in FY 2015, which
intensified the focus on removing people with criminal convictions
and recent entrants. The highest priority for enforcement resources,
known as “Priority 1,” groups together immigrants “engaged in or
suspected of terrorism or espionage” along with individuals
“apprehended at the border while attempting to unlawfully enter the
United States.” This includes asylum seekers, immigrants convicted
of a felony offense and immigrants convicted of an “aggravated
felony” as defined in section 101(a) (43) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. The term “aggravated felony” includes offenses that
are neither aggravated nor felonies and has been expanded over time
to include, for example, a single theft offense with a suspended
one-year sentence involving no actual jail time. The memo’s second-
highest priority for detention and deportation, “Priority 2,”
includes immigrants convicted of three or more misdemeanor offenses,
individuals with a “significant misdemeanor” including drug
“distribution” offenses, and people who entered the United States
unlawfully after January 1, 2014. The final category, “Priority 3,”
includes immigrants who were ordered deported after January 1, 2014.
ICE continues to remove individuals who do not fall under these
revised categories if their removal would serve an important
“federal interest.”

Blacks are Disproportionately Represented in the Criminal
Enforcement System

Black people are far more likely than any other population to be
arrested, convicted, and imprisoned in the U.S. criminal enforcement
system–the system upon which immigration enforcement increasingly
relies. Black people are arrested at 2.5 times the rate of whites.
They are more likely than whites to be sentenced to prison, and less
likely to be sentenced to probation. According to the FBI Criminal
Justice Information Services Division, of the total individuals
arrested in 2014, 69.4% were white, 27.8% were Black or African
American, and 3% were of another race. These arrest rates
demonstrate that Black and African American individuals are arrested
at a higher rate than their overall percentage in the population.
These disparities exist even when crime rates are the same; for
example, although Blacks and whites use marijuana at roughly equal
rates, Black people are 3.7 times more likely than whites to be
arrested for marijuana possession.

Targeting Immigrants with Criminal Records

Despite racial disparities in criminal enforcement, the federal
government prioritizes the deportation and detention of individuals
with criminal records. In FY 2015, ICE deported 139,368 people with
criminal convictions, which represented 59% of all ICE removals. The
percentage of people targeted for deportation by ICE based on their
criminal records rose from 82% in FY 2013 to 91% in FY 2015. Many of
their records involved drug-related convictions. In FY 2003-2013,
drug offenses, including simple drug possession, accounted for
almost a quarter of all criminal removals.

Three federal agencies are tasked with enforcing immigration laws:
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS).

Although immigration law is federal, the U.S. government has
instructed state and local law enforcement agencies to assist with
immigration enforcement.

The high proportion of immigrants with criminal records who are
targeted for immigration enforcement is the result on an intentional
and pervasive reliance on the machinery of the criminal enforcement
system to identify people for deportation. The criminal enforcement
system–each stage of which has been shown to target Black people
disproportionately–has become a funnel into the immigration
detention and deportation system.

Stops

Immigrants are exposed to more risks and vulnerability when they are
stopped by the police for minor offenses, such as broken taillights
and traffic violations. When the police decide to take on the duties
of federal immigration enforcement, they often use these stops to
question people about their immigration status and to turn
immigrants over to ICE. Several federal programs have made it easier
for police to expose immigrants with past criminal records.

Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the
Department of Homeland Security to partner with state and local law
enforcement agencies. The 287(g) Program’s Jail Enforcement Teams
interview arrestees regarding their immigration status. … The
National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP) was established on
January 25, 2002. Immediately following the events of September 11,
2001, the Justice Department increased efforts to deport immigrants
with old removal orders.  … Many individuals identified and
deported through this program lived in the United States for many
years and have significant family and community ties. NFOP also
dispatches Fugitive Operations Teams (FOTs) across the country to
arrest “fugitives” and specifically focuses on “residential
operations.” In late 2006, FOTs began conducting raids more
aggressively and demanding document checks on long-distance buses
and trains. They also arrest people on the streets, in their homes,
and at their workplaces if they cannot produce status documents. FOT
practices have been challenged, especially for home raids, based on
the lack of judicial warrants or probable cause. The program was
still in effect at the time of this report’s publication.

Arrests

When an individual is arrested and booked by a police officer, his
or her fingerprints are sent to the FBI. Through the Priority
Enforcement Program (PEP), state and local law enforcement agencies
share data with immigration enforcement. PEP replaced its
predecessor program, Secure Communities, in July 2015. Under PEP,
this same information is sent to the Department of Homeland
Security, which checks its own databases to determine whether the
individual is a “priority for removal” as described in Secretary Jeh
Johnson’s November 20, 2014 memorandum. ICE will then ask the law
enforcement agency to notify ICE of the individual’s release–or
detain the individual past the time that he or she otherwise would
have been released–so ICE may pick the individual up, resulting in
his or her immediate transfer to ICE custody. …

Many jails and prisons also participate in the Criminal Alien
Program (CAP), which seeks to identify, arrest, and deport
individuals who are incarcerated in federal, state, and local
prisons and jails, as well as “at-large criminal aliens that have
circumvented identification.” Law enforcement agencies notify ICE’s
office of Detention and Removal Operations, which administers CAP,
of foreign-born detainees in their custody. ICE then attempts to
secure their final orders of removal before they are released from
criminal custody.

The programs described in this section employ the use of
“detainers,” also known as “immigration holds,” to facilitate ICE’s
capture of the immigrants that the agency identifies. Detainer use
peaked in March 2011 and then fell steadily; however, it stabilized
as of October 2015, with ICE issuing approximately 7,000 detainers
per month. …

Criminal Charges and Disposition

Immigration enforcement is increasingly present in local jails.
Often, an ICE officer will try to interview noncitizens while in
custody and then initiate paperwork for the removal process if an
individual is determined to be deportable. After an individual or
person charged with a crime, he or she may be confronted with a
choice to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Immigrants are
particularly vulnerable to guilty pleas that may later lead to
removal proceedings. …

A criminal conviction could trigger mandatory detention, deportation
and ineligibility to reenter the United States. It may also serve as
a bar to U.S. citizenship, eligibility to obtain a green card, and
various forms of relief from deportation, such as asylum or
withholding of removal. A conviction will remain permanently in an
individual’s immigration file unless it can be “vacated,” that is
removed, by a judge on the basis of some error in the underlying
criminal proceeding.

Post-Conviction

Serving a sentence may result in further immigration scrutiny or
even removal prior to release. The Institutional Removal Program
(IRP) is a nationwide Department of Homeland Security initiative
that purports to identify removable immigrants who are incarcerated,
ensure they are not released into the community, and remove them
upon completion of sentences. IRP has the effect of forcing
incarcerated noncitizens into deportation proceedings from within
the very prisons to which they are confined, often in the form of
“video hearings” that take place from a room within prison. As a
result, inmates are isolated from all other parties, including the
judge, the prosecutor, the interpreter, witnesses, and sometimes
even their own lawyer. …

IV. Recommendations

W e have concluded from the overwhelming amount of data that the
racialized criminalization evident in the immigration enforcement
system has an acute impact on the state of Black immigrants in the
U.S.. This result is partially due to discriminatory policing
practices and criminal penalties that adversely affect all Black
people. Simultaneously, our analysis of the data suggests that
racial inequities, evidenced by disproportionate, negative outcomes
for Black people, in removal proceedings, also persist in the
immigration enforcement system.

It is the Black Alliance for Just Immigration’s view that the
immigration system must be upended and redesigned to ensure that
those entering the U.S. seeking work, refuge or reunification with
their families and communities, are treated fairly and with dignity.
This transformation can begin by divorcing the U.S. mass
criminalization and immigration enforcement regimes. For this
reason, the repeal of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (“IIR-IRA”) and Anti-terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), commonly known as the “1996 immigration
laws,” in favor of policies that shift the focus away from criminal
contact as the deciding factor as it pertains to one’s immigration
status in the US by Congress, is BAJI’s primary policy
recommendation.

The 1996 immigration laws expanded the grounds for deportation,
broadened classes of mandatory detention, stripped away judicial
discretion and the right to due process and retroactively punished
those who already served time for their offenses. As this report has
highlighted, Black immigrants have been disproportionately affected
by these laws. The 20th anniversary of IIR-IRA and AEDPA, along with
the current political climate, presents an opportunity to
reinvigorate the movement to upend the nation’s immigration
enforcement system.

V. Conclusion

Just as African-Americans suffer disproportionately high arrest,
prosecution and incarceration rates, so too are Black immigrants.
This occurs despite no evidence that they engage in more
criminalized activities in comparison to any other racial group.
Black immigrants are also disproportionately impacted by the
compounding impact of the immigration enforcement system. Numerous
federal agencies and programs work in conjunction with local law
enforcement to criminalize, detain and deport immigrants. The racism
present in the criminal legal system spills over and informs the
immigration enforcement system, and thus it naturally and unjustly
targets Black immigrants at all stages of the process. As the number
of Black immigrants living in the United States continues to rise,
debates around immigration must acknowledge and rectify the
injustice inherent in these enforcement and deportation systems.

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
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particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
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West Africa/Europe: Toxic Fuels for African Markets

AfricaFocus Bulletin
October 4, 2016 (161004)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

European commodity trading companies in Switzerland, using petroleum
‘blending’ plants in the Netherlands and Belgium, are exporting
toxic fuels to Africa in large quantity. “Their business model,”
according to a new report from the Swiss organization Public Eye,
“relies on an illegitimate strategy of deliberately lowering the
quality of fuels in order to increase their profits. Using a common
industry practice called blending, trading companies mix cheap but
toxic intermediate petroleum products to make what the industry
calls ‘African Quality’ fuels.”

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/dd1610.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
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The findings come from a three-year study by Public Eye (formerly
the Berne Declaration), in which researchers collected and analyzed
samples of fuel from petrol stations in eight countries: Angola,
Benin, the Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali,
Senegal and Zambia. The problem is particularly intense in West
Africa, which imports half its refined petroleum products despite
being a significant producer of crude oil.

The full 164-page investigative report is available on the Public
Eye website (https://www.publiceye.ch/en/campaigns/dirtydiesel/),
with extensive background material, audiovisual resources, and a
petition targeting the key Swiss companies involved, linked to
campaigns in the West African countries affected. This AfricaFocus
Bulletin contains excerpts, including the executive summary.

