Month: February, 2017
A Canadian responds to John Bachtell’s report
| February 19, 2017 | 7:43 pm | About the CPUSA, V.I. Lenin | Comments closed

Read this excerpt from Bachtell’s report  http://www.cpusa.org/article/standing-together-in-protest-unity-will-trump-hate/  and compare it to Lenin’s critique of Kautsky in the State and Revolution, last chapter (“Kautsky’s Controversy with the Opportunists”)

Thirdly, we are not dropping Leninism or the ideas of Lenin. This includes Lenin’s concept of the revolutionary party rooted in the working class with the aim of socialism, a party devoted to developing strategy and tactics, studying stages of struggle, following the democratic path, and centered around the press (in the current day, this means the digital media, i.e. PeoplesWorld.org).”

My emphasis.

The closing of Bachtell’s report is also revealing in the same sense – what it does not contain.

I think the first paragraph of the last chapter in S&R says it all
“The question of the relation of the state to the social revolution, and of the social revolution to the state, like the question of revolution generally, was given very little attention by the leading theoreticians and publicists of the Second International (1889-1914). But the most characteristic thing about the process of the gradual growth of opportunism that led to the collapse of the Second International in 1914 is the fact that even when these people were squarely faced with this question they tried to evade it or ignored it.”

Road to Berlin
| February 15, 2017 | 7:52 pm | Fascist terrorism, Russia, USSR | Comments closed

Падение Берлина. Серия 2 / The Fall of Berlin film 2
| February 15, 2017 | 7:47 pm | Fascist terrorism, political struggle, Russia, USSR | Comments closed

Падение Берлина. Серия 1 / The Fall of Berlin film 1
| February 15, 2017 | 7:44 pm | Russia, USSR | Comments closed

Congo (Kinshasa): Tshisekedi Place Hard to Fill
| February 13, 2017 | 7:50 pm | Africa, political struggle | Comments closed

AfricaFocus Bulletin
February 12, 2017 (170213)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“The death of prominent opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi has
deprived the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) of a unique
political figure who was at the forefront of the fight for democracy
for over three decades. … Coming just a month after the signing of
a political agreement, which would have put him at the head of an
important follow-up committee, his departure robs the opposition of
a leader able to combine genuine street-level popularity with an
ability to squeeze out political deals.” – International Crisis
Group

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs17/kin1702.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
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This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains several short analytical articles
on the death of Etienne Tshisekedi and the difficult road ahead for
this year in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. All agree in
paying tribute to the record of this Congolese leader in his long
struggle for democracy in the country and to renewed and heightened
uncertainties about the future in the wake of his death.

Additional relevant background links include the following:

Interview with Georges Nzongola Ntalaja
“Congolese Scholar And Activist Pays Hommage to Etienne Tshisekedi,”
Audio and transcript
Friends of the Congo blog, February 9, 2017
http://congofriends.blogspot.com/

Karen Attiah
“With the death of Etienne Tshisekedi, a light goes out in Congo,”
Washington Post, Feb. 3, 2017
http://tinyurl.com/zepdvb7

“Etienne Tshisekedi, l’opposant congolais historique en six dates,”
Video, Le Monde, February 3, 2017
http://tinyurl.com/j9qby5g

Trésor Kibangula, “Étienne Tshisekedi, la voix de Kinshasa”
Jeune Afrique, Feb. 9, 2017
http://tinyurl.com/hs8d9rh

Sasha Lezhnev and John Prendergast, “Congo’s Violent Kleptocracy at
a Crossroads”
Fox News, February 4, 2017
http://tinyurl.com/jozg9q7

Sabine Cessou, “Transition à haut risque en RDC”
Le Monde Diplomatique, Dec 2016
https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2016/12/CESSOU/56889

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, visit http://www.africafocus.org/country/congokin.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

Tshisekedi, Misunderstood and Maligned, Leaves Uncertainty in his
Wake

Congo Research Group, February 2, 2017

http://tinyurl.com/j8q77aa

During the run-up to the 2011 elections, Roger Meece visited
Washington, DC. Meece, then the head of the UN peacekeeping mission
to the Congo, was perhaps the US diplomat with the best
understanding of the country. He had served as deputy chief of
mission to the Congo between 1995-1998, as director for Central
African Affairs at the State Department between 1998-2000, and as
ambassador between 2004-2007.

The 2011 elections were going to be won either by Joseph Kabila or
Etienne Tshisekedi. In meetings with people inside and outside State
Department, Meece’s analysis was clear: Tshisekedi was the wrong
choice for the country. He was a dangerous firebrand who could upend
the fragile peace process that had swept in a new era of democracy
to the country.

Meece was not alone in his analysis. Few western diplomats had much
love for “Ya Tshitshi.” They perceived him to be stubborn, misguided
and aloof. It is not difficult to understand this perception. Among
his policy missteps in recent years have figured an ill-advised
coalition with the unpopular Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)
rebels in 2002; a boycott of the 2005 registration process and of
the 2006 elections; and tolerance of virulent anti-Tutsi demagoguery
by some of his UDPS members during the 2011 elections. This was
compounded by his own difficult personality; in my own meetings with
him, he was curt and difficult to engage in constructive
discussions.

