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Africa/Global: Open Data for Tax Justice

worker | February 28, 2017 | 10:49 am | Africa | Comments closed

AfricaFocus Bulletin
February 28, 2017 (170228)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“Multinational companies typically publish global, consolidated
accounts – and international accounting standards now allow these to
roll into one all financial information on the substance of their
economic activities, or at best to provide regional figures. This
means that country-level information on profits, revenues, taxes,
borrowings and employees, for example, are not provided. … As the
name suggests, the longstanding proposal for country-by-country
reporting (CBCR) would make multinational companies break down and
publish their results for each country. This is essential for
citizens to know what companies and their affiliates are doing where
they live, and what contributions they are making.” – Open Data for
Tax Justice announcement

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs17/tax1702.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
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The need for CBCR, a demand first advanced by tax justice
campaigners in 2003, has become widely recognized, leading to
proposals by international bodies such as the “rich states” club of
the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).
The OECD proposal for collecting and sharing such data only by
selected tax authorities, however, is in sharp contradiction to the
initial goal of public transparency. And further retreats from
transparency are already visible in initial actions by the
Republican-dominated U.S. Congress (see
http://www.africafocus.org/docs17/iff1702.php).

In response, leading tax justice campaigners have set out a roadmap
for “the creation of a global public database on the tax
contributions and economic activities of multinational companies. ”
Using new technologies to collect in standard format information
from a wide variety of public sources, the database has the goal of
making information accessible worldwide for journalists,
policymakers, tax officials, and civil society activists.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from the press release
and white paper released on February 17, 2017

For more details, see http://datafortaxjustice.net

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on tax justice and related
issues, visit http://www.africafocus.org/intro-iff.php

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

The Trump Election: Intersecting Explanations

http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/trump-win-reasons.php

Observations (fourth installment, Feb 28, 2017)

Much of the commentary on the narrow victory by Tom Perez over Keith
Ellison in Saturday’s election for the chair of the Democratic
National Committee has had a narrow focus, interpreting it as a
victory for the Democratic establishment over progressives who had
backed Bernie Sanders in 2016. While to some extent true, that is a
highly over-simplified view, andÂ neglects the wide-ranging
mobilization and rethinking within the broader context of the highly
decentralized Democratic Party, progressive movements, and their
common social base.

Several articles on Saturday’s results with more nuanced analysis:

Peter Dreier, “Three Cheers for the Perez-Ellison DNC Team To Move
the Democrats in a Progressive Direction,” Huffington Post, February
25, 2017 http://tinyurl.com/gkqmp46

David Weigel, “Why did Keith Ellison lose the DNC race?” Washington
Post, February 26, 2017 http://tinyurl.com/zq7hf9r

James Downie, “Tom Perez’s biggest problem as DNC chair: His
backers,” Washington Post, February 27, 2017
http://tinyurl.com/hqu2vxd

And, for a wide range of articles digging more deeply into the
mistakes and structural limitations of the Democratic Party and the
Clinton campaign, and their implications for current strategy, see
http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/clinton.php (10 articles from
Nov. 11 – Dec. 20, 2016 and
http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/democratic-party.php (15 articles
from Mar. 30, 2016 – Feb. 21, 2017

And you can find sources on 19 other relevant “explanations” for the
election outcome at
http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/trump-win-reasons.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

Launch of White Paper Setting Out Roadmap for Creation of a Public
Database of Country-by-country Reporting Data

Press Release

17th February 2017

Leading tax justice campaigners and open data specialists are today
publishing a white paper setting out a roadmap for the creation of a
global public database on the tax contributions and economic
activities of multinational companies.

The open database would draw on various existing information sources
to create a central point forÂ publicly available country-by-country
reporting (CBCR) data to help tax authorities, tax justice
campaigners, investors, journalists and citizens to gain a better
understanding of the activities of these companies.

Multinational companies typically publish global, consolidated
accounts – and international accounting standards now allow these to
roll into one all financial information on the substance of their
economic activities, or at best to provide regional figures. This
means that country-level information on profits, revenues, taxes,
borrowings and employees, for example, are not provided. There may
be a set of results for “Africa” or “Europe”, but even then the
combination of operations in (say) Ghana and Mauritius, or France
and Luxembourg, makes it is impossible to unpick these numbers in a
useful way.

As the name suggests, the longstanding proposal for country-by-
country reporting would make multinational companies break down and
publish their results for each country. This is essential for
citizens to know what companies and their affiliates are doing where
they live, and what contributions they are making.

An OECD standard has now been introduced which will require all
multinationals of a certain scale to report this information
privately to the tax authority in their headquarters country. In
addition, there are public standards for limited CBCR data with
respect to the extractive and financial sectors in the EU, creating
multiple requirements for some multinational companies. It is
critical that this data is used effectively, and seen to be so used.

The next two to three years provide a window in which to establish a
single format for reporting, to ensure lower compliance costs for
businesses and to facilitate more effective use of the data by civil
society, media and tax authorities alike. This will both confirm the
value of CBCR and help policymakers to move towards a global
consensus on requiring a comprehensive public CBCR under a single
standard.

The paper – What Do They Pay? -Â is coÂauthored by Alex Cobham (Tax
Justice Network), Dr Jonathan Gray (University of Bath and Open
Knowledge International) and Professor Richard Murphy (University of
London). It is the result of a partnership between the Tax Justice
Network (TJN) and Open Knowledge International (OKI) supported by
Omidyar Network and the Financial Transparency Coalition (FTC). TJN
has, since its establishment in 2003, led the way in developing and
promoting the idea of public CBCR for multinational companies. OKI,
who partnered with TJN in establishing the Open Data for Tax Justice
initiative, are pioneers in using open data to achieve tangible
policy results and human progress. The FTC has championed public
CBCR since its inception, as have many FTC members including
Christian Aid, Tax Justice Network-Africa and TJN.

The white paper is divided into four main sections. Firstly, the
authors present a set of user stories, questions, requirements, and
scenarios of usage for a database. Secondly, they look at what kinds
of information a public database could and should contain. Thirdly,
they look at the opportunities and challenges of building a public
database drawing on various existing information sources. Fourthly
and finally, the authors suggest next steps for policy, advocacy,
and technical work towards a public database.

As leading organisations in this field, TJN and OKI now propose to
establish an open database, to include all publicly available CBCR
data; to provide a venue for multinationals that wish to lead in
transparency by publishing their data voluntarily; and to make the
data, and core tools and risk measures, accessible to a wider
audience.

Alex Cobham, chief executive of the Tax Justice Network, says:

“This white paper marks an important step towards the creation of a
fully public database to track the tax behaviour of both
multinationals and jurisdictions from Luxembourg to Mauritius, and
from Bermuda to Singapore. We’re delighted that so many
organisations and experts have contributed to this process, which
has really strengthened the analysis and design. And we’re
delighted, too, at the ongoing discussions with investors and
business groups around providing and using data.

“It’s striking that civil society is leading on this process, rather
than the OECD or a global tax body. But just as civil society
created the original proposal for country-by-country reporting,
perhaps it’s right that we should also take a lead in creating the
database that will eventually deliver the full benefits â€“ from lower
costs for multinationals dealing bilaterally with different tax
authorities, and for tax authorities exchanging information with
each other, to the benefits of the public being empowered to hold
governments and multinationals to account for their role in
international tax avoidance.”

Dr Jonathan Gray, Prize Fellow at the University of Bath’s Institute
for Policy Research and Senior Advisor to Open Knowledge
International, says:

“This new report outlines the case for a global public data project
that would transform democratic engagement around the role of
multinational corporations in our economies. A civil society
database would be more than just an information source: it would
facilitate collaboration amongst researchers, journalists and
campaigners and pave the way for an official database at an
international body such as the UN.”

Richard Murphy, Professor of Practice in International Political
Economy at City, University of London and director of Tax Research
UK, says:

“Country-by-country reporting was created to be used. Its purpose is
to show what is happening in the world and to change it. That’s why
a database holding all publicly available CBCR data is vital: with
it we can see who is doing what, and where and demand change from
the governments and companies engaged in tax abuse.”

Launched in 2016, supported by a grant from Omidyar Network, the FTC
and coordinated by TJN and OKI, Open Data for Tax Justice is a
project to create a global network of people and organisations using
open data to improve advocacy, journalism and public policy around
tax justice.

More details about the project and its members can be found at
http://datafortaxjustice.net

***************************************************************

What Do They Pay?: Towards a Public Database to Account for the
Economic Activities and Tax Contributions of Multinational
Corporations

Alex Cobham
Chief Executive, Tax Justice Network
Visiting Fellow, King’s College London

Jonathan Gray
Prize Fellow, Institute for Policy Research, University of Bath
Co-Founder, Public Data Lab
Senior Advisor, Open Knowledge International

Richard Murphy
Professor of Practice in International Political Economy, City,
University of London
Director, Tax Research UK

February 2017

[Excerpts: for full report see
http://datafortaxjustice.net/what-do-they-pay/]

Introduction

Many of the policy proposals put forward by the Tax Justice Network
(TJN) after its establishment in 2003 were so far from mainstream
thinking about tax that it was difficult to find a policy audience
with which to discuss them seriously (Murphy, Christensen & Kimmis,
2005). But by 2013, just ten years later, these proposals had come
to form the basis for the global policy agenda – including “Country-
by-Country Reporting” (CBCR) of the tax contributions and economic
activities of multinational companies.

So common is the exposÃ© of tax avoidance by multinationals today â€“
think of headlines featuring Apple or Amazon, Google or Starbucks â€“
that it would be easy to forget how recently things changed. But the
Tax Justice Network’s first front-page media splash was only in
2007. Even the headline, ‘Revealed: How multinational companies
avoid the taxman’, has become so familiar that it would be almost
redundant today (Guardian, 2007).

Over the past decade, international media coverage and civil society
campaigning has flourished. Investigative journalists have
undertaken international collaborations highlighting the scale and
societal effects of tax avoidance strategies. In many lower-income
countries, the tax treatment of multinationals has risen to the top
of policy agendas, driven by civil society mobilisation and public
anger. In OECD countries, protesters have taken to the streets to
oppose the minimal contributions of high street companies. The issue
has caught the attention of populist political movements of various
stripes.

By 2013, issues of tax were atop the global policy agenda too. The
G8 and G20 groups of countries set the aim of reducing the
‘misalignment’ between the location of multinational companies’
economic activity, and the location of declared, taxable profits.
The OECD was given a mandate to change international tax rules to
achieve this end, including the specific remit to introduce a
country-by-country reporting standard. While there are a range of
benefits to this data being compiled and made public, the critical
development is that it is intended to show for the first time
exactly where companies do business, and the extent to which this is
aligned â€“ or misaligned â€“ with where they declare profits. This is
would not be a smoking gun to establish that a specific tax
avoidance structure has been at play; but it could be a powerful
instrument to help a variety of different actors to know where to
investigate further, and what the scale of the problem may be.

The OECD standard for CBCR is technically very close to the original
TJN proposal (Murphy, 2003) – but politically very far from it. The
TJN proposal was for accounting data that it always intended be made
public, to ensure the accountability to citizens of both
multinationals and of tax authorities. The OECD data, in contrast,
is to be provided privately to the tax authority in a
multinational’s headquarters jurisdiction. It may then be exchanged,
under a range of conditions, with other tax authorities in which
subsidiaries of that multinational company trade. But under no
circumstances are those tax authorities allowed to make the
information more widely accessible. Longhorn et al (2016) provide a
comprehensive analysis of various CBCR standards, their evolution
and the arguments and evidence on their value.

Knobel and Cobham (2016) demonstrate the paths by which OECD
reporting could exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, existing global
inequalities in taxing rights with respect to multinationals. In
addition to failing to respond to lower-income countries’ revenue
losses, the lack of transparency means that the current standard
will also fail to build confidence in the fair tax treatment of
these high-profile taxpayers – missing an important opportunity to
build tax morale and wider public support for tax compliance.

As things stand, if CBCR data is not made publicly available the
OECD initiative would perhaps be the least transparent transparency
measure imaginable. And yet, it marks an important step forward for
CBCR. With most major multinationals now actually facing the
obligation to comply with the OECD requirement, the argument about
transparency has turned. The question now is no longer ‘Why should
this information be collected?’ Instead, it is now ‘Why should this
information, now collected, be kept secret?’.

The OECD is in some sense a late adopter, with multiple country-by-
country reporting standards having been introduced since the
original proposal. Notably, these include public CBCR for extractive
sector companies in both the EU and US, and for financial
institutions in the EU. There were also two notable attempts to
include CBCR data in International Financial Reporting Standards,
and although both failed the fact that this was not on technical
grounds did prove that this data is within the scope of such
standards. The data is, to be clear, accounting data rather than tax
data: it reflects the location of activities, and is not an extract
from a tax return.

That some variations on CBCR have been adopted does, however, mean
that in the absence of any official attempts, there is the
possibility for civil society to take steps towards establishing a
public database of all available CBCR information. This could
support greater use of the existing data by various stakeholders,
from tax authorities to activists and journalists. The data produced
may also be of some interest to investors, many of whom are now
showing some awareness of the significance of this data.
Importantly, it also provide a platform for the creation and testing
of risk measures – above all, those that capture the extent of
profit misalignment and therefore allow tracking of progress on the
global policy aim of its curtailment. In addition, such a database
would provide an avenue for companies that embrace transparency to
begin unilaterally to publish their own CBCR.