The fuels exported from the “ARA Hub” of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and
Antwerp, which supplies approximately half of fuel exports to West
Africa, include diesel with sulphur content “at least 100 times the
European standard.”

The Public Eye campaign in Switzerland, called “Return to Sender,”
calls for African governments to set stringent fuel quality
standards, for Swiss trading companies to stop abusing the current
weak standards, and for European governments to prohibit the export
of any health-damaging fuels that would not be allowed under their
own domestic standards. See, in particular, the short video and
other resources at
https://www.dirtydiesel.ch/en/campaign/?section=intro

This expose of trade in “African Quality” fuels is one of the most
dramatic illustrations of structural environmental racism at the
international level. It is also a clear illustration of why
combating such abuses effectively requires an international
response.

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on environmental issues, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/intro-env.php

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

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Dirty Diesel. How Swiss Traders Flood Africa with Toxic Fuels

A Public Eye Investigation, September 2016.

http://www.publiceye.ch

by Marc Guéniat, Marietta Harjono, Andreas Missbach, Gian-Valentino
Viredaz

[Public Eye (formerly the Berne Declaration) is a non-profit,
independent Swiss organisation with around 25,000 members. Public
Eye has been campaigning for more equitable relations between
Switzerland and underprivileged countries for more than forty years.
Among its most important concerns are the global safeguarding of
human rights, the socially and ecologically responsible conduct of
business enterprises and the promotion of fair economic relations.]

Executive summary

Swiss commodity trading companies take advantage of weak fuel
standards in Africa to produce, deliver and sell diesel and
gasoline, which is damaging to people’s health. Their business model
relies on an illegitimate strategy of deliberately lowering the
quality of fuels in order to increase their profits. Using a common
industry practice called blending, trading companies mix cheap but
toxic intermediate petroleum products to make what the industry
calls “African Quality” fuels. These intermediate products contain
high levels of sulphur as well as other toxic substances such as
benzene and aromatics. By selling such fuels at the pump in Africa,
the traders increase outdoor air pollution, causing respiratory
disease and premature death. This affects West Africa, in
particular, because this is the region where the authorised levels
of sulphur in fuels remain very high. West Africa does not have the
refining capacity to produce enough gasoline and diesel for its own
consumption, and so it must import the majority of its fuels from
Europe and the US, where fuel standards are strict.

Fuels have been on the agenda for some time already. Beginning in
2002, the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) conducted a ten-year
campaign that led in most countries to a ban on lead in gasoline.
However, fuels still account for other severe health issues. The
issue of sulphur content must be urgently addressed.

This report is the result of three years of research by Public Eye
(formerly the Berne Declaration). It highlights the contribution by
the commodity trading industry to outdoor air pollution in Africa
and the related health effects.

The Issue: Sulphur, A Ticking Bomb that Needs Defusing

African mega-cities such as Lagos or Dakar already have worse air
quality than Beijing. Rapid urbanisation, the growing numbers of
cars, and the poor quality of these cars, which are mostly second
hand, partly explains the worsening air pollution in African cities.

The crucial factor though is that most African countries still
permit the use of high-sulphur diesel and gasoline. On average,
African sulphur limits in diesel are 200 times above the European
limit, in some countries this figure is as high as 1,000.

Sulphur in fuels is crucial to air pollution because of its direct
health-damaging effects but also because it destroys emissions
control technologies in vehicles. As long as fuel sulphur content
remains so high, any efforts to reduce air pollution (for example,
by modernising Africa’s car fleet) will be in vain. Without rapid
and meaningful improvements in fuel quality, traffic-related air
pollution will soon be a major health issue (see chapter 3).
Respiratory diseases such as asthma, chronic obstructive lung
diseases, lung cancer and cardiovascular diseases will rise.

On the other hand the use of ultra-low sulphur fuels (10 parts per
million [ppm] sulphur) would immediately halve the emissions of
pollutants. If done together with the introduction of cars that use
existing emissions control technologies, the emission of pollutants
could be reduced by 99 percent.

The Players: The Swiss Trading Companies

The fuel business in Africa is very opaque. Over the past decade,
important shifts have happened, almost unnoticed. As oil majors
pulled out from Africa’s retail business, Swiss trading companies
moved in, expanding downstream to control key as sets such as
storage facilities and hundreds of petrol stations across Africa
(see chapter 4). Hidden from view by operating behind the Shell and
Puma Energy brands, two big Swiss trading companies Vitol and
Trafigura, together with smaller Swiss companies, have a dominant
position in the import and distribution of petroleum products in
many African countries, especially in West Africa. Other
heavyweights, namely Glencore, Mercuria and Gunvor, that don’t own
petrol station networks, are equally important in supplying African
markets. To access markets and increase their market share, they
often rely on dodgy local door-openers or other politically exposed
persons (see chapter 5).

The Test: Sampling at the Pump

Public Eye tested fuels sold at the pump by Swiss trading companies
(see chapter 6). Countries were selected based on their weak fuel
standards and on the presence of petrol stations owned by Swiss
trading companies. We analysed samples from eight coun tries:
Angola, Benin, the Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire,
Mali, Senegal and Zambia. The trading companies sampled were
Trafigura (operating through Puma, Pumangol, Gazelle trading, UBI),
Vitol (Vivo Energy with Shell brand), Addax & Oryx Group (Oryx) and
Lynx Energy (X-Oil).

More than two thirds of the diesel samples (17 out of 25) had a
sulphur level higher than 1,500 ppm, which is 150 times the European
limit of 10 ppm. The highest level of sulphur was in a diesel sample
from one of Oryx’s petrol stations in Mali, where the sulphur
content was 3,780 ppm. Almost half of the gasoline samples (10 out
of 22) have a sulphur level between 15 and 72 times the European
limit of 10 ppm. Worryingly, we also detected other health damaging
substances in concentrations that would never be allowed in a
European or US fuel. These substances include polyaromatics
(diesel), aromatics and benzene (gasoline). In a number of samples,
we found traces of metals that would also contribute to higher
emissions of pollutants and damage car engines too.

The Context: Toxic Fuels Brought to Africa

West Africa is a significant producer of crude oil. But due to its
lack of refining capacity, the region must import roughly half of
its diesel and gasoline, which is high in sulphur, mostly from
Europe and the US.

Around 50 percent of the fuels imported to West Africa come from
Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Antwerp, collectively known as the “ARA”
region (see chapter 8). Trade statistics show 80 percent of the
diesel exported from ARA to Africa has sulphur content at least 100
times above the European standard. This figure soared to an average
90 percent for West Africa, with Ghana (93 percent), Guinea (100
percent), Senegal (82 percent), Nigeria (84 percent) and Togo (96
percent) receiving the biggest volumes.

Based on specific cargoes, official documents from Ghana show that,
in both 2013 and 2014, diesel imports contained sul phur levels
extremely close to the legal limit. This all happened even as
specifications were changed between 2013 and 2014. This shows how
trading companies are able quickly to adapt to new standards,
sticking as close as possible to the limit (see chapter 7). Swiss
trading companies play a major role in transporting fuel from the
ARA region, and from the US, to West Africa. In the case of Ghana,
these companies delivered most of the known high sulphur cargoes in
2013 and 2014.

The Business: Blending Fuels

Contrary to what most people might think, fuels such as diesel or
gasoline tend not to come straight from refineries. Instead, the
refineries produce intermediate products, which are then mixed
together, occasionally with intermediate products from other sources
(such as the chemical industry). This process is called “blending”
(see chapter 9). To make matters more com plex, different types of
refineries produce different intermediate products or “blendstocks”.

Gasoline is always a blended product because vehicle engines require
a particular mix, which usually consists of between six and ten
blendstocks. By contrast, diesel does not need to be blended.
However, since blending is a profitable activity and since
refineries do not produce enough diesel by them selves, diesel is
also blended. It usually consists of between four and six
blendstocks.

Blending does not require a huge infrastructure. A few pipes and
tanks are usually enough to prepare a specific blend of diesel or
gasoline. It can be done in tank terminals, onboard ships, or at the
interface between the two while still in port.

Having become giants with revenues of hundreds of billions of
dollars, Swiss commodity trading companies have more oil tankers at
sea and own more storage capacity than the oil majors. Storage
capacity is key not only to trading but also to blending.

The Illegitimate Business: Making “African Quality” Fuels

As trading companies (and other blenders) explain, they “tailor”
fuels to meet the standards of the country they supply. They call
this blending “on-spec”, or according to required specifications.
This can refer to the required specification of sulphur content, or
to the content of any other regulated substances, such as ben zene
or aromatics.

Differences between national fuel quality regulations offer
opportunity for companies to profit from a form of regulatory
arbitrage. With weak standards, Africa is an excellent example. And
industry uses the term “African Quality” (see chapter 10) when
referring to low-quality fuels, characterised primarily by their
high sulphur content, although the term also refers to fuels with
other low-quality aspects.

Africa’s weak fuel standards allow traders to use cheap blendstocks,
dropping production costs and making the produc tion of low fuels a
lucrative business model.

These cheap blendstocks are also of poor quality and, most
importantly, they damage health through their high levels of
sulphur, aromatics and benzene. Such blendstocks could never be used
in European or American markets. Sometimes fuels also contain waste
and recycled blendstocks from the chemical industry and elsewhere,
posing additional risks.

Traders and other blenders, who have a below specification petroleum
product on their hands, will search the market for other blendstocks
(nicknamed “tasty juices”) that will enable the production of an on-
spec fuel. The closer to the specifica tion boundary the product
lies, the larger the potential margin for the trader. On the other
hand, if the trader has a product that is above the specification,
then it may be able to purchase cheap, low-quality “juices” to blend
in. The process of lowering product quality is known in the industry
as “filling up quality give-away”.

In principle, blending is a legitimate and necessary technical
process, but there is a large margin for abuse when it comes to
blending low-quality blendstocks – a practice we call “blend
dumping”. We consider this to be an illegitimate practice. Con
taminants present in any blendstock, such as sulphur and benzene,
should be minimised or fully eliminated by further refining, not
diluted to meet the weak standards of African countries.

The Hub: Where African Quality Fuels Are Produced

While African Quality fuels could never be legally sold in Europe,
they are produced in Europe nevertheless. The ARA region has become
the main hub for the blending and shipping of fuels, especially
diesel, to West Africa for a number of reasons, includ ing its
extensive refining and blending capacity, its strategic po sition
(which allows it to receive petroleum products and blend stocks from
the UK, Russia and the Baltic countries), and its geographic
proximity to West Africa (see chapter 11). The Swiss trading
companies own or hire extensive blending facilities in ARA and we
can prove for the first time that they dominate the export of
African Quality fuels to West Africa.