That was not all. Ironically, despite being an uncompromising
crusader for democracy in the Congo, he struggled to keep his own
party together. In 1987, Frédéric Kibassa Maliba, one of the iconic
13 dissenters who had founded the UDPS, defected to join the Mobutu
government, creating his own UDPS party in 1991. Many others
defected over the years, co-opted by the government or complaining
about Tshisekedi’s imperious managerial style––today, none of the 13
UDPS founders remain in the party.

And yet, Tshisekedi continued to tower as a Congolese hero. What
Meece and other detractors failed to fully appreciate was the
symbolic importance of Tshisekedi. In contrast with many other
opposition leaders, Tshisekedi never sold out (in recent memory; his
career under Mobutu is a different matter). It was precisely his
lack of pragmatism, his stubborn recalcitrance and inability to
compromise that many Congolese loved. As one of his supporters said
to the press today: “He was the hope for Congolese democracy.”

This adoration was on frequent display. When he returned from
medical treatment to run for the 2011 elections, hundreds of
thousands turned out to see him pass. Similar crowds lined the roads
last year, when he came back once more from treatment in Brussels.

Tshisekedi’s death will usher in problems and opportunities. It will
complicate the formation of a new government to implement the 31
December deal; and it will allow for a new generation of Congolese
politicians to come to the fore. But for now, we should mourn the
passing of a behemoth of Congolese politics, a man who despite his
deep flaws came to embody the hopes of millions. May his dogged
pursuit of democracy inspire the youth, and may we all learn from
his many mistakes.

**************************************************************

Congo Kinshasa: Tshisekedi’s Death Highlights Obstacles and
Opportunities for Peace

AllAfrica.com

Guest Column, February 6, 2017

http://allafrica.com/stories/201702060001.html

By Olivier Kambala wa Kambala

[Olivier Kambala wa Kambala is a rule of law and transitional
justice expert and the founder of the Congo Memory Institute (
http://www.memorycongo.org)]

The death in Brussels of Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, the iconic
figure of democracy in the Democratic Republic of Congo, combined
with a stalemate in the implementation of the agreement on governing
until elections later this year, could plunge the country again into
a constitutional abyss.

This could destabilise the eastern Congo even further, potentially
reverberating throughout the Great Lakes Region. But these
developments could also be turned into an opportunity for
democratising and stabilising the nation in the long term.

On the night of December 31, 2016, President Joseph Kabila’s
political camp-called the Presidential Majority (PM)-and the group
of political parties (named Rassemblement) gathered around Etienne
Tshisekedi, reached an eleventh-hour agreement to stop the country
from descending into a constitutional abyss created by the failure
of the Kabila government to organise general elections and step down
at the end of his second term of office.

In lieu of President Kabila peacefully transferring power to an
elected successor on December 20, political negotiations facilitated
by the National Episcopal Conference of Congo (CENCO) reached an
agreement on five points:

1. Kabila will remain in power throughout a transitional period
which will end in December 2017 with a transfer of power to a
democratically elected president. A determining parameter of the
transitional period is that the constitution will not be altered,
notably its provisions limiting presidential terms;

2. There will be a transitional government led by a prime minister
designated by the Rassemblement and appointed by President Kabila.
The transitional government’s main tasks will be to organise
credible, transparent and peaceful elections by December 2017;

3. Swift electoral reforms will be implemented to ensure that
presidential, legislative and provincial elections are organized no
later than December 2017, including the establishment of a new
electoral roll and the restructuring of the membership of the
National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI);

4. A body will be created- the National Council for the Monitoring
of the Agreement- with the power to monitor the implementation of
the political agreement; and

5. Confidence-building measures will be implemented, mainly aimed at
ensuring the exercise of civil and political rights, the release of
political prisoners and the return of exiled activists and
politicians such as Floribert Anzuluni of Filimbi (“the whistle”)
and Moise Katumbi, former governor of the Katanga region and former
member of the presidential majority, whose sins were to announce his
availability as President Kabila’s successor.

What was hailed as a political breakthrough is proving to be a
complicated agreement to implement.

Two main trends of thinking are pitched against one another: one
holds that the agreement should be implemented strictly in terms of
the DRC constitution of February 2006; the other says the
Constitution is the basis of the agreement, but that it has been
violated by the Presidential Majority and it ought to be adjusted by
the terms of the December 31 agreement.

In between these two schools of thought, the Presidential Majority
is distorting the process by partly respecting the Constitution when
it serves their purpose to block negotiations and frustrate the
opposition.

These obstacles are illustrated principally by the resistance of the
Presidential Majority to allowing the Rassemblement to present the
name of one individual to be appointed as Prime Minister by
President Kabila. The Rassemblement has named Felix Antoine
Tshisekedi as their designate as the agreement suggests, but the
Presidential Majority is adamant that the Rassemblement needs to
present at least three names from which the president will choose.

While the DRC constitution provides that the prime minister is
appointed within the majority group in parliament, this provision
cannot hold in the light of the fact that the agreement granted the
position of the Prime Minister to the Rassemblement and also that
there will be no legitimate parliament from end of February 2017,
when the elective mandate of members of Parliament will lapse. Other
blockages include the determination of ministerial posts and their
allocations to the Presidential Majority and the Rassemblement.

