AfricaFocus Bulletin
March 6, 2017 (170306)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“In the post-apartheid South Africa, resurgence of xenophobic
violence is a symptom of the deep leadership deficit. For the fourth
consecutive week now, South Africa is witnessing what many analysts
call a “resurgence” of xenophobic violence in parts of Johannesburg
and Pretoria, the country’s capital city. The reality is that this
type of violence is a daily occurrence in the country, although it
does not always get media attention. It has, in fact, become a long-
standing feature in post-apartheid South Africa.” – Jean Pierre
Misago, African Centre for Migration and Society, Johannesburg

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
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South Africa is not unique in seeing a “resurgence” of anti-
immigrant violence this year. As in many other countries, notably
the United States and many European countries, this trend draws on
widespread prejudice among substantial sectors of citizens against
immigrants seen as criminal and job-takers. But it is also driven by
official state policy which employs its own official bureaucratic
violence, by the “leadership deficit” cited by Misago, and by even
more massive and multifaceted anti-immigrant campaigns such as that
currently being mobilized by the new U.S. administration.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains three short articles with news
and analysis of the most recent events in South Africa, as well as
links to other sources for deeper analysis.

Additional short articles and reports of related interest, including
reactions from other African countries:

Omano Edigheji, “Xenophobia in South Africa and Nigeria,” Sahara
Reporters, February 26, 2017
http://tinyurl.com/hfqya5d

Simon Allison, “South Africa has become the Bad Guy in Africa,”
Daily Maverick, February 26, 2017
http://tinyurl.com/jm9qlxm

Alexandra Hiropoulos, “Gauteng Xenophobic Attacks February 2017,”
Xenowatch, February 26, 2017
http://tinyurl.com/jm6xnmr

And for contemporary US parallels, see Anand Giridharadas, “A Murder
in Trump’s America,” The Atlantic, February 28, 2017, at
http://tinyurl.com/zv8ucb9
On murders of immigrants, including the most recent shooting in
Kansas.

Laila Lalam, “Donald Trump Is Making America White Again,” The
Nation, March 2, 2017
By Laila Lalami

Donald Trump Is Making America White Again

Holland Carter, “For Migrants Headed North, the Things They Carried
to the End,” New York Times, March 3, 2017
Art exhibit on deadly results of U.S. immigration policy in desert
on Mexican border, from Clinton through Obama

Emily Bazelon, “Department of Justification,” New York Times
Magazine, February 28, 2017
On the anti-immigrant agenda of Jeff Sessions, Stephen Bannon, and
Donald Trump.
http://tinyurl.com/jxsb4af

Additional sources on the anti-immigrant attitudes and the Trump
election campaign can be found at
http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/anti-immigrant.php

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on migration and related issues,
visit http://www.africafocus.org/migrexp.php

Of special interest is the 2014 article by Sisonke Msimang,
“Belonging–why South Africans refuse to let Africa in,” –
http://www.africafocus.org/docs14/sa1410.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

Xenophobic violence in the ‘Rainbow’ nation

by Jean Pierre Misago

Al Jazeera, March 1, 2017

http://tinyurl.com/hggn89u

[Jean Pierre Misago is a researcher with the African Centre for
Migration and Society at the University of the Witwatersrand, South
Africa.]

[Text only. Original at link above contains additional links to many
other sources.]

In the post-apartheid South Africa, resurgence of xenophobic
violence is a symptom of the deep leadership deficit.

For the fourth consecutive week now, South Africa is witnessing what
many analysts call a “resurgence” of xenophobic violence in parts of
Johannesburg and Pretoria, the country’s capital city.

The reality is that this type of violence is a daily occurrence in
the country, although it does not always get media attention. It
has, in fact, become a long-standing feature in post-apartheid South
Africa.

Since 1994, tens of thousands of people have been harassed, attacked
or killed because of their status as outsiders or foreign nationals.

Despite claims to the contrary by the government, violence against
foreign nationals in South Africa did not end in June 2008 when the
massive outbreak that started a month earlier subsided.

As the current incidents illustrate, hostility towards foreign
nationals is still pervasive in the country and continues to result
in more cases of murder, injuries, threats of mob violence, looting
and the destruction of residential property and businesses, as well
as mass displacement.

And yes, the violence is xenophobic (and not “just crime”, as many
in government prefer labelling it) because it is – as the scholar
Belinda Dodson reminds us – “an explicit targeting of foreign
nationals or outsiders for violent attacks despite other material,
political, cultural or social forces that might be at play”.

It is a hate crime whose logic goes beyond the often accompanying
and misleading criminal opportunism. The real motive of the
violence, as unambiguously expressed by the perpetrators themselves,
is to drive foreign populations out of communities.

Xenophobic violence as a symptom of leadership deficit

A quick analytical look reveals that the drivers of ongoing
xenophobic violence in South Africa, as well as the lack of
effective response and preventive interventions, reflect a dreadful
lack of competent, decisive and trusted leadership at all levels of
government.

The drivers of xenophobic violence in South Africa are inevitably
multiple and embedded in a complex interplay of the country’s past
and present structural – political, social and economic – factors.

Chief among underlying causal factors is obviously the prevailing
anti-immigrant sentiment easily fuelled by political scapegoating.
Political leaders and officials of the national, provincial and
local government often blame foreign nationals for their systemic
failures to deliver on the political promises and satisfy the
citizenry’s growing expectations.

Due to political scapegoating, many South African citizens perceive
foreign nationals as a serious threat that needs to be eliminated by
any means necessary. This perception is stronger among the majority
of citizens living in poor townships and informal settlements where
they meet and fiercely compete with equally poor African immigrants
for scarce resources and opportunities.

The result is that local residents in these areas have become
increasingly convinced that foreign nationals are to blame for all
their socioeconomic ills and hardships including poverty,
unemployment, poor service delivery, lack of business space and
opportunities; crime; prostitution; drug and alcohol abuse; and
deadly diseases.

By blaming foreign nationals for its failures to deliver on its core
functions and responsibilities, the South African government is
unfortunately displaying an obvious if sorry sign of weak and
incompetent leadership.

The triggers of the violence paint an even more worrying picture of
the leadership deficit in the “rainbow” nation. Indeed, the strong
anti-immigrant sentiment alone cannot explain the occurrence of
violence in some areas and not in others where such negative
attitudes are equally strong.