Besides Europe, the blending is also done offshore the West African
coast. Most West African ports are too small to receive a large
number of tankers or have limited draft, which prevents the larger
European tankers from entering. Mostly coming from the ARA region,
these oil product tankers sail across the Atlan tic Ocean and meet
in the Gulf of Guinea. Mostly in Togolese waters, they transfer
petroleum products from one vessel to an other in an operation known
as ship-to-ship (STS) transfer. The usually smaller tankers then
sail off, discharging the products to different countries in the
region. These STS operations are also a common way to blend
products.

The Conclusion: Ban All Dirty Fuels

Now is the time for African governments to act. They have the chance
to protect the health of their urban population, reduce car
maintenance costs, and spend their health budgets on other pressing
health issues. By moving to ultra-low sulphur diesel, Africa could
prevent 25,000 premature deaths in 2030 and al most 100,000
premature deaths in 2050. An examination of past experience, the
price structure of diesel, and recent developments on the continent
show that African leaders shouldn’t fear significant price increases
from improving the standards of fuel (see concluding chapter 12). In
January 2015, for example, five East African countries adopted low
sulphur fuels with no impact on prices at the pump, or on government
spending through subsidies. A limited increase of prices at the pump
should in any case be balanced with the health and associated
savings of reducing air pollution from high sulphur fuels. The
savings from better health are by far higher than the effects of the
potential costs of cleaner fuels.

Four different sets of actors should take decisive steps
immediately:

* African governments (and others with weak fuel standards) should
set stringent fuel quality standards of 10 ppm sulphur for diesel
and gasoline, and introduce European limits on other health damaging
substances. Whether or not they have sufficient refining capacity in
the country or can only import, governments should be strict with
implementing fuel standards. If not, their fuels will quickly
contain bad blendstocks. The blenders know exactly which standards
apply where, and how best they can dump their African Quality
blends.

* Swiss trading companies should stop abusing Africa’s low fuel
quality standards, recognize that if left unchanged their practices
will kill more and more people across the continent, and immediately
produce and sell to African countries only fuels that would meet
Europe’s high fuel quality standards.

* Governments of export hubs for African fuels (such as Amsterdam,
Antwerp or the US Gulf) should prohibit the export of any health
damaging fuels or blendstocks, which would never be used in their
own country.

* The Swiss government should implement mandatory human rights and
environmental due diligence requirements for Swiss companies,
covering the entire supply chain and including potentially toxic
products.

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
write to this address to subscribe or unsubscribe to the bulletin,
or to suggest material for inclusion. For more information about
reposted material, please contact directly the original source
mentioned. For a full archive and other resources, see
http://www.africafocus.org

AfricaFocus Bulletin
September 21, 2016 (160921)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

The direct and indirect toll resulting from illicit financial flows
reflects the unequal value today’s world places on human lives by
race and place … Reflecting the legacy of the slave trade and
colonialism, the African continent and Black people around the world
are disproportionately located at the bottom of a global system that
systematically sucks wealth upward, toward the top “1 percent.” …
there can be no doubt that the number of deaths caused by these
structural economic inequalities rivals or likely even exceeds those
lost due to bombs, guns, or machetes.

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/iff1609.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
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This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains an article published today in
Praxis (http://www.kzoo.edu/praxis/making-violence-visible/), an on-line publication of the
Arcus Center for Social Justice Leadership at Kalamazoo College. The
article, written by Emily Williams and William Minter, seeks to do
the following: 1) introduce readers to the #StoptheBleeding campaign
and make the tremendous loss of resources from African countries via
illicit financial flows more visible; 2) begin to make the case for
linking #BlackLivesMatter and #StoptheBleeding with the
understanding that the same system of (mis)appropriation of wealth
is hurting people in Africa and elsewhere in the world including the
US; and 3) offer several domestic and global policy changes that
could make a difference on both sides of the Atlantic.

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on illicit financial flows and
related issues, visit http://www.africafocus.org/intro-iff.php

In addition to links in the article below, additional newly
published resources include:

From the US-Africa Network

“Top 10 Questions About Illicit Financial Flows and Africa”
http://tinyurl.com/zz4xr53

“Resources about Illicit Financial Flows from Africa”
http://tinyurl.com/jsyg8el

From AfricaFocus Bulletin

Top Ten Books on Illicit Financial Flows, Tax Justice, and Africa
http://www.africafocus.org/iff-books.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

Making Violence Visible: From #BlackLivesMatter to #StoptheBleeding
Africa

By Emily Williams and William Minter

[Emily Williams is an educator and organizational development
consultant. William Minter is the editor of AfricaFocus Bulletin (
http://www.africafocus.org) and author of numerous books and other
publications on African issues and international relations. Both
authors are members of the coordinating committee of the US-Africa
Network (http://www.usafricanetwork.org). The authors are grateful
for the skillful editing of Alice Kim, which has contributed
immensely to the development of this article.]

In June 2015, a coalition of six Pan-African activist networks
launched #StoptheBleeding Africa (
http://stopthebleedingafrica.org/faqs/) in Nairobi, Kenya to curb
the hemorrhage of resources from the African continent. As the
#BlackLivesMatter movement continued to gain strength in the United
States, this Pan-African coalition came together to expose and
mobilize global support to end illicit financial flows – money that
is illegally earned, transferred or used. Estimates of illegal
transactions in Africa show a loss of at least $50 billion to $80
billion in wealth every year, a figure that would be incalculably
more if transfers made legal by loopholes and unfair treaties were
included. Some flows are only seen as “legal” because the laws are
written and interpreted by those profiting from the system.
Nevertheless, even the outflow of clearly illegal  funds is far
greater than the estimated $40 billion a year that Africa receives
in official development assistance. As explained in this 16-minute
video from the United Nations Economic Commission on Africa (
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lenH1SaOcIA), the #StoptheBleeding
campaign includes official commitments by African governments.
However, implementing these commitments depends on large-scale
mobilizations within Africa and around the world.

Unlike the pillage of Africa in earlier periods of the slave trade
and colonial rule, these illicit financial transactions are most
often hidden from public view. They happen through fraudulent
invoicing of trade, “creative accounting” by multinational
corporations, tax giveaways by African governments, and the use of
shell companies based in tax havens around the world including
Delaware, Luxembourg, Panama, the British Virgin Islands, Liberia,
and Mauritius. Despite repeated revelations, notably the recent
#PanamaPapers (https://panamapapers.icij.org/) scandal, the public
eye glazes over at billions of dollars cited alongside obscure
company names and a complex web of financial links across national
and continental borders. This article seeks to do the following: 1)
introduce readers to the #StoptheBleeding campaign and make the
tremendous loss of resources from African countries via illicit
financial flows more visible; 2) begin to make the case for linking
#BlackLivesMatter and #StoptheBleeding with the understanding that
the same system of (mis)appropriation of wealth is hurting people in
Africa and elsewhere in the world including the US; and 3) offer
several domestic and global policy changes that could make a
difference on both sides of the Atlantic.

The Looting Machine

As South African student activist Pearl Pillay noted, “it is a
common error of thought that violence is only what you can see”
(http://tinyurl.com/jtk3hzy). Violence that stems from decisions
made in boardrooms, city halls, and the offices of high-paid
international accounting and law firms can be harder to see than
violence on the streets but is deadly nonetheless.

In the US, economic violence is carried out through systemic public
disinvestment in health and education as we’ve seen in Flint,
Michigan’s water crisis and the closure of public schools in Chicago
and Detroit, not to mention below-poverty-level wages paid by
corporations such as Wal-Mart and McDonald’s.

In African countries, capitalist enterprises suck resources out of
the continent via traditional industries like oil and minerals and
rapidly expanding economic sectors like telecommunications and
retail:

* In Nigeria, Shell, Chevron, and other companies from Europe and
China share oil profits with corrupt Nigerian officials. The Panama
Papers reveals that “three oil ministers, several senior employees
of the national oil company and two former state governors” were
“convicted of laundering ill-gotten money from the oil industry” (
https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160725-nigeria-oil-mogul.html). One
prominent Nigerian oil trader is accused of cheating the Nigerian
government out of 1.8 billion dollars in oil sales.

*In Angola, an oligarchy headed by the president’s family presides
over oil riches in alliance with companies including Chevron,
ExxonMobil, BP, and a Hong Kong-based international network of
companies known as the Queensway Group (http://tinyurl.com/n5bn5gn).

* In South Africa, the mobile phone company MTN is able to avoid
paying taxes on hundreds of millions of dollars from its
subsidiaries in Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, and other African countries,
it was revealed last year, by channeling most of its profits through
“management fees” to its subsidiary tax haven in Mauritius (
http://www.africafocus.org/docs15/td1510.php).

* Walmart, which has controlled the South Africa-based Massmart
since 2011, hides an estimated $76 billion of its foreign earnings
through subsidiaries in Luxembourg, where it owns no stores (
http://tinyurl.com/hmhg24t). By hiding these earnings stored in
Luxembourg, Walmart avoids paying taxes on the funds.

These financial practices can be as, if not more, deadly than police
violence due to the sheer number of people impacted as resources
needed for health, education, and other public services, as well as
for private and public investment in development, are siphoned out
to multinational corporations and overseas bank accounts. The
ensuing competition for scarce resources fuels local and national
conflicts, often heightened by demagogues channeling the frustration
into hostility toward ethnic “others.”

The direct and indirect toll resulting from illicit financial flows
reflects the unequal value today’s world places on human lives by
race and place; and, in fact, not only parallels the violence of
terrorism but also reflects its disproportionate toll on the Middle
East, Africa, and Asia than in Europe and the Americas (
http://tinyurl.com/hlsbj8b). Reflecting the legacy of the
slave trade and colonialism, the African continent and Black people
around the world are disproportionately located at the bottom of a
global system that systematically sucks wealth upward, toward the
top “1 percent.” Whether this system is best called capitalism,
neoliberalism, global apartheid, white supremacy, kleptocracy, or
something else, there can be no doubt that the number of deaths
caused by these structural economic inequalities rivals or likely
even exceeds those lost due to bombs, guns, or machetes.