Overall, the use of such data is likely to provide valuable evidence
not only on the underlying issues of misalignment, but also on the
challenges and opportunities of CBCR data. In particular, it may
help to resolve questions on the need for data quality and
consistency, and to motivate convergence towards best practice among
existing and possible future standards. Over time, it is possible to
imagine such a database being hosted within a more official setting
such as the mooted intergovernmental tax body that could be created
at the UN (Cobham and Klees, 2016).

For now, this report focuses on what a global public database could
look like; what public sources of information already exist and
which may be important to prioritise in addition; how far towards
ideal CBCR it is possible to reach using existing sources; and what
changes would be needed to strengthen the contribution from CBCR
towards the shared, global policy aim of reducing corporate tax
avoidance by curtailing profit misalignment.

Our aim is not to create the perfect, final product in terms of a
public CBCR database. In their “Changing What Counts” report, Gray,
LÃ¤mmerhirt and Bounegru (2016) emphasise the role that citizen and
civil society data can play as an advocacy tool to shape
institutional data collection practices. In that spirit, the aim
here is to provide not a final product but the basis for discussion,
experimentation and iterative improvement, that we hope will help to
prepare the way for a global database that is maintained by an
international public body in the longer term.

To that end, we would like to experiment assembling and aligning
data that has been published in accordance with various existing
CBCR standards and publishing requirements. This may be used to
construct an open, online database into which researchers and other
actors can enter new data as it becomes available, and which has the
potential to become a longer term global repository for public data
about the tax contributions and economic activity of multinationals,
and a useful resource for future research and policy analysis. The
proposed database could contain and support a range of different
tools and indicators, in order to facilitate different forms of
analysis and comparison across companies and across jurisdictions.
This would represent an important step towards understanding the
role of multinationals in the composition of the world economy â€“ as
well as paving the way for an official public database.

The purpose of creating a database would extend beyond that of a
technical project to simply gather and publish existing information.
There are other things that we might expect a global civil society
database to do. As economic sociologist Donald MacKenzie argues,
economic models can be considered not just cameras which represent
the world, but also as engines which change them in different ways
(MacKenzie, 2008). By taking steps to render the economic activities
and tax contributions of multinationals publicly visible,
measurable, quantifiable and accountable, it might be expected to
change not only the dynamics of corporate reporting (as one might
expect), but potentially also the operations and organisation of
multinational firms as they adjust to new forms of publicity and
public engagement. The behaviour-changing effects of public data on
the economic activities and tax arrangements of multinationals are
certainly deserving of further attention and research.

A public database could potentially play a social function in
assembling and facilitating collaboration between different “data
publics” interested in multinational taxation. It would thus
represent an experiment in socio-technical design to organise public
activity around tax base erosion. As well as supporting links
between relevant data projects such as OpenCorporates, Open
Ownership, the Open Contracting Partnership and OpenOil, it could
act as a locus to coordinate the efforts of different actors and
groups who are interested in undertaking research, journalism,
advocacy, public policy, and public engagement work in the service
of building a fairer global tax system. This would not simply be a
matter of catering to pre-existing social groups, but also
potentially creating new kinds of associations and collaborations
between different actors. As such a public database could also be
viewed as a democratic experiment â€“ especially if these different
groups play not only a role not only in using and consuming data,
but also in co-designing and assembling the database (Gray, 2016a,
2016b). Such a database might thus open up space for new kinds of
democratic deliberation and public engagement around how the global
economy is organised â€“ and how some of the largest most powerful
economic actors on the planet – both multinationals and
jurisdictions including major tax havens – can be understood,
managed and held to account; as well supporting civil society
interventions around the kinds of transparency measures and data
collection processes we have in place to understand and shape the
behaviour of these actors.

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
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or to suggest material for inclusion. For more information about
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Africa/Global: Agribusiness Giants on Merger Path

worker | February 20, 2017 | 8:10 pm | Africa, Analysis, Economy | Comments closed

AfricaFocus Bulletin
February 20, 2017 (170220)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“If the Bayer-Monsanto merger is approved, the new merged company
will control almost 30% of the global commercial seed market and
25% of the agrochemical market – making it the world’s largest
supplier of seeds and chemicals. In South Africa, it would control
about 30% of both markets. Already today, Monsanto is one of two
companies in South Africa that employs 80% of the private sector
breeders in maize and 100% of the breeders in soybean and sunflower
breeders. ” – African Centre for Biodiversity

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs17/ag1702.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
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The dominance of giant agribusiness multinational companies in the
supply of seeds and chemicals is not new, whether at the national
level in both developing and developing countries or on a global
scale. The vast influence of these companies is felt in policies
imposed on national governments damaging to small farmers as well as
to the environment and human health, as well as in control of
pricing for agricultural inputs.

Recent years, however, have seen a further escalation of mergers
which is accelerating concentration in the industry, of which the
merger of Bayer and Monsanto is currently under review by national
regulatory agencies in South Africa and other countries. This new
report highlights the negative consequences of this trend,
particularly for smallholder farmers.

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on biodiversity and related
issues, documenting this and other related critical analyses on
policies in African agriculture, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/intro-ag.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

The Bayer-Monsanto merger: Implications for South Africa’s
agricultural future and its smallholder farmers

February 2017

The African Centre for Biodiversity (http://www.acbio.org.za) Rosa
Luxemburg Stiftung (http://www.rosalux.co.za)

[Excerpts only: Full paper available at http://tinyurl.com/z4pkxb9]

About This Paper

This paper explores the likely implications of an approved Bayer-
Monsanto merger for the South African agricultural system. It
outlines the trend of consolidation occurring within the seed and
agrochemical industries, provides a background to the merger,
criticises the rationale given for the merger by Bayer and Monsanto
and outlines concerns should the merger be approved in South Africa.
These concerns focus on the implications for South African farmers,
smallholder farmers in particular. The paper argues that further
consolidation of an already corporate- controlled seed sector is not
needed and that it undermines the emergence of an alternative system
that would support smallholder farmers in contributing to food
security in an egalitarian agricultural economy.

Key Findings

Context

* The proposed Bayer-Monsanto merger takes place in a context of
megamergers: China National Chemical Corporation (ChemChina)-
Syngenta; DuPont-Dow. If approved, just three corporations would
control about 60% of the global patented seed market and 64% of the
agrochemical market.

* If the Bayer-Monsanto merger is approved, the new merged company
will control almost 30% of the global commercial seed market and
25% of the agrochemical market – making it the world’s largest
supplier of seeds and chemicals. In South Africa, it would control
about 30% of both markets. Already today, Monsanto is one of two
companies in South Africa that employs 80% of the private sector
breeders in maize and 100% of the breeders in soybean and sunflower
breeders.

* The merger will need to be approved by regulatory authorities in
more than 30 countries. Authorities are viewing the merger
activities in totality to assess possible implications for the
market, farmers and consumers. They will look at whether reduced
competition will lead to reduced innovation, lowered spending on
research and development and implications for increased input costs
and reduced choice for farmers and other consumers (although the
market is already significantly consolidated).

* Merger activity is being driven by the global economic downturn
and reduced demand for products by farmers because of low commodity
prices. It is also driven by the desire to reduce operational
costs, particularly for research and development processes, and to
access proprietary knowledge enclosed in intellectual property
rights, such as patents. The merger and acquisition trend is
supported by the historically low interest rates (close to zero)
being offered in the United States, the Euro zone, Japan and the
United Kingdom.

* Both Bayer and Monsanto are already engaged in big data projects
in the agricultural sector. Bayer notes that one of its prime
reasons for acquiring Monsanto is because it owns The Climate
Corporation, which has the most powerful data science engine and
the most extensive field research network. In addition, Monsanto
has its foot in several important Genome Editing initiatives: it
owns one of the two existing CRISPR licenses and has started two
joint ventures on precision agriculture with the agrotech giants
CNH and AGCO.

* Both companies would benefit from sharing patents on genetically
modified crops and existing network and distribution models as they
both plan to expand into the African market, with a particular
focus on smallholder farmers. Bayer has been in the plant genetic
engineering arena since the early 2000s and holds more patents on
transgenic plant traits (206) than Monsanto (119) in the European
Union). Having access to each other’s proprietary knowledge would
provide them with significant cost savings, particularly as the
biotech industry shifts towards using CRISPR genome editing
technology, which revolutionises transgenic interventions through
the rewriting of whole DNA-sequences, but is not yet subject to a
comparable degree of regulatory oversight as the first generation
of genetic engineering. Both traits and germplasm is needed to
remain competitive in this market.

* South Africa is the most important African market for both
companies in terms of sales and for providing a base for African
expansion. The recent request by GrainSA, Agbiz Grain, the South
African National Seed Organization (SANSOR) and the Agricultural
Research Council for a breeding and technology levy to be imposed
on winter cereals in South Africa – with the possibility of
expanding this to other crops – would effectively mean that public
resources would be used to collect royalty payments for these
companies.

* Both Bayer and Monsanto sit on industry representative bodies,
giving them a significant degree of influence on the industry – a
combined company would enjoy benefits of greater influence.

Implications

The merger between Bayer Crop Science and Monsanto would have
possible implications for the agricultural sector and the food
system in South Africa:

* It would further reduce the competition within the South African
seed sector. Evidence from the US seed market shows that mergers of
this size will change key parameters of the seed market. Bayer-
Monsanto’s dominant market position will be further enhanced, as
will both companies’ control over traits-germplasm-crop protection
products in the country.

* Quite contrary to the claims of Bayer and Monsanto managers, the
merger is likely to decrease the amount of investment and the range
of innovations. This paper argues that the potential merger must be
analysed in the larger context of a rapid privatisation of research
and development. A particularly important tool of the potential
Bayer-Monsanto seed giant would be the instrument of licensing
rights, and increased pressure on farmers through the collection of
levies is expected.

* Serious impacts are anticipated for farmers and food consumers
alike. For farmers, evidence from the last few years at both the
South African seed market and the US seed market shows that a
further increase in seed prices is very likely. The choice of
available inputs will further decrease. Given the high amount of
sunk costs that particularly Monsanto invested in the development
of partly unsuccessful genetically modified organisms, there is a
threat that the South African market will be used as a strategic
point from where to ‘dump’ old genetically modified (GM)
technologies onto the African market. On the other hand, available
micro data from households in South Africa show how any price
increase in staple food prices might affect the income poor. An
indirect effect on food prices from the merger cannot be excluded.

* A closer look at the drivers of the Bayer- Monsanto merger reveals
that the ‘efficiency argument’ put forward by the corporations
might lead to a benefit to their shareholders, but cannot be
expected to spill over to external groups, such as farmers and food
consumers.

…

Seed and Agrochemical Markets

Global agricultural input markets (seed, fertiliser, crop protection
products, farm machinery and agri-tech markets) are already
significantly consolidated, having experienced a series of
horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions over the past two
decades (Figure 1).

The global and regional seed market

In 1994, the four biggest seed companies controlled 21% of the
global market (AgriPortal, 2016); today just ten companies own
about 65% of the world’s proprietary seed (seed registered for
legal protection) for major crops (Wattnem, 2016). It must be noted
that in Africa 65-100% of seed used by smallholder farmers is
farmer-saved and exchanged (varies by crop and geography) (Wattnem,
2016). The global commercial seed market has an estimated value of
about US$53 billion and is expected to grow to US$113 billion by
2020 (Marketsandmarkets, 2016) with the African market contributing
less than 2% to the current value (CTA, 2015). This presents a
potentially lucrative market, but many obstacles have to be
overcome to carry out a sustainably profitable business. Some of
the bigger ones include lack of infrastructure, specialised
knowledge, institutional arrangements and political bureaucracy.

The genetically modified seed market was worth US$15.6 billion in
2011 and is expected to grow to US$30.2 billion in 2018 (AGPRO,
2013). However, a recent market report notes that conventional
seeds are expected to be the fastest growing segment of total seed
sales (Marketsandmarkets, 2016). …Â Africa presents an untapped
market but with very slow processes of regulatory and institutional
development to allow GM crops to be grown. In the meantime, market
expansion will be based on conventional certified seed and
agrochemicals.

Maize and horticulture are the two biggest seed markets on the
African continent, with the maize market valued at about US$500
million and horticulture at US$250 million; most seed company
activity takes place in this space (ACB, 2015). There is more
recent interest in commercialisation of legume seed on the
continent.

The South African seed market

South Africa has a dominant commercial seed industry, which is
primarily geared to serving the needs of large-scale commercial
farmers, with a dominant focus on hybrid, improved and genetically
modified seed (DAFF, 2015). South Africa’s marginal smallholder
farmers also rely on commercial seed as a significant source of
planting material, especially for maize and horticulture, although
indigenous crops and farmer seed varieties are also used.
Multinational corporations dominate the seed industry: Pioneer Hi-
Bred/Pannar, Sakata, Monsanto and Syngenta (GrainSA, 2015). …

The value of the South African seed market was estimated at R5.62
billion in 2012/13 (TASAI, 2015). The focus of both Bayer and
Monsanto is on commodity crops: maize, sunflower, soybean, cotton
and wheat. The value of the seed market in grain and oilseed was
about R3.9 billion (about US$285 million) for the 2014/15
production season (GrainSA, 2015). …

Maize dominates the national variety list – there are 546 maize
varieties on the official list; 308 are protected by plant
breeders’ rights and 162 are genetically modified (TASAI, 2015).
There are 41 genetically modified soybean varieties on the list and
35 non- genetically modified ones, including 19 with plant
breeders’ rights protection (TASAI, 2015). Monsanto and
DuPont/Pioneer Hi-Bred/Pannar own at least 85% of the seed business
for the big commodity crops – maize, soybean (the second largest
agronomic crop in the country) and sunflower. There is intense
competition between them (TASAI, 2015). DuPont is planning to merge
with Dow, which puts pressure on Monsanto to increase its scale to
continue competing in seed and agrochemical markets. Bayer’s
strength is in agrochemicals, although it has a small seed
footprint in South Africa. Bayer introduced its cotton seed to
South Africa in 2014 and a new canola seed variety in 2015
(Breytenbach, 2015). It reportedly introduced these new varieties
into South Africa in response to a direct call from farmers asking
for alternative products (Breytenbach, 2015).