Attitudes are not always a good predictor of behaviour. Rather ample
research evidence indicates that the triggers of the violence are
located in the “micropolitics” at play in many of country’s towns
townships and informal settlements.

Instigators and perpetrators of xenophobic violence are well known
in their respective communities, but the de facto impunity they
enjoy only means that they are likely – as they have in many cases –
to strike again.

Violent attacks on foreign nationals are usually triggered by
political mobilisation led by local economic and/or political
players and informal community leadership groups (in the form of
civic organisations, community policing forums, business
associations, concerned residents’ associations, etc) for their
economic and political interests.

This violence is essentially “politics by other means”. It has
proved a useful tool for these local politicians to consolidate
their power and community leadership monopoly needed to expand their
client base and the economic revenues it represents.

These “violence entrepreneurs” capitalise on people’s sentiments and
frustrations and have no difficulty co-opting local residents for
participation in the violence given the pervasive negative
attitudes. Xenophobic violence is triggered by the mobilisation of
the existing collective discontent.

With denialism and impunity, violence continues

It is common knowledge that the official South African government’s
response to xenophobia and related violence has been characterised
by “denialism”.

Such denialism is rooted in a discourse which labels all xenophobic
violence as “just crime and not xenophobia”, a categorisation that
demands few specific and sustained interventions or policy changes.

Both President Jacob Zuma and Minister of Home Affairs Malusi Gigaba
repeated the popular if infamous refrain this week.

Perhaps understandably, admitting the existence of a xenophobic
citizenry is both ideologically and politically uncomfortable for
the ruling African National Congress, which is now the custodian of
the multiracial, multi-ethnic “rainbow” nation and sees itself as
the champion of human rights and unity in diversity.

In addition to the lack of effective policy response, the government
unwillingness to recognise xenophobia coupled with a general weak
judicial system has also led to an alarming culture of impunity and
lack of accountability for perpetrators and mandated institutions:
foreign nationals have been repeatedly attacked in South Africa
since 1994 but few perpetrators have been charged, even fewer
convicted. In some instances, state agents have actively protected
those accused of anti-foreigner violence.

Similarly, there have been no efforts to hold mandated institutions
such as the police and the intelligence community accountable for
their failure to prevent and stop violence despite visible warning
signs.

As an example, government promises to set up special courts to
enable quick prosecutions after the 2008 and 2015 violence never
materialised.

Instigators and perpetrators of xenophobic violence are well known
in their respective communities, but the de facto impunity they
enjoy only means that they are likely – as they have in many cases –
to strike again.

Unfortunately, the government’s unwillingness to acknowledge that
this violence is xenophobic and its failure to work on finding
appropriate solutions are a sign of ineffective leadership. Without
appropriate intervention violence will continue.

**********************************************************

Black lives don’t matter in xenophobic South Africa

Redi Tlhabi

Washington Post, March 2, 2017

http://tinyurl.com/hved2oz

Redi Tlhabi is a radio and television journalist from Johannesburg.

Last week was an ugly, humiliating one for South Africa; a country
once considered a jewel of democracy on the African continent has
been gripped by a wave of xenophobic violence. In a matter of days,
more than 30 stores belonging to foreign nationals were shut down
after intense attacks and looting by locals in several townships. We
are breathing a sigh of relief that there has been no loss of life.

This is not the first time that foreigners have faced attacks in
South Africa’s townships and provinces. In 2008, the country’s
streets were ablaze, literally, with violence against foreigners.
Ernesto Alfabeto Nhamuave, a national from Mozambique, was beaten,
stabbed and set on fire in broad daylight. A police officer tried in
vain to douse the flames, but it was too late. Nhamuave died. And
there has been no justice for him. Sixty-two people, including South
Africans, were killed at that time and more than 100,000 were
displaced. Last year, more than 20 shops were looted in one area
alone, and foreign nationals had to flee their homes.

On Friday, with the government’s endorsement, citizens from
Pretoria, the capital, marched against foreign nationals in an anti-
immigrant protest. The government said that the march was an
agitation against crime in South Africa, which has been endemic in
this society for many years. Yet the protesters did not march to
police headquarters; instead they went to the Home Affairs office,
which is in charge of immigration in the country.

The xenophobic violence tends to have a racial element. Nigerians,
Somalis, Malawians, Pakistanis and Zimbabweans are often the targets
of this prejudice. Perhaps it reflects the complex truth about South
Africa’s xenophobia — that it is never just a rejection of a
different identity but also a lament for the economic exclusion
experienced by black South Africans, or all black Africans, for that
matter. The acts of violence are specifically targeted at African
and Asian migrants. White migrants are safe. They own businesses and
property and generally go about their lives peacefully. They are
seen as providers of work and capital, but black ones are seen as
encroachments and threats. They are from the margins of our society,
and even the language used to describe them — illegal immigrants,
illegal aliens, outsiders — creates an “us and them” dynamic. They
are dirty, they are criminals, they are drug peddlers — common
accusations that are articulated boldly on radio and television.

It is surreal as we watch how here and in the United States, black
lives really don’t matter. Even in a majority black country, the
government is not decisive or unequivocal in its condemnation,
choosing instead to obfuscate and sanitize this xenophobia by
calling it something else, such as “criminal acts.” These are hate
crimes, no different from the killing of Indian engineer Srinivas
Kuchibhotla in the United States. The suspect reportedly asked him
and a companion whether they had valid visas and shouted that they
should “get out of my country.” This sounds so familiar. Migrants in
South Africa are constantly told to “go back home.” We have not
experienced random shootings by citizens, but rather a well-
orchestrated, mass uprising by multitudes. And in this way,
individuals escape personal responsibility for hate crimes.

Nelson Mandela, the founding father of our democracy, said: “South
Africans must produce an actual South African reality that will
reinforce humanity’s belief in justice. … Never, never and never
again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the
oppression of one by another.”

We have failed. According to the Migration Policy Institute, South
Africa displays one of the highest levels of xenophobia in the
world. In the past decade, foreigners have been blamed for every
malaise under the sun — “They are stealing our jobs,” “committing
crimes” and, of course, “taking our women.” High levels of
unemployment — especially youth unemployment, which averaged 51
percent between 2013 and 2016 — creates a fertile environment for
foreign workers to be scapegoats, despite the fact that foreign-born
migrants make up only 1.6 million of South Africa’s population of
about 55 million.