+++++++++++

Stop the Bleeding (4-minute music video)

++++++++++++

Financial Flows and Tax Losses

With the #PanamaPapers leak in April 2016, illicit financial flows
momentarily gained international media attention. This is in part
because rich as well as poor countries are affected. A recent
calculation (http://tinyurl.com/holnnc5) estimated that illegal
tax evasion costs US taxpayers $35 billion a year, with an
additional $130 billion a year lost to technically legal “tax
avoidance.” Even without any changes in tax rates for the rich,
these “lost” funds could add $165 billion a year more in public
funds and be invested in health, education, and other public goods
that benefit Americans.

The losses to sub-Saharan Africa from illicit flows, however, have
an even more significant impact given the smaller size of African
economies and the urgent need for investment in basic services.
According to World Bank estimates (http://tinyurl.com/hw7b8t3) for
2014, while the United States and other rich countries on average
spend over $9,000 a year per person on public health, South Africa
spends a little less than $600 a year per person. Meanwhile the
average for all African countries together is less than $100 per
person per year. As the wealthy evade taxes in both richer and
poorer countries, it is always the most vulnerable in society who
suffer most from budget cuts. On a global scale, African countries
and African people suffer disproportionately, reflecting the global
hierarchy of wealth and power
http://www.africafocus.org/iff-inequality.php).

Watch this 3.5 minute video on how Zambia Sugar evades taxes.

Making Connections Across Geographic and Mental Distance

Although #BlackLivesMatter and #StoptheBleeding were born out of
distinct geographic contexts, highlight apparently different social
problems, call for varying solutions, and have diverging levels of
visibility in the global media, they are inextricably and deeply
linked.

Thanks to #BlackLivesMatter the pervasive systemic violence against
Black people by police and the criminal justice system in the US is
now more visible. Names like Trayvon Martin, Mike Brown, Sandra
Bland, Rekia Boyd, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Alton Sterling, and
Philando Castile have not been forgotten because activists have
strategically used social media, street protests, and behind-the-
scenes organizing to force the media, the public, and politicians to
pay attention.

In the U.S., increasing economic inequality has led to the
criminalization of the poor and can be directly connected to police
violence. For example, in the cases of Alton Sterling and Eric
Garner, their attempts to make money in the street economy (selling
cd’s and loose cigarettes respectively) is what preceded their
interaction with police that ultimately ended in the loss of their
lives. U.S. activists are intentionally making economic justice fundamental to the message of #BlackLivesMatter in initiatives like the Agenda to Build Black Futures (http://agendatobuildblackfutures.org/) released by Black Youth
Project in January 2016 and the Vision for Black Lives (https://policy.m4bl.org/) released by a coalition of Black
organizations in August 2016. Notably, #BlackLivesMatter
interventions in numerous cities were integral to pushing Bernie
Sanders’ presidential campaign, which appealed to a growing segment
of the American population because it called for a more progressive
and populist economic agenda, to (belatedly) acknowledge the
relationship between racial justice, gender justice, and economic
justice.

But the violence plaguing Africa remains far too invisible to most
Americans. It is more difficult to #saytheirnames when the report is
of 44 killed at the #Marikana mine in South Africa, 147 students at
#Garissa in Kenya, or hundreds of men, women, and children at #Baga
in northeastern Nigeria, places most Americans have never visited
and can’t find on a map.

Although the Nigerian-launched campaign to #BringBackOurGirls won
international fame, few Americans (beyond African immigrants and
others with close personal links to the continent) are attentive to
other struggles in Africa. Hashtags like #StoptheBleeding,
#OccupyNigeria, #MinersShotDown, #FeesMustFall, and #RhodesMustFall
echo faintly, if at all, across the Atlantic.

Making the connections between what is happening “here” and what is
happening “there” is not easy – #StoptheBleeding can feel less
tangible because the violence being contested is hidden in a tangle
of economic statistics, anonymous shell companies, and accounting
tricks – but it is fundamental to addressing the obstacles that must
be overcome to make a different world possible. It is imperative to
address the roots of injustice that connect #BlackLivesMatter and
#StoptheBleeding by fostering a collective process that builds
solidarity between movement forces in the US and Africa.

Follow the Money

When policymakers—in Chicago, Washington, Pretoria, Nairobi, or
anywhere else —ask “Where is the money?” to pay for health,
education, and infrastructure, the answer should be, in the words of
the African Union Panel on Illicit Financial Flows: “Track it! Stop
it! Get it!” (http://tinyurl.com/zvwn5p5) The debate must go beyond
the very real issues of setting different budget priorities to
raising the basic question of who pays and who is evading their duty
to pay their fair share. The first step is to ensure that there is
full information available on income and wealth of those who have
the most money, including the ultra-rich, the well-known giant
companies, and also the obscure shell companies that both use to
hide their wealth from public view.

The United States and other rich countries are the home countries
for the majority of multinational corporations involved in the
looting of the African continent. They also provide convenient
facilities for African elites to hide their riches. In a report
published in January 2016, Global Witness documented with video
interviews their undercover investigation of 13 leading New York law
firms (https://www.globalwitness.org/shadyinc/). “We said we were
advising an African minister who had accumulated millions of
dollars, and we wanted to buy a Gulfstream Jet, a brownstone and a
yacht. We said we needed to get the money into the U.S. without
detection. … the results were shocking; all but one of the lawyers
had suggestions on how to move the funds.”

On the African continent, #StoptheBleeding activist groups and many
public officials at continental and national level are working to
identify the money that pours out of the continent. They have
identified specific measures to improve tracking of fraud in trade
invoices and are campaigning against tax treaties with foreign
investors with massive giveaways. They are working with
international partners to train journalists in investigations such
as those in the Panama Paper, and with tax specialists to improve
capacity to track overseas bank accounts. Implementation depends on
mobilization of public pressure and political will in each
individual country. Since the system is global, however, it also
depends on international collaboration, particularly from the
countries where the money is hidden.

And that’s where the connection to the United States becomes
essential, and the agendas of #BlackLivesMatter and #StoptheBleeding
Africa potentially converge. The ultra-rich and multinational
corporations operate on a global playing field. Using secret bank
accounts, lawyers, and accountants spread around the world, money
can be transferred with a click of a mouse from Nairobi or Chicago
to the British Virgin Islands to London, with stops along the way in
Panama, the Seychelles in the Indian Ocean, Singapore, and Samoa in
the Pacific. If tax authorities are going to track down the money
they should be getting, activists and honest public officials around
the world must also find ways to collaborate to change the laws and
implement them (see the text box for a few examples of key policies
that could make a difference).

++++++++++++++++

Key Policy Changes Needed for Tax Justice

1. Beneficial ownership in the US

Over two million corporations, LLCs, and other business entities are
formed in the United States every year—and almost every state
collects less identifying information from the individuals forming
these entities than from people applying for a driver’s license or
registering to vote. Indeed, many states rank among the easiest
places in the world in which to form “anonymous shell companies” or
“phantom firms” – business entities that exist solely on paper with
no obligation to list the real people who actually own or control
them, otherwise known as the “beneficial owners.” If they remain
hidden, it is not possible to find and to tax the assets, whether
they come from drug dealing or simply from rich people trying to
avoid paying taxes.

Relevant federal legislation proposed: The Incorporation
Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act (S. 2489 and H.R.
4450)

2. Public Country-by-Country Reporting

Currently, multinationals are able to exploit loopholes in domestic
and international tax laws to shift profits from one country to the
next, often through tax havens (or “secrecy jurisdictions”), with
the end goal of reducing or even eliminating the tax they pay to
governments. Without leaks and whistleblowers, even governments only
see a small window into the inner workings of companies, which makes
proving tax avoidance or evasion nearly impossible. Although MNCs
report on their profits, revenue, taxes paid, and number of
employees, the global numbers they provide are for the operations of
all of their subsidiaries bundled together.

Multinational corporations should be required to submit individual
reports with basic financial information such as revenue, profits,
taxes, and number of employees for each jurisdiction in which they
operate. These country by country reports should be made available
to the public. Public country-by-country reporting strengthens the
financial system for everyone.

New regulations on country-by-country reporting by corporations were
issued this year by the Treasury and the IRS, and are also under
consideration by the Security and Exchange Commission. However,
these do not yet meet the standard of public disclosure demanded by
tax justice advocates.

3. Financial Transaction (Robin Hood) Tax

Simply put, the big idea behind the Robin Hood Tax is to generate
hundreds of billions of dollars, through a small tax of 0.5% on all
financial transactions such as sales of stocks and bonds. That money
could provide funding for jobs to kickstart the economy and get
America back on its feet. It could help save the social safety net
here and around the world, and it will come from fair taxation of
the finance sector. The revenue raised would be enough to protect
American schools, housing, local governments and hospitals, to pay
for lifesaving AIDS medicines, to support people and communities
around the world, and to deal with the climate challenges we’re
facing.

Relevant federal legislation proposed: The Inclusive Prosperity Act
(H.R. 1464), introduced in the House of Representatives by Rep.
Keith Ellison and 36 co-sponsors and in the Senate (S. 1371) by Sen.
Bernie Sanders, with 1 co-sponsor.

+++++++++++

Action at the federal level can have the widest effect, given the
size of the U. S. economy and the impact of U.S. policy on
international action. But given that corporations are registered at
the state level and also pay corporate taxes at the state level,
states also have the capacity to take the lead and set a precedent
for national action. If the political will and the technical legal
and financial expertise are available, similar laws could possibly
even be implemented at city levels, as were divestment measures in
the anti-apartheid era.

Solidarity between #BlackLivesMatter and #StoptheBleedingAfrica is
crucial. Via weak corporate tax law, the U.S. gives license to
corporations to hoard profits and withhold their fair share of taxes
from the societies and countries which allow them to become
prosperous. By standing in opposition to tax injustice, activists
can push back against an aspect of U.S. capitalism that contributes
to increasing wealth inequality. By staying informed, building
relationships, and working in solidarity, we begin to create better
conditions for Black lives across the globe.

Incremental policy change will not be enough. We must confront the
legacy of centuries of systemic injustice and end society’s denial
that this past still shapes the present. The violent inequality of
today’s world is not new, despite dramatic changes in the
technologies of both physical and economic violence. Making that
violence visible also requires making full use of new technologies,
from cellphone videos to big-data journalism. But above all, it
depends on forging links between activists engaged on these
different fronts in different places, who together can build the
political will to act and thus make new futures possible.