Syngenta, Monsanto, Pannar-Du Pont Pioneer and Dow form SANSOR’s
committee on genetically modified organisms (SANSOR, 2016). Any
activity that is likely to increase Monsanto’s influence in this
market in South Africa is significant given the extent of
genetically modified maize planted, the country’s staple food crop.

The global and regional agrochemical market

The global agrochemical market is estimated to be worth about
US$33.4 billion (Macaskill, 2016) with the African market valued at
around US$1.1 billion (R15-20 billion) in 2014 (Odendaal, 2014).
The agrochemical market is dominated by Monsanto (US$15 billion),
Syngenta (US$13.4 billion), Bayer (US$10.4 billion), DuPont (US$9.8
billion), Dow (with sales of US$6.38 billion in 2015) and BASF
(US$5.8 billion); Chinese-owned ChemChina doesn’t make divisional
sales figures available, but total sale figures for all divisions
(of which agrochemicals is just one) were US$45 billion in 2015
(Alessi, 2016).

The South African agrochemical market

South Africa uses more agrochemicals than any other African country,
mostly for grain crop production (PR Newswire, 2015), yet it
comprises less than 2% of the global market (Macaskill, 2016).
South African farmers spent R2.3 billion on agrochemicals in the
2014/15 season (GrainSA, 2015). The South African agrochemicals
market is estimated to grow at a compound annual growth rate of
4.5% by 2020 (PR Newswire, 2015). Major agrochemical companies
operating in the country range from Bayer Cropscience and Syngenta
to Adama, Dow Agrosciences, Philagro South Africa, BASF South
Africa, Sipcam, Monsanto and Chemtura Corporation (GrainSA, 2015).
Companies such as Bayer, Syngenta SA, Dow, DuPont and Monsanto
South Africa sit on the executive council of CropLife SA, an
industry representative body (CropLife SA, 2016).

Bayer and Monsanto in South Africa

Both Bayer and Monsanto are major manufacturers of agrochemicals,
seeds and genetically modified seed (Court, 2016). Company
confidentiality makes it difficult to ascertain market-specific
market shares for any company.

Bayer Crop Science in South Africa

Most of Bayer’s African sales are generated in South Africa, and a
key part of Bayer’s strategic focus for its business in southern
Africa is ‘expanding our seed footprint – especially for soyabeans
and wheat – through further acquisitions, in-licensing agreements
and partnerships’ (Bayer, 2016). It owns a manufacturing plant in
South Africa, has established a maize competency centre in KwaZulu-
Natal (Bayer Crop Science, 2016e) and has opened its first African
SeedGrowth Centre near Johannesburg (one of 16 in the world)
(Bayer, 2016c). The Centre will train seed company production
staff, support seed companies in upscaling processes, act as a base
for research in optimising seed treatment technologies and
demonstrate how Bayer’s equipment works (Bayer, 2016c).

It is focusing on both the large-scale commercial and small-scale
farming sectors. In March 2016 Bayer launched its ‘Committed to the
Future Pledge’ at the South African Grain Congress, in which it
promised to continue to invest more than 10% of turnover into
developing new compounds (it should be noted that this is their
core business and so does not qualify as an added benefit for South
Africa). It also promised to invest in further initiatives, like
its Bayer Forward Farms project, a knowledge platform that
facilitates the sharing of knowledge between selected farms and the
combined expertise of the broader industry (Bayer, 2016d).

It is also actively pursuing the small-scale farming market. Bayer
uses demonstration farms and training centres set up by
organisations, such as the United States farm machinery giant AGCO
to showcase its inputs (Maritz, 2016). It is involved in other
projects like this in South Africa, Ghana, Ethiopia and Morocco
(Maritz, 2016). …

Monsanto in South Africa

Monsanto is a pioneer of genetic modification of agricultural crops
(ACB, 2005) and the largest maize seed company in the country by
sales (DAFF, 2015); it also supplies 90% of soybean planted
commercially in South Africa (ACB, 2016). It has been operating in
South Africa since 1968 and has licensed its genetic modification
technology to other seed companies operating in the domestic
market. In the late 1990s it purchased domestic seed companies
Sensako and Carnia, thereby taking up a major stake in local seed
and grain markets (ACB, 2005). Monsanto sells seed for alfalfa,
canola, corn, cotton, sorghum, soybean, sugarbeets and wheat
(Stucke and Grunes, 2016). Monsanto’s purchase of global seed
company Seminis gave it ownership of plant breeders’ rights to a
range of South African vegetable seed varieties (ACB, 2005) and
access to germplasm. The Sensako purchase gave Monsanto about 45%
of the South African agrochemical market for field crops (ACB,
2015b).

In November 2016 Monsanto opened its renovated breeding centre in
Petit near Benoni, South Africa (Van Wyngaardt, 2016). The 300
hectare plant breeding farm uses imported and local germplasm to
establish new breeding crosses (Van Wyngaardt, 2016). Monsanto also
pursues the small-scale farming sector through projects, such as
Water Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA) (Monsanto, n.d.[2]). …

ACB has extensively critiqued this programme for its use of
Monsanto’s genetically modified drought tolerant maize because the
product has not been successful in the United States, and it is
inappropriate for smallholder farmers, due to its reliance on the
use of synthetic fertilisers and agrochemicals (ACB, 2015a). The
project, which is supposedly meant to benefit small-scale farmers,
leads them onto a technological treadmill with known environmental
consequences and one that is difficult to escape. Farmers have
drought tolerant varieties of their own, which are freely saved and
thus always available and adapted to localised conditions.
Genetically modified crops were also trialled in eight African
countries in 2015 (SeedWorld, 2016a) with Monsanto’s drought
tolerant maize from the WEMA project expected to be released in
field trials in Tanzania and Mozambique in 2017.

…

2016 – The year of the mega-mergers

* July 2014: Monsanto tried to buy Syngenta for US$46 billion, but
the deal was rejected by shareholders.

* November 2015: Chinese state-owned ChemChina made a US$43 billion
bid for Syngenta, which was accepted by shareholders in February
2016. This was the largest purchase of a foreign firm in Chinese
history.

– ChemChina owns Adama (formerly Maktheshim Agan Industries), the
world’s seventh largest agrochemical company.

– The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States approved
the deal in August 2016 (Bloomberg 2016b), South Africa in
September 2016 and Australia in December 2016 (Food Ingredients
First, 2016). South Africa attached the condition that Syngenta’s
formulation plant could not be relocated outside of the country for
an undefined period to avoid job losses (CCSA, 2016a). The deal was
also approved by the Common Market for East and Southern Africa
(COMESA) Competition Commission in September 2016 (Comesa
Competition Commission, 2016).

– The European Commission has requested additional information from
both companies and will announce its decision on the ChemChina-
Syngenta merger on 12 April 2017 (Produce Business UK, 2017).

– A possible obstacle to approval is ChemChina’s plans to acquire
another Chinese state- owned fertiliser company, Sinochem, which
was not mentioned in the applications for approval of its
acquisition of Syngenta (Noel and Baghdjian, 2016).

* December 2015: DuPont and Dow announced a merger that will give
the combined company an estimated value of US$130 billion.

– The deal was approved by the COMESA Competition Commission in
September 2016 (Comesa Competition Commission, 2016a), but still
awaits approval in Australia, the United States, Brazil and South
Africa.

– The deal is being held up by the European Commission, which has
launched a full investigation on the basis that insufficient
information has been provided (Reuters, 2016a). The Commission will
announce its decision on 6 February 2017 (Investopedia, 2016).

* May 2016: Bayer started the bidding process for Monsanto. The $66
billion bid was accepted in December 2016. If approved, the merged
company will be the world’s largest seed and agriculture chemicals
company. If the merger is not approved by competition regulators,
Bayer will pay a US$2 billion termination fee to Monsanto
(Begemann, 2016).

– The European Commission will decide on this merger by 15 March
2017 (European Commission, 2016).

– It has not yet been submitted to South Africa’s regulators.

* August 2016: Canadian Potash Corp. started negotiations to buy
fertiliser producer Agrium for US$30 billion. The deal is expected
to close in mid-2017 and will create the largest fertiliser company
in the world; it also plans to expand into seeds and crop chemicals
(Skerritt and Casey, 2016).

BASF has been left out of the scramble to consolidate and may well
have to buy up smaller companies, or sell, because it will not have
the strength to take on the concentrated power of its competitors
(ETC Group, 2016). Or it could benefit from forced divestitures of
the mergers. If all the proposed megamergers are approved, these
three companies (ChemChina-Syngenta, DuPont-Dow, Bayer-Monsanto)
will own and sell about 60% of the world’s patented seeds and
pesticides/herbicides (AgriPortal, 2016).

*****************************************************

Africa/Global: Transparency Setback, African Agendas

worker | February 7, 2017 | 7:34 pm | Africa, Economy, political struggle | Comments closed

AfricaFocus Bulletin
February 7, 2017 (170207)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

In the world of large multinational corporations, secrecy is more
than the rule rather than exception. Despite this reality, there
have been some advances in recent years, including U.S. legislation
and regulations requiring disclosure of payments by U.S. oil, gas,
and mining companies to foreign governments. Last week, the U.S.
Congress revoked this Security and Exchange Commission rule, a year
before it was actually to be implemented. Although comparatively
little noticed in comparison to the tumult around White House
actions, this was an indication that the Republican Congress as well
was determined to reverse even modest steps to fight corporate
corruption and other similar abuses.

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs17/iff1702.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=http://www.africafocus.org/docs17/iff1702.php

In this context, the continuing Africa-wide campaign to curb some
$70 billion in illicit financial flows from the continentÂ Â becomes
both more difficult and even more imperative. A timely new report
just released on January 27 by six civil society organizations lays
out specific steps that African governments can take to “accelerate
the IFF agenda.” The six include five African organizations (Trust
Africa, Tax Justice Network-Africa, the Pan African Lawyers Union,
CRADEC (Cameroon),Â CISLAC (Nigeria), and Global Financial Integrity
(Washington, DC).

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains (1) a brief article on the U.S.
congressional action to revoke the SEC rule on transparency for oil,
gas, and mining companies, and (2) the full text of “Accelerating
the IFF Agenda for African countries.”

For more information on the revocations of the SEC rule, visit
https://thefactcoalition.org/press/news-releases/,
http://www.pwypusa.org/category/press-releases/, and
http://tinyurl.com/ze7rr6k

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on illicit financial flows,
corruption, and related issues, see
http://www.africafocus.org/intro-iff.php

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

The Trump Election: Intersecting Explanations
http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/trump-win-reasons.php

Observations (third installment, Feb 7, 2017)

Since the inauguration of President Donald Trump on January 20, the
news cycle has been driven by the rapid pace of executive orders,
tweets, and, most surprisingly, an unprecedented range of resistance
to the assault on democratic values and rationality by the new
administration. Although the debate about explanations for the Trump
election have faded into the background, they remain highly relevant
for the present and future, for evaluation of his questionable
legitimacy, analysis of both medium-term and long-term strategies
for resistance, and, at a deeper level, as x-rays or CAT scans to
help piece together a deeper analysis of the history and driving
forces underpinning the U.S. and global socioeconomic and political
order.

[Continued at http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/explanations.php]

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

Following House, Senate Axes SEC Oil, Mining Payments Rule Bloomberg
BNA, February 6, 2017

By Rob Tricchinelli

http://tinyurl.com/zxm2bs6

The Senate voted early Feb. 3 to revoke an SEC rule requiring oil,
gas and mining companies to disclose more about their operations,
two days after related House action. President Donald Trump can now
sign the measure, which would negate the long-embattled Securities
and Exchange Commission rule mandated by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act and
designed to fight overseas corruption.

It was set to take effect in 2018 and force companies like Chevron
Corp. to reveal payments to governments tied to resource
development.

Republican lawmakers are using the Congressional Review Act to kill
the rule, which skirts the procedural requirement for 60 Senate
votes. The vote broke along party lines, 52-47, with Sen. Ed Markey
(D-Mass.) not voting.

Dodd-Frank Mandate

While the CRA action negates the SEC rule, it doesn’t strip away the
Dodd-Frank Act provision mandating the regulation. This means the
SEC is still technically required to craft the measure, even though
a Republican-led commission is unlikely to act and Republican
lawmakers are seeking to repeal that part of Dodd-Frank.

Several Republican lawmakers said they want the SEC to craft a
better rule. “It’s time to go back to the drawing board and redo
it,” Rep. Bill Huizenga (R-Mich.), who sponsored the effort in the
House, told Bloomberg BNA in a brief interview. Democrats slammed
the move. “This bill puts Big Oil and its cronies ahead of
transparency and accountability, and ought to be called the
Kleptocrat Relief Act,” Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) said in a news
release.