While the December 31 agreement is being implemented, the executive
is run by a government led by an opposition defector, Samy
Badibanga, who participated in a non-inclusive negotiation process
led by an African Union mediator. The agreement that came out of
that process on October 18 2016 was discussed in Luanda on October
26, during the Seventh High-Level Meeting of the Regional Oversight
Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region. While the high-
level meeting recognized the agreement as a step towards national
dialogue, it encouraged the leaders of the DRC to extend the reach
of the dialogue to include the Rassemblement. Hence the political
negotiations under CENCO’s facilitation.

During the uncertainty of 2016 over whether President Kabila would
hand over power, the international community called for a peaceful
settlement but also applied sanctions. As people took to the streets
in Kinshasa last September, galvanized by Etienne Tshisekedi, to
demonstrate against CENI’s decision to postpone presidential
elections, the United States and the European Union imposed targeted
sanctions against securocrats and a close political aide to Kabila.
The sanctions however did not prevent the deaths of 50 or more
protesters, nor the illegal detention of members of citizen
resistance groups such as Filimbi and LUCHA.

Meanwhile, security continued to deteriorate in the notorious
eastern part of the DRC. Especially on the periphery of the town of
Beni in Northern Kivu province, where civilians have been abandoned
to the cruelty of armed groups, either local militias or foreign
groups, which have committed inhumane acts of violence, including
machete-type executions.

In the middle of January, allegations emerged that there has been a
resurgence of activities of the M-23 armed group around the Virunga
Park. The Rwandan-aligned group had been defeated in November 2013
by a coalition of the DRC’s armed forces and a United Nations
special force, but they were reported missing from the detention
centres in Kampala where they sought shelter after the 2013 debacle.
Insecurity also spread in the Kasai Central province, where fighters
from the militia group Kamwina Nsapu are wreaking havoc. In the
Central Kongo province, supporters of the politico-mystic party
Bundu Dia Kongo have been readying for war.

Now, a month after the signing of the 31 December political
agreement, the passing of Etienne Tshisekedi, the deteriorating
security situation and the devaluation of the franc congolais, what
can be done?

The power-sharing agreement of December 31 is the way to stop DRC
from bleeding its people and economy. A matter of priority is the
establishment of a transitional government that will take stock of
interim measures to stabilize the country economically and secure
its people, and become credible interlocutors to DRC neighbours and
the international community.

Moreover, it is in the interests of anyone who cares about the DRC
that a prime minister is appointed without further delay. President
Kabila should take a bold move and appoint Felix Antoine Tshisekedi
as prime minister. The international community, particularly African
leaders–learning from the outstanding handling by ECOWAS of the
Gambian post-electoral crisis–should step in to prevent further
deterioration in the DRC.

On the eve of the signing of the 31 December agreement, and as the
Presidential Majority was putting in jeopardy the prospect of an
agreement, Angola decided to withdraw its 1,500 soldiers deployed in
the DRC and within hours, the agreement between political actors was
reached. An undeniable economic and political power in the
continent, South Africa should swiftly support the implementation of
the 31 December agreement and depart from the image of being a die-
hard supporter of the Kabila regime. A timeframe for the
implementation of that agreement should be agreed upon without
delays and all friends of DRC should pledge their support,
particularly in the preparation of general elections by December
2017.

Africa and the world cannot afford to have another Congo crisis. The
Congolese people, despite their willingness to defend their civil
rights and liberties, do not deserve to go through trying times that
they have already endured. The democratic struggle of Dr. Etienne
Tshisekedi wa Mulumba will be honored if peace, stability and
democratic change of power happen swiftly in DRC.

**************************************************************

What does opposition leader Tshisekedi’s death mean for DR Congo’s
road to elections?

Hans Hoebeke & Richard Moncrieff

African Arguments, February 3, 2017

http://tinyurl.com/hjpe6fn

[Hans Hoebeke and Richard Moncrieff are respectively Senior Analyst
for Congo and Central Africa Project Director of International
Crisis Group, the independent conflict prevention organisation.]

The death of prominent opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi has
deprived the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) of a unique
political figure who was at the forefront of the fight for democracy
for over three decades.

His loss is a major blow to the main opposition coalition, the
Rassemblement, which he led alongside the relative newcomer, ex-
Katanga Governor Moïse Katumbi. It also undermines the DRC’s
faltering transition and may play into the hands of the ruling
majority that has consistently sought to delay elections.

Coming just a month after the signing of a political agreement,
which would have put him at the head of an important follow-up
committee, his departure robs the opposition of a leader able to
combine genuine street-level popularity with an ability to squeeze
out political deals. As popular anger mounts, the opposition will
have to work hard to rebuild a credible leadership, capable of
concluding a deal with the majority.

A fragmented opposition loses its figurehead

The 84-year-old Etienne Tshisekedi launched the Union for Democracy
and Social Progress (UDPS) opposition party in 1982 and built a
strong following in his native Kasai region and in the capital
Kinshasa. He symbolised the struggle for democracy in the waning
days of the President Mobutu Sese Seko regime. He also opposed
President Laurent Kabila, who overthrew Mobutu in 1997, and his son
Joseph Kabila, the current president.