For More Information

Africa-specific

Tax Justice Network – Africa
http://www.taxjusticeafrica.net/en/blog/

AfricaFocus Bulletin
http://www.africafocus.org/intro-iff.php

US-Africa Network
Stop the Bleeding Africa

USA and Global

FACT (Financial Accountability and Corporate Transparency) Coalition
https://thefactcoalition.org/blog/

ActionAid International
http://www.actionaid.org/tax-power

Global Alliance for Tax Justice
http://www.globaltaxjustice.org/en/resources

Tax Justice Network
http://www.taxjustice.net/reports-2/

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
write to this address to subscribe or unsubscribe to the bulletin,
or to suggest material for inclusion. For more information about
reposted material, please contact directly the original source
mentioned. For a full archive and other resources, see
http://www.africafocus.org

AfricaFocus Bulletin
September 14, 2016 (160914)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“Among 36 African countries surveyed in 2014/2015, Gabon ranks at or
near the bottom on every indicator of election quality and fairness,
according to citizen responses collected in September and October
2015. … Gabon ranks dead last in public trust in the election
commission. … [at the same time] Gabon ranks near the top in
favoring multiparty competition and term limits on presidents, as
well as in disapproving of one-party and one-man rule.” –
Afrobarometer

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/gab1609.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=
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Election observers agree the narrow victory for incumbent President
Ali Bongo in last month’s presidential election was almost certainly
the result of fraud. Yet his opponent, Jean Ping, is also a long-
standing member of the country’s elite, and is reportedly the father
of two children with the president’s half-sister. Ping’s support is
based largely on the fact that he is not a member of the Bongo
family, which has been in power since 1967, when Omar Bongo, Ali’s
father, came to power. The regime in this small oil-producing
country has been notorious for corruption, and for its close links
to the power structure in France, with Omar Bongo reportedly himself
a major influence for decades as a donor in French national
politics.

Ali Bongo has diversified international ties since taking office in
2009, reaching out to the United States and China. But France
remains Gabon’s dominant external partner, intricately intertwined
with both economic and political structures in the country.

For a short overview, see in particular “Gabon’s Bongo Family:
Living In Luxury, Paid For By Corruption And Embezzlement,”
International Business Times, February 15, 2013
(http://tinyurl.com/zordjcq). For more background, see the links
listed at the end of this Bulletin.

Gabon, like other Francophone African countries, is not well-known
to most English-speaking readers. But increasingly, the range of
sources available in English as well as French makes it possible to
access basic sources for both news and analysis.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin, focused on the current situation.
contains two short articles, from Chatham House in London and The
Daily Maverick in South Africa, and press releases from extensive
polling research by Afrobarometer (Everyone concerned about reliable
information on African public opinion should note that Afrobarometer
is currently experiencing a fiscal crisis, and its extraordinarily
useful and revealing research in more than 35 African countries is
threatened with cutbacks from donors, including USAID. Go to
http://www.afrobarometer.org for more background and to contribute
through paypal).

The Afrobarometer studies on Gabon reveal strong support for
democracy among Gabonese voters, but intense skepticism about the
capacity of the system to deliver. Political commentators agree that
significant reforms are highly unlikely, but there is no consensus
on the likely outcome of the dispute over the election results.

For the reader who has the time and internet bandwith to watch,
AfricaFocus highly recommends the Youtube playlist of the four
videos listed at the beginning of this Bulletin (To go directly to
the playlist, click on http://tinyurl.com/zollum3)

For up-to-date news coverage and analysis, see
http://allfrica.com/gabon (in English)
and http://fr.allafrica.com/gabon (in French), and particularly
http://www.lemonde.fr/gabon/ (in French)

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Gabon, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/gabon.php

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Announcement: New Resources on Illicit Financial Flows

Newly available on website of US-Africa Network – new resources on
Illicit Financial Flows and the Stop the Bleeding Africa campaign.
Go to https://usafricanetwork.org/home/issues/stop-the-bleeding-africa/

Thanks to Chris Root and Anita Plummer of the US-Africa Network for
preparing and sharing these resources, including “Top 10 Questions
About Illicit Financial Flows and Africa” and a carefully selected
and annotated “Resources about Illicit Financial Flows from Africa.”

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

Youtube Playlist with recent videos on the situation in Gabon

France 24, September 7, 2016 – part 1, 18 minutes & part 2 – 26
minutes
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=88h6q4P4z_Y and

London Business School, November 11, 2015, “My Two Years Working for
the Government of Gabon” – 22 minutes

Anonymous, September 12, 2016 – 6 minutes

Anonymous, June 13, 2013 – 4 minutes

************************************************

Electoral Chaos Leaves Gabon in a State of Uncertainty

Paul Melly, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Chatham House, 7 September 2016

https://www.chathamhouse.org/ – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/h57jts2

The country’s democratic credentials have been deeply wounded by
dodgy official results, protest riots and a brutal government
crackdown.

Gabon’s model of political moderation and gradualist reform may have
just imploded. Without external mediation, a full audit of polling
station results and a hitherto absent readiness to compromise on the
part of President Ali Bongo Ondimba and his main challenger, Jean
Ping, the country risks being condemned to months or even years of
unstable and sullen post-election stalemate.

Mild though the crisis appears by the standards of more
authoritarian or conflict-torn neighbours, it is disastrously
damaging for Bongo’s long-held ambition of transforming himself from
dynastic heir into freely-elected architect of modernization and
reform. After seven years trying to mark his country out from the
fiefdoms of central Africa’s strongmen, he now risks cantoning
himself into the category of presidents whose hold on office depends
on power rather than consent.

Contested results

Official results for the 27 August presidential election gave Bongo
49.8% of the nationwide total, compared with 48.23% for Ping; two
candidates pulled out to leave Ping a clear run, while the minor
players who stayed in the race got trivial scores.

The final winning margin was just 5,594 votes. After severe defeats
for Bongo in western urban centres such as Libreville and Port
Gentil and with national average turnout at 59%, Bongo was
miraculously saved by results from his Haut Ogooué heartland, which
registered 95% support on a reported 99% turnout. In the context of
a highly secretive electoral system, such an outcome threatens to
fundamentally undermine Gabon’s democratic ambitions.

Yet the aftermath has been even more damaging. Furious protesters
rioted, setting light to the national assembly, other public
buildings and the shops of West African traders – a longstanding
target of popular resentment.

The government’s response has been uncompromising. During the night
of 31 August-1 September, security force units, supposedly searching
for rioters, took control of Ping’s campaign headquarters. There
were several deaths, while a number of casualties were taken to
hospital with gunshot wounds; dozens were arrested, and senior
opposition figures were still in the building, surrounded by
security forces, a day later.

Gabon, so often a broker in other nations’ disputes, now finds
itself being offered African Union crisis mediation. The justice
minister has resigned from both government and ruling party,
demanding a full audit of all the election counts, polling station
by polling station.

Bongo’s failed strategy

The violence is a tragedy for Gabon. Street protest is hardly new
but is usually curbed with routine policing and the odd volley of
tear gas. Moreover, this bloodshed represents a major failure for
Bongo’s leadership. He came to power in 2009 after the death of his
father, Omar Bongo Ondimba, who had ruled for four decades, in
elections that were opaque and widely seen as a continuation of the
status quo. His subsequent banning of the new Union Nationale
opposition party seemed to confirm this pattern.

But Ali has spent much of the past seven years trying to reshape
Gabon’s governance. He has sought to rebalance and diversify the
economy, improve the performance of the state and foster a more
equitable social model, tilting social services and public sector
wage structures towards the poorer citizens who had previously been
neglected in favour of the governing middle class. Key barons of his
father’s regime were marginalized, the ban on the Union Nationale
was lifted, and Bongo acceded to opposition demands for a biometric
electoral roll. Assets in France held personally by the Bongo family
were transferred to the ownership of the state.

Bongo had hoped that his measures to stimulate the economy and
protect the environment, bolster the efficiency of public services
and help the poor would allow him to shed his image as the inheritor
of dynastic power, and earn his own legitimacy through his own
performance as president. In the face of an opposition dominated by
the ancien regime power-brokers who he had forced out, Ali sought to
present himself as the real incarnation of change.

But several factors combined to undermine this strategy. The
influence of several prominent West Africans in the presidency and
in business circles close to the government was unpopular with many
locals. Like other oil producing countries, Gabon has been hit hard
by the collapse in world energy prices, despite its care in
nurturing a reputation as a prudent borrower in international bond
markets. And ultimately, Bongo under-estimated the scale of anger
and impatience for change in a country whose voters are well aware
of democracy’s advance elsewhere in francophone Africa – powerfully
symbolized by the popular revolution that felled Burkina Faso
strongman Blaise Compaoré in 2014.

Changed times

Many Gabonese feel it is now time to move on from the era of
dynastic rule, even in the refreshed and more modern form that Ali
Bongo Ondimba has provided.

Bongo seems to have been completely unprepared for the strength of
the response to the electoral pitch made by Jean Ping. As a former
regime veteran once married to Ali’s sister Pascaline, Ping could
not claim to be a new face. Indeed, having also served a term as
chair of the African Union Commission, he is very much part of the
establishment.

But he cleverly tapped into the current mood, presenting himself as
the man whose election would show that power in Gabon really could
change hands through the ballot box. A promise to serve only one
term enhanced this appeal – and usefully contrasted with Ali’s
aspiration to yet another extension of rule by the Bongo dynasty.

When most other opposition candidates dropped out at the last
minute, Ping was ideally placed to capitalize.

Furthermore, in the aftermath, Bongo has badly misread the evolution
of attitudes in the international community: France, the EU and the
US want to see a transparent and credible election process. Even
Paris, for so many years a supportive ally of the Bongos, is no
longer prepared to turn a blind eye. As a result, pressure is
mounting for a full breakdown of the vote, to show figures for every
single polling station. Privately, many diplomats feel it is clear
that Ping won, even if there was cheating on all sides.

Looking ahead, there seems no easy way out. The most consensual
option would be a full audit of the election count, with both
contenders fully committed to accepting the eventual result – a
course of action that would offer a face saving and honourable way
out to the loser. Without that, Gabon seems condemned to a prolonged
period of unrest and political confrontation. Even if Bongo hangs
on, his standing will be critically damaged.

