Category: Africa
Africa/Global: Ebola Lessons & Questions
| January 21, 2015 | 9:19 pm | Africa, Ebola | Comments closed

AfricaFocus Bulletin
January 21, 2015 (150121)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

Media coverage of the Ebola epidemic, which took a sharp downward
turn after a handful of patients in the United States recovered, has
faded even further into the background as the battle against the
epidemic has begun to succeed in the most-affected countries. But
those on the front lines warn that complacency could easily allow
the still-present virus to hold out and even expand. And although
there are clear lessons to be learned, there are also unanswered
questions, most notably about international will to implement the
imperative of sustainable health systems for the future.

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs15/who1501.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

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A 14-part report from the World Health Organization provides a rich
analysis of lessons learned and of measures needed for ending the
epidemic this year. But it also leaves many questions unanswered,
and some unasked. In particular, it does not address the fundamental
question of the failure of international agencies as well as
national governments to invest in sustainable health systems, a
factor that everyone agrees was a fundamental cause of vulnerability
(see “Sierra Leone: Losing Out” at
http://www.africafocus.org/docs15/sl1501.php).
And, while the UN and the United States have joined in calls for the
IMF to cancel debts of the most-affected countries, to assist in
their recovery, this proposal has not yet been acted on.

Among many valuable lessons covered in the WHO report is the
essential role of community involvement in changing behaviors to
block transmission channels for the virus (such as safe as well as
culturally appropriate burial practices). Another is the success of
several West African countries (Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali) in
implementing rapid response to the threat, with isolation,
treatment, and case tracking.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from the last chapter of
the report, focused on what needs to be done in 2015. The full
report (http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/en/) is essential
reading for anyone seeking a deeper analysis than in the sparse
ongoing news coverage. It includes chapters analyzing the evolution
of the epidemic in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, as well as the
contrasting case of successful containment in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.

Among the key questions posed but left unanswered by the WHO report
is the sharp differential in survival rates with treatment in
developed countries versus treatment in the most-affected countries.
As the report notes, this is a practical as well as an ethical
question, since people will not go to treatment centers unless they
have some hope of survival.

The ethics of this is clear, as stressed by Paul Farmer in a recent
op-ed in the Washington Post. Everyone deserves the same standard
care known to be effective in developed countries. Evidence from
several treatment centers in the affected countries shows this must
include intravenous as well as oral rehydration, as well as other
elements of “supportive care.” The unanswered question is whether
the implicit double standard will be abandoned, and adequate
resources allocated by the international community to implement
standard care both in the response in 2015 and in future epidemics.

Paul Farmer, “The secret to curing West Africa from Ebola is no
secret at all,” Washington Post, Jan 16, 2015
http://tinyurl.com/m4j6tk2
Survival rates from Ebola are high when people receive supportive
care that has been standard for cases of Ebola in rich countries and
foreign medical workers airlifted out. “What we need — what we’ve
always needed — to improve survival in West Africa is the capacity
to safely deliver excellent supportive care.”

Peter Piot in BBC article, Jan 21 “My concern is that when [the
Ebola outbreak] is over we will just forget about it. We need to be
better prepared and we need to invest in vaccines and treatment.
It’s like a fire brigade – you don’t start to set up a fire brigade
when some house is on fire.”
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30907630

For a set of general talking points and previous AfricaFocus
Bulletins on health issues, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/intro-health.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

Ebola response: What needs to happen in 2015

[Excerpts: full text available at
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/en/]

The four biggest lessons from 2014

First, countries with weak health systems and few basic public
health infrastructures in place cannot withstand sudden shocks,
whether these come from a changing climate or a runaway virus. Under
the weight of Ebola, health systems in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra
Leone collapsed. People stopped receiving — or stopped seeking —
health care for other diseases, like malaria, that cause more deaths
yearly than Ebola.

In turn, the severity of the disease, compounded by fear within and
beyond the affected countries, caused schools, markets, businesses,
airline and shipping routes, and borders to close. Tourism shut
down, further deepening the blow to struggling economies. What began
as a health crisis snowballed into a humanitarian, social, economic
and security crisis. In a world of radically increased
interdependence, the consequences were felt globally.

The evolution of the crisis underscored a point often made by WHO:
fair and inclusive health systems are a bedrock of social stability,
resilience and economic health. Failure to invest in these
fundamental infrastructures leaves countries with no backbone to
stand up under the weight of the shocks that this century is
delivering with unprecedented frequency.

Second, preparedness, including a high level of vigilance for
imported cases and a readiness to treat the first confirmed case as
a national emergency, made a night-and-day difference. Countries
like Nigeria, Senegal and Mali that had good surveillance and
laboratory support in place and took swift action were able to
defeat the virus before it gained a foothold.

Third, no single control intervention is, all by itself,
sufficiently powerful to bring an Ebola epidemic of this size and
complexity under control. All control measures must work together
seamlessly and in unison. If one measure is weak, others will
suffer.

Aggressive contact tracing will not stop transmission if contacts
are left in the community for several days while test results are
awaited. Good treatment may encourage more patients to seek medical
care, but will not stop community-wide transmission in the absence
of rapid case detection and safe burials. In turn, the powers of
rapid case detection and rapid diagnostic confirmation are
diminished in the absence of facilities for prompt isolation. As
long as transmission occurs in the community, medical staff
following strict protocols for infection prevention and control in
clinics will be only partially protected.