South Africans must remember the sagacity and generosity extended to
us in our time of need. African countries took on South Africa’s
liberation movements when they were banned by apartheid. They
provided a home and education for their families. Some of these
governments provided financial help to the party that is in
government in South Africa today. I am hoping that the divisions
that colonialism and racism tried to engineer in our psyche will not
prevail. I am hoping that citizens who endeavor to make their
countries “great again” will not do so at the expense of basic
decency and justice.

********************************************

The awful politics of xenoophobia

by Stephen Grootes

Daily Maverick, February 27, 2017

http://tinyurl.com/jhx7pf4

South Africans have a certain reputation for public robustness. We
fight, scream, and shout at each other, all in the name of deciding
what would make for a better country. At times, though, this
robustness threatens to derail us at a time when many people could
be vulnerable to serious harm. On Friday in Pretoria, violence broke
out during a march planned by people who were “opposed to illegal
immigrants”. The police struggled to maintain order. And instead of
speaking with one voice, everyone in a leadership position was busy
pointing fingers, particularly at Joburg Mayor Herman Mashaba.

There was plenty of notice that xenophobic violence was coming. In
stark contrast to the violence that claimed nearly 60 lives in 2008,
and the awfulness that marked the violence in KwaZulu-Natal two
years ago, last week we knew that a group of people in Mamelodi were
going to march against the presence of foreign nationals in their
community. They said that it was a march against crime, but when
pushed on their motives it became clear that the real issue was
simply that they did not like people who were not like them.

When the marching and the clashes started on Friday, the police
immediately moved to contain the protests. A group of Somali men
grouped together, partly perhaps for protection, partly perhaps to
cause their own violence. This was the kind of thing that only leads
to trouble. One of the oldest insults among human beings can be
boiled down to this: He is a foreigner, and therefore a barbarian.
And it is also universal among societies everywhere; when people
feel their lives are getting worse and hopeless, they will turn on
people they see as different, or somehow not being “like them”.

Situations like these need cool heads, and plenty of disciplined
force from the police. But a problem of this kind also needs
leadership.

On Friday morning, the ANC released a statement about the xenophobic
violence, essentially calling for calm. But by the third paragraph
of the statement, it was already attacking Johannesburg Mayor Herman
Mashaba, saying he should be “singled out for particular mention”,
and attempting to blame him for the violence. They claimed further
that “it was the reckless statements of Mayor Mashaba that lit the
tinderbox of hatred in the first place”.

Where the ANC is absolutely correct is to criticise Mashaba for his
words and actions on this issue in the last few months. His comments
about “illegal immigrants”, and his almost wilful and deliberate
conflation of the words “immigrants” and “criminals”, was wrong,
perhaps bordering on the criminal. As a public representative, he
should be ashamed of himself, and the DA should be ashamed of itself
for not smacking him down in public. His comments in this regard are
surely against everything the DA claims to stand for.

It is hard to know why Mashaba made them in the first place. Maybe
he genuinely believes there is a problem and that it needs to be
addressed. Perhaps he feels that it’s a way to get votes. As the US
and other places have recently demonstrated again, being “anti-
immigrant” can play successfully to prejudice. Or he could just be
prejudiced himself, like so many other South Africans, and people
all over the world.

But to say that he is responsible is to utterly miss the greater
context of what is happening in South Africa these days. And, worse,
it is to forget the role the ANC government played over the last few
years.

Last week, before the march, Home Affairs Minister Malusi Gigaba
held a press conference specifically about the xenophobic tensions.
He said he had met with the organisers of the march, and had pleaded
with them to act responsibly. It was the kind of act that you would
expect someone in his position to do; it was the right thing to do.
Unfortunately, his department could also be accused of playing a
role in demonising foreign nationals in the first place. It is his
officials who deport people, and decide which foreign nationals get
to stay and which get to be kicked out. And, depending on where you
stand on these things, it is also his department that has largely
failed to deal with the problem. The perception has grown that
people who are foreign are here illegally, because government has
failed to stop them from being here.

But it is not only Gigaba’s fault. It is impossible to police this
properly, the dynamics of economics, geography and the human nature
to desire a better life for yourself and your children are all
against him. With the best will in the world, Gigaba is going to be
unable to change those perceptions, or even make much of a
difference on the ground. Stopping human migration requires the kind
of a control over a population that North Korea has. Anything less
will just not work.

Gigaba himself has a fairly decent track record in this regard. He
at least is not afraid to call xenophobia what it is, and to label a
xenophobic march a xenophobic march. His political boss, President
Jacob Zuma, appears unable to do even that, claiming on Friday that
there were even foreign nationals in these marches, because they
were actually “anti-crime”. Proof, once again, that it’s not only
the facts that are alternative, sometimes it’s the entire universe.

Gigaba once did something that very few other ministers have done on
this issue. He raised the ire of Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini. In
2015 Zwelithini had been accused of making comments that were seen
as an incitement to commit violence against foreign nationals. A few
days later, violence did in fact erupt in KwaZulu-Natal. Gigaba made
a comment that leaders should behave responsibly, which appeared to
have angered the king.

In the end, the SA Human Rights Commission decided, controversially,
to exonerate Zwelithini. And the ANC, certainly in public, has
failed to publicly criticise the king for these comments. Which
surely suggests they do not believe that there is a link between
what he said and the violence that followed.

It is important to follow this logic through to the bitter end. If
the Zulu king makes comments like this and does not incite violence
against foreign nationals, while the mayor of Joburg makes similar
comments and does incite violence, then who has more power? Is the
ANC seriously suggesting that Herman Mashaba, as a DA mayor, has a
greater moral authority and plain old influence over people in
Tshwane than King Goodwill Zwelithini does in KZN? And if that is
the case, it surely follows then that the ANC is actually in much
greater political trouble than we thought.

In politics, it is usually a mistake to build your enemy up, to make
them look powerful. In their haste to be seen to condemn Mashaba,
that is exactly what the ANC is doing. It made him look powerful, as
if he had the ability to shape events, that he has this magical
authority over people. Who, for the record, weren’t even in “his”
city, but in Pretoria.