Unable to resist the populist option, he made a strategic error when
he boycotted the relatively credible 2006 elections. In 2011, he
ended up coming second in a hard-fought but less credible election,
and did not accept the result, proclaiming himself president in a
parallel swearing in ceremony.

In more recent years, despite living abroad, he again became the
symbolic figurehead of the struggle for democracy, this time over
the defence of the constitution, and particularly its two-term limit
for the president, and the need to organise elections on time in
December 2016. They have since been delayed.

This position allowed him to improve cooperation with his fellow
opposition leaders, and in June 2016 he was a driving force behind
the creation of the Rassemblement, combining the forces of several
parties and high-profile figures, including Moïse Katumbi and those
in the “G7” (an umbrella group of opposition parties that left the
ruling majority in 2016), giving the opposition renewed cohesion and
strength.

When Tshisekedi returned to Kinshasa on 27 July 2016 after years of
self-imposed exile, he was greeted by massive crowds, demonstrating
his unique credibility and ability to get people out onto the
street. These were seemingly undamaged by simultaneously being in
direct and secretive talks with Kabila’s governing majority.

As president of the Rassemblement’s “governing council” (Conseil des
sages), Tshisekedi provided legitimacy and political credibility to
the other parties and individuals, most of whom had been part of the
ruling majority or held positions in government. These actors needed
Tshisekedi’s street credibility and popularity as they tried to
build a more pragmatic negotiation strategy. At several moments,
tension within the Rassemblement was palpable as the G7 tried to
manage the unpredictability of the platform’s leader.

After the elections were pushed back by 18 months, a combination of
mounting popular tension and pressure by the international community
led to the signing of the 31 December 2016 global and inclusive
agreement mediated by the Congolese Catholic Church. It called for a
transitional government, a promise that President Kabila will not
run for another term, and elections to be held in 2017. Tshisekedi
no longer had the physical strength to participate in the talks, but
his symbolic importance was underlined when he was appointed as the
president of the critical follow-up committee, the Conseil National
de suivi de l’accord et du processus électoral (CNSA).

The transition process stalls

Tshisekedi left Kinshasa on 24 January as negotiations on the
implementation of the 31 December agreement stalled over several
issues, including the procedure to appoint a new prime minister and
the division of ministerial positions. The lack of progress, in the
context of deepening economic malaise and insecurity in several
provinces, including Tshisekedi’s native Kasai Central, will
increase popular frustrations and tensions.

Tshisekedi had symbolic importance for the population; despite his
at times vainglorious or inflammatory approach, he represented hope
of a better political future. Those now taking over the mantle of
political opposition will find it hard to channel the frustrations
of the population, already deeply sceptical about politicians, into
constructive political engagement. The only moral authority and
beacon of hope at this stage remains the Catholic Church, currently
attempting to resuscitate the agreement it mediated in December.

Before his demise, Tshisekedi’s party had already been struggling
with the succession question. And while some have been pushing for
Tshisekedi’s son Felix to take over, others refuse moves that make
the party seem like a hereditary monarchy, whatever the strength of
the name Tshisekedi. This struggle played out in the broader
political negotiations and disputes over who should become prime
minister, with some pushing for Felix to take that role in the name
of the Rassemblement.

The opposition now faces considerable challenges, especially after
the earlier loss of Charles Mwando Nsimba, the G7’s president and
Rassemblement’s vice-president, who died in December. Moïse Katumbi
would be an obvious choice to take on a more prominent leadership
role. But he is still in a form of exile abroad, pending an eventual
agreement on his judicial prosecution (a sensitive case, that is
now, per the December agreement, managed by the National Episcopal
Conference of Congo [CENCO]). Moreover, while Katumbi has a certain
national popularity, he does not have the political party, political
weight or legitimacy as an opposition leader that Tshisekedi could
command.

Talks that had been extended for a week by CENCO after the failure
to meet the 28 January deadline are likely to be halted for a while
during the funeral and mourning period. After that, there is an
opportunity for political leaders to work in good faith to implement
the 31 December agreement and to open up political space. But
renewed popular anger will be an increasing challenge as people’s
faith in the political process plumbs new depths.

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
write to this address to subscribe or unsubscribe to the bulletin,
or to suggest material for inclusion. For more information about
reposted material, please contact directly the original source
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http://www.africafocus.org

DER JUNGE KARL MARX Trailer German Deutsch (2017)
| February 9, 2017 | 8:05 pm | Karl Marx | Comments closed

Africa/Global: Transparency Setback, African Agendas
| February 7, 2017 | 7:34 pm | Africa, Economy, political struggle | Comments closed

AfricaFocus Bulletin
February 7, 2017 (170207)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

In the world of large multinational corporations, secrecy is more
than the rule rather than exception. Despite this reality, there
have been some advances in recent years, including U.S. legislation
and regulations requiring disclosure of payments by U.S. oil, gas,
and mining companies to foreign governments. Last week, the U.S.
Congress revoked this Security and Exchange Commission rule, a year
before it was actually to be implemented. Although comparatively
little noticed in comparison to the tumult around White House
actions, this was an indication that the Republican Congress as well
was determined to reverse even modest steps to fight corporate
corruption and other similar abuses.