Finally, community engagement is the one factor that underlies the
success of all other control measures. It is the linchpin for
successful control. Contact tracing, early reporting of symptoms,
adherence to recommended protective measures, and safe burials are
critically dependent on a cooperative community. Having sufficient
facilities and staff in place is not enough. In several areas,
communities continued to hide patients in homes and bury bodies
secretly even when sufficient treatment beds and burial teams were
available. Experience also showed that quarantines will be violated
or dissolve into violence if affected communities are given no
incentives to comply.

An epidemic with two causes

The persistence of infections throughout 2014 had two causes. The
first was a lethal, tenacious and unforgiving virus. The second was
the fear and misunderstanding that fuelled high-risk behaviours. As
long as these high-risk beliefs and behaviours continue, the virus
will have an endless source of opportunities to exploit, blunting
the power of control measures and deepening its grip. Like the
populations in the three countries, the virus will remain constantly
on the move.

Getting to zero means fencing the virus into a shrinking number of
places where all transmission chains are known and aggressively
attacked until they break. It also means working within the existing
context of cultural beliefs and practices and not against them. As
culture always wins, it needs to be embraced, not aggravated, as WHO
aimed to do with its protocol on safe and dignified burials.

A more strategic emergency response

As the new year began, a revised response that builds on accumulated
experiences was mapped out by WHO. This new response plan adopts
what has been shown to work but also sets out new strategies
designed to seize all opportunities for getting the number of cases
down to zero.

Community resistance must be tackled by all outbreak responders with
the greatest urgency. Concrete guidance on ways of doing this is
likely to emerge from an analysis of Sierra Leone’s Western Area
Surge, which included several strategies for engaging communities
and responding to their concerns. As was learned during 2014,
community leaders, including religious leaders as well as tribal
chiefs, can play an especially persuasive role in reducing high-risk
behaviours.

Apart from low levels of community understanding and cooperation,
contact tracing is considered the weakest of all control measures.
Its poor performance likewise needs to be addressed with the
greatest urgency. For example, in Guinea, which has the most
reliable data, only around 30% of newly identified cases appear on
contact lists. In all three countries, the number of registered
contacts for confirmed cases is too low. In Sierra Leone, some lists
of contacts include family members only, and no one from the wider
community.

As the year evolved, outbreak responders learned the importance of
tailoring response strategies to match distinct needs at district
and sub-district levels. An understanding of transmission dynamics
at the local level usually reveals which control measures are
working effectively and which ones need improvement. Doing so
requires better district-level data and, above all, better
coordination. The outbreaks will not be contained by a host of
vertical programmes operating independently. Again, all control
measures must work seamlessly and in unison.

At year end, as cases flared up in new areas or moved from urban to
rural settings, a clear need emerged for rapid response teams and
for agile and flexible strategies that can change direction — and
location — quickly. In WHO’s assessment, all three countries now
have sufficient numbers of treatment beds and burial teams, but
these are not always located where they are most needed. As was also
learned during 2014, transporting patients over long distances for
treatment does not work, either for families and communities or in
terms of its impact on transmission.

As long as logistical problems persist, community confidence in the
response will remain low. People cannot be expected to do as they
are told if the effort leaves them visibly worse off — quarantined
without food, sleeping in the same room with a corpse for days —
instead of better off. These problems are compounded by poor road
systems and weak telecommunications in all three countries. In
Liberia, for example, health officials in rural areas are lucky if
they have an hour or two of internet connectivity per week. This
weakness defeats rapid communication of suspected cases, test
results and calls for help, thus ensuring that response efforts
continue to run behind a virus that seizes every opportunity to
infect more people.

A decentralized strategy — and an ethical imperative

As the response decentralizes to the subnational level, fully
functional emergency operations centres, with local government
health teams integrated and playing a leadership role, must be
established in each county, district and prefecture in the three
countries. These centres will drive the step-change in field
epidemiology capacity needed to achieve high-quality surveillance,
rapid and complete case-finding, and comprehensive contact tracing
— the fundamental requirements for getting to zero.

A decentralized response also demands urgent attention to well-known
gaps and failures in collecting, collating, managing and rapidly
sharing information on cases, laboratory results and contacts.
Understanding and tackling the drivers of transmission in each area
call for enhanced case investigation and analytical epidemiology.
Tools for collecting and sharing this information need to be
standardized and put into routine use by governments and their
partners.

Another major problem is the unacceptably large difference in case
fatality rates between people who receive care in affected countries
(71%) and foreign medical staff (26%) who were evacuated for
specialized treatment in well-resourced countries. Getting case
fatality down in affected countries is an ethical imperative.

Innovation needs to be encouraged, publicized, tested and funnelled
into control strategies whenever appropriate. Mali used medical
students with training in epidemiology to rapidly increase the
number of contact tracers. Guinea drew on its corps of young and
talented doctors to strengthen its outbreak response, with training
provided by WHO epidemiologists. These staff know the country and
its culture best. They will still be there long after foreign
medical teams leave.

In Sierra Leone, the government-run Hastings Ebola Treatment Centre,
a 123-bed facility entirely operated by local staff, has defied
statistics elsewhere in the country with its survival rates. Six out
of every 10 patients treated there make a full recovery. As noted by
an infection control specialist working on the wards, the only
patients that cannot be saved are those who wait too long to seek
care. After noting that Ebola virus disease has some similarities
with cholera, staff at the facility made intravenous administration
of replacement fluids a mainstay of the routine treatment protocol.