Try, Try Again

The rule has a tortured history. The SEC’s first attempt was struck
down in a lawsuit by the American Petroleum Institute. The second
attempt was prompted by a different lawsuit alleging the agency was
dragging its feet in reproposing it. Oil, gas and mineral companies
argue that the rule’s compliance costs, which the SEC estimates to
run in the tens or hundreds of millions industry-wide, outweigh its
benefits. The rule’s supporters counter that similar rules are
already in effect in other jurisdictions without hampering the
industry. They also say disclosures would reduce graft in mineral-
rich countries whose residents have low standards of living.

“It is alarming that lawmakers would move to undermine American
efforts to combat violent extremism abroad by rolling back this
anti-corruption measure, which protects American companies and
democratic interests around the globe,” Clark Gascoigne, deputy
director of the Financial Accountability and Corporate Transparency
Coalition, said in a news release.

To contact the reporter on this story: Rob Tricchinelli in
Washington atrtricchinelli@bna.com

******************************************************

Accelerating the IFF Agenda for African Countries

January 2017

http://tinyurl.com/jf6ro5n

Introduction

Illicit financial flows (IFFs) are a large and growing problem for
the African continent, with upwards of $70 billion in IFFs leaving
the continent annually. African governments, intergovernmental
organizations, industry, and civil society have come to understand
the severity of the problem over the past few years.

The following list of actions are meant to address some of the first
steps in addressing IFFs. These actions are foundational, involving
measures that can either be undertaken more quickly and easily in
some countries where some of the processes and commitments may
already be underway or measures that lay the groundwork for later
reforms. The result is an Accelerated IFF Agenda that governments
can use as a place to begin their work to tackle IFFs in their own
countries, leading to greater domestic resource mobilization and
growth, resources which will be critical in making progress on the
Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, and the African Union’s Agenda 2063, the Addis Tax
Initiative, and the Africa Mining Vision.

In considering the items on the Accelerated IFF Agenda, it is
important to remember two things. The first is that this should not
be seen as an all-or-nothing agenda. Each of these measures is
important in its own right and can be implemented independently of
others, and governments may want to consider ways to phase in
certain actions. For example, requiring country-by-country reporting
of all multinational companies operating in the country is one
option, but a government could instead require it only of companies
operating in the extractive industries or in construction. Second,
public involvement in helping achieve many of these aims can be of
great benefit. For example, a team of computer science students at a
university might be able to assist in the creation of an online
registry for corporations. Civil society organizations, academics,
the country’s youth, and other parts of society want to help tackle
IFFs for the good of their countries and their futures. Working with
them can multiply the effectiveness of many of the government’s
efforts, as well as building confidence with donors, investors, and
citizens.

The Accelerated IFF Agenda

Below is a list of fourteen measures governments can take in the
immediate term to catalyze their efforts to combat IFFs. Brief
explanations of each measure are included in the pages that follow.

Create Governmental IFF Policy

1. Establish Multi-Agency Units within Governments to Address IFFs

2. Include IFF Accountability within the African Peer Review
Mechanism

Promote Financial Transparency

3. Establish or Enhance Online Corporate Registries, Make
Information Publicly Available, and Require Beneficial Ownership
Information as Part of the Registration Process

4. Adopt the Open Contracting Data Standard

5. Require Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership Information from all
Government Contract Bidders

6. Require Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership Information in
Political Asset Declarations

7. Establish Government/Independent Measurement Mechanisms for
Extracted Natural Resources

Increase Enforcement Efforts and Powers

8. Adopt a Law Clearly Prohibiting Trade Misinvoicing

9. Establish Specialized Asset Forfeiture and Recovery Units and/or
Advocate for the Creation of a Special Office of Asset Recovery
within the African Union

Tackle Tax Evasion and Avoidance

10. Join African Tax Information Sharing Networks

11. Establish Transfer Pricing Units within Tax Authorities

12. Require Public Country-by-Country Reporting by Multinationals

Prevent Financial Crime

13. Mandate Rigorous Customer Due Diligence and Suspicious Activity
Reporting Programs within Banks

14. Empower Strong and Effective Financial Intelligence Units (and
create them if not yet established)

Several of the actions identified above require that certain
information be made available to the public. Countries may also want
to consider adopting a more wide-ranging law, regulation or policy
that provides the public with greater access to government
information and data, often called freedom of information
provisions.

Additional Detail for Accelerating the IFF Agenda for African
Countries

Create Governmental IFF Policy

1. Establish Multi-Agency Units within Governments to Address IFFs

IFFs affect all aspects of a country’s economy, therefore approaches
to curtailing IFFs must include agencies from across government,
enabling agencies to come together to coordinate and to develop
policy.

Governments should consider establishing multi-agency units that
include officials from various ministries or departments who
specialize in:

*Â Financial intelligence and bank supervision

*Â Import administration

*Â Export administration

*Â Transfer pricing

*Â Income tax

*Â Natural resource exploitation

*Â National criminal investigations

*Â National criminal prosecutions

*Â Anti-corruption

To ensure that these multi-agency units can function effectively,
countries should ensure that laws are in place to allow officials
from different agencies to share information within these multi-
agency units. Some African countries have begun to establish multi-
agency units, but they are often more narrowly focused on, for
example, corruption or ‘illicit finance’ as described in the US-
Africa Partnership on Illicit Finance. While we welcome the
initiative to build on these existing multi-agency endeavors, we
believe it is imperative that the scope of work for the units be
broad enough to encompass the entirety of the IFF challenge.

2. Include IFF Accountability within the African Peer Review
Mechanism and Open Government Partnership Commitments

Countries should call on the African Union to include IFF-related
questions on the African Peer Review Mechanism questionnaire. As a
starting point, questions on this questionnaire could address each
of the policy areas recommended in this document. In addition,
African countries that are part of the Open Government Partnership
(OGP) should include in their OGP National Action Plans commitments
to carry out the action items identified in this document.

This action would implement previous recommendations made by the UN
Economic Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows from Africa,Â which were endorsed by the African
Union in January 2015. The High Level Panel on Illicit Financial
Flows from Africa is now a joint initiative of the African Union and
the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

Promote Financial Transparency

3. Establish or Enhance Online Corporate Registries, Make
Information Publicly Available, and Require Beneficial Ownership
Information as Part of the Registration Process

Countries could look to legislation and regulation from early
adopters like the United Kingdom and the Ukraine for models on how
to implement these measures. In addition, a number of other
countries have committed to establishing public registers or
exploring their establishment and may soon have legislation that
could be referenced in developing domestic measures. These countries
include Bulgaria, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya,
Netherlands, New Zealand, and Nigeria.

This action would implement previous recommendations made by the UN
Economic Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows from Africa, and the Human Rights Development
Initiative, which was appointed by the African Union’s African
Commission on Human & Peoples’ Rights to conduct a study on the
human rights implications of IFFs.

4. Adopt the Open Contracting Data Standard

The Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS) is a common data model
that establishes a framework to enable governments to publish
shareable, reusable, and machine-readable procurement data that is
publicly accessible. While many countries have started to publish
PDFs of procurement contracts, information provided in PDF form is
of extremely limited utility. Adoption of a global data standard
like the OCDS is not just an exercise in publishing procurement
information. It enables governments to conduct assessments on the
fitness of their procurement systems by examining the experiences
and outcomes of other countries using the same standard. In
addition, the OCDS is a mature standard, offering practical tools,
expertise, and support to assist governments in adoption of the
standard.

The Contracting 5â€”Colombia, France, Mexico, Ukraine, and the UKâ€”are
implementing the OCDS, and Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia have included open contracting in
their National Action Plans for the Open Government Partnership.
Uganda developed an open contracting platform, the Government
Procurement Portal (GPP), and continues to work to improve the
system.

This action would implement previous recommendations on open
contracting and open spending made by the UN Economic Commission for
Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa,
and the Pan African Lawyers’ Union.

5. Require Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership Information from all
Government Contract Bidders

Currently, the Open Data Contracting Standard does not collect
information on beneficial ownership. To fill this gap, countries
should require beneficial ownership disclosures for all bidders for
and recipients of government contracts to help prevent sham bidding,
bidding by persons barred from government procurement for past
actions, and other forms of corruption in bidding processes. Such
policies are already in place in Slovakia and could serve as a study
for countries wishing to implement this recommendation.

This action would implement previous recommendations made by the UN
Economic Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows from Africa.

6. Require Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership Information in
Political Asset Declarations

Conflicts of interest may not be readily identifiable in asset
declarations unless the beneficial owners of the entities included
are known. Adding this detail to the asset declaration requirements
can help identify where potential conflicts may arise in the
individual’s political work. The Ukraine has passed legislation
requiring the inclusion of beneficial ownership of property
information on its asset declarations, and Liberia has included
making use of beneficial ownership information on asset declarations
an element of its National Action Plan for the US-Africa Partnership
on Illicit Finance.

7. Establish Government/Independent Measurement Mechanisms for
Extracted Natural Resources

Governments should independently determine or verify the actual
volume of natural resources being extracted from the ground by
mining and oil companies and not just rely on the volumes reported
by the companies. Without independent verification of the volume of
natural resources being extracted, it is impossible to determine if
companies have in fact paid the correct amount to the government
under their extraction contracts.

Zambia has implemented the Mineral Value Chain Monitoring Project
(MCVMP), which aims to independently monitor and facilitate the
exploration and exploitation of mining and mineral value chains in
the country. International support has contributed to the MCVMP
effort in Zambia, including the Government of Norway, the European
Union, and the Public Finance Management Reform programme. 8 Where
the African Mining Vision and/or the African Mineral Governance
Framework call for similar verification of the volume of minerals
extracted, this action item could be implemented through those
initiatives. This action builds on the strength of the OCDS and the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which track
agreements and payments between governments and companies.

Increase Enforcement Efforts and Powers

8. Adopt a Law Clearly Prohibiting Trade Misinvoicing

Trade misinvoicing is the manipulation of the price, value, or
quantity of a good on an international invoice in order to avoid
taxes, move money, or evade capital controls. Of measurable IFFs,
trade misinvoicing has historically represented and continues to
represent the largest portion of IFFs. Though trade misinvoicing is
a relatively simple technique to use, it is exceedingly difficult
for government officials to identify. Moreover, the widespread,
routine, and customary nature of its use makes enacting a law
prohibiting the conduct essential in order to put business persons
on notice and to empower prosecutors to prosecute the conduct when
it is identified.

Example of a model law criminalizing trade misinvoicing:

Whoever, in relation to the importation or exportation of goods or
in relation to the trade in services or intangible property,
deliberately misstates, manipulates, falsifies, or omits a price,
quantity, volume, grade, or other material aspect of an invoice for
the purpose of (i) evading or avoiding VAT taxes, customs duties,
income taxes, or any other form of tax or revenue collected by the
Government; (ii) obtaining a tax benefit, export subsidy, or other
benefit provided by the Government; or (iii) evading or avoiding
[capital or foreign exchange controls]; shall be subject to a civil
or criminal fine of up to [specific amount] [or imprisoned for up to
[x] year[s], or both].

This action would implement previous recommendations made by the UN
Economic Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows from Africa.

9. Establish Specialized Asset Forfeiture and Recovery Units and/or
Advocate for the Creation of a Special Office of Asset Recovery
within the African Union

Asset forfeiture and recovery efforts deprive all types of criminals
of the proceeds of their crime, providing powerful disincentives for
crime in the first place. However, in order to be effective
disincentives, these efforts must be consistent and efficient.
Because they involve funds found in other jurisdictions, asset
recovery efforts require specialized knowledge of foreign legal
systems and mutual legal assistance treaties. Establishing units
specializing in asset forfeiture and recovery ensures that all
criminals face the potential for the loss of their criminal proceeds
and improves the odds of a country recovering the funds because of
the increased capacity and expertise that these units develop over
time.

Another approach would be to advocate for the creation of a special
office of asset recovery within the African Union. This office could
assist and facilitate asset repatriation requests among states,
including the maintenance of a public list of funds requested for
return and the status of such requests. Taking this approach could
contribute to the implementation of the recommendation by the UN
Economic Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows from Africa for the African Union to lead an effort
to establish a global governance framework for asset freezing and
repatriation. 10 The African Development Bank has also committed to
supporting a regional network on recovery of stolen assets in its
recently adopted Bank Group Policy on the Prevention of Illicit
Financial Flows. In addition, collaborative asset recovery
approaches already exist. For example, Asset Recovery Inter-Agency
Networks (ARIN) have been initiated in Southern Africa, East Africa,
and West Africa.

Tackle Tax Evasion and Avoidance

10. Join African Tax Information Sharing Networks

Several African countries have signed up to the OECD-led Common
Reporting Standard (CRS) for the international exchange of
information about bank accounts held by citizens abroad in an effort
to capture lost tax revenue. Access to this information is critical
in identifying and pursuing cases of individual tax evasion because
without the information provided by the foreign countries, the home
country has no way of knowing which citizens hold taxable bank
accounts abroad and must instead rely upon self-reporting by
individuals.