But what is also being forgotten here is the other actions of
national government. As the CEO of the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation,
Neeshan Balton, pointed out on Friday, it was national government
that decided to roll out “Operation Fiela”, whose aim was action
against foreign nationals. And it is national government alone that
controls the police. And thus the officers who are famous for
rounding up foreign nationals and stealing cash from them. It’s not
about what you say as a leader, it’s also about what you do. Our
government has failed to do much to change attitudes, to present any
kind of example.

Mashaba himself said, in a statement issued on Monday, that he had
tried to set up several meetings with Gigaba to discuss this entire
issue, and invited him to a city lekgotla on the issue. Mashaba says
he declined that invitation. But it would appear Gigaba is happy to
discuss the issue, just not with Joburg’s DA mayor. Rather,
according to Mashaba, he has accepted an invitation to speak at an
event hosted by the Joburg ANC, and its leader, and former Joburg
mayor Parks Tau.

No matter how you look at it, that is playing politics in times when
the national government should know better.

To look at this situation from a neutral standpoint, should such a
place exist, is to realise that everyone is at fault here. Mashaba
should not have said what he said. The ANC national government has
not provided an example of how to treat foreign nationals, despite
often saying the right words. People of influence who say things
that are xenophobic are let off the hook.

Very few of the people who call themselves leaders in our society
can escape blame here. And if any of them think that they can blame
someone else, it’s time they took a look in the mirror. DM

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
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AfricaFocus Bulletin
February 20, 2017 (170220)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“If the Bayer-Monsanto merger is approved, the new merged company
will control almost 30% of the global commercial seed market and
25% of the agrochemical market – making it the world’s largest
supplier of seeds and chemicals. In South Africa, it would control
about 30% of both markets. Already today, Monsanto is one of two
companies in South Africa that employs 80% of the private sector
breeders in maize and 100% of the breeders in soybean and sunflower
breeders. ” – African Centre for Biodiversity

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
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click on “format for print or mobile.”

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The dominance of giant agribusiness multinational companies in the
supply of seeds and chemicals is not new, whether at the national
level in both developing and developing countries or on a global
scale. The vast influence of these companies is felt in policies
imposed on national governments damaging to small farmers as well as
to the environment and human health, as well as in control of
pricing for agricultural inputs.

Recent years, however, have seen a further escalation of mergers
which is accelerating concentration in the industry, of which the
merger of Bayer and Monsanto is currently under review by national
regulatory agencies in South Africa and other countries. This new
report highlights the negative consequences of this trend,
particularly for smallholder farmers.

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on biodiversity and related
issues, documenting this and other related critical analyses on
policies in African agriculture, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/intro-ag.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

The Bayer-Monsanto merger: Implications for South Africa’s
agricultural future and its smallholder farmers

February 2017

The African Centre for Biodiversity (http://www.acbio.org.za) Rosa
Luxemburg Stiftung (http://www.rosalux.co.za)

[Excerpts only: Full paper available at http://tinyurl.com/z4pkxb9]

About This Paper

This paper explores the likely implications of an approved Bayer-
Monsanto merger for the South African agricultural system. It
outlines the trend of consolidation occurring within the seed and
agrochemical industries, provides a background to the merger,
criticises the rationale given for the merger by Bayer and Monsanto
and outlines concerns should the merger be approved in South Africa.
These concerns focus on the implications for South African farmers,
smallholder farmers in particular. The paper argues that further
consolidation of an already corporate- controlled seed sector is not
needed and that it undermines the emergence of an alternative system
that would support smallholder farmers in contributing to food
security in an egalitarian agricultural economy.

Key Findings

Context

* The proposed Bayer-Monsanto merger takes place in a context of
megamergers: China National Chemical Corporation (ChemChina)-
Syngenta; DuPont-Dow. If approved, just three corporations would
control about 60% of the global patented seed market and 64% of the
agrochemical market.

* If the Bayer-Monsanto merger is approved, the new merged company
will control almost 30% of the global commercial seed market and
25% of the agrochemical market – making it the world’s largest
supplier of seeds and chemicals. In South Africa, it would control
about 30% of both markets. Already today, Monsanto is one of two
companies in South Africa that employs 80% of the private sector
breeders in maize and 100% of the breeders in soybean and sunflower
breeders.

* The merger will need to be approved by regulatory authorities in
more than 30 countries. Authorities are viewing the merger
activities in totality to assess possible implications for the
market, farmers and consumers. They will look at whether reduced
competition will lead to reduced innovation, lowered spending on
research and development and implications for increased input costs
and reduced choice for farmers and other consumers (although the
market is already significantly consolidated).

* Merger activity is being driven by the global economic downturn
and reduced demand for products by farmers because of low commodity
prices. It is also driven by the desire to reduce operational
costs, particularly for research and development processes, and to
access proprietary knowledge enclosed in intellectual property
rights, such as patents. The merger and acquisition trend is
supported by the historically low interest rates (close to zero)
being offered in the United States, the Euro zone, Japan and the
United Kingdom.

* Both Bayer and Monsanto are already engaged in big data projects
in the agricultural sector. Bayer notes that one of its prime
reasons for acquiring Monsanto is because it owns The Climate
Corporation, which has the most powerful data science engine and
the most extensive field research network. In addition, Monsanto
has its foot in several important Genome Editing initiatives: it
owns one of the two existing CRISPR licenses and has started two
joint ventures on precision agriculture with the agrotech giants
CNH and AGCO.

* Both companies would benefit from sharing patents on genetically
modified crops and existing network and distribution models as they
both plan to expand into the African market, with a particular
focus on smallholder farmers. Bayer has been in the plant genetic
engineering arena since the early 2000s and holds more patents on
transgenic plant traits (206) than Monsanto (119) in the European
Union). Having access to each other’s proprietary knowledge would
provide them with significant cost savings, particularly as the
biotech industry shifts towards using CRISPR genome editing
technology, which revolutionises transgenic interventions through
the rewriting of whole DNA-sequences, but is not yet subject to a
comparable degree of regulatory oversight as the first generation
of genetic engineering. Both traits and germplasm is needed to
remain competitive in this market.