The pattern of transmission seen throughout 2014 makes a final
conclusion obvious: cross-border coordination is essential. Given
West Africa’s exceptionally mobile populations, no country can get
cases down to zero as long as transmission is ongoing in its
neighbours.

Prevent outbreaks in unaffected countries

With the increasing number of cases and infected prefectures in
Guinea, the risk of new importations to neighbouring countries is
also growing. In terms of preparedness, the most urgent need is for
active surveillance in the areas bordering Mali, Senegal, Guinea-
Bissau and Cote d’Ivoire, through the deployment of additional human
and material resources, and the introduction of standard performance
monitoring and reporting on a weekly basis.

Improvements in contact tracing and monitoring in the second phase
of the response provide an opportunity to substantially enhance the
efficacy of exit screening. Doing so further reduces the risk of new
Ebola exportations from affected areas. As contact tracing improves,
lists of active contacts could be systematically shared with border
and airport authorities to link this information with exit
screening.

Get health systems functioning again — on a more resilient footing

Much debate has focused on the importance of strengthening health
systems, which were weak before the outbreaks started and then
collapsed under their weight. In large parts of all three countries,
health services have disintegrated to the point that essential care
is either unavailable or not sought because of fear of Ebola
contagion.

As some have argued, cases will decrease fastest when a well-
functioning health system is in place. That argument also points to
the need to restore public confidence — which was never high — in
the public health system. Targeted drug-delivery campaigns that
aimed to treat and prevent malaria were well-received by the public
and are a step in the right direction, but much more needs to be
done.

Although virtually no good systems for civil registration and vital
statistics are still functioning in the three countries, indirect
evidence suggests that childhood deaths from malaria have eclipsed
Ebola deaths. Liberia, for example, had around 3500 malaria cases
each month prior to the outbreak, with around half of these cases,
mainly young children, dying. An immediate strengthening of health
systems could reduce these and many other deaths, while also
restoring confidence that health facilities can protect health and
heal disease.

Others argue that efforts must stay sharply focused on outbreak
containment. As this argument goes, response capacity is limited and
must not be distracted. This argument favours a step-wise approach
that initially concentrates on strengthening those health system
capacities, like surveillance and laboratory services, that can have
a direct impact on outbreak containment.

For its part, WHO sees a need to change past thinking about the way
health systems are structured. As the Ebola epidemic has shown,
capacities to detect emerging and epidemic-prone diseases early and
mount an adequate response need to be an integral part of a well-
functioning health system. Outbreak-related capacities should not be
regarded as a luxury or added as an afterthought. Otherwise, the
security of all health services is placed in jeopardy.

Step up research

Research aimed at introducing new medical products needs to continue
at its current accelerated pace. Executives in the R&D-based
pharmaceutical industry have expressed their view that all candidate
vaccines must be pursued “until they fail”. They have further agreed
that the world must never again be taken by surprise, left to
confront a lethal disease with no modern control tools in hand.

New tools will likely be needed to get to zero. For example,
vaccines to protect health care workers may make it easier to
increase the numbers of foreign and national medical staff. Better
therapies — and improved prospects of survival — may encourage
more patients to promptly seek medical care, greatly increasing
their prospects of survival.

Mine every success story

Operational research is needed to understand why some areas have
stopped or dramatically reduced transmission while others, including
some in the same vicinity and with similar population profiles,
remain hotspots of intense transmission.

Did the striking and robust declines in Lofa County, Liberia, and
Kailahun and Kenema districts in Sierra Leone occur because
devastated populations learned first-hand which behaviours carried a
high risk and changed them? Or can the declines be attributed to
simultaneous and seamless implementation of the full package of
control measures, as happened in Lofa country? Answers to these
questions will help refine control strategies.

Research is also needed to determine how areas that have achieved
zero transmission can be protected from re-reinfection. Some success
stories look real and robust, but these are only pockets of low or
zero transmission in a broad cloak of contamination.

At every opportunity, strategies devised for the emergency response
should be made to work to build basic health capacities as well.
Some success stories can serve as models.

Liberia demonstrated how quickly the quality of data and reporting
can improve, thus strongly supporting the strategic targeting of
control measures at district and sub-district levels.

Sierra Leone showed how laboratory services can be strengthened and
expanded, reducing waiting times for test results close to what is
seen in countries with advanced health systems while also supporting
the better clinical management of cases.

Each and every survivor is also a success story. In an effort to
fight the stigma that so often haunts these people, many treatment
centres hold celebratory ceremonies when survivors are released from
treatment. Each is given a certificate as proof that they pose no
risk to families or communities.

Get the incentives — and support — right

Both foreign and domestic medical staff have worked in the shadows
of death, placing their lives at risk to save the lives of others.
In many places, these staff also risked losing their standing in
communities, given the fear and stigma attached to anything or
anyone associated with Ebola.

These people deserve to be honoured and respected. They also deserve
to be paid on time and given safe places to work. Timely and
appropriate payment to national staff remains problematic. More
studies are currently under way to identify the circumstances under
which health care workers continue to get infected.

Special efforts are also needed to improve safety at private health
facilities, in pharmacies, and among traditional healers, as
evidence suggests the risk of transmission is highest in these
settings. The number of hospitals that remain closed or virtually
empty supports the conclusion that doctors and nurses are most
likely getting infected while treating patients in community
settings.

Incentives also need to be in place to ensure that foreign medical
teams stay in countries long enough to understand conditions,
including political and social as well as operational issues, and
pass on this knowledge to replacement staff. Towards the end of the
year, WHO ensured that its field coordinators stayed in countries
for several months.