*************************************************************

Afrobarometer Reports on Gabon

http://www.afrobarometer.org

In Gabon, overwhelming public distrust of CENAP and election quality
forms backdrop for presidential vote dispute

News Release, 1 September 2016

For full news release, as well as Afrobarometer report released on
September 6, visit http://afrobarometer.org/countries/gabon-0

Gabon’s presidential election dispute is playing out against a
background of overwhelming public distrust of the national election
commission (CENAP) and strikingly negative assessments of the
country’s election environment in advance of the August 2016 vote, a
new analysis by Afrobarometer shows.

Among 36 African countries surveyed in 2014/2015, Gabon ranks at or
near the bottom on every indicator of election quality and fairness,
according to citizen responses collected in September and October 2015.

Gabon ranks dead last in public trust in the election commission: A
majority (51%) of citizens said they do not trust the CENAP “at
all,” and only 8% said they trust the commission “a lot.”

Gabon also ranks among the worst in citizens’ perceptions of the
fairness of the vote count, the freeness and fairness of its
previous national election (2011), fear of voter intimidation or
violence, fair treatment of opposition candidates, and the
prevalence of voter bribery. Overall, Gabon citizens held the most
negative perceptions of how well elections function to ensure that
voters’ views are represented and to enable voters to remove leaders
who don’t do what the people want.

The Gabon findings are part of a new Afrobarometer report, to be
released 6 September 2016, on citizens’ perceptions of electoral
management institutions and the quality of elections, It is based on
almost 54,000 interviews in 36 African countries.

The new report, titled “Election quality, public trust are central
issues as African nations look toward next contests,” will be
available at http://www.afrobarometer.org.

Key findings for Gabon

* A majority (51%) of Gabonese respondents said in late 2015 that
they do not trust the CENAP “at all,” with 17% who trust it
“somewhat,” 24% “a little bit,” and only 8% “a lot” (Figure 1).
Among 36 African countries surveyed in 2014/2015, Gabon ranks last
in public trust in the election commission (Figure 2).

* Only 37% of citizens saw their 2011 election as having been
“completely free and fair” or “free and fair, but with minor
problems.” A majority said the 2011 election was “not free and fair”
(31%) or “free and fair, with major problems” (24%) (Figure 3).

* On perceptions of the election environment (Figure 4), seven in 10
Gabonese citizens (71%) said that votes are “never” or only
“sometimes” counted fairly. Only 15% said the vote count is “always”
fair.

* Almost two-thirds (64%) of Gabonese said they fear campaign-
related intimidation or violence at least “a little bit,” including
almost one-fourth (23%) who expressed “a lot” of fear. One-third
(32%) said voters are “often” or “always” threatened with violence
at the polls.

* A majority (56%) of citizens said that opposition candidates are
at least “sometimes” prevented from running for office. One in five
(22%) said this happens “often” or “always.”

* Three-fourths (77%) of Gabonese said the news media “never” or
only “sometimes” provides fair coverage of all candidates – the
worst rating among the 36 surveyed countries.

*Seven in 10 citizens (71%) said that voters are “often” or “always”
bribed during Gabon’s elections – far above the 36-country average
of 43%.

* Gabon ranks worst among 36 African countries in citizens’
perceptions of how well elections work. More than three-fourths of
Gabonese say elections perform “not very well” or “not at all well”
to ensure that elected officials reflect the views of voters (76%)
or to enable voters to remove underperforming leaders from office
(79%).

Afrobarometer

Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that
conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic
conditions, and related issues across more than 30 countries in
Africa. Five rounds of surveys were conducted between 1999 and 2013,
and findings from Round 6 surveys (2014/2015) are currently being
released. Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in the
language of the respondent’s choice with nationally representative
samples that yield country-level results with margins of error of
+/-2% (for samples of 2,400) or +/3% (for samples of 1,200) at a 95%
confidence level.

The Afrobarometer team in Gabon, led by the Centre de Recherche en
Géoscience Politique et Prospective (CERGEP), interviewed 1,200
adult Gabonese citizens in September and October 2015. A sample of
this size yields country-level results with a margin of error of
+/-3% at a 95% confidence level. This was the first Afrobarometer
survey in Gabon.

***************************************************

Behind Gabon’s election dispute, citizens strongly support
multiparty democracy, reject autocratic alternatives

News Release, 2 September, 2016

For full news release, including figures and additional findings,
visit http://afrobarometer.org/countries/gabon-0

Behind Gabon’s eruption in post-election conflict, its citizens are
among the strongest in Africa in their support for multiparty
democracy and their rejection of non-democratic alternatives, a new
analysis by Afrobarometer shows.

Among 36 African countries surveyed in 2014/2015, Gabon ranks near
the top in favouring multiparty competition and term limits on
presidents, as well as in disapproving of one-party and one-man
rule, according to citizen responses collected in September and
October 2015.

Large majorities also expressed support for democracy in general and
for elections as the best way to choose leaders, although on these
issues Gabon ranks only average or below. Gabon’s less enthusiastic
endorsement of elections aligns with citizens’ strikingly negative
views on the national electoral commission (CENAP) and the fairness
of the country’s elections (see press release titled “In Gabon,
overwhelming public distrust of CENAP and election quality forms
backdrop for presidential vote dispute” at www.afrobarometer.org).

Findings on citizens’ perceptions of electoral management
institutions and the quality of elections in Gabon and 35 other
African countries will be released in a new Afrobarometer report on
6 September 2016.

Key findings for Gabon

*In interviews in September-October 2015, two-thirds (68%) of
Gabonese citizens said democracy is preferable to any other
political system, matching average support for democracy among 36
African surveyed in 2014/2015 (67%).

* Gabonese overwhelmingly rejected autocratic alternatives to
democracy. Nine in 10 citizens disapproved of one-party rule (91%)
and one-man rule (89%), including majorities who “strongly”
disapproved (Figure 1). These assessments place Gabon near the top
among surveyed countries. Seven in 10 Gabonese (70%) rejected
military rule.

* Three-fourths (76%) said regular, open, and honest elections are
the best way to choose leaders, compared to 82% across all surveyed
countries (Figure 2).

* In their support for multiparty competition (80%) (Figure 3),
Gabonese are second only to Ivoirians (82%) and far above average
(63%).

* Nine in 10 Gabonese (92%) supported limiting presidents to two
terms in office (Figure 4). Gabon’s support for term limits is
second only to Benin’s (93%) and well above the 36-country average
(75%).

[for full report, including figures and additional findings, visit
http://afrobarometer.org/countries/gabon-0

*************************************************************

Gabon: Jean Ping and the boy who didn’t cry wolf

Simon Allison

Daily Maverick, 6 September, 2016

http://www.dailymaverick.co.za – Direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/hodtpeh

Opposition leader Jean Ping is incensed that Gabon’s president stole
the recent election. He’s right to be. But maybe Ping should have
harnessed this fury earlier, when he was in a position to do
something about it. Instead, as top boss of the African Union, he
helped to legitimise dodgy polls and obscure accountability. Now he,
and Gabon, are paying the price.

Let me tell you the parable of the boy who didn’t cry wolf. One day,
in an African country of your choice, a wolf passed through the
village. Observing from afar, the boy said nothing, and called no
one, even as the wolf feasted. The next day, the wolf came to
another village. Again the boy saw, again the boy ignored the
tortured shouts of the villagers as they screamed and begged for
help. And so it went on, village by village, as the wolf devoured
his way through the continent; instead of raising the alarm, the boy
stayed silent.

And then the wolf came to Gabon, where the boy lived, and started
snapping its jaws in his direction. The boy screamed and shouted and
cried “wolf!” at the top of his lungs, but by then it was too late.
Everyone around him, everyone who could have helped, had already
been eaten.

The real-life star of this little story is Jean Ping, opposition
candidate for president in Gabon.

Ping is not a happy man right now. Last week, he lost the
presidential election by the slimmest of margins – just 6,000 votes
– and he believes the poll was rigged. “The whole world knows today
who is the president of the Republic of Gabon. It’s me, Jean Ping,”
he said. “Each time the Gabonese people have chosen their president,
the dark forces are always gathered to place he who was not chosen
as head of state.”

Ping is right, of course. These elections were stolen, and brazenly
so. Despite an average turnout of around 60%, an unbelievable 99.3%
was recorded in Haute Ogue, home province of incumbent Ali Bongo –
with Bongo winning 95% of the vote there. That statistically
impossible aberration made all the difference to the final count.

Ping has rejected the outcome, and is pursuing a legal challenge.
Meanwhile, an estimated 5 people have died in post-election violence
between rival supporters and security forces.

Bongo’s security forces may have pulled the trigger, but their blood
is also on Ping’s hands.

Ping, you see, was not always an opposition candidate. He wasn’t
always an outspoken advocate for free and fair elections. He wasn’t
always a fierce critic of dictators and police brutality.

Quite the opposite, in fact.

Although memories fade fast, we must not forget that it was only
four years ago that Ping was forced out of his position as chairman
of the African Union Commission. Between 2008 and 2012, he was the
continental body’s most senior and visible leader.

In this position, he oversaw and monitored elections all over
Africa: polls both free and flawed, and everything in between. But
instead of raising the alarm when something was wrong – instead of
crying wolf – Ping legitimised dodgy polls and obscured
accountability. The very same tactics that Bongo is now using
against him, Ping previously would rubber-stamp.

Take, for example, the Sudanese elections in 2010, in which
President Omar al-Bashir – then and still wanted for war crimes by
the International Criminal Court – strolled to victory in a vote
marred by intimidation, gerrymandering, and accusations of “massive
rigging” by an opposition group. Ping, who headed the African Union
observer mission, had a more generous take:

“These historic elections have indeed afforded the majority of the
Sudanese citizens the opportunity to exercise their civic and
democratic rights by electing representatives of their choice for
the first time in 24 years. The mission believes that the just-
concluded multiparty elections will enhance the peace and democratic
processes under way in the country.”

It also fell to Ping, early in his term, to lead the African
response to Zimbabwe’s tightly contested election in 2008. In the
first round, challenger Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic
Change led Robert Mugabe’s Zanu-PF. A state-sponsored campaign of
violence and intimidation forced Tsvangirai to withdraw from the
second round of the vote, which he was on course to win.