* South Africa is the most important African market for both
companies in terms of sales and for providing a base for African
expansion. The recent request by GrainSA, Agbiz Grain, the South
African National Seed Organization (SANSOR) and the Agricultural
Research Council for a breeding and technology levy to be imposed
on winter cereals in South Africa – with the possibility of
expanding this to other crops – would effectively mean that public
resources would be used to collect royalty payments for these
companies.

* Both Bayer and Monsanto sit on industry representative bodies,
giving them a significant degree of influence on the industry – a
combined company would enjoy benefits of greater influence.

Implications

The merger between Bayer Crop Science and Monsanto would have
possible implications for the agricultural sector and the food
system in South Africa:

* It would further reduce the competition within the South African
seed sector. Evidence from the US seed market shows that mergers of
this size will change key parameters of the seed market. Bayer-
Monsanto’s dominant market position will be further enhanced, as
will both companies’ control over traits-germplasm-crop protection
products in the country.

* Quite contrary to the claims of Bayer and Monsanto managers, the
merger is likely to decrease the amount of investment and the range
of innovations. This paper argues that the potential merger must be
analysed in the larger context of a rapid privatisation of research
and development. A particularly important tool of the potential
Bayer-Monsanto seed giant would be the instrument of licensing
rights, and increased pressure on farmers through the collection of
levies is expected.

* Serious impacts are anticipated for farmers and food consumers
alike. For farmers, evidence from the last few years at both the
South African seed market and the US seed market shows that a
further increase in seed prices is very likely. The choice of
available inputs will further decrease. Given the high amount of
sunk costs that particularly Monsanto invested in the development
of partly unsuccessful genetically modified organisms, there is a
threat that the South African market will be used as a strategic
point from where to ‘dump’ old genetically modified (GM)
technologies onto the African market. On the other hand, available
micro data from households in South Africa show how any price
increase in staple food prices might affect the income poor. An
indirect effect on food prices from the merger cannot be excluded.

* A closer look at the drivers of the Bayer- Monsanto merger reveals
that the ‘efficiency argument’ put forward by the corporations
might lead to a benefit to their shareholders, but cannot be
expected to spill over to external groups, such as farmers and food
consumers.

…

Seed and Agrochemical Markets

Global agricultural input markets (seed, fertiliser, crop protection
products, farm machinery and agri-tech markets) are already
significantly consolidated, having experienced a series of
horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions over the past two
decades (Figure 1).

The global and regional seed market

In 1994, the four biggest seed companies controlled 21% of the
global market (AgriPortal, 2016); today just ten companies own
about 65% of the world’s proprietary seed (seed registered for
legal protection) for major crops (Wattnem, 2016). It must be noted
that in Africa 65-100% of seed used by smallholder farmers is
farmer-saved and exchanged (varies by crop and geography) (Wattnem,
2016). The global commercial seed market has an estimated value of
about US$53 billion and is expected to grow to US$113 billion by
2020 (Marketsandmarkets, 2016) with the African market contributing
less than 2% to the current value (CTA, 2015). This presents a
potentially lucrative market, but many obstacles have to be
overcome to carry out a sustainably profitable business. Some of
the bigger ones include lack of infrastructure, specialised
knowledge, institutional arrangements and political bureaucracy.

The genetically modified seed market was worth US$15.6 billion in
2011 and is expected to grow to US$30.2 billion in 2018 (AGPRO,
2013). However, a recent market report notes that conventional
seeds are expected to be the fastest growing segment of total seed
sales (Marketsandmarkets, 2016). …  Africa presents an untapped
market but with very slow processes of regulatory and institutional
development to allow GM crops to be grown. In the meantime, market
expansion will be based on conventional certified seed and
agrochemicals.

Maize and horticulture are the two biggest seed markets on the
African continent, with the maize market valued at about US$500
million and horticulture at US$250 million; most seed company
activity takes place in this space (ACB, 2015). There is more
recent interest in commercialisation of legume seed on the
continent.

The South African seed market

South Africa has a dominant commercial seed industry, which is
primarily geared to serving the needs of large-scale commercial
farmers, with a dominant focus on hybrid, improved and genetically
modified seed (DAFF, 2015). South Africa’s marginal smallholder
farmers also rely on commercial seed as a significant source of
planting material, especially for maize and horticulture, although
indigenous crops and farmer seed varieties are also used.
Multinational corporations dominate the seed industry: Pioneer Hi-
Bred/Pannar, Sakata, Monsanto and Syngenta (GrainSA, 2015). …

The value of the South African seed market was estimated at R5.62
billion in 2012/13 (TASAI, 2015). The focus of both Bayer and
Monsanto is on commodity crops: maize, sunflower, soybean, cotton
and wheat. The value of the seed market in grain and oilseed was
about R3.9 billion (about US$285 million) for the 2014/15
production season (GrainSA, 2015). …

Maize dominates the national variety list – there are 546 maize
varieties on the official list; 308 are protected by plant
breeders’ rights and 162 are genetically modified (TASAI, 2015).
There are 41 genetically modified soybean varieties on the list and
35 non- genetically modified ones, including 19 with plant
breeders’ rights protection (TASAI, 2015). Monsanto and
DuPont/Pioneer Hi-Bred/Pannar own at least 85% of the seed business
for the big commodity crops – maize, soybean (the second largest
agronomic crop in the country) and sunflower. There is intense
competition between them (TASAI, 2015). DuPont is planning to merge
with Dow, which puts pressure on Monsanto to increase its scale to
continue competing in seed and agrochemical markets. Bayer’s
strength is in agrochemicals, although it has a small seed
footprint in South Africa. Bayer introduced its cotton seed to
South Africa in 2014 and a new canola seed variety in 2015
(Breytenbach, 2015). It reportedly introduced these new varieties
into South Africa in response to a direct call from farmers asking
for alternative products (Breytenbach, 2015).

Syngenta, Monsanto, Pannar-Du Pont Pioneer and Dow form SANSOR’s
committee on genetically modified organisms (SANSOR, 2016). Any
activity that is likely to increase Monsanto’s influence in this
market in South Africa is significant given the extent of
genetically modified maize planted, the country’s staple food crop.