However, some African countries may have difficulty initially
accessing the broader international system for automatic exchange of
tax information because of how the system has been set up (with
little input from developing countries). Despite this, the
international framework could readily be adapted to establish
exchange arrangements among developing countries, especially within
regions. In fact, the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) is
currently engaged in a pilot program facilitating automatic exchange
of tax information among a number of African countries. In addition
to enabling African countries to get this critical information
sooner than may be available from developed countries, it offers
countries the opportunity to demonstrate capacity to perform within
these arrangements, making the country a more attractive potential
exchange partner for developed countries down the line.

11. Establish Transfer Pricing Units within Tax Authorities

Financial arrangements within corporate groups or among related
entities are nearly impossible to observe from the outside and
consequently are of high risk for manipulation. For this reason,
transactions among these parties, referred to as transfer pricing,
warrant special attention. Given the complexity of these
arrangements and transactions, it has been found that forming units
with highly trained officials to monitor these types of transactions
yields the most consistent and effective results for tax
administrations.

12. Require Public Country-by-Country Reporting by Multinationals

Public country-by-country reporting (CBCR) helps identify where
transfer pricing investigations should focus. By requiring companies
to provide basic financial information for entire corporate groups,
disaggregated by country, tax administrations are better able to
identify the risk of potential transfer pricing abuse and even
identify jurisdictions of concern to help establish more sensitive
risk management frameworks within tax administrations.

African countries should require foreign multinational corporations
(MNCs) operating in their country to provide their country-by-
country reports with their local tax returns and encourage those
MNCs to make the information publicly available. Further, African
countries should require MNCs headquartered in their country to
prepare and publish country-by-country reports.

This action would implement previous recommendations made by the UN
Economic Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows from Africa. 12

Prevent Financial Crime

13. Mandate Rigorous Customer Due Diligence and Suspicious Activity
Reporting Programs within Banks

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has set the international
standards for customer due diligence and suspicious activity
reporting in their FATF Recommendations 2012 standard,
Recommendations 10 and 20, respectively. Countries can look to their
FATF-Style Regional Body (FSRB) for assistance in implementing and
strengthening their laws and regulations in this area. This action
would implement previous recommendations made by the UN Economic
Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows
from Africa, and the Human Rights Development Initiative. 14.
Empower Strong and Effective Financial Intelligence Units (and
create them if not yet established)

Financial intelligence units (FIUs) are bodies that collect and, if
given the power, coordinate intelligence on financial crime that
results in IFFs. Creating FIUs where none exist, and giving them
strong powers of coordination and information collation from
different arms of government (possibly in a lead role in a Multi-
Agency IFF Unit (see point 1 above)), is critical to organizing and
operationalizing counter-IFF measures. Additionally, connecting to
the international network of FIUs, the Egmont Group, can help
facilitate cooperation among FIUs of different countries. While most
African countries do have FIUs, only twenty-two African countries
have FIUs that are members of the Egmont Group.

About

This document is the result of consultations among experts on
various elements of illicit financial flows, including:

* Raymond Baker – Global Financial Integrity, Washington, D.C., USA

* Jason Braganza – Tax Justice Network-Africa (TJN-A), Nairobi,
Kenya

* Liz Confalone – Global Financial Integrity, Washington, D.C., USA

* Donald Deya – Pan African Lawyers’ Union (PALU), Arusha, Tanzania

* Donald Ideh – TrustAfrica, Abuja, Nigeria

* Heather Lowe – Global Financial Integrity, Washington, D.C., USA

* Jean Mballa Mballa – Centre RÃ©gional Africain pour le
DÃ©veloppement EndogÃ¨ne et Communautaire (CRADEC), YaoundÃ©, Cameroon

*Â Auwal Ibrahim Musa (Rafsanjani) – Civil Society Legislative
Center (CISLAC), Abuja, Nigeria

*Â Crystal Simeoni – Tax Justice Network-Africa (TJN-A), Nairobi,
Kenya

We wish to thank the Swedish International Development Agency for
their support of this project.

*****************************************************

South Africa: State Capture & Energy Policy

worker | January 23, 2017 | 7:52 pm | Africa, Analysis, Donald Trump, Economy | Comments closed

AfricaFocus Bulletin
January 23, 2017 (170123)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“Eskom, accused of overly cozy ties with the Guptas featured heavily
in the report, with 916 mentions. … it’s Eskom’s chief executive,
Brian Molefe, who comes out looking the worst. According to cell
phone records, Molefe had 58 phone calls with the eldest of the
Gupta brothers, Ajay Gupta, between August 2015 and March 2016, just
before the Guptas purchased South Africa’s Optimum coal mine for
2.15 billion rand ($160 million). Eskom, which prepaid the Gupta’s
Tegeta Exploration and Resources 600 million rand for coal, had been
accused of helping to finance the Guptas’ coal mine deal through
preferential treatment.” – Quartz Africa

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs17/saf1701.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=http://www.africafocus.org/docs17/saf1701.php

In South Africa, as elsewhere in countries both large and small, the
debates about government energy policy are often framed in terms of
what is best for the “national interest.” But few doubt that behind
these choices between renewable energy options and others (fossil
fuels or nuclear energy), there are also private interests, whose
roles in the management of the state are not new but are becoming
more and more blatant (see below on links on the common stakes of
the incoming Trump administration and Russia’s Putin in promoting
fossil-fuel interests).

Concentrating on this aspect of what is termed “state capture” in
South Africa, this AfricaFocus Bulletin includes (1) brief excerpts
from the 355-page report on “State of Capture” from Public Protector
Thuli Madonsela; (2) an article with a summary of the report from
Quartz Africa, and (3) an article from The Conversation on the state
capture issue and its effects on plans for nuclear energy.

Two recent articles with background on the energy debate include:

le Cordeur, Matthew, “5 reasons why Eskom is wrong about renewables
costs – CSIR,” Jan 12, 2017 http://www.fin24.com – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/jmpts84

“Eskom delaying R50 billion renewable energy plan to push nuclear
goals,” Jan 10, 2017, http://businesstech.co.za – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/zcqku94

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Just Announced re State Capture in Mozambique

Watch live on youtube January 25
Zitamar News and Africa Research Institute present:
A Webinar on Mozambique’s Debt Crisis
Wednesday 25 January â€“ 15:00 Maputo / 13:00 London / 08:00 New York

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

The Trump Election: Intersecting Explanations
http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/trump-win-reasons.php

Observations (second installment), Jan 23, 2017

In the period between the election and the inauguration, the
highest profile debate about reasons for the Trump electoral win was
about Putin’s intervention. But that debate produced more heat than
light, while key issues such as the common interests of Putin and
the Trump administration in promoting the fossil-fuel industry
received only marginal attention.

See http://noeasyvictories.org/usa/putin-intervention.php forÂ short
observations and database entries for 31 sources to date.

Articles on the fossil-fuel connection in particular include:

Joe Romm, “Did Putin help elect Trump to restore $500 billion Exxon
oil deal killed by sanctions?,” ThinkProgress, Jan 8, 2017
http://tinyurl.com/z6d45ub

Rachel Maddow, 5-minute video on ExxonMobil & Russia deal, Dec. 20,
2016 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n60SzMzjXog

Alex Steffen, “Trump, Putin and the Pipelines to Nowhere
You can’t understand what Trump’s doing to America without
understanding the ‘Carbon Bubble’,” Dec 15, 2016, http://medium.com
– Direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/hb2xnc6

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

“State of Capture”: A Report of the Public Protector

14 October 2016

Full 355-page report in pdf available at http://tinyurl.com/jffpskt

5. Evidence and Information Obtained

Introduction

5.1. The Gupta family, originating from India, arrived in South
Africa in 1993. TheyÂ established businesses in South Africa with
their notable business being a computerÂ assembly and distribution
company called Sahara Computers. The family is led byÂ three
brothers Ajay Gupta who is the eldest, Atul Gupta and Rajesh Gupta
who isÂ the youngest. Rajesh is commonly known as “Tony”. According
to a letter submittedÂ to my office, total revenues from their
business activities for the 2016 financial yearÂ amounted to R2,6
billion, with government contracts contributing a total of R235
million of the revenues.

5.2. They later diversified their business interests into mining
through the acquisition ofÂ JIC Mining Services, Shiva Uranium and
Tegeta Exploration and Resources,Â Optimum Coal Mine and
Koornfontein Coal Mine. They also started a mediaÂ company called
TNA Media, which publishes a newspaper called The New Age andÂ owns
a television channel called ANN7.

5.3. The Gupta family are known friends of the President Zuma.
President Zuma hasÂ openly acknowledged his friendship with them,
most notably during a discussion inÂ the National Assembly on 19
June 2013 where he admitted that members of theÂ Gupta family were
his friends. Mr Ajay Gupta (“Mr A. Gupta), also admitted to being
friends with President Zuma when I interviewed him on 4 October
2016.

5.4. President Zuma’s son, Mr Duduzane Zuma (“Mr D. Zuma”) is a
business partner ofÂ the Gupta family through an entity called
Mabengela Investments (“Mabengela”).Â Mabengela has a 28.5% interest
in Tegeta Exploration and Resources (“Tegeta”).Â Mr D. Zuma is a
Director of Mabengela.

5.5. Members of the Gupta family and the President Zuma’ son, Mr D.
Zuma, haveÂ secured major contracts with Eskom, a major State owned
company, throughÂ Tegeta. Tegeta has secured a 10 year coal supply
agreement (“CSA”) with EskomÂ SOC Limited (“Eskom”) to supply coal
to the Majuba Power station. The entity hasÂ also secured contracts
with Eskom to supply coal to the Hendrina and Arnot powerÂ stations.

5.6.Â Eskom CEO, Mr Brian Molefe (“Mr Molefe”) is friends with
members of the GuptaÂ family. Mr A. Gupta admitted during my
interview with him on 4 October 2016 thatÂ Mr Molefe is his “very
good friend” and often visits his home in Saxonwold.

5.7. The New Age newspaper has also secured contracts with some
provincialÂ government departments and state owned entities, most
notably Eskom and SouthÂ African Airways (“SAA”).

5.8. The Gupta family recently purchased shares in an entity called
VR Laser ServicesÂ (“VR Laser”). VR Laser has major contracts with
Denel SOC Limited (“Denel”), aÂ State owned armaments manufacturing
company. VR Laser has also partnered withÂ Denel to apparently seek
business opportunities abroad.

5.9. During March this year, Mr Jonas issued a media statement
alleging that he wasÂ offered the position of Minister of Finance by
members of the Gupta family inÂ exchange for executive decisions
favourable to the business interests of the GuptaÂ family, an offer
which he declined. The Gupta family has denied the allegationsÂ made
by Mr Jonas.

5.10. At the time Mr Jonas is alleged to have been offered a Cabinet
post as Minister ofÂ Finance, Mr Nene was occupying the post. Mr
Nene was removed from his post onÂ 9 December 2015 by President Zuma
and replaced with Minister Van Rooyen.Â Minister Van Rooyen was
replaced by Minister Gordhan on 14 December 2015 asÂ Minister of
Finance, 4 days after his appointment.

5.11. Following Mr Jonas’ statement, Ms Mentor also issued a
statement to the pressÂ alleging that she was also offered a Cabinet
post by members of the Gupta family inÂ exchange for executive
decisions favourable to their business interests, anÂ allegation
denied by the Gupta family.

5.12. The former CEO of Government Communication and Information
System (“GCIS”),Â Mr Themba Maseko also issued a statement alleging
that members of the GuptaÂ family pressured him into placing
government advertisements in the New AgeÂ newspaper. Mr Maseko
further alleged that President Zuma asked him to “help” theÂ Gupta
family.

**********************************************

What the “State Capture” report tells us about Zuma, the Guptas, and
corruption in South Africa

Lynsey Chutel and Lily Kuo

Quartz Africa, November 2, 2016

What the “State Capture” report tells us about Zuma, the Guptas, and corruption in South Africa

It’s the report that confirms South Africa’s worst fears about
corruption: that the state has been captured. In 355 pages, former
public protector Thuli Madonsela and her team of investigators
outline in detail just how much control the Gupta family, a wealthy
Indian immigrant family, has over South Africa’s resources. The
Guptas’ close friend, president Jacob Zuma, as well as two ministers
implicated in the report, went to court to stop its release. But it
was finally released on Nov. 2, after protests and a court battle.

The report is potentially damning for Zuma, offering proof that he
sanctioned the use of state companies for personal enrichment. But
now the real reckoning begins, as a web of corruption around Zuma,
the Guptas, and at least three ministers begins to unravel.

Hiring and firing ministers in the Guptas’ house

The report contains a detailed interview with deputy finance
minister Mcebisi Jonas, who alleges that the Guptas offered him the
finance minister’s post weeks before Zuma was to shuffle three
finance ministers in one week. Jonas was driven to the Guptas’ home
by the president’s son Duduzane Zuma, where he was met by Ajay
Gupta.

Ajay Gupta allegedly told Jonas they’d been keeping tabs on him and
wanted him to be their man in the treasury. Ajay Gupta revealed that
they’d already made 6 billion rand ($443 million) from dealings with
the government, and wanted to make at least 2 billion rand more
(about $147 million). When Jonas refused, they tried to sweeten the
deal with 600 million rand (about $44 million) and an extra 600,000
rand ($44,318) in cash, right there. Jonas declined the money, and
months later became the whistle-blower that launched this
investigation when he revealed his story in March.