The “post-Ebola syndrome”

Given the fear and stigma associated with Ebola, people who survive
the disease, especially women and orphaned children, need
psychosocial support and counselling services as well as material
support. They may need medical support as well. A number of symptoms
have been documented in what is increasingly recognized as a “post-
Ebola syndrome”.

Efforts are now under way to understand why these symptoms persist,
how they can best be managed, whether they are caused by the
disease, and whether they might be linked to treatment or the heavy
use of disinfectants. WHO staff have developed an assessment tool
that is being used to investigate these issues further.

Maintain unwavering commitment at national and international levels

Media coverage of the Ebola crisis peaked in August, when two
American missionaries and a British nurse became infected in West
Africa and were medically evacuated for treatment in their home
countries. Coverage increased dramatically in October, when the USA
and Spain confirmed their first locally transmitted cases.

Although the situation in Liberia at year end, especially in
Monrovia, looked promising, optimism must remain cautious. As
experiences in Guinea made clear, this is a virus that can go into
hiding for some weeks, only to return again with a vengeance. In
Liberia, as caseloads declined, evidence of complacency and “Ebola
fatigue” rapidly appeared in some populations even though
transmission continued.

The three countries will continue to need international support for
some time to come, whether in the form of direct support for
response measures or assistance in rebuilding their health services.
Countries and the international community must brace themselves for
the long-haul.

One overarching question hangs in the air. The virus has
demonstrated its tenacity time and time again. Will national and
international control efforts show an equally tenacious staying
power?

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

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Details on the passing of Cuban nurse, Reinaldo Villafranca Antigua, in Sierra Leone
| January 21, 2015 | 8:52 pm | Africa, Cuba, Ebola | Comments closed

Statement from the Ministry of Public Health

Yesterday, January 18 at 7.00 a.m., Cuban time, 12.00 p.m. in Sierra Leone, the Cuban collaborator and nurse, Reinaldo Villafranca Antigua, from Los Palacios municipality in Pinar del Río province, died aged 43, after suffering from malaria with cerebral complications.
The collaborator formed part of the Henry Reeve Medical Brigade, currently fighting the Ebola virus in Sierra Leone. He arrived in the country on October 2, 2014, and was working in the Ebola Treatment Center located in the capital, Kerry Town.
On the morning of January 17, he presented the first symptoms of diarrhea, which he associated with a digestive problem, by the afternoon that day he had a fever of 38ºC. A test for malaria was taken and resulted positive, and the patient began to receive anti-malarial treatment orally. Hours later he was unconscious of his surroundings and continued to suffer from a high fever.
He was transferred to the British Navy Hospital, located in Kerry Town. A second test for malaria was taken which again was positive, as well as a test for Ebola, which proved negative.
The latest intravenous anti-malarial treatment was applied. The patient continued to progressively deteriorate, suffering from respiratory difficulty he was connected to a ventilation machine under the care of British specialists.
During the early morning his clinical state deteriorated further and he was unresponsive to treatment until ultimately passing away. Reinaldo Villafranca Antigua worked in the health sector for ten years and volunteered to form part of the group of collaborators traveling to West Africa.
We are grateful to the authorities of the Sierra Leone Health Ministry, representatives of the United Nations, the World Health Organization and the British Mission in the country, for their attention and monitoring of our collaborator.
To the family of our compañero we extend our sincerest condolences.
Cuban Doctor Returns to Fight Ebola in Africa
| January 15, 2015 | 7:50 pm | Africa, Cuba, Ebola, Health Care, International | Comments closed

HAVANA, Cuba, Jan 15 (acn) Cuban doctor Felix Baez, who overcame the Ebola virus, which he got in Sierra Leone, returned to that Western African nation to continue fighting the disease along his comrades with the Henry Reeve international medical brigade.

Cubadebate website published a series of photos of the doctor along his comrades in Sierra Leone announcing his return.

An internal medicine specialist, Baez announced in December 2014 that he would return to the African nation to finish the job he started, once he fully recovered from the disease.

The 43-year-old doctor returned to Cuba after having been released from the Geneva-based Cantonal University Hospital, where he received treatment against Ebola.

In response to the World Health Organization call to fight Ebola in Africa, Cuba sent three brigades to Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea to fight the virus.

According to the World Health Organization over 8 thousand 800 people have died from the Ebola virus in Africa.

================================================
LAST MEMBERS OF CUBAN FIVE RETURNING TO CUBA:

2000 slaughtered in Nigeria
| January 13, 2015 | 8:25 pm | Africa, Analysis, Ebola, International, Nigeria | Comments closed

Nigeria: Elections/Security Disconnect

AfricaFocus Bulletin
January 13, 2015 (150113)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“These images from Northern Nigeria should be searing the conscience
of the world. Some two thousand innocent children, women and elderly
reportedly massacred in Baga. A young girl sent to her death with a
bomb strapped to her chest in Maiduguri. And lest we forget, more
than two hundred girls stolen from their families, still lost. Words
alone can neither express our outrage nor ease the agony of all
those suffering from the constant violence in northern Nigeria. But
these images of recent days and all they imply for the future of
Nigeria should galvanize effective action.  For this cannot go on.”
– UNICEF Executive Director Anthony Lake, January 11, 2015

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs15/nig1501.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

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Despite exceptions such as the statement above, the disparity
between the global reaction to the terrorist killings in Paris and
those in northeastern Nigeria has been a horrific if predictable
reminder of the differential value placed on human lives by race and
location (for roundups of commentaries making this point, see
articles in The Guardian and The Daily Maverick below).