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs17/iff1702.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
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In this context, the continuing Africa-wide campaign to curb some
$70 billion in illicit financial flows from the continent   becomes
both more difficult and even more imperative. A timely new report
just released on January 27 by six civil society organizations lays
out specific steps that African governments can take to “accelerate
the IFF agenda.” The six include five African organizations (Trust
Africa, Tax Justice Network-Africa, the Pan African Lawyers Union,
CRADEC (Cameroon),  CISLAC (Nigeria), and Global Financial Integrity
(Washington, DC).

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains (1) a brief article on the U.S.
congressional action to revoke the SEC rule on transparency for oil,
gas, and mining companies, and (2) the full text of “Accelerating
the IFF Agenda for African countries.”

For more information on the revocations of the SEC rule, visit
https://thefactcoalition.org/press/news-releases/,
http://www.pwypusa.org/category/press-releases/, and
http://tinyurl.com/ze7rr6k

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on illicit financial flows,
corruption, and related issues, see
http://www.africafocus.org/intro-iff.php

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

The Trump Election: Intersecting Explanations
http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/trump-win-reasons.php

Observations (third installment, Feb 7, 2017)

Since the inauguration of President Donald Trump on January 20, the
news cycle has been driven by the rapid pace of executive orders,
tweets, and, most surprisingly, an unprecedented range of resistance
to the assault on democratic values and rationality by the new
administration. Although the debate about explanations for the Trump
election have faded into the background, they remain highly relevant
for the present and future, for evaluation of his questionable
legitimacy, analysis of both medium-term and long-term strategies
for resistance, and, at a deeper level, as x-rays or CAT scans to
help piece together a deeper analysis of the history and driving
forces underpinning the U.S. and global socioeconomic and political
order.

[Continued at http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/explanations.php]

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

Following House, Senate Axes SEC Oil, Mining Payments Rule Bloomberg
BNA, February 6, 2017

By Rob Tricchinelli

http://tinyurl.com/zxm2bs6

The Senate voted early Feb. 3 to revoke an SEC rule requiring oil,
gas and mining companies to disclose more about their operations,
two days after related House action. President Donald Trump can now
sign the measure, which would negate the long-embattled Securities
and Exchange Commission rule mandated by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act and
designed to fight overseas corruption.

It was set to take effect in 2018 and force companies like Chevron
Corp. to reveal payments to governments tied to resource
development.

Republican lawmakers are using the Congressional Review Act to kill
the rule, which skirts the procedural requirement for 60 Senate
votes. The vote broke along party lines, 52-47, with Sen. Ed Markey
(D-Mass.) not voting.

Dodd-Frank Mandate

While the CRA action negates the SEC rule, it doesn’t strip away the
Dodd-Frank Act provision mandating the regulation. This means the
SEC is still technically required to craft the measure, even though
a Republican-led commission is unlikely to act and Republican
lawmakers are seeking to repeal that part of Dodd-Frank.

Several Republican lawmakers said they want the SEC to craft a
better rule. “It’s time to go back to the drawing board and redo
it,” Rep. Bill Huizenga (R-Mich.), who sponsored the effort in the
House, told Bloomberg BNA in a brief interview. Democrats slammed
the move. “This bill puts Big Oil and its cronies ahead of
transparency and accountability, and ought to be called the
Kleptocrat Relief Act,” Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) said in a news
release.

Try, Try Again

The rule has a tortured history. The SEC’s first attempt was struck
down in a lawsuit by the American Petroleum Institute. The second
attempt was prompted by a different lawsuit alleging the agency was
dragging its feet in reproposing it. Oil, gas and mineral companies
argue that the rule’s compliance costs, which the SEC estimates to
run in the tens or hundreds of millions industry-wide, outweigh its
benefits. The rule’s supporters counter that similar rules are
already in effect in other jurisdictions without hampering the
industry. They also say disclosures would reduce graft in mineral-
rich countries whose residents have low standards of living.

“It is alarming that lawmakers would move to undermine American
efforts to combat violent extremism abroad by rolling back this
anti-corruption measure, which protects American companies and
democratic interests around the globe,” Clark Gascoigne, deputy
director of the Financial Accountability and Corporate Transparency
Coalition, said in a news release.

To contact the reporter on this story: Rob Tricchinelli in
Washington atrtricchinelli@bna.com

******************************************************

Accelerating the IFF Agenda for African Countries

January 2017

http://tinyurl.com/jf6ro5n

Introduction

Illicit financial flows (IFFs) are a large and growing problem for
the African continent, with upwards of $70 billion in IFFs leaving
the continent annually. African governments, intergovernmental
organizations, industry, and civil society have come to understand
the severity of the problem over the past few years.

The following list of actions are meant to address some of the first
steps in addressing IFFs. These actions are foundational, involving
measures that can either be undertaken more quickly and easily in
some countries where some of the processes and commitments may
already be underway or measures that lay the groundwork for later
reforms. The result is an Accelerated IFF Agenda that governments
can use as a place to begin their work to tackle IFFs in their own
countries, leading to greater domestic resource mobilization and
growth, resources which will be critical in making progress on the
Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, and the African Union’s Agenda 2063, the Addis Tax
Initiative, and the Africa Mining Vision.