The global and regional agrochemical market

The global agrochemical market is estimated to be worth about
US$33.4 billion (Macaskill, 2016) with the African market valued at
around US$1.1 billion (R15-20 billion) in 2014 (Odendaal, 2014).
The agrochemical market is dominated by Monsanto (US$15 billion),
Syngenta (US$13.4 billion), Bayer (US$10.4 billion), DuPont (US$9.8
billion), Dow (with sales of US$6.38 billion in 2015) and BASF
(US$5.8 billion); Chinese-owned ChemChina doesn’t make divisional
sales figures available, but total sale figures for all divisions
(of which agrochemicals is just one) were US$45 billion in 2015
(Alessi, 2016).

The South African agrochemical market

South Africa uses more agrochemicals than any other African country,
mostly for grain crop production (PR Newswire, 2015), yet it
comprises less than 2% of the global market (Macaskill, 2016).
South African farmers spent R2.3 billion on agrochemicals in the
2014/15 season (GrainSA, 2015). The South African agrochemicals
market is estimated to grow at a compound annual growth rate of
4.5% by 2020 (PR Newswire, 2015). Major agrochemical companies
operating in the country range from Bayer Cropscience and Syngenta
to Adama, Dow Agrosciences, Philagro South Africa, BASF South
Africa, Sipcam, Monsanto and Chemtura Corporation (GrainSA, 2015).
Companies such as Bayer, Syngenta SA, Dow, DuPont and Monsanto
South Africa sit on the executive council of CropLife SA, an
industry representative body (CropLife SA, 2016).

Bayer and Monsanto in South Africa

Both Bayer and Monsanto are major manufacturers of agrochemicals,
seeds and genetically modified seed (Court, 2016). Company
confidentiality makes it difficult to ascertain market-specific
market shares for any company.

Bayer Crop Science in South Africa

Most of Bayer’s African sales are generated in South Africa, and a
key part of Bayer’s strategic focus for its business in southern
Africa is ‘expanding our seed footprint – especially for soyabeans
and wheat – through further acquisitions, in-licensing agreements
and partnerships’ (Bayer, 2016). It owns a manufacturing plant in
South Africa, has established a maize competency centre in KwaZulu-
Natal (Bayer Crop Science, 2016e) and has opened its first African
SeedGrowth Centre near Johannesburg (one of 16 in the world)
(Bayer, 2016c). The Centre will train seed company production
staff, support seed companies in upscaling processes, act as a base
for research in optimising seed treatment technologies and
demonstrate how Bayer’s equipment works (Bayer, 2016c).

It is focusing on both the large-scale commercial and small-scale
farming sectors. In March 2016 Bayer launched its ‘Committed to the
Future Pledge’ at the South African Grain Congress, in which it
promised to continue to invest more than 10% of turnover into
developing new compounds (it should be noted that this is their
core business and so does not qualify as an added benefit for South
Africa). It also promised to invest in further initiatives, like
its Bayer Forward Farms project, a knowledge platform that
facilitates the sharing of knowledge between selected farms and the
combined expertise of the broader industry (Bayer, 2016d).

It is also actively pursuing the small-scale farming market. Bayer
uses demonstration farms and training centres set up by
organisations, such as the United States farm machinery giant AGCO
to showcase its inputs (Maritz, 2016). It is involved in other
projects like this in South Africa, Ghana, Ethiopia and Morocco
(Maritz, 2016). …

Monsanto in South Africa

Monsanto is a pioneer of genetic modification of agricultural crops
(ACB, 2005) and the largest maize seed company in the country by
sales (DAFF, 2015); it also supplies 90% of soybean planted
commercially in South Africa (ACB, 2016). It has been operating in
South Africa since 1968 and has licensed its genetic modification
technology to other seed companies operating in the domestic
market. In the late 1990s it purchased domestic seed companies
Sensako and Carnia, thereby taking up a major stake in local seed
and grain markets (ACB, 2005). Monsanto sells seed for alfalfa,
canola, corn, cotton, sorghum, soybean, sugarbeets and wheat
(Stucke and Grunes, 2016). Monsanto’s purchase of global seed
company Seminis gave it ownership of plant breeders’ rights to a
range of South African vegetable seed varieties (ACB, 2005) and
access to germplasm. The Sensako purchase gave Monsanto about 45%
of the South African agrochemical market for field crops (ACB,
2015b).

In November 2016 Monsanto opened its renovated breeding centre in
Petit near Benoni, South Africa (Van Wyngaardt, 2016). The 300
hectare plant breeding farm uses imported and local germplasm to
establish new breeding crosses (Van Wyngaardt, 2016). Monsanto also
pursues the small-scale farming sector through projects, such as
Water Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA) (Monsanto, n.d.[2]). …

ACB has extensively critiqued this programme for its use of
Monsanto’s genetically modified drought tolerant maize because the
product has not been successful in the United States, and it is
inappropriate for smallholder farmers, due to its reliance on the
use of synthetic fertilisers and agrochemicals (ACB, 2015a). The
project, which is supposedly meant to benefit small-scale farmers,
leads them onto a technological treadmill with known environmental
consequences and one that is difficult to escape. Farmers have
drought tolerant varieties of their own, which are freely saved and
thus always available and adapted to localised conditions.
Genetically modified crops were also trialled in eight African
countries in 2015 (SeedWorld, 2016a) with Monsanto’s drought
tolerant maize from the WEMA project expected to be released in
field trials in Tanzania and Mozambique in 2017.

…

2016 – The year of the mega-mergers

* July 2014: Monsanto tried to buy Syngenta for US$46 billion, but
the deal was rejected by shareholders.

* November 2015: Chinese state-owned ChemChina made a US$43 billion
bid for Syngenta, which was accepted by shareholders in February
2016. This was the largest purchase of a foreign firm in Chinese
history.

– ChemChina owns Adama (formerly Maktheshim Agan Industries), the
world’s seventh largest agrochemical company.

– The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States approved
the deal in August 2016 (Bloomberg 2016b), South Africa in
September 2016 and Australia in December 2016 (Food Ingredients
First, 2016). South Africa attached the condition that Syngenta’s
formulation plant could not be relocated outside of the country for
an undefined period to avoid job losses (CCSA, 2016a). The deal was
also approved by the Common Market for East and Southern Africa
(COMESA) Competition Commission in September 2016 (Comesa
Competition Commission, 2016).