Less easily explicable, but equally consequential, is the muted
reaction at the top levels of the Nigerian government itself.
According to a January 12 CNN report on the Baga massacre “Last
week, [President] Jonathan launched his re-election bid in a raucous
rally in Lagos. He did not say a word about the massacres.” (
http://tinyurl.com/of33dmm)

This reality, as Nigeria approaches national elections next month,
is critical to understanding the obstacles that Nigeria faces in
responding to Boko Haram. Despite widespread opposition to that
extremist movement in all sections of the country, notes Nigerian
analyst Zainab Usman, there is no common national narrative on how
to deal with it, with many supporters of the incumbent government as
well as of the opposition party actually accusing their opponents of
covertly sponsoring Boko Haram for political reasons.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains a short article by Usman making
this point. A more extensive and very clear analysis is in her 21-
minute video presentation from October, available on her website at
http://zainabusman.wordpress.com/ – direct URL to video:
http://tinyurl.com/n2yva7s If you can, watch the video!

In the video Usman refers to the car bombings by Boko Haram in July
2014 targeting opposition presidential candidate Muhammadu Buhari as
well as a prominent Muslim scholar, which
left 82 bystanders dead. This is a clear reminder that the movement
has targeted both Christians and Muslims, and that simplistic
portrayals of either security or the elections based on region and
religion alone are highly misleading. The complex political party
scene, at both federal and state levels, brings together politicians
of all backgrounds on both sides. The presidential ticket of the
incumbent Goodluck Jonathan includes Muslim Namadi Sambo as vice-
president, while opposition leader Muhammadu Buhari’s vice-
presidential candidate is Yemi Osinbajo, a lawyer and a Christian
pastor.

Also included in this issue is a general background article on the
elections by Idayat Hassan, Director of the Centre for Democracy and
Development, Abuja, and a brief roundup from the latest report by
Mohammed Ibn Chambas, the UN Secretary-General’s special
representative for West Africa, on the multiple atrocities committed
by Boko Haram in 2014.

Few if any observers would venture to predict the results of the
election (Gallup notes widespread distrust among Nigerians at the
likelihood of a fair election: http://tinyurl.com/nmmuw5x). And
skepticism towards all political figures is profound. But
President Jonathan’s record, onfacing Boko Haram as well as more
generally, is extremely weak. And opposition candidate Muhammadu
Buhari, a former military head of state, does have a reputation for
personal integrity as well as a clear commitment to strengthening
the security response to Boko Haram.

Of related interest:

* Good roundup of coverage and opinion on “Why did the world ignore
Boko Haram’s Baga attacks?” in The Guardian, Jan. 12, 2015
http://tinyurl.com/om7y8jl

* “I am Charlie, but I am Baga too: On Nigeria’s forgotten
massacre,” Simon Allison, The Daily Maverick, Jan. 12, 2015
http://tinyurl.com/l8pja9a

* Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)
http://www.inecnigeria.org/

* Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, December 2014
Detailed overview of internal displacement, including but not
limited to that by Boko Haram
http://tinyurl.com/n57loz4

* “The Tragedy of Borno State: Local Dimensions of Boko Haram’s
Insurgency,” by Michael Baca, African Arguments, December 19, 2014
http://africanarguments.org/ – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/lxg98np

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Nigeria, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/nigeria.php

For ongoing news coverage of Nigeria from Nigerian sources, visit
http://saharareporters.com and http://allafrica.com/nigeria

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Ebola Perspectives

[AfricaFocus is regularly monitoring and posting links on Ebola on
social media. For additional links, see
http://www.facebook.com/AfricaFocus]

Informative roundup on prospects for fight against Ebola in 2015.
Notable differences between affected countries as of end of 2014.
http://lauriegarrett.com/blog/ahead-in-2015-part-one

Short video tribute to local health workers in Liberia, by U.S.
photographer who survived Ebola – a “must watch”
“Making Sure We Give Credit Where It’s Due in the Ebola Outbreak,”
by Ashoka Mukpo, Jan 8, 2015
http://tinyurl.com/mnna7yg

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

Boko Haram and the Competing Narratives

July 11, 2014

Zainab Usman

http://zainabusman.wordpress.com/ – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/q9esued

This is an article I recently wrote for the Opinion section of
AlJazeera English. It was originally published on the AJE website.

Nigeria has recently been brought to global media attention both as
the largest economy in Africa and as the home country of the Boko
Haram insurgency. The growing security threat has been accompanied
by a failure to develop a comprehensive narrative about Boko Haram’s
origins, its motivations and its implications for the country’s
future. The absence of such a cohesive narrative by the Nigerian
government, its citizens and the communities affected is indicative
of the need for a domestic solution to tackle this security
challenge.

The recent abduction of more than 200 schoolgirls from the remote
community of Chibok in Nigeria’s northeast focused the world’s
attention on the country’s five-year battle with violent extremism.
Within this period, the goals of Boko Haram have evolved – from
leading a hermetic life away from a society they deemed corrupt and
decadent, to a vengeful war against all symbols of modernity,
democratic governance and Western education.

Upsurge in violence

Unfortunately, Nigerians haven’t been as quick to come to terms with
the upsurge in violence. The now-daily suicide bombings, mass
murders, mysterious assassinations of political, traditional and
religious leaders, mass abductions and other incidents of mindless
violence are still hard to grasp.