While the AU was involved in mediating the Zimbabwe situation, its
solution allowed Robert Mugabe – architect of the brutality- to stay
in charge as part of a government of national unity. Ping refrained
from condemning the violence, and downplayed the extent of the
crisis. A reading of the AU’s observer mission statement, following
Mugabe’s uncontested second-round victory, noted vaguely that “there
was violence in the run down to the elections”, but failed to
attribute blame; a neat diplomatic side-step that helped Mugabe’s
regime avoid responsibility.

As leader of the African Union Commission, Ping repeatedly failed to
enforce international electoral standards, or hold African
governments to account for human rights abuses. This is not a unique
failing; a general reticence to criticise is a characteristics of
the AU, and Ping’s successor Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is also rarely
outspoken.

But now Ping finds himself on the other side of the fence. Suddenly,
he is on the receiving end of a rigged vote and electoral violence;
suddenly, he wants those international standards enforced and human
rights observed. If only he had defended these virtues earlier, when
he was in a position of
influence and could have made a real difference. If only Ping had
cried wolf before it was too late. DM

*****************************************************

Links to additional articles recommended

“Gabon’s presidential election: are the opposition’s attempts at
unifying too little too late?,” by Oumar Ba
African Arguments, August 22, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/h7us69a

“Gabon is in chaos — and France is to blame,” Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry,
The Week, September 2, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/zu7wsj5

“Meet Ali Bongo Ondimba, Obama’s Man in Africa,” by Siobhán O’Grady,
Foreign Policy, April 5, 2016
http://foreignpolicy.com – Direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/j2cjv7h

“The murky world of Omar Bongo,” BBC, May 21, 2009
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8056309.stm

“A fight inside Gabon’s kleptocratic dynasty exposes the complicity
of French business,” Emma-Kate Symons
May 01, 2015
http://tinyurl.com/hqb4lvt

“Keeping Foreign Corruption Out of the United States: Four Case
Histories: Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,”
http://tinyurl.com/hvhqby4
September, 2010 – one of the case histories is President Omar Bongo
of Gabon – for a brief summary see
http://www.africafocus.org/docs10/usa1002.php

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
write to this address to subscribe or unsubscribe to the bulletin,
or to suggest material for inclusion. For more information about
reposted material, please contact directly the original source
mentioned. For a full archive and other resources, see
http://www.africafocus.org

South Africa: Post “Post-Apartheid”?

AfricaFocus Bulletin
September 7, 2016 (160907)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

The “post-apartheid” period is now over, it seems. Whether one dates
the change from the massacre of miners at Marikana in 2012, the
death of Nelson Mandela in 2013, student protests in 2015, or the
municipal elections last month, a generation has now passed since
the high hopes of the first democratic elections in 1994. South
Africans, particularly the generation known as the “born-frees,” are
coping with the realization that that political victory was only the
beginning, not the achievement of the  hopes for social and economic
transformation so many had hoped and died for.

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/sa1609a.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/sa1609a.php

As in other African countries a generation after the achievement of
political independence, and in the United States a generation after
the dramatic gains for political rights in the 1950s and 1960s, it
is clear that centuries of history of oppression are still deeply
embedded in current stubborn structures of inequality, as well as in
the dominant culture. The number of years counted in a generation
are generally taken as somewhere from 20 to 30. But changes in
consciousness are uneven, and sharply marked by transformative
events.

Those experiences differ, of course, from country to country and
continent to continent. But in the age of hashtags such as
#BlackLivesMatter and #FeesMustFall, there are also striking
convergences and linkages across continental boundaries. Yet the
unequal balance in global media (including social media) means that
the outside world is far less aware of the changes in South Africa
than of the highly publicized events in the United States.

Today’s series of two AfricaFocus Bulletins, therefore, focuses
particularly on South Africa.

Another AfricaFocus Bulletin, not sent out by email but available on
the web at http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/sa1609b.php, contains
excerpts from a forthcoming chapter by Patrick Bond, focusing on the
link between student protest in South Africa and the current heated
debates about the government budget and economic priorities in South
Africa.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin includes, as is our normal format, several
articles and additional links related to selected topics: recent
protests by black girls against racist hair codes at elite private
schools, analysis of the aftermath of the municipal elections, and
the planned launch of a new progressive trade union federation.

A new feature this week, however, consists of links  to a Youtube
playlist of highly recommended videos available for free watching,
including two acclaimed feature films on the Marikana Massacre of
2012 (Miners Shot Down) and on the student protests of 2015 (The
People Versus the Rainbow Nation) as well as shorter videos and
interviews, such as the explosive speech by ANC veteran Sipho
Pityana at the funeral of ANC leader Makhenkhesi Stofile in last
August. You can find the listing below, with links to each video.
But, if your time right now is limited, I suggest you save this
email for later reading and go directly to Youtube to pick what to
watch and save any you are interested in to “watch later.” See
“South Africa in the 21st Century in Video: A Youtube Playlist,”
available at http://tinyurl.com/hqpr255.

Watching these videos and preparing the playlist has been both
enjoyable and highly informative for me, but it is also much more
time-consuming than selecting written material from email and web.
So I would much appreciate feedback on whether readers find any of
the videos useful, and whether you would like similar playlists to
be an ongoing feature for AfricaFocus.

To provide feedback, after you have watched a video, please fill out
this form: https://goo.gl/forms/skDu3L9MxgfpJIJj2

If you prefer audio to video, and have time to listen (a bit less
than an hour), note that KPFA radio host Walter Turner interviewed
me about South Africa after the municipal elections on his program
Africa Today. For the discussion with Walter, focused on trying to
understand South Africa’s present situation in comparison to the
parallels in the United States, visit the KPFA site at
https://kpfa.org/program/africa-today/, and scroll down to the
program for August 15, 2016. I’m not doing a form on this one, but
if you listen, any feedback (email to africafocus@igc.org) would be
welcome.

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on South Africa, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/southafrica.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

Zulaikha Patel: How we all wish we were you

by Azad Essa

Daily Vox, August 30, 2016

http://www.thedailyvox.co.za/zulaikha-patel-wish-we-were-you/

[For regular progressive coverage of South Africa, follow The Daily
Vox on Facebook or subscribe to the weekly “Top of the Vox” at
http://tinyurl.com/z5fvnpm]

I don’t think I have ever seen anything quite like it.

The little girl – now known to all as Zulaikha Patel – standing in
front of a row of three white males, refusing to back down, calling
on them to follow through with their threats to arrest them – for
their hair.

“Take us all,” she said, for half a dozen girls at the school. “They
want to take us prison … take us all.”

It was an act of extraordinary courage that left us tingling. Who
were these brave girls and how had they secured such resilience
against authority?

I watched the video on a loop on Instagram. Stolen moments from a
protest that left me breathless. I think it was five times before I
dared to blink. And still, there was an artistry in the execution of
their defiance. A calmness that betrayed possible consequence.

For Zulaikha – her resolve was as natural as the curls on her head
and the light creases on her young face. It was earnest, determined
and uncomplicated.

Their actions were undeterred by mortgage payments and outstanding
car loans. Unconcerned about the impact of her actions on “her
career” or “that promotion”.

A free spirit, asking only for the right to be herself.

The photo of her standing tall with steely eyes, arms outstretched
and fists folded above her irresistible afro in a defiance of an
antiquated, warped and racist policy will be studied and fluttered
over for years to come.

We learnt later that Zulaikha had been previously put in detention
for her hair. That she had to leave three schools because her hair
challenged the system. Her sister said she was continually mocked,
her hair described as “exotic” and looking like a “cabbage”. She
would come home in tears.  It is remarkable then that she didn’t
look for ways to mend the “problem”.

I know I would have. I know I turned a blind eye to any whispers or
condescension from teachers or classmates at both primary and
secondary school reserved for the few brown and black faces in the
former Model-C schools I attended. I know I put on a purported
civilised face each morning I entered that school and showed my true
colours each afternoon back home or with fellow brown savages at the
local madrassa.

Then, as profiling at airports or certain cities continue to
proliferate, so many of us are shifting our behaviours,
assimilating, changing the way we curl our tongues so we fit in, or
draw attention to ourselves. And if we protest, it will be decided
after a cost-benefit assessment: based on time and place, potential
to win and lose, energy levels and interest to take on the prejudice
or let it slip. We are all in awe of Zulaikha, because we wish to
hell we could have all been her, growing up. We wish we could be
her, as a grown up.

While so many of us were trying as children, and then as adults, to
make the world work for us, we forgot that world already belonged to
each and every one of us. We’ve been left so insecure and desperate
to “make it”, we’ve been wired to forgo anything, including
ourselves.

I wondered after watching the clip another five times: what if there
hadn’t been a video to record the sublime protest initiated by the
girls of the school? The reported narrative would have never gone
viral. It would not have brought the school to its knees, its
policies into the spotlight. It might not have brought politicians
and policymakers into the discussion. Zulaikha might have found
herself immediately suspended, or expelled, maybe jailed. It might
have all been in vain.

We don’t know, as per her sister’s admission, how all of this
attention will impact on Zulaikha. She is just a 13-year-old after
all, acting on her own accord. And this is not a fight she was ever
meant to fight.

But she has provided a most memorable lesson.

Justice, it turns out, simply needs people to speak out against
injustice.

And it’s apt, that it would take a child to make us remember that.

—————

See also, for a description of the protest and its background,
“Pretoria Girls High:  A protest against sacrificed cultures and
identities,” by Greg Nicolson, Daily Maverick, August 30, 2016 (
http://tinyurl.com/hjqpzek).

***********************************************************

The Sun Also Rises: And the Darkest Hour is just before the Dawn

John Matisonn

Daily Maverick, 29 August 2016

http://www.dailymaverick.co.za – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/grp9h3a

[John Matisonn is the author of God, Spies and Lies, Finding South
Africa’s future through its past, and host of Cape Town TV’s Between
the Lines, a series of half-hour programs each featuring an
interview with a key South African newsmaker or analyst.]

[For a Youtube playlist of Between the Lines beginning in June 2016,
visit http://tinyurl.com/jsotek5 – For links to selected interviews,
see “South Africa in the 21st Century” below]

I guess I’m cursed to be a contrarian. By late 1996 I could see that
this democratic government so many had risked life and limb for
would not be strong against corruption. I saw it first-hand when it
sided against the honest in the first big corruption scandal of the
ANC era, at the Independent Broadcasting Authority. Everyone else
was optimistic, and I, an IBA councillor, was out of step.