– The European Commission has requested additional information from
both companies and will announce its decision on the ChemChina-
Syngenta merger on 12 April 2017 (Produce Business UK, 2017).

– A possible obstacle to approval is ChemChina’s plans to acquire
another Chinese state- owned fertiliser company, Sinochem, which
was not mentioned in the applications for approval of its
acquisition of Syngenta (Noel and Baghdjian, 2016).

* December 2015: DuPont and Dow announced a merger that will give
the combined company an estimated value of US$130 billion.

– The deal was approved by the COMESA Competition Commission in
September 2016 (Comesa Competition Commission, 2016a), but still
awaits approval in Australia, the United States, Brazil and South
Africa.

– The deal is being held up by the European Commission, which has
launched a full investigation on the basis that insufficient
information has been provided (Reuters, 2016a). The Commission will
announce its decision on 6 February 2017 (Investopedia, 2016).

* May 2016: Bayer started the bidding process for Monsanto. The $66
billion bid was accepted in December 2016. If approved, the merged
company will be the world’s largest seed and agriculture chemicals
company. If the merger is not approved by competition regulators,
Bayer will pay a US$2 billion termination fee to Monsanto
(Begemann, 2016).

– The European Commission will decide on this merger by 15 March
2017 (European Commission, 2016).

– It has not yet been submitted to South Africa’s regulators.

* August 2016: Canadian Potash Corp. started negotiations to buy
fertiliser producer Agrium for US$30 billion. The deal is expected
to close in mid-2017 and will create the largest fertiliser company
in the world; it also plans to expand into seeds and crop chemicals
(Skerritt and Casey, 2016).

BASF has been left out of the scramble to consolidate and may well
have to buy up smaller companies, or sell, because it will not have
the strength to take on the concentrated power of its competitors
(ETC Group, 2016). Or it could benefit from forced divestitures of
the mergers. If all the proposed megamergers are approved, these
three companies (ChemChina-Syngenta, DuPont-Dow, Bayer-Monsanto)
will own and sell about 60% of the world’s patented seeds and
pesticides/herbicides (AgriPortal, 2016).

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
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http://www.africafocus.org

By A. Shaw and James Thompson

We are talking about race and the fight against racism.

Race seems to be short hand for all of us –the human race.

Race suggests some kind of totality among people.

Racism, on the other hand, necessarily implies segments of the race that are hostile towards one another.

So, racists are hostile segments of the people. For example, some racists hate all of the human race.

These are called misanthropes. Misanthropes hate and often want to destroy everybody. They often want to destroy the human race merely because members of the human race are human.

Other races hate and often want to destroy only half of the race.

These are called misandrists. They hate and often want to destroy boys and men simply because they are boys and men.

Another type of racist hates and often wants to destroy girls and women who constitute half of the race. These are called misogynists.

How can we fight the racism whether it aims to destroy the totality of the human race or the destruction of only the males or only the females?

Today, perhaps a doctor can give them a pill or an injection or lock them up or lie them on an injection table or hang them. In Texas, it is not feasible to electrocute all the racists because it would drain all the electricity. Texas administers so many lethal injections that it sometimes has to deal with shortages of the poison that it pumps into the veins of its people so it is not a viable option.

By the way, in the USA, a misogynist can become President and reside in the White House, Donald Trump.

At some point, it became obvious to even the racists that a racism based on gender was unsatisfactory. A gender based racism requires racists to destroy some of their parents and some of their siblings. So, the racists modified their racism to be based on color more than on gender in order to protect their kinfolk.

The racists then imagined that there is a multiplicity of racists based on color chiefly of the skin. The racists thereby discovered blacks, whites, yellows and later on during the latter 19^th and 20^th centuries, browns and reds.

Initially, the division of humanity consisted of blacks and whites. Later on the racists added the yellows. The prevalence of these sexual mixtures (miscegenation)made it difficult to determine whether an individual was this color or that color. Sometimes blacks who look like they were white insisted that they were black. Vice versa, sometimes whites who look like they were white insisted they were black. When the yellows entered the mixture, the problem of determination of racial identity grew more complex and hopeless. Nobody could tell whether somebody else was white or black. Among the whites, people discovered that other whites were the principle foe, for example, yellow haired and blue eyed people who were white hated some other people who did not have yellow hair and blue eyes even though they were white. So clearly color was an inadequate basis for racism.

In order to fight racism progressive people fought a legal struggle-both judicial and legislative-in which laws were passed to prohibit racist acts called discrimination, e.g. in the USA the civil rights act in 1964 and the voting rights act in 1965. The state in the USA mildly enforced these legal measures against racism over the last 50 years but the state in the USA did not enforce these anti-racist laws with the vigor to eradicate racism.

Around the middle of the 19^th century the form of racism based on skull shape became popular among the intelligentsia and almost replaced color based racism.

Skull based racism known as phrenology became popular, advocating that there was a relationship between skull shape and psychological characteristics. Almost all phrenologists insisted that non-whites lacked the kind of skull shape that results in the development of strong and smart individuals.

People relied on other scientists to debunk the non-sense of the phrenologists and after the defeat of the Nazi racists who were enthusiastic phrenologists, people widely saw that skull based racism was non-sense. So, to fight skull based racism and the residues of color and gender racism requires war.

This brings us up to the present time where the original basis of racism, the emergence of an economic surplus or deficit, generates race hatred mostly of the misanthropic form. There is a group of highly trained racists who argue that at least 80% of the world population must be exterminated so that the 20% can strive and survive. These are basically misanthropes. These misanthropes claim that they only want to get rid of about 80% of the world’s population.

If these racists were successful in wiping out 80% of the world’s population, they would then attempt to get rid of the remaining 20%. These racists so far believe that pestilence and famine are the best ways to get rid of the 80%, but these modern day racists do not overlook the Nazi contribution to racism. This racism can be described as industrialized genocide.

Contemporary racists primarily rely on the manufacture and distribution of lethal germs to produce the pestilence that can wipe out the 80%.

And this pestilence in turn produces the famine that greatly contributes to wiping out the 80%. Research institutes around the world are developing the viruses that will accelerate the rate of mass murder that is underway.

For decades, these institutes were mostly interested in the research of deadly biological agents but today their focus is mainly on the development of these agents.