In the first five months of 2014, over 5,000 lives were lost to such
violence, according to the think tank, the Council on Foreign
Relations. In the wake of the glaring inability of the government to
contain this violent extremism, several competing narratives have
emerged.

On the part of the Nigerian government, the narrative has been
mostly incoherent and highly politicised. With the Chibok girls’
abduction for instance, both the federal government and the states
in the northeast – Boko Haram’s stronghold – have been preoccupied
with trading blame. Constitutionally, the responsibility for
security lies with the central government.

Since May 2013, three of these northeastern states have been under a
state of emergency, which gives greater powers to the central
government over their security.

These states accuse the federal government of negligence,
incompetence and corruption affecting the capacity of themilitary.
In turn, the federal government blames the states for exaggerating
the insecurity in their domains to embarrass it.

The key to understanding this lack of cohesion between the federal
and the northeastern states lies in understanding the nature of the
heated political environment.

The next round of general elections in 2015 may be the country’s
most contentious. President Goodluck Jonathan, it is widely
believed, will run for a second term, against a groundswell of
opposition under the All Progressives Congress (APC).

Jonathan’s emergence as presidential candidate in 2011 breached the
ruling People’s Democratic Party’s (PDP) power-sharing rule in which
presidential power alternated every eight years between the mostly
Christian southern elites and their mostly Muslim northern
counterparts. In the typical rhetoric of political brinkmanship that
characterises electoral politics in Nigeria, a few aggrieved
northern PDP politicians who felt short-changed of their turn at the
presidency, threatened to make the country “ungovernable” for
Jonathan, a southerner.

Where these empty threats should have ordinarily dissipated into
thin air, they coincided with the escalation of the Boko Haram
insurgency. The Islamist group which emerged in the early 2000s
became increasingly violent after confrontations with security
agencies, as an International Crisis Group report documents. The
extra-judicial murder of Muhammad Yusuf, the group’s leader by the
police in 2009, captured on camera, forced the remaining members
into hiding. They reassembled a few years later, embarking on a
viciously vengeful killing spree.

South-north divide?

In 2011, Jonathan became president in regionally polarising
elections, on the platform of a fractured ruling party, and with a
simmering insurgency about to explode in its full wrath. The
interaction of all these meant that as Boko Haram waged its campaign
of violence, including its historic bombing of the UN building in
Abuja, the president and his inner circle wrestled to consolidate
their power in the PDP.

Consequently, a narrative slowly emerged from the president’s mostly
southern support base that the insurgency was being sponsored by
“disgruntled northern politicians” to undermine his administration.
This view has been articulated by known associates of the president
such as Chief Edwin Clark and ex-militant Mujahid Dokubo Asari.

It is now a widely-shared belief by many southerners that the
worsening insecurity is evidence of the northern elite making real
their erstwhile threat, as opposed to the governance challenges
bedevilling every aspect of Nigerian society. The northern elite are
funding the insurgency, destroying their infrastructure and killing
their own people just to make Jonathan look weak, it is said.

In the north where most of Boko Haram’s attacks and victims have
been concentrated, a widespread sense of fear, alienation and deep
distrust pervades. This stems from the federal government’s
inability to contain Boko Haram despite the increase in defence
spending to $5.8bn (or 20 percent of the budget) and militarisation
of the northeast.

Rather, brutal human rights abuses by the security forces and
allegations by combat soldiers of deliberate sabotage by their
commanders reinforce the deep distrust in the federal government.
The president’s slow response and perceived indifference to attacks
in the north has further alienated him from many northerners – he
only publicly acknowledged the Chibok girls’ abduction two weeks
after.

Consequently, the predominant narrative among many northerners is
that Jonathan’s federal government at best has little interest in
ending the insurgency in the north; and at worst, his associates may
be indirectly fuelling it, to weaken the region and its elites’
national political leverage. This is a view recently articulated by
Murtala Nyako, the governor of Adamawa, one of the states under
emergency rule. Coincidentally, the governors of all three
northeastern states under the state of emergency are in the
opposition party, the APC.

As the country’s elites and citizens blame one another, Boko Haram
appears more determined. As the country’s social fabric unravels
after each bomb blast, and the narratives become more disparate,
Boko Haram remains consistent with its vision against Western
education, modern governance structures and inter-religious harmony.
The strong national cohesion needed among Nigeria’s leaders and
citizens to collectively tackle this terrorist threat is lacking due
to contentious local politics. References to a civil war and a
disintegration of the country are now constant features online, in
print media and other fora of public discourse.

It is commendable that at this time of need, governments of the
United States, United Kingdom and other global powers have pledged
military support to help Nigeria to contain this terrorist threat.
Yet it is up to Nigerians to decide whether to unite and tackle the
insurgency, or continue blaming each other while the country
gradually unravels at the seams.

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Nigeria Forum:  Why are the stakes so high for the 2015 elections?

by Idayat Hassan

African Arguments, December 16, 2014

http://africanarguments.org/ – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/mt49ld4

[Idayat Hassan is Director of the Centre for Democracy and
Development, Abuja.]

The 2015 general elections in Nigeria will define the country.
Speculation about a crisis that may ensue in the post-election
period is rife. Irrespective of which political party emerges
victorious to form the national government, the south-north divide,
zoning, religion and other factors could have a significant effect
in the aftermath of the polls.