In considering the items on the Accelerated IFF Agenda, it is
important to remember two things. The first is that this should not
be seen as an all-or-nothing agenda. Each of these measures is
important in its own right and can be implemented independently of
others, and governments may want to consider ways to phase in
certain actions. For example, requiring country-by-country reporting
of all multinational companies operating in the country is one
option, but a government could instead require it only of companies
operating in the extractive industries or in construction. Second,
public involvement in helping achieve many of these aims can be of
great benefit. For example, a team of computer science students at a
university might be able to assist in the creation of an online
registry for corporations. Civil society organizations, academics,
the country’s youth, and other parts of society want to help tackle
IFFs for the good of their countries and their futures. Working with
them can multiply the effectiveness of many of the government’s
efforts, as well as building confidence with donors, investors, and
citizens.

The Accelerated IFF Agenda

Below is a list of fourteen measures governments can take in the
immediate term to catalyze their efforts to combat IFFs. Brief
explanations of each measure are included in the pages that follow.

Create Governmental IFF Policy

1. Establish Multi-Agency Units within Governments to Address IFFs

2. Include IFF Accountability within the African Peer Review
Mechanism

Promote Financial Transparency

3. Establish or Enhance Online Corporate Registries, Make
Information Publicly Available, and Require Beneficial Ownership
Information as Part of the Registration Process

4. Adopt the Open Contracting Data Standard

5. Require Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership Information from all
Government Contract Bidders

6. Require Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership Information in
Political Asset Declarations

7. Establish Government/Independent Measurement Mechanisms for
Extracted Natural Resources

Increase Enforcement Efforts and Powers

8. Adopt a Law Clearly Prohibiting Trade Misinvoicing

9. Establish Specialized Asset Forfeiture and Recovery Units and/or
Advocate for the Creation of a Special Office of Asset Recovery
within the African Union

Tackle Tax Evasion and Avoidance

10. Join African Tax Information Sharing Networks

11. Establish Transfer Pricing Units within Tax Authorities

12. Require Public Country-by-Country Reporting by Multinationals

Prevent Financial Crime

13. Mandate Rigorous Customer Due Diligence and Suspicious Activity
Reporting Programs within Banks

14. Empower Strong and Effective Financial Intelligence Units (and
create them if not yet established)

Several of the actions identified above require that certain
information be made available to the public. Countries may also want
to consider adopting a more wide-ranging law, regulation or policy
that provides the public with greater access to government
information and data, often called freedom of information
provisions.

Additional Detail for Accelerating the IFF Agenda for African
Countries

Create Governmental IFF Policy

1. Establish Multi-Agency Units within Governments to Address IFFs

IFFs affect all aspects of a country’s economy, therefore approaches
to curtailing IFFs must include agencies from across government,
enabling agencies to come together to coordinate and to develop
policy.

Governments should consider establishing multi-agency units that
include officials from various ministries or departments who
specialize in:

*  Financial intelligence and bank supervision

*  Import administration

*  Export administration

*  Transfer pricing

*  Income tax

*  Natural resource exploitation

*  National criminal investigations

*  National criminal prosecutions

*  Anti-corruption

To ensure that these multi-agency units can function effectively,
countries should ensure that laws are in place to allow officials
from different agencies to share information within these multi-
agency units. Some African countries have begun to establish multi-
agency units, but they are often more narrowly focused on, for
example, corruption or ‘illicit finance’ as described in the US-
Africa Partnership on Illicit Finance. While we welcome the
initiative to build on these existing multi-agency endeavors, we
believe it is imperative that the scope of work for the units be
broad enough to encompass the entirety of the IFF challenge.

2. Include IFF Accountability within the African Peer Review
Mechanism and Open Government Partnership Commitments

Countries should call on the African Union to include IFF-related
questions on the African Peer Review Mechanism questionnaire. As a
starting point, questions on this questionnaire could address each
of the policy areas recommended in this document. In addition,
African countries that are part of the Open Government Partnership
(OGP) should include in their OGP National Action Plans commitments
to carry out the action items identified in this document.

This action would implement previous recommendations made by the UN
Economic Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows from Africa,  which were endorsed by the African
Union in January 2015. The High Level Panel on Illicit Financial
Flows from Africa is now a joint initiative of the African Union and
the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

Promote Financial Transparency

3. Establish or Enhance Online Corporate Registries, Make
Information Publicly Available, and Require Beneficial Ownership
Information as Part of the Registration Process

Countries could look to legislation and regulation from early
adopters like the United Kingdom and the Ukraine for models on how
to implement these measures. In addition, a number of other
countries have committed to establishing public registers or
exploring their establishment and may soon have legislation that
could be referenced in developing domestic measures. These countries
include Bulgaria, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya,
Netherlands, New Zealand, and Nigeria.

This action would implement previous recommendations made by the UN
Economic Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows from Africa, and the Human Rights Development
Initiative, which was appointed by the African Union’s African
Commission on Human & Peoples’ Rights to conduct a study on the
human rights implications of IFFs.