Vytjie Mentor, who came out after Jonas with an account of how the
Guptas tried to offer her the job of minister of public enterprises,
in charge of state-owned companies, also details her exchange with
the family. According to the report (p.89), Mentor was told during a
meeting in October last year at the Guptas’ home that she would go
from an ordinary parliamentarian to cabinet minister in a week. All
she had to do was make sure South African Airways dropped their
route between Johannesburg and Mumbai, making way for the Gupta-
linked carrier Jet Airways. Mentor declined. She was surprised to
see the president himself emerge from an adjacent room, who said
“it’s okay girlâ€¦take care of yourself,” as he personally escorted
her out.

According to the report, the Guptas also have the power to fire
ministers seen as stumbling blocks to their plans. Former finance
minister Nhlanhla Nene’s insistence on sticking to the rules cost
him his job. As did Barbara Hogan, former minister of public
enterprises, who refused to allow outside influence in appointments
of board members of state-owned South African Airways, Transnet, the
national rail, and Eskom, the state power utility (p. 89, 90). On an
official visit to India, Hogan said she was shocked to find the
Guptas running proceedings. She was relieved of her duties a few
months later.

Des van Rooyen, the unknown parliamentarian who became finance
minister for a few days after Nene, went to court in a bid to delay
the report, fearing it would implicate him. And it has. His phone
records show that van Rooyen visited the Guptas’ home seven days in
a row before he was appointed as finance minister. He was later
moved to a less prominent ministry. Van Rooyen has denied any
wrongdoing.

Negotiating on behalf of the Guptas

Mining minister Mosebenzi Zwane also tried to have the report
delayed, saying it was hastily prepared and that he had not been
given time to respond. According to the report (p. 124, 125), Zwane
travelled to Switzerland on behalf of the Guptas to smooth over
their acquisition of a troubled coal mine from multinational
commodity trader Glencore, helping the Guptas become one of the main
coal suppliers for state utility Eskom. Zwane allegedly helped
facilitate the deal by accompanying delegates from a Gupta resources
company, Tegeta, to Zurich, according to a flight itinerary obtained
by the public protector. Zwane could not be interviewed in time for
the report, but should be allowed to give his version in subsequent
investigations, the report says.

Eskom: Keeping the lights on for the Guptas

Eskom, accused of overly cozy ties with the Guptas featured heavily
in the report, with 916 mentions. Lynn Brown, who became the
minister in charge of South Africa’s state owned enterprises, is
implicated in the report for allowing the appointment of a lame-duck
board that turned a blind eye to murky deals made at the energy
monopoly.

But it’s Eskom’s chief executive, Brian Molefe, who comes out
looking the worst. According to cell phone records, Molefe had 58
phone calls with the eldest of the Gupta brothers, Ajay Gupta,
between August 2015 and March 2016, just before the Guptas purchased
South Africa’s Optimum coal mine for 2.15 billion rand ($160
million). Eskom, which prepaid the Gupta’s Tegeta Exploration and
Resources 600 million rand for coal, had been accused of helping to
finance the Guptas’ coal mine deal through preferential treatment.

The report concludes (p, 20), “it appears that the sole purpose of
awarding contracts to Tegeta to supply Arnot Power Station, was made
solely for the purposes of funding Tegeta and enabling Tegeta to
purchase all shares in OCH [Optimum Coal Holdings]. The only entity
which appears to have benefited from Eskom’s decisions with regards
to [the Optimum coal mine deal] was Tegeta.” Cellphone records also
put Molefe in the Saxonwold area, where the Guptas live, 19 times
between August and November 2015 and phone calls between Molefe and
Ronica Ragavan, head of the Gupta’s holding company, Oakbay
Investments. Justifying these calls and visits, Ajay Gupta told
Madonsela in an interview last month that Molefe is his “very good
friend” who often visits the Gupta compound. But Madonsela says
these records show “a distinct line of communication between Molefe
of Eskom, the Gupta family and directors of their companiesâ€¦ These
links cannot be ignored as Mr Molefe did not declare his
relationship with the Guptas.” Eskom hasrefuted any allegations of
wrongdoing. “We do believe everything that we’ve done so far was
above board,” spokesman for the utility, Khulu Phasiwe, told a local
radio station.

Advertising with the Guptas

Themba Maseko, former chief executive of government’s communications
agency, in charge of a media buying budget of 600 million rand a
year, said he was pressured by the Gupta family to place government
ads in their newspaper the New Age. Maseko was also one of the
whistleblowers who took his story to the media in March.

In an interview with Madonsela in August, Maseko said he was on his
way to a meeting with the Guptas in late 2010 when the president
called him on the phone to say, “The Gupta brothers need your help,
please help them.” During the meeting with Ajay Gupta, Gupta told
Maseko that he wanted government advertising channeled to his new
newspaper, the New Age. According to Maseko’s account, the
government official told Gupta that he could not decide where
government departments advertise. Gupta responded that this was not
a problem. He would instruct the departments to advertise in the
newspaper

According to Maseko’s account, Gupta instructed Maseko to tell him
“where the funds are and inform the departments to provide the funds
to you and if they refuse, we will deal with them. If you have a
problem with any department, we will summon ministers here.” Later
when Maseko refused to take a meeting with a New Age staff, Gupta
told Maseko, “I will talk to your seniors in government and you will
be sorted out.” Maseko was fired a few months later.

A bright spot: Integrity in the Treasury

The report shows how the Guptas’ plans were repeatedly thwarted by
officials in the treasury (p. 131, 132, and 94). The National
Treasury, in charge of approving deals linked to state-owned
enterprises, stuck to the rules of procurement and public finance.
Treasury officials questioned the Eskom coal deal with Tegeta.
Unable to stop the initial deal, they succeeded in blocking an
extension of the Tegeta contract. These obstructions appear to have
frustrated the Guptas and cost Nene his job. Many speculate that
current finance minister Pravin Gordhan’songoing legal battles are
related to the treasury’s resistance to the Guptas influence.

What next?

Zuma, the ministers, and the Guptas have yet to respond to the
damning allegations in the report. Madonsela has since left office,
with state capture report serving as her parting shot in a seven-
year battle against corruption. Still, she’s left instructions on
how to use with her findings. Her successor, who has already
started, should bring potentially criminal accusations in the report
to the National Prosecuting Authority and the police’s Directorate
for Priority Crime Investigation, better known as the Hawks.

Madonsela has also recommended that the report be taken further by a
commission of inquiry, headed by a judge appointed by the chief
justice of South Africa’s constitutional court, Mogoeng Mogoeng.
There are concerns that the prosecuting authority and the Hawks have
been compromised. (They have spearheaded the fraud case against
finance minister Gordhan.) But the public’s hopes lie in the chief
justice, who has spoken out harshly against the abuse of power
before.

“Public office bearers ignore their constitutional obligations at
their peril. This is so because constitutionalismâ€š accountability
and the rule of law constitute the sharp and mighty sword that
stands ready to chop the ugly head of impunity off its stiffened
neck,” Mogeng said in March when he ruled against the president over
his use public funds used to renovate his personal compound in
Nkandla.

*******************************************************

How the state capture controversy has influenced South Africa’s
nuclear build

Harmut Winkler

The Conversation, May 26, 2016

http://tinyurl.com/jgrjcz8

South Africa is facing a critical decision that could see it
investing about R1 trillion â€“ or US$60 billion to $70 billion â€“ in a
fleet of new nuclear power stations. Proponents argue that it will
greatly increase electrical base-load capacity and generate
industrial growth. But opponents believe the high cost would cripple
the country economically.

What should be an economic decision has now been clouded by
controversy, with political pressure to push through the nuclear
build and the increasingly apparent rewards it would bring to
politically linked individuals.

The nuclear expansion programme needs to be considered exceptionally
carefully given that the required financial commitment is roughly
equal to the total South African annual tax revenue. Loan repayments
could place a devastating long-term burden on the public and on the
economy as a whole.

South Africa’s energy needs

South Africa is in the process of massively expanding and
modernising its electricity generation capacity. The government-
driven Integrated Resource Plan aims to increase total capacity from
42,000MW (peak demand of 39,000MW) to 85,000MW (peak demand of
68,000MW) in 2030. A key component of this plan is the construction
of facilities to produce 9,600MW of nuclear power. However, this
aspect of the plan has been challenged.

The biggest concern is that nuclear power is too expensive for the
country. The debate gained momentum when the 2013 update to the
2010-2030 electricity plan found that electricity demand is growing
slower than originally anticipated. Peak demand in 2030 is now
expected to range between 52,000 MW and 61,000 MW. There is
consequently widespread belief that new nuclear power stations can
be delayed considerably.

South Africa’s energy generation options

South Africa has had remarkable success with speedy, cost-effective
installation of renewable energy power plants. In addition to this,
technologies for harvesting South Africa’s plentiful wind and solar
energy resources are rapidly becoming cheaper, raising the question
of whether the country should not invest more in these options
rather than in going nuclear.

The argument that nuclear energy provides a stable base load,
independent of weather conditions, is mitigated by improvements in
energy storage technologies. But also by the fact that South Africa,
with its large coal power production, has a proportionally higher
base load than many highly developed industrialised countries. The
pro-nuclear option is therefore not unavoidable, as nuclear
proponents suggest, but rather a matter for thorough economic
consideration.

Zuma and the Russians

The nuclear debate gained a political dimension when President Jacob
Zuma and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, started to develop
an unusually close relationship. It culminated in an announcement
that the Russian nuclear developer, Rosatom, had been awarded the
potentially highly lucrative contract to build the new reactors. The
agreement was later denied.

Rosatom was considered the preferred contender, with other bidders
only there to lend the process legitimacy, according to some
observers. The lack of transparency surrounding the process, coupled
with a history of corruption in South African mega-projects like the
arms deal, has made the whole scheme seem suspicious to the broader
public.

A thickening plot

A crucial thread in this saga involves the Shiva uranium mine, about
30km north-west of Pretoria, the country’s executive capital. It
originally belonged to a company called Uranium One, a subsidiary of
Russia’s Rosatom. It was sold in 2010 to Oakbay Resources, a company
controlled by members of the politically connected Gupta family and
the president’s son, in a deal that greatly surprised economists.

The mine was deemed unprofitable and thus unattractive to other
mining companies. But it was still considered worth a whole lot more
than the R270 million paid by Oakbay. The mine would, however,
become highly profitable if it became the uranium supplier to the
new nuclear power stations. Oakbay and its associates therefore have
a very strong incentive for this nuclear build to happen.

It is here that the nuclear build drama feeds into the recent major
controversy surrounding alleged state capture, meaning a corrupt
system where state officials owe their allegiance to politically
connected oligarchs rather than the public interest. This was
highlighted by the shock dismissal of Finance Minister Nhanhla Nene,
a reported nuclear build sceptic, but also by subsequent allegations
of ministerial positions being offered to people by members of the
Gupta family.

Political, legal and civil opposition

The nuclear build’s association with the Zuma faction in the ruling
African National Congress (ANC) will be a political hot potato for
decades to come. The whole scandal also offers potential opportunity
to opposition parties. With increasing evidence of individuals
benefiting, opposition parties have found another spot to exploit,
as they did with Nkandla. A post-Zuma government would find it most
convenient to simply dissociate itself from the whole scheme.

The South African courts have been used very effectively by pressure
groups in the past. Already a number of environmental groups have
initiated legal applications, and these might end up being escalated
to the Supreme and Constitutional Courts. This will delay any
building initiative by years.

The South African experience with the 2010 World Cup has shown that
mega-projects can come to fruition when there is broad overall
support for the initiative. At the same time, South Africans can be
very disruptive and obstructive when this is not the case. For
example, the public opposition to e-tolling, an electronic toll
collection on certain roads.

The two leading opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance and the
Economic Freedom Fighters, have already expressed their strong
criticism of the planned nuclear build. Their supporters and civil
society in general have demonstrated their capacity for mobilisation
around specific issues. So the potential for an anti-nuclear protest
movement cannot be discounted.

A negative nuclear outlook

Building these plants is a risky business proposition, especially
for Rosatom, which is implicated in the developing scandal. The
recent political mood swing against state capture and a likely
credit rating downgrade add to the risk.

Rosatom has suggested a nuclear build financing option that
effectively amounts to it providing a loan. It is, however,
conceivable that a future government may not honour debt repayments
if there is a view that the construction deal was secured
irregularly.

The narrow public support base and downright hostility in some
quarters to a nuclear build has already effectively stalled local
nuclear construction plans. The level of controversy, high costs and
potential for further disruption mean that the planned
implementation could only proceed under severe social strain.

Such a scenario could very well cost the ruling ANC the 2019
national elections. And the party is becoming increasingly aware of
this. As such, it is posited that the nuclear build will not happen
any time as soon as planned.

*****************************************************

Africa Still in Chains

worker | January 18, 2017 | 7:42 pm | Africa, Economy, political struggle | Comments closed

Â http://www.renegadetribune.com/africa-still-chains/

Africa Still in Chains

January 12, 2017January 13, 2017 Mike Walsh 12 Comments

A common misconception is that post-colonial Africa has been a failure and its natural resources are squandered by incompetent or corrupt African despots. Not quite.

What we do have is ethnic-African bank managers dressed up as presidents and prime ministers. The natural and human resources of the largest of the earthâ€™s continents are today plundered more than at any time in the history of the Dark Continent.

Recent research reveals that companies listed on the London Stock Exchange control over $1 trillion worth of Africaâ€™s resources. These key resources are just five in number; oil, gold, diamonds, coal and platinum. There are many other forms of natural and human resource exploitation.