Identity has always played a prominent role in Nigerian elections.
This situation has been further exacerbated in the prelude to 2015
as ethnic and religious entrepreneurs capitalize by whipping up such
sentiments. At the heart of this is the power sharing and rotation
equation between different groups divided along regional, ethnic and
religious. This, however, takes different dimensions at different
levels of government.

At the national level the bifurcation is along the North – South
divide. This is fueled by the power-sharing agreement within the
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) called ‘zoning’. Under this
agreement, power is expected to alternate between the North and
South, however the death of former President Umaru Yar’Adua’s put
the agreement in disarray, not only did his then vice president
Goodluck Jonathan utilize his unexpired tenure, but also contested
and won the election in 2011 (with an alleged agreement that he
would not seek re-election in 2015.)

The issue of identity also plays out at the state level. The
politics of attrition – “our turn, we are the largest group, we
produce the most resources” – is easily observable. This syndrome,
coupled with the marginalization card, is strongly played by ethnic
zones and religious groups. But identity is quite fluid within the
Nigeria context and ethnicity, religion or geo- political identity
can fade away when necessary.

The upcoming 2015 general elections differ from the 2011 polls in
part due to the emergence of the All Progressive Congress (APC). The
country can now be said to be a two party state. In the 2011 general
elections, four major parties, including PDP, ACN, CPC and ANPP,
contested the elections with the opposition groups polling (in
total) less than 42 percent of the votes cast. However, General
Buhari of the CPC, registered just a few months prior to the
elections, polled over 12 million votes, with 96.9 percent of the
vote from Northern Nigeria.

With the merger of major opposition parties, the APC is more
formidable, having membership and support beyond the North. Now that
General Buhari is on its presidential ticket, it is unlikely that
PDP stalwarts will sit back patiently without devising means to win
the election at all costs. If Buhari could poll 12,214,853 as the
presidential candidate of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC)
as the APC candidate he is a genuinely credible challenger to PDP
dominance.

The defection of the five PDP governors to the APC also raised the
stakes higher. Political structures previously under the control of
the PDP are now controlled by APC. The PDP will however, want to
regain these states at all costs which further raises the stakes.

This acrimonious atmosphere has led to an explosion of hate speech.
In the last weeks there have been accusations by Northern leaders
and even the opposition party that Jonathan-led Federal Government
is fueling the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East. Reminiscent
of the Rwanda genocide, the state governor of Katsina was caught on
tape referring to opponents as “cockroaches” and encouraging his
supporters to crush them while they chanted “kill them”. The PDP
National Publicity Secretary described the APC as a terrorist party,
linking it to Al-Qaeda.

The use of social media has further led to the explosion of hate
speech with a geopolitical dimension attached. There is also a need
to watch out for the impact opinion polls may have in the elections.
In the last  months, several polls have been conducted placing some
candidates ahead of others, the likelihood of conflict entrepreneurs
latching on to figures from such polls to incite violence when a
particular candidate loses out is a reality that must be proactively
countered.

This election is being conducted as impunity and partisanship are
exhibited at all levels. The security agencies are viewed as
partisan at the national and state level. There are allegations of
police patrol vehicles carrying political parties/candidates
stickers in certain states.  The Inspector General of police is
being accused of partisanship with his recent handling of the House
of Representatives’ impasse and failure to recognize the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, Hon Aminu Tambuwal, as the speaker.

In addition, the spokesperson of the Department of State Service
(DSS), Ms. Marilyn Ogar, has been accused of partisanship following
several unsubstantiated allegations against the APC, which includes
claiming the party tried to bribe the DSS during the governorship
election of August 9th. Similarly, she alleged that APC was a
sponsor of the Boko Haram insurgency.

The preconceived notion of the security agencies’ partisanship has
implications on the election, with the likelihood that opposition
parties will resort to self-help or arming ethnic militias. This is
worrying, particularly in the context of an election where the
acceptance of results and the electoral outcome is a key challenge.
Already the opposition parties are threatening to create a parallel
government.

Speaking at the grand finale of Governor Rauf Aregbesola’s bid for
re-election in Osogbo, Osun State, APC National Chairman, Chief John
Oyegun, warned that any attempt by PDP to rig the 2015 elections
would lead to the formation of a parallel government. This was
reiterated by the Governor of Rivers State, Rotimi Amaechi, during
an APC protest rally held in Abuja on 19th November 2014.

In the 2011 general election, INEC enjoyed the goodwill of most
Nigerians, but this trend is changing for a number of reasons. Top
of the list is the handling of the Permanent Voters’ Card (PVC)
distribution and the Continuous Voters’ Registration (CVR) exercise.
These exercises experienced varying challenges, ranging from
logistics and capacity to the disappearance of over a million names
off the register in Lagos State, to the extension of the exercise
from the initially planned 3 to 4 + phases.

The PVC distribution in Lagos and Kano generated so much bad blood
with rallies against the commission held across Lagos and political
parties joining the fray with press conferences and statements
issued, not only questioning INEC but also fostering the impression
that the commission is acting out a script. In the same vein, the
commission has been accused of planning to disenfranchise Christians
by the Chairman of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Pastor
Ayo Oritsejafor.

The perceived politicization of the creation of additional polling
units (now suspended) also impacted the credibility of the
commission as it was accused of favouring a particular part of the
country. The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) created by the Boko
Haram insurgency constitute another challenge for INEC. There have
been many calls for these people to be included in the elections
without regard to the provisions of the law, which states that
voters can only vote at the polling units where they registered.
Without a review of electoral law, the practicality of this is in
doubt, and even if an amendment to this effect is passed, how it
would be achieved comes into question as these IDPs are scattered in
homesteads (not just living in camps).