4. Adopt the Open Contracting Data Standard

The Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS) is a common data model
that establishes a framework to enable governments to publish
shareable, reusable, and machine-readable procurement data that is
publicly accessible. While many countries have started to publish
PDFs of procurement contracts, information provided in PDF form is
of extremely limited utility. Adoption of a global data standard
like the OCDS is not just an exercise in publishing procurement
information. It enables governments to conduct assessments on the
fitness of their procurement systems by examining the experiences
and outcomes of other countries using the same standard. In
addition, the OCDS is a mature standard, offering practical tools,
expertise, and support to assist governments in adoption of the
standard.

The Contracting 5—Colombia, France, Mexico, Ukraine, and the UK—are
implementing the OCDS, and Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia have included open contracting in
their National Action Plans for the Open Government Partnership.
Uganda developed an open contracting platform, the Government
Procurement Portal (GPP), and continues to work to improve the
system.

This action would implement previous recommendations on open
contracting and open spending made by the UN Economic Commission for
Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa,
and the Pan African Lawyers’ Union.

5. Require Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership Information from all
Government Contract Bidders

Currently, the Open Data Contracting Standard does not collect
information on beneficial ownership. To fill this gap, countries
should require beneficial ownership disclosures for all bidders for
and recipients of government contracts to help prevent sham bidding,
bidding by persons barred from government procurement for past
actions, and other forms of corruption in bidding processes. Such
policies are already in place in Slovakia and could serve as a study
for countries wishing to implement this recommendation.

This action would implement previous recommendations made by the UN
Economic Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows from Africa.

6. Require Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership Information in
Political Asset Declarations

Conflicts of interest may not be readily identifiable in asset
declarations unless the beneficial owners of the entities included
are known. Adding this detail to the asset declaration requirements
can help identify where potential conflicts may arise in the
individual’s political work. The Ukraine has passed legislation
requiring the inclusion of beneficial ownership of property
information on its asset declarations, and Liberia has included
making use of beneficial ownership information on asset declarations
an element of its National Action Plan for the US-Africa Partnership
on Illicit Finance.

7. Establish Government/Independent Measurement Mechanisms for
Extracted Natural Resources

Governments should independently determine or verify the actual
volume of natural resources being extracted from the ground by
mining and oil companies and not just rely on the volumes reported
by the companies. Without independent verification of the volume of
natural resources being extracted, it is impossible to determine if
companies have in fact paid the correct amount to the government
under their extraction contracts.

Zambia has implemented the Mineral Value Chain Monitoring Project
(MCVMP), which aims to independently monitor and facilitate the
exploration and exploitation of mining and mineral value chains in
the country. International support has contributed to the MCVMP
effort in Zambia, including the Government of Norway, the European
Union, and the Public Finance Management Reform programme. 8 Where
the African Mining Vision and/or the African Mineral Governance
Framework call for similar verification of the volume of minerals
extracted, this action item could be implemented through those
initiatives. This action builds on the strength of the OCDS and the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which track
agreements and payments between governments and companies.

Increase Enforcement Efforts and Powers

8. Adopt a Law Clearly Prohibiting Trade Misinvoicing

Trade misinvoicing is the manipulation of the price, value, or
quantity of a good on an international invoice in order to avoid
taxes, move money, or evade capital controls. Of measurable IFFs,
trade misinvoicing has historically represented and continues to
represent the largest portion of IFFs. Though trade misinvoicing is
a relatively simple technique to use, it is exceedingly difficult
for government officials to identify. Moreover, the widespread,
routine, and customary nature of its use makes enacting a law
prohibiting the conduct essential in order to put business persons
on notice and to empower prosecutors to prosecute the conduct when
it is identified.

Example of a model law criminalizing trade misinvoicing:

Whoever, in relation to the importation or exportation of goods or
in relation to the trade in services or intangible property,
deliberately misstates, manipulates, falsifies, or omits a price,
quantity, volume, grade, or other material aspect of an invoice for
the purpose of (i) evading or avoiding VAT taxes, customs duties,
income taxes, or any other form of tax or revenue collected by the
Government; (ii) obtaining a tax benefit, export subsidy, or other
benefit provided by the Government; or (iii) evading or avoiding
[capital or foreign exchange controls]; shall be subject to a civil
or criminal fine of up to [specific amount] [or imprisoned for up to
[x] year[s], or both].

This action would implement previous recommendations made by the UN
Economic Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows from Africa.

9. Establish Specialized Asset Forfeiture and Recovery Units and/or
Advocate for the Creation of a Special Office of Asset Recovery
within the African Union

Asset forfeiture and recovery efforts deprive all types of criminals
of the proceeds of their crime, providing powerful disincentives for
crime in the first place. However, in order to be effective
disincentives, these efforts must be consistent and efficient.
Because they involve funds found in other jurisdictions, asset
recovery efforts require specialized knowledge of foreign legal
systems and mutual legal assistance treaties. Establishing units
specializing in asset forfeiture and recovery ensures that all
criminals face the potential for the loss of their criminal proceeds
and improves the odds of a country recovering the funds because of
the increased capacity and expertise that these units develop over
time.