Recent research reveals that 101 companies, most of them British registered but not necessarily British owned, control $305 billion worth of platinum, $276 billion worth of oil and $216 billion worth of coal at current market prices.

Mark Curtis, the reportâ€™s author, says â€œthe â€˜scramble for Africaâ€™ is proceeding apace. The result is that African governments have largely handed over their treasure to the great corporations of the Western alliances.â€

Tanzaniaâ€™s gold, Zambiaâ€™s copper, South Africaâ€™s platinum and coal and Botswanaâ€™s diamonds are dominated by London-listed companies. Corporate slave drivers own mines or hold mineral licences in 37 African countries. The corporations of the West control vast swathes of African territory. Their concessions cover a staggering 1.03 million square kilometres on the Dark Continent.

African territory controlled by London-based corporations is more than four times the size of the United Kingdom. With remarkable chutzpah, an appropriate term in the circumstances, the Peopleâ€™s Republic of China has been much chastised for their interest in Africaâ€™s resources.

Many African governments depend on mineral resources for tax revenues. However, the extent of foreign ownership means that most tax wealth is milked along with the mineral resources wealth of Africa.

African governments themselves are minority shareholders in the Westâ€™s mining operations. Corruption among the political elite is endemic and the source of the corruption is in Londonâ€™s Square Mile and Wall Street. Company tax payments are minimal due to low tax rates while governments often provide companies with generous incentives such as corporation tax holidays.

Corporation slave owners are able to avoid paying taxes by their use of tax havens. Of the 101 London-listed companies, 25 are actually incorporated in tax havens. These fiscal hideouts are mostly to be found lurking in the colonised British Virgin Islands.

It is estimated that Africa loses around $35 billion a year in illicit financial outflow of the continent. Africa loses a further $46billion a year in multinational company profits taken from their operations in Africa.

British registered companiesâ€™ play an increasingly dominant role in Africa. This form of modern slavery is facilitated by both Conservative and Labour governments; given the nod by Britainâ€™s royalty and aristocracy.

Whitehall has long been a fierce advocate of â€˜liberalisedâ€™ trade and investment regimes in Africa that provide access to markets for foreign companies. London is largely opposed to African countries putting up regulatory or protectionist barriers to foreign investment. Yet, such policies adopted by nations in East Asia are successful and to a larger extent their peoples benefited.

British corporate and banking sectors do not challenge the use of tax havens by multinational companies using tax havens. The harsh truth is that the global infrastructure of tax havens is largely a British creation.

British governments permit corporations to self-regulate, which again has a negative impact on human values and rights. As an entity the combined corporations stand in the way of internationally legally binding curbs against human rights abuse.

Recent research calculated the financial wellbeing of sub-Saharan Africa. Its purpose was to discover whether Africa is being helped or exploited by the rest of the world. The findings were abysmal.

It found that only $134 billion flows into Africa annually, mainly in the form of high interest loans, foreign investment and recoverable aid. However, $192 billion is extracted, mainly in profits made by foreign companies and tax dodging scams. The result is that Africa suffers a net loss of $58 billion a year.

The outcome is that Africa, potentially the worldâ€™s richest continent in terms of natural resources, is the poorest territory on earth. Modern Africa has been Bolshevised as was Imperial Russian from 1922. The same corporations that invested in Stalinâ€™s Five Year Plans and the Gulag slave plantations now control Africaâ€™s resources. Instead of Trotskyâ€™s White Negroes we have Africaâ€™s ethnic slaves.

Corporate Londonâ€™s policy to keep corporate taxes low means Africans are reduced to an existence on a par or worse than they endured during the American era of cotton plantations. As a consequence of corporation slavery sub-Saharan Africans become refugees and flood Europe to escape their harsh conditions.

Africa: Electoral Landscapes

worker | January 16, 2017 | 7:35 pm | Africa, Economy, political struggle | Comments closed

AfricaFocus Bulletin
January 16, 2017 (170116)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

Ghana, Gambia, and Gabon are all small African countries with names
beginning with the letter “G,” which held presidential elections in
2016. But neither the electoral landscapes nor the electoral
outcomes can fruitfully be analyzed without giving greater weight to
the contrasts than to the similarities. The same applies to the even
wider set of 14 African countries with presidential elections last
year, or the 8 so far scheduled to hold elections in 2017.

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/afr1701.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/afr1701.php

As this Bulletin is published in mid-January, the most pressing
uncertainty about Africa’s elections is for Gambia, where outgoing
President Yahya Jammeh reversed his decision to accept his election
defeat in December (see
http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/gamb1612.php), meeting with
widespread condemnation both internationally and domestically.
And for the latest news as of this morning, see
http://tinyurl.com/h2p3vzn and follow this Gambian news site
(http://jollofnews.com).

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains several summary commentaries on
Africa’s elections in 2016 and 2017: Vera Songwe on the contrasting
outcomes in Gabon, Ghana, and Gambia; Abdi Latif Dahir on five
elections to watch in 2017; Kim Yi Dionne reviewing public opinion
on the wide variations in the extent of freedom to organize in 36
different African countries. Also included are several links to
additional recent analyses worth noting.

Also of related interest

Two videos of particular relevance, given the nomination of
ExxonMobil executive Rex Tillerson for U.S. Secretary of State. Both
Chad and Equatorial Guinea held elections in 2016, with leaders who
have been in power for 26 and 37 years respectively continuing
in their positions.

Rachel Maddow on Chad and ExxonMobil December 13, 2016 – 16 minutes
video: http://tinyurl.com/jp57m7z
transcript: http://tinyurl.com/gn5yqvh

Rachel Maddow on Equatorial Guinea and ExxonMobil January 12, 2017 –
4 minutes
video: http://tinyurl.com/hqwc73m
transcript not yet available

List of Africa’s rulers longest in office, updated for 2017
https://qz.com/852384/

For general reference and news related to African elections

Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
Resources includes an election calendar for each year beginning in
2005

Election Calendar

Afrobarometer – extensive data and analysis on public opinion in 36
African countries
http://afrobarometer.org

Quartz Africa
https://qz.com/africa/ – sign up for their weekly brief at
https://qz.com/africa-weekly-brief/

AllAfrica.com
http://allafrica.com/governance

——————————————————–

The Trump Election: Intersecting Explanations

An intersectional database of articles and books, compiled by
AfricaFocus editor William Minter

http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/trump-win-reasons.php

* 21 relevant explanations, any of which arguably sufficient to have
tipped the balance of the narrowly decided electoral college outcome

* As of January 15, 2017: 244 recommended articles, 23 books for
deeper background

* Voter suppression is among the most important factors, but also
among the least prominent in the public debate. See
http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/voter-suppression.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

Africa’s mixed political transitions in the 3 Gs: Gabon, the Gambia,
and Ghana

Vera Songwe

Brookings Institution blog, December 22, 2016

http://www.brookings.edu – Direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/j3reoma

Africa has gone through a number of leadership transitions in 2016
and with each one the edifice that will shape Africa’s leadership
and political transition process is being molded. 2016 has been
another of year progress on the African leadership transition front.
This year there have been 16 elections, in seven of the elections
there was an effective leadership transition and over 60 percent of
the elections were conducted in a free and transparent manner with
satisfactory citizen involvement and little or no unrest–such as in
Ghana or Cabo Verde.Â Overall, the leadership transitions have been
largely peaceful, constitutional, and transparent. However, the
experiences across countries and sub-regions have been quite varied
and provide us with many lessons for the future. I will use Gabon,
Gambia, and Ghana (the “three Gs”) to illustrate these experiences.

Three elections, in Gabon in August, and the Gambia and Ghana in
December, are shaping the narrative of this dynamic process and
providing important lessons for the transition process. First, the
struggle for change continues: While Africa is slowly moving towards
more participatory political transitions, the fight has not
completely won. In addition, the growing importance and maturity of
electoral commissions; citizens’ increasing awareness that their
votes matter; the slow but certain move away from tribal politics to
issues politics; and now regional, rather than foreign, ownership
around leadership transitions all contribute towards the deepening
of democracy on the continent. Each of the countries–Gabon, the
Gambia, and Ghana–have tackled these issues differently.

The Struggle for Change Persists

Ghana is the pride of Africa when it comes to democratic
transitions. Once again, its most recent election has proven this
point.Â Despite the tense and intensely fought campaign both parties
continue to pledge respect for the process. Indeed, there is much to
celebrate around Africa’s leadership transitions, but much remains
to perfect the process the continent over. This year many elections
were held freely and fairly on the continent, and both incumbents
and new leaders were elected to office–including Benin, Cabo Verde,
SÃ£o TomÃ© and PrÃncipe, and Zambia for example. And in an
unprecedented move the President of Mauritania and Angola all
declared they will not seek re-elections at the end of the term. A
very positive and encouraging trend if the pronouncements come to
pass.

However, in a number of countries the old has not given way to the
new, and the evolution of democracy is still in motion with too-
often deadly consequences for the citizens in Burundi, Gabon, and
the Gambia to name a few. These examples demonstrate that the
concept of leadership transition has not yet been fully adopted. A
number of lessons can be drawn from these latter experiences. The
populations are increasingly more vocal about transparency of
elections. Both sides incumbent and opposition have increasingly
equal chances of getting their voices heard and results tend to be
closer in these countries. There is still a need for vigilance, and
the tendency to slip remains. Peaceful leadership transitions are
not yet the norm.

Election Commissions: Strong, Credible, and Independent Institutions
are Emerging

In the three Gs, the role of the electoral commissions has been a
determining factor. In fact, electoral commission heads are
increasingly becoming the new villains and/or heroes in the African
struggle for peaceful leadership transitions.

In Gabon, the head of the electoral commission’s independence was
largely questioned primarily by the opposition and the people of
Gabon, as well as international election observers. Notably, the
final results of the election were not announced by the head of the
electoral commission, as constitutionally stated, but by the
minister of the interior–an institution with no independence from
the incumbent. Gabon’s incumbent President Ali Bongo won by 49.9
percent over 48.2 percent for his rival Jean Ping, less than a 6,000
vote difference and suspiciously high turnout in Bongo’s home
province. Violence and protests erupted not long after the
announcement.

The Gambia’s electoral commission performed and fared much better:
Three months before the election, the head of the electoral
commission Alieu Momarr Njai pledged in a memorable but unpublicized
speech to uphold the integrity of the commission and protect the
integrity of the process.Â During the launch of the electoral
process he said:

Election results may be rigged to predetermine who will win or lose,
and election may be disrupted, casting doubt on the legitimacy of
the process, but I stand here today to pronounce to you that, as far
as our concerted efforts are in play, this will never be the case in
our dear country. The Independent Electoral Commission believes that
an election without integrity subverts the purpose of a democratic
election, and cannot be considered fair and equitable. The IEC will
ever concentrate on conducting free and fair elections. This, I
believe we will ever achieve by upholding governing principles such
as: respect for principles of electoral democracy; ethical conduct;
accuracy and transparency.

The people of the Gambia and many others did not expect such clarity
of vision from the head of the electoral commission, and many
dismissed this as normal election propaganda. However, Njai kept his
word. He pronounced the elections results in favor of the opposition
candidate Adama Barrow and called for President Yahya Jammeh, who
has been in power for over 22 years, to step down, eliciting pride
and jubilation from the people of the Gambia. The Gambia’s troubles
have instead come from Jammeh’s withdrawal of his concession and
determination to stay in power.

In Ghana, the head of the election commission benefitted from a
robust and solid system, which has a history of inclusion,
transparency, and most of participation by all members of the
political exercise. The continuous process undertaken by the
Ghanaian electoral commission to continuously educate the electorate
and the political parties is clearly a lesson for the rest of the
continent on how to build trust and interact with the population.

However, even in Ghana there are lessons to learn from the election,
such as how to manage delays in the announcement of the election
results and or glitches in the system on election day. In Ghana the
commission needed more time to ensure everyone eligible to vote had
voted and to count the votes.Â Tensions began to mount as the
population waited for the elections results to be proclaimed, both
sides began proclaiming victory and the supporters of each candidate
began filling the streets.

This could have led to severe unrest. However, the communication of
the election committee head asking the people for patience while all
the votes were counted was an example of good election management.
The people could only heed to this request because of the trust
built by the commission and a legitimate sense of ownership of the
commission.Â Therefore, while independently elected, the first task
of every election commission is to build trust with the people. As
African countries prepare for more elections this should be an area
that gets special attention.

Ownership: The People’s Voice, The Continent’s Voice

Ethnic politics is slowly giving way to issues politics. The economy
is taking center stage in elections. In Ghana, as in the Gambia, the
last few years have seen citizens suffer under the weight of
weakening currencies, erosion of purchasing power by over 50
percent, increasing poverty, joblessness, and interest rates above
25 percent. Similarly, the rise of corruption, noted by Ghanaian
President John Mahama in his concession speech, undermined all the
achievements of Mahama presidency–and most of all his struggle to
give affordable and reliable power to the people of Ghana. The
results of these elections increasingly show that while there will
always remain a thread of local politics in elections, the
electorate is becoming more sophisticated and are voting on issues
broader than ethnic origins. Citizens are more engaged and are
owning the election agenda.