We also cannot gloss over international best practice as espoused in
instruments such as the African Charter on Democracy, elections and
governance, which prescribes six months before elections for the
amendment of any electoral laws.

This analysis is not complete without emphasizing the increased role
of religion in the upcoming elections. While much emphasis has been
on political Islam in the Nigerian context, rising Pentecostalism
and political power wielded by the Pentecostal pastors with huge
followings must be emphasized. Particularly worrisome is the
increased vituperation of the chairman of the Christian Association
of Nigeria (CAN) and outright partisan role played in the prelude to
the elections.

As insecurity continues to pervade the country, much emphasis is
being laid on the Boko Haram Insurgency. But a conflict risk
assessment shows an average of eighteen states as being at ‘high
risk’. For the purpose of this analysis, I shall concentrate on
Nassarawa state.

Nassarawa state has been enmeshed in violence for the last 2 years,
leaving aside the attempt to impeach the governor which led to loss
of lives and property. The quest for power change and an unorthodox
agreement between the incumbent governor and the Eggons (who
constitute the highest percentage of citizens in the state) that the
incumbent Governor will serve only a term in office in exchange for
their support in the 2011 general election, is said to be one of the
reasons for the emergence of the religious cult group, ‘Ombatse’, in
2013.

The sect is alleged to have murdered over 70 security agents,
including men of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) and DSS in cold
blood in May 2013. The security agents were said to have stormed the
shrine over alleged forceful conscription of people into the cult,
none of the alleged killers of the security men have been brought to
book while the white paper that emanated from the panel of inquiry
set up by the state government is being challenged in court by the
group.

The Fulani/Eggon crises, conflict between farmers and pastoralists
and the rivalry between the PDP and APC pervade the Nassarawa state.
There is hardly a week without a report of violent conflict, but the
state is not being prioritized in terms of election programming.

As Boko Haram continues to acquire more territory, the likelihood of
elections in the north east seems dim. From its concentration in the
three states of Bornu, Yobe and Adamawa, in the last weeks, the
insurgents have shifted attacks to Bauchi and Gombe in the North
East, while at the same time making forays into Kano, Niger and
Plateau in North West and North Central Nigeria respectively. Boko
Haram has established its hegemony in some local government areas in
the North East following the incapacity of the military to regain
the areas. The question therefore is whether elections be held in
the occupied territories.

The legitimacy of the elections and the incoming administration will
hinge on the resolution of some of the highlighted issues and above
all the quality of elections delivered by INEC.

**********************************************************

Excerpts from

Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the
United Nations Office for West Africa, 24 December 2014
S /2014/945

Available at http://tinyurl.com/ps455le

20. Nigeria also witnessed an escalation in attacks and bombings,
particularly in   the north-eastern States of Borno, Yobe and
Adamawa. During the reporting period, Boko Haram carried out several
attacks on military and security installations, as well as over 40
deadly raids on civilian settlements, which included torching of
churches and mosques. On 1 July, a vehicle-borne explosive device
detonated and  killed at least 56 civilians in a crowded arketplace
in Maiduguri, Borno State. On 23 July in Kaduna, Kaduna State, two
successive bombings targeted the convoys of Sheik Dahiru Bauchi, a
prominent Islamic scholar, and Muhammadu Buhari, a presidential
contender for APC, leaving 82  people dead. On 7 November, a bomb
killed 10 people in Azare, Bauchi State. On 10 November, a suicide
bomber in Potiskum, Yobe State, killed at least 46 students and
wounded 79 others at the  Public Science Technical College. The
Yobe State government subsequently closed all schools until further
notice. On 12 November, another suicide bombing took place at a
school in Kontagora, Niger State, injuring scores of people. On 25
November, two teenage female suicide bombers killed over 45 people
in the marketplace of Maiduguri. On 27 November, a bomb explosion
in the Maraba -Mubi area in Adamawa State killed at least 40
people. The  Kano Central Mosque was attacked on 28 November,
killing at least 120 people and injuring over 270 others.
On 11 December, twin bombs killed at least 40 people at a market in
Jos. On the  same day, in Kano, a 13-year-old girl was arrested for
allegedly wearing a suicide vest.

21. The territorial expansion of the Boko Haram insurgency was quite
rapid. The group took over the towns of Buni Yadi, Yobe State, on 20
August; Gambaru -Ngala, Borno State, on 26 August; Dikwa, Borno
State on 28 August, and Bama, the second-largest city in Borno
State, on 2 October. On 5 and 11 November, Boko Haram captured the
town of Malam Fatori in Borno State and the city of Maiha in Adamawa
State, respectively. The group is now believed to be in control of
significant swaths of land in Borno and Adamawa States, raising
questions about the Government’s ability to conduct elections in
these areas. Boko Haram has also reportedly established governance
architecture and imposed Sharia law in the areas
under its control.

22. Despite national and international reaction to the kidnapping of
schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno State, in April 2014, Boko Haram has
continued its spate of kidnappings of adults and children. On 10
August, Boko Haram militants overran local militias in a remote
fishing village near Lake Chad and  kidnapped 97 persons. On 14
September, over 50 women were reported to have been abducted in
Gulak, Adamawa State; on 30 September an unknown number of persons
were abducted in Gwoza, Borno State; and  on 18 October, 40 women
were reportedly abducted in Wagga, Adamawa State.

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