Another approach would be to advocate for the creation of a special
office of asset recovery within the African Union. This office could
assist and facilitate asset repatriation requests among states,
including the maintenance of a public list of funds requested for
return and the status of such requests. Taking this approach could
contribute to the implementation of the recommendation by the UN
Economic Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows from Africa for the African Union to lead an effort
to establish a global governance framework for asset freezing and
repatriation. 10 The African Development Bank has also committed to
supporting a regional network on recovery of stolen assets in its
recently adopted Bank Group Policy on the Prevention of Illicit
Financial Flows. In addition, collaborative asset recovery
approaches already exist. For example, Asset Recovery Inter-Agency
Networks (ARIN) have been initiated in Southern Africa, East Africa,
and West Africa.

Tackle Tax Evasion and Avoidance

10. Join African Tax Information Sharing Networks

Several African countries have signed up to the OECD-led Common
Reporting Standard (CRS) for the international exchange of
information about bank accounts held by citizens abroad in an effort
to capture lost tax revenue. Access to this information is critical
in identifying and pursuing cases of individual tax evasion because
without the information provided by the foreign countries, the home
country has no way of knowing which citizens hold taxable bank
accounts abroad and must instead rely upon self-reporting by
individuals.

However, some African countries may have difficulty initially
accessing the broader international system for automatic exchange of
tax information because of how the system has been set up (with
little input from developing countries). Despite this, the
international framework could readily be adapted to establish
exchange arrangements among developing countries, especially within
regions. In fact, the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) is
currently engaged in a pilot program facilitating automatic exchange
of tax information among a number of African countries. In addition
to enabling African countries to get this critical information
sooner than may be available from developed countries, it offers
countries the opportunity to demonstrate capacity to perform within
these arrangements, making the country a more attractive potential
exchange partner for developed countries down the line.

11. Establish Transfer Pricing Units within Tax Authorities

Financial arrangements within corporate groups or among related
entities are nearly impossible to observe from the outside and
consequently are of high risk for manipulation. For this reason,
transactions among these parties, referred to as transfer pricing,
warrant special attention. Given the complexity of these
arrangements and transactions, it has been found that forming units
with highly trained officials to monitor these types of transactions
yields the most consistent and effective results for tax
administrations.

This action would implement previous recommendations made by the UN
Economic Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows from Africa, and the Human Rights Development
Initiative.

12. Require Public Country-by-Country Reporting by Multinationals

Public country-by-country reporting (CBCR) helps identify where
transfer pricing investigations should focus. By requiring companies
to provide basic financial information for entire corporate groups,
disaggregated by country, tax administrations are better able to
identify the risk of potential transfer pricing abuse and even
identify jurisdictions of concern to help establish more sensitive
risk management frameworks within tax administrations.

African countries should require foreign multinational corporations
(MNCs) operating in their country to provide their country-by-
country reports with their local tax returns and encourage those
MNCs to make the information publicly available. Further, African
countries should require MNCs headquartered in their country to
prepare and publish country-by-country reports.

This action would implement previous recommendations made by the UN
Economic Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows from Africa. 12

Prevent Financial Crime

13. Mandate Rigorous Customer Due Diligence and Suspicious Activity
Reporting Programs within Banks

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has set the international
standards for customer due diligence and suspicious activity
reporting in their FATF Recommendations 2012 standard,
Recommendations 10 and 20, respectively. Countries can look to their
FATF-Style Regional Body (FSRB) for assistance in implementing and
strengthening their laws and regulations in this area. This action
would implement previous recommendations made by the UN Economic
Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows
from Africa, and the Human Rights Development Initiative. 14.
Empower Strong and Effective Financial Intelligence Units (and
create them if not yet established)

Financial intelligence units (FIUs) are bodies that collect and, if
given the power, coordinate intelligence on financial crime that
results in IFFs. Creating FIUs where none exist, and giving them
strong powers of coordination and information collation from
different arms of government (possibly in a lead role in a Multi-
Agency IFF Unit (see point 1 above)), is critical to organizing and
operationalizing counter-IFF measures. Additionally, connecting to
the international network of FIUs, the Egmont Group, can help
facilitate cooperation among FIUs of different countries. While most
African countries do have FIUs, only twenty-two African countries
have FIUs that are members of the Egmont Group.

About

This document is the result of consultations among experts on
various elements of illicit financial flows, including:

* Raymond Baker – Global Financial Integrity, Washington, D.C., USA

* Jason Braganza – Tax Justice Network-Africa (TJN-A), Nairobi,
Kenya

* Liz Confalone – Global Financial Integrity, Washington, D.C., USA

* Donald Deya – Pan African Lawyers’ Union (PALU), Arusha, Tanzania

* Donald Ideh – TrustAfrica, Abuja, Nigeria

* Heather Lowe – Global Financial Integrity, Washington, D.C., USA

* Jean Mballa Mballa РCentre R̩gional Africain pour le
Développement Endogène et Communautaire (CRADEC), Yaoundé, Cameroon

*  Auwal Ibrahim Musa (Rafsanjani) – Civil Society Legislative
Center (CISLAC), Abuja, Nigeria

*  Crystal Simeoni – Tax Justice Network-Africa (TJN-A), Nairobi,
Kenya

We wish to thank the Swedish International Development Agency for
their support of this project.

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