There is a consideration that impedes the use of these deadly biological agents to attack the 80%. That consideration is the existence or absence of a highly effective antidote that will cure members of the 20% if they are inadvertently infected by the biological agents distributed by modern day racists.

People who talk about the conspiracy to wipe out 80% of the world population are ridiculed as hopeless and incurable paranoids.

The information concerning wiping out the 80% has been hacked but what do you do with the documentation that demonstrates that imperialists are conspiring to wipe out the 80%? Anyone who has possession of the data that proves the imperialists are wiping out the 80% would get the same kind of treatment as Edward Snowden. You cannot take the data hacked from biological research institutes to the bourgeois media because under bourgeois law they are required to notify the state.

AfricaFocus Bulletin
January 23, 2017 (170123)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“Eskom, accused of overly cozy ties with the Guptas featured heavily
in the report, with 916 mentions. … it’s Eskom’s chief executive,
Brian Molefe, who comes out looking the worst. According to cell
phone records, Molefe had 58 phone calls with the eldest of the
Gupta brothers, Ajay Gupta, between August 2015 and March 2016, just
before the Guptas purchased South Africa’s Optimum coal mine for
2.15 billion rand ($160 million). Eskom, which prepaid the Gupta’s
Tegeta Exploration and Resources 600 million rand for coal, had been
accused of helping to finance the Guptas’ coal mine deal through
preferential treatment.” – Quartz Africa

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs17/saf1701.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
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In South Africa, as elsewhere in countries both large and small, the
debates about government energy policy are often framed in terms of
what is best for the “national interest.” But few doubt that behind
these choices between renewable energy options and others (fossil
fuels or nuclear energy), there are also private interests, whose
roles in the management of the state are not new but are becoming
more and more blatant (see below on links on the common stakes of
the incoming Trump administration and Russia’s Putin in promoting
fossil-fuel interests).

Concentrating on this aspect of what is termed “state capture” in
South Africa, this AfricaFocus Bulletin includes (1) brief excerpts
from the 355-page report on “State of Capture” from Public Protector
Thuli Madonsela; (2) an article with a summary of the report from
Quartz Africa, and (3) an article from The Conversation on the state
capture issue and its effects on plans for nuclear energy.

Two recent articles with background on the energy debate include:

le Cordeur, Matthew, “5 reasons why Eskom is wrong about renewables
costs – CSIR,” Jan 12, 2017 http://www.fin24.com – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/jmpts84

“Eskom delaying R50 billion renewable energy plan to push nuclear
goals,” Jan 10, 2017, http://businesstech.co.za – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/zcqku94

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Just Announced re State Capture in Mozambique

Watch live on youtube January 25
Zitamar News and Africa Research Institute present:
A Webinar on Mozambique’s Debt Crisis
Wednesday 25 January – 15:00 Maputo / 13:00 London / 08:00 New York

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

The Trump Election: Intersecting Explanations
http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/trump-win-reasons.php

Observations (second installment), Jan 23, 2017

In the period between the election and the inauguration, the
highest profile debate about reasons for the Trump electoral win was
about Putin’s intervention. But that debate produced more heat than
light, while key issues such as the common interests of Putin and
the Trump administration in promoting the fossil-fuel industry
received only marginal attention.

See http://noeasyvictories.org/usa/putin-intervention.php for  short
observations and database entries for 31 sources to date.

Articles on the fossil-fuel connection in particular include:

Joe Romm, “Did Putin help elect Trump to restore $500 billion Exxon
oil deal killed by sanctions?,” ThinkProgress, Jan 8, 2017
http://tinyurl.com/z6d45ub

Rachel Maddow, 5-minute video on ExxonMobil & Russia deal, Dec. 20,
2016 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n60SzMzjXog

Alex Steffen, “Trump, Putin and the Pipelines to Nowhere
You can’t understand what Trump’s doing to America without
understanding the ‘Carbon Bubble’,” Dec 15, 2016, http://medium.com
– Direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/hb2xnc6

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

“State of Capture”: A Report of the Public Protector

14 October 2016

Full 355-page report in pdf available at http://tinyurl.com/jffpskt

5. Evidence and Information Obtained

Introduction

5.1. The Gupta family, originating from India, arrived in South
Africa in 1993. They  established businesses in South Africa with
their notable business being a computer  assembly and distribution
company called Sahara Computers. The family is led by  three
brothers Ajay Gupta who is the eldest, Atul Gupta and Rajesh Gupta
who is  the youngest. Rajesh is commonly known as “Tony”. According
to a letter submitted  to my office, total revenues from their
business activities for the 2016 financial year  amounted to R2,6
billion, with government contracts contributing a total of R235
million of the revenues.

5.2. They later diversified their business interests into mining
through the acquisition of  JIC Mining Services, Shiva Uranium and
Tegeta Exploration and Resources,  Optimum Coal Mine and
Koornfontein Coal Mine. They also started a media  company called
TNA Media, which publishes a newspaper called The New Age and  owns
a television channel called ANN7.

5.3. The Gupta family are known friends of the President Zuma.
President Zuma has  openly acknowledged his friendship with them,
most notably during a discussion in  the National Assembly on 19
June 2013 where he admitted that members of the  Gupta family were
his friends. Mr Ajay Gupta (“Mr A. Gupta), also admitted to being
friends with President Zuma when I interviewed him on 4 October
2016.

5.4. President Zuma’s son, Mr Duduzane Zuma (“Mr D. Zuma”) is a
business partner of  the Gupta family through an entity called
Mabengela Investments (“Mabengela”).  Mabengela has a 28.5% interest
in Tegeta Exploration and Resources (“Tegeta”).  Mr D. Zuma is a
Director of Mabengela.

5.5. Members of the Gupta family and the President Zuma’ son, Mr D.
Zuma, have  secured major contracts with Eskom, a major State owned
company, through  Tegeta. Tegeta has secured a 10 year coal supply
agreement (“CSA”) with Eskom  SOC Limited (“Eskom”) to supply coal
to the Majuba Power station. The entity has  also secured contracts
with Eskom to supply coal to the Hendrina and Arnot power  stations.

5.6.  Eskom CEO, Mr Brian Molefe (“Mr Molefe”) is