Now, as President Jacob Zuma’s rank disdain for the people he
governs has seen in some a spiral of despair, I feel positive. Why?
Because August 2016 will go down in this country’s history as a
turning point. Zuma is not finished yet, but my crystal ball tells
me that whatever damage he does before he goes, and there will be
damage, politically speaking he is a dead man walking. The South
African voter has awoken. And you can take that to the bank.

Of course this may not be the end of the ANC. If good leadership,
leadership with vision and integrity, takes the helm, the ANC
obviously can rebuild. Too many people care about it to abandon it
if given new reasons for hope. But every day Zuma remains in charge
is a blessing to Mmusi Maimane and Julius Malema. For them, the
president is the gift that keeps on giving. And from the day after
Zuma goes, he will be like apartheid: Support Zuma? Who, me? Never
happened!

The cascade of good people coming out against Zuma and for Gordhan
should bring tears of relief to the patriotic eye. Let’s be blunt
for a moment, like we know South Africans are at home: a lifelong
Communist of Indian descent has the hopes and admiration of a
grateful nation. His courage, smarts and sensibleness have brought
out the best in leaders in every field and of every ethnicity.

Not a day goes past without an icon of the struggle, or a gaggle of
academics or a billionaire business leader, scathingly attacking the
president. And Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa has finally lifted
his skirt. After a seemingly endless period of the unseemly
grovelling necessary to stay in his job, he’s given a limited idea
of what we are asked to believe is the real Cyril: he backed Pravin
Gordhan unequivocally at an ANC funeral.

Don’t bet the farm that Cyril will not cover those ankles again.
Zuma retains the majority in the decision-making National Executive
Committee, and Ramaphosa knows how to count. But for ordinary South
Africans, either the ANC throws out Zuma, or voters continue to
nibble away at the ANC’s eviscerated credibility and votes.

It will be a long time before all of us — commentators,
politicians, businesspeople, academics and the jobless — digest the
news of August 2016. Around 10 percent of the national budget, and
hundreds of thousands of jobs, are no longer controlled by the ANC.
Even in the unlikely event of a 2019 ANC recovery from these local
election results, further losses will accrue in provincial and
national legislatures.

The ANC lacks the tools for opposition politics, except perhaps in
Johannesburg, where the outgoing mayor, Parks Tau, retains his
skills and moral compass.

If Herman Mashaba messes up as mayor of Johannesburg, Tau’s people
will be back in 2021. That’s in the future. For the rest of this
decade, the defeated will have to adjust.

The new metro governments have something going for them. That hunger
and lack of entitlement, the feeling they have no God-given right to
govern and everything to prove, may serve them well.

Do not underestimate the prize: even if they do not get the ANC
below 50% in 2019, think about the thousands of town councillors who
lost their jobs this month, and the MPs and MPLs who know they will
be unemployed in 2019. Think about the tens (hundreds?) of thousands
of cadres whose guarantees of deployed positions just evaporated.
They must prove themselves competent, or they’re next. Those old
enough will remember that apartheid slugger John Vorster’s famous
phrase: adapt or die.

The adaptations to come will boggle the pre-August 2016 mind. Zuma
seems determined to take out Paul Mashatile as ANC Gauteng
provincial leader. He, Tau, and Gauteng premier David Makhuru
represent the best in the ANC. Urban, urbane, modern and honourable.
What will they do?

The answer follows logic: some will stay ANC to the bitter end. But
others will switch parties. It may still seem impossible to imagine,
but when they are out in the cold, their choice will be fairly
simple: DA or EFF. Perhaps COPE or the UDM will attract a few, but
they lack the infrastructure or heft to make it on their own. The
future is with three parties. Only in KwaZulu-Natal will the fourth,
the Inkatha Freedom Party, remain in the running, though the age of
its leader, Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and his failure to prepare
for succession mean it too is on borrowed time. As in the white
politics days of the United Party’s Douglas Mitchell and before that
the British imperialist Dominion Party, the languid politics of our
tropical province will be slow to catch up.

The country needs to move to debate that’s more concrete. Probably
nothing is more critical or central and essential to debate than
reprioritising the national budget. That requires a public argument
tied to what the government is actually doing as opposed to what it
says it’s doing.

To give but two examples: Every government leader says we are
prioritising infrastructure, but the companies that would be
building infrastructure — construction companies — are staving off
collapse because so little is being commissioned. Infrastructure
brings jobs and growth, both short-term and long-term.

Second, the government wants a zero fees increase because it is
scared of students. But it hasn’t offered a way to pay for it.
Universities are a top priority. They provide the job creators (as
opposed to the claim especially by the American right that cutting
already low taxes on the 1% creates jobs).

Where should the money come from? That is what the debate must be
about. But first, a major step must be to cut the public sector
payroll. If we don’t we will be Zimbabwe — where Robert Mugabe has
stayed in power for 36 years by protecting public sector salaries at
the expense of the economy. In 2016 that chicken (his party symbol
is the rooster) has finally come to roost. This week, after he
proved unable to meet the payroll yet again, he finally agreed to
the cuts. That is the worst possible way to do it — to cut when you
have no money to redirect productively.

What happened on August 3 may be the best possible outcome for a
number of reasons besides giving the ANC a well deserved bloody
nose. The fact that the transfer of power occurred largely
peacefully is a good sign. That makes it more likely that the ANC
will accept the next round of losses.

As important, this slow easing of power away from the ANC is better
than an overnight landslide, for this reason: South Africa is
extremely hard to govern. Its complexity, managing unruly and
compromised trade unions and increasingly confident traditional
leaders, remain substantially the ANC’s problem.

So keep your chin up. Take the long view. The wheels of democracy
grind slow but sure. The majesty of democracy is a wonderful thing
to behold. South Africa will be back. China won’t bring it back.
America and Europe won’t bring it back. Only we, South Africans, can
and must. DM

See also Sahra Ryklief, “South Africa’s 2016 municipal elections –
why the excitement?,” GroundUp, August 23, 2016 (
http://tinyurl.com/jvbx4aw)

************************************************************

“Zwelinzima Vavi’s address to the FAWU [Food and Allied Workers
Union] National Congress”
22 August 2016

[Brief excerpts from beginning of speech by the former general
secretary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and
convenor of the Steering Committee for a New Trade Union Federation.
Full text available at http://tinyurl.com/j8b6roc]

It is also a time of extreme hardship for millions of workers and
thousands of your own members, particularly on the farms, where far
too many employers still act as if apartheid had never ended.

Poverty pay, casualisation, exploitation and racism are widespread
and even getting worse, as the job-loss bloodbath continues. Entire
industries are in danger of disappearing. Unemployment at 36% is
among the highest in the world, and employers have been quick to
exploit the desperation of the unemployed to find or keep jobs at
any cost in order to drive down wages and working conditions.

As well as outsourcing, casualisation of work and using labour
brokers, the bosses are now waging a concerted campaign to sabotage
collective bargaining structures and weaken the power of organised
labour. Some, like Uber taxis, want to redefine all their workers as
self-employed so-called ‘partners’, with no benefits or union
rights.

Inequality is widening globally, but South Africa remains the worst
in the world, and it is still blatantly racial as the gap gets wider
between the white, super-rich capitalist elite and the black working
class majority, women in particular, who remain even more firmly
mired in poverty, hunger and squalid living conditions. Wealth is
shifting further into the pockets of the white capitalists.

This widening inequality fosters a mood of growing anger and despair
as the problems which the ANC keep promising to solve remain as bad
as ever or get even worse. Community protests against the lack of
basic services, corruption and unaccountable local officials have
become so frequent that they rarely make the news headlines, except
in traffic reports when they disrupt motorists travel plans!

This is all aggravated by the unchecked explosion of
maladministration, corruption and theft of our wealth not just by a
few rogue families but the entire capitalist class and their
political allies in the ANC, DA and other political parties. It is
not just President Jacob Zuma and the Guptas who are plundering the
wealth created by our labour, but the entire corrupt capitalist
system of which they are part.

More and more reports are leaking out revealing systematic tax
evasion and money-laundering by big business. Millions of rands are
disappearing from the country as investors put their cash where they
will make the quickest and biggest profits, with no regard for the
welfare of the people, the environmental price and least of all the
conditions of their workers who produce the wealth in the first
place. Big business is sitting on R1, 5 trillion in the banks and it
blames this investment strike on ‘uncertainty’.

These are all the real reasons for the decline in the ANC vote and
the record high number of abstentions on 3 August. Although it is
still the biggest party, the ANC’s vote dropped from 62.9% in 2011
to 54.4%.

…

********************************************

South Africa in the 21st Century in Video: A Youtube Playlist

Videos selected by AfricaFocus Bulletin (http://www.africafocus.org)
as key resources for understanding South Africa today. The full
playlist is available at http://tinyurl.com/hqpr255

Miners shot down [Full documentary]
Award-winning 2014 film on the 2012 Marikana Massacre.
1 hour, 26 minutes

Shutting Down the Rainbow Nation: #FeesMustFall
by Africa is a Country
Short film on #FeesMustFall student protests. October 2015.
11 minutes

The People Versus The Rainbow Nation
by MTV Base Africa
Feature film. May 2016. Inside look at students and the issues
behind the protests.
1 hour, 2 minutes

Between The Lines Episode 1
by Cape Town TV
Interview with Sylvia Vollenhoven, June 2016. From rediscovery of
history of the Khoisan to corruption and illicit financial flows in
the mid-1990s.
26 minutes

Between the Lines Episode 3
by Cape Town TV
Interview with Andrew Feinstein. June 2016. Corruption in the South
African arms deal & the global arms trade.
24 minutes

Between the Lines Episode 6
by Cape Town TV
Interview with leading university educator Jonathan Jansen. July
2016. The state of South African higher education. Financial &
policy neglect.
26 minutes

Between the Lines Episode 8
by Cape Town TV
Interview with #FeesMustFall activist Akosua Korenteng at University
of Cape Town. August 2016.
26 minutes

Between the Lines Episode 11
by Cape Town TV
Interview with election analyst Bob Mattes. August 2016. Data-based
analysis of municipal election results.
24 minutes

Full Speech: Sipho Pityana Attacks Jacob Zuma at Makhenkhesi Stofile
funeral
by Tribe2Tribes
Devastating critique of regime corruption at funeral of respected
ANC leader. August 25, 2016.
30 minutes

“Sipho Pityana speech at Stofile funeral,” News24,
2016-08-26. Background and partial transcript at
http://tinyurl.com/glhkhgx

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AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

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