African leaders are also increasingly more active in the resolution
of African leadership transition issues. During the crisis period of
the Gabon elections the French and the European Union were the most
active and vocal voices. The French president called for a recount
and the EU asked that all results be published, but Chadian
President Idriss DÃ©by, as head of the African Union, was the central
mediator of the proceedings. In the case of the Gambia, the African
Union alongside five other presidents of ECOWAS countries have taken
it upon themselves to mediate a settlement of the impasse. The
acknowledgement and ownership of the transition agenda by Africa’s
leaders is an important part of assuring peace and stability during
transition crises.Â The cases of Burundi and the Gambia should
provide lessons on how to make such negations successful. What
incentives could be put in place to minimize difficult transitions?

As the Ghanaians celebrate the peaceful election of new President
Nana Akufo Addo, as President Bongo of Gabon settles into his second
term, and as the Gambians wait anxiously for a resolution, the
continent must heed the lessons of these three transitions and begin
putting in place systems that allow citizens more ownership of the
process, ensure that election commissions are truly independent and
equipped to build trust with citizens, and encourage candidates that
acknowledge the increasing sophistication of the electorate so
campaign messages must have content and can no longer rely solely on
identity politics.

**********************************************************

The five African elections to watch out for in 2017

Abdi Latif Dahir

January 03, 2017 Quartz Africa

The five African elections to watch out for in 2017

Last year, a public survey of elections by the Pan-African research
network Afrobarometer showed Africans distrusted national electoral
commissions and the quality of their elections. Just over 40% of
Africans in 36 countries believed that the last elections in their
country were free and fair; 25% said they trusted their electoral
commissions “a lot”; and many described elections where bribery was
rampant, media bias persisted, and voters were often threatened with
violence at the polls.

Yet elections across the continent are always markers of important
democratic milestones and are followed closely by observers and
citizens alike. In 2016, congratulations poured into Ghana after the
country elected Nana Akufo-Addo as its new president. Several
incumbent presidents, including Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, Zambia’s
Edgar Lungu and Ali Bongo Ondimba of Gabon all won re-election too–
despite protests from opposition members, violence, and internet
shutdowns. And after 22 years in power, The Gambia’s Yahya Jammeh,
who once said he will rule for “one billion years” conceded defeat
live on television, only to reject the outcome of the elections a
few days later.

In 2017, more African countries will pursue the democratic path by
conducting presidential, legislative and municipal elections. Some
281 sworn lawmakers–they are 347 legislators in total–will kick
things off in Somalia by voting for a president later on Jan. 24.
Incumbent president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is considered a
frontrunner and is among dozens of candidates who are vying for the
presidency.

Here are the key elections to watch as millions of people head to
the polls.

1. Rwanda

When: Aug. 4, 2017

President Paul Kagame will be seeking a third, seven-year term since
winning the country’s second election in 2010 with 93% of the vote.
Dubbed as the “global elite’s favorite strongman” and the “darling
tyrant,” Kagame is a media-savvy politician who uses his sleek
website and over 1.5 million Twitter followers to propagate his
message of progress and development. Kagame is also credited with
transforming the landlocked nation’s economic development, boosting
youth employment and trade, reducing poverty and advocating for
technology as a tool for prosperity.

Yet, the country’s transformation under Kagame has come with a
catch. Kagame is accused of muzzling the press, restricting free
speech, and silencing dissidents–in some cases, even allegedly
assassinating opponents who fled to Uganda and South Africa.

But the upcoming election will point more to the future of Rwanda
than to its troubled past. In 2015, a constitutional amendment
allowed Kagame to run for this new term and two more five-year terms
after that, meaning that he could stay in power till 2034. The
controversial move was criticized by many in the international
community and questioned whether Kagame was even interested in
fostering a new generation of leaders to take on the mantle of
leadership. “I don’t think that what we need is an eternal leader,”
Kagame said when he announced his candidacy early last year. And in
2017, he will have to work hard to prove to his critics that he
doesn’t count on being one.

2. Kenya

When: Aug. 8, 2017

Kenyans will go to the polls to elect almost 1900 public officials
including the president, senators, county governors, members of the
national and county assemblies, and women county representatives.
This is yet another high-stakes election, which is tilted in favor
of incumbent president Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto.
The two, however, will go into election facing an energized
opposition who have used the administration’s failings as a rallying
point.

Since Kenyatta came to power in 2013, the country has been bedeviled
with deadly terrorist attacks; teachers, nurses and doctor strikes;
failing banks; and several corruption scandals that have drained
tens of millions of dollars from government coffers.

Even though the opposition is yet to pick a candidate, Kenyatta will
likely face Raila Odinga, a longtime opposition figure who has been
angling to become president for almost 20 years. The opposition has
also accused the country’s Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission of being inept and biased, with a British court recently
convicting two British businessmen of bribing election commissioners
to get contracts for printing ballots.

Like previous elections in the past two decades, the fear of
violence, ethnic polarization, and escalating political tensions
looms large. Kenya walks a tight rope and depending on how the IEBC
conducts the election, might see it maintain its fragile democracy
or slide into yet another gloomy post-election period.

3. Angola

When: Aug. 2017

President Jose Eduardo dos Santos arrives for an EU Africa Summit in
Lisbon, Sunday Dec. 9, 2007. European and African leaders are
scheduled to sign a strategic partnership agreement on Sunday, after
a two-day summit marked by tensions over human rights in Zimbabwe.

In Dec. 2016, president Jose Eduardo dos Santos surprised many
observers by announcing that he will step down as president before
the 2017 elections. The ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation
of Angola party has elected JoÃ£o Lourenco, a former defense
minister, as vice president ahead of the next parliamentary
elections. In Angola, the leader of the winning party automatically
becomes president.

But Angola is still dominantly a one-party state, ruled by dos
Santos and his family, who have amassed wealth and power over the
last four decades. Yet, the fourth elections in the country since it
gained independence from Portugal in 1975, come at a time when the
country has been hit by the slump in global crude prices–
diminishing its foreign exchange revenues. The 2017 elections will
test the maturity of Angola’s democracy and if successful, confer a
measure of legitimacy on its government

4. Liberia

When: Oct. 10, 2017

After 10 years in office, it is the end of the road for Ellen
Johnson-Sirleaf, Liberia, and Africa’s first female president.
Sirleaf leaves office after winning the Nobel Peace Prize, dealing
with the Ebola crisis, passing a Freedom of Information bill, and
taking on the taxing effort of rebuilding a country ravaged by war.
But by Oct. 25, 2017, Liberia will have a new president-elect, who
will take the mantle of an economy battered by low global commodity
prices and post-Ebola decline in official inflows.

Former Liberian soccer player and current Senator George Weah smiles
after addressing thousands of supporters of the Congress for
Democratic Change (CDC) party who petitioned him to contest
Liberia’s Presidential elections in 2017, at Party headquarters in
Monrovia, Liberia, 28 April 2016. George Weah contested the 2005 and
2011 Presidential elections, but lost to incumbent Ellen Johnson
Sirleaf on both occasions. Sirleaf’s second term in office will end
in 2017.

More than 1.9 million registered voters will elect presidential and
legislative candidates from 22 political parties, according to the
National Elections Commission. A key contender in the elections is
George Weah, an ex-footballer who is considered by Fifa as the
highest-ranking African footballer of the 20th century, and whose
first presidential bid failed after he lost to Sirleaf. The former
AC Milan footballer and current senator has promised to increase the
national budget, work on religious harmony and support vocational
education.

Weah could also face off with Jewel Howard-Taylor, the ex-wife of
former Liberian president and warlord Charles Taylor. Jewel,
considered the second most powerful woman in Liberian politics, is a
twice-elected senator from Bong County, which has the third-highest
number of registered voters in Liberia. Vice president Joseph Boakai
will also run for president on the government’s record.

5. The Democratic Republic of Congo

When: TBD 2017

Moise Katumbi, governor of Democratic Republic of Congo’s mineral-
rich Katanga province, arrives for a two-day mineral conference in
Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo March 24, 2014.

On New Year’s Eve, the government and opposition members in the DR
Congo appeared to have signed a deal that could see president Joseph
Kabila step down after the next election. The agreement came after
deadly protests, arrests and internet shutdown that followed the end
of Kabila’s constitutionally-mandated second term on Dec. 19.

As part of the deal, a transitional government will be appointed by
March, and the elections will take place before the end of the year.
If this does take place, it will be the first peaceful transfer of
power since independence in 1960. A peaceful election will also
avert a return to war in the populous, mineral-rich country, where
some five million people lost their lives in the civil war that
lasted between 1994 and 2003. Moise Katumbi, a popular politician
and opposition member, is expected to run to replace Kabila.

The challenge to hold the vote in 2017 will also be enormous, given
that the electoral commission once said that it needed at least 17
months to complete registration processes and hold the elections.
Beyond the election, a new government and president will face the
task of addressing economic, humanitarian and political
instabilities that persist all across the country.

**************************************************************

Only 7 percent of citizens in this African country [Swaziland] feel
free to join political organizations
Kim Yi Dionne,Â Afrobarometer Blog, Dec. 16, 2016

http://www.afrobarometer.org – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/hdk9rlc

“Afrobarometer measures citizens’ perceptions of freedom to assemble
by asking: “In this country, how free are you to join any political
organization you want?” Survey participants could answer completely
free, somewhat free, not very free or not at all free.

On average, across the 36 African countries where Afrobarometer
conducts its nationally representative public opinion surveys, a
majority (58 percent) reported that they feel “completely free” to
join any political organization they want.

But citizens’ perceptions of freedom to assemble varied across the
continent. While 85 percent of Senegalese felt completely free to
join political organizations, only 7 percent felt that same way in
Swaziland.

Why is Swaziland so far below its peers in Africa in protecting its
citizens’ freedom to assemble?

Plainly, Swaziland is not a democracy. It holds elections and has a
parliament, but real power is vested in the last absolute monarch in
Africa, King Mswati III. King Mswati III has ruled Swaziland since
1986, a couple of years after the death of his father, King Sobhuza
II.”

**************************************************************

Additional links worth noting

Brett L. Carter, “Congo President Denis Sassou Nguesso’s
embarrassing attempt to ingratiate himself to Donald Trump,” Jan 9,
2017
http://africasacountry.com – direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/jnthw78

Nic Cheeseman, “Africa’s real story of 2017 will be of close
elections and activists struggling to hold governments accountable,”
Jan 10, 2017
http://www.africanarguments.org – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/jtgt2tb

Sarah Brierley and George Ofosu, “What will Ghanaians expect from
their new president,” Afrobarometer blog, Jan 6, 2017
http://tinyurl.com/zxb5kfz

Jesse Weaver Shipley, “The market decides if we are free,” Africa is
a Country, Jan. 16, 2017
On President Nana Akufo-Addo’s inauguration speech in Ghana
http://tinyurl.com/hqz7msy

*****************************************************

Africa/Global: Climate Threat, Action Tracks

worker | November 11, 2016 | 6:06 pm | Africa, Climate Change, Donald Trump, environmental crisis, Latin America, political struggle | Comments closed

AfricaFocus Bulletin
November 10, 2016 (161110)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“Africa is already burning. The election of Trump is a disaster for
our continent. The United States, if it follows through on its new
President’s rash words about withdrawing from the international
climate regime, will become a pariah state in global efforts for
climate action. This is a moment where the rest of the world must
not waver and must redouble commitments to tackle dangerous climate
change,”Â Geoffrey Kamese, Friends of the Earth Africa.

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/ren1611.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/ren1611.php

[This version of this AfricaFocus Bulletin sent out by email contains
only brief excerpts from each article. For more extensive excerpts,
read on-line at http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/ren1611.php; for
full articles go to the link cited in each case.]

There is no doubt that the election of Donald Trump poses an extreme
threat to action on climate change, as on a host of other
interconnected issues. But, in this case, as in many others, it is
important to remember that a U.S. president, no matter how powerful,
is only one of the forces affecting the outcomes.

Yes, this is a major setback, but the threat did not begin with
Trump and the struggles to combat it must and will continue – on
multiple fronts. While no one organization or movement can fight on
all fronts, those forces fighting for justice and for a future for
our planet must have a vision of a wider background than one U.S.
presidential election.

The context is not only the United States, but the world. And the
arenas are not only political (at multiple levels of government, and
even within the executive branch of the federal government itself),
but also technical, economic, and activist (from divestment to
protest sites such as the Dakota Pipeline). No one organization or
even movement can be on all fronts at once, but together we must
find ways to strategies embedded in a wider vision rather than
engage in fruitless debates about which action track is the “most
important.”

This AfricaFocus Bulletin consists of excerpts from a selection of
statements and articles illustrating the multiple tracks on which
action to combat the threat of global warming can and must take
place, globally, in Africa, and in the United States.

* The first two statements are reactions from climate activists to
the additional threat posed by the election of Donald Trump.

* The third highlights the continuing technical and economic success
of cheap off-grid and mini-grid solar in Africa, which is now
estimated to be reaching 10% of the 600,000 Africans living off
nationalÂ electricity grids.

* The next provides a summary of both the necessity and the economic
and technical viability of a comprehensive transition away from
fossil fuels, from Oil Change International and a coalition of
related organizations.

* The fifth is an open letter from climate activist groups to the
Equator Principles Association of banks committed to social
responsibility principles, calling for withdrawal of support for the
Dakota Access Pipeline.

* The sixth is an update from the International Energy Agency,
revising upwards its projections for growth of renewable energy
worldwide.

* And the last is a report from South Africa’s Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) noting that “new power
from solar PV and wind today is at least 40% cheaper than that from
new baseload coal today.”

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on the environment and climate
issues, visit http://www.africafocus.org/intro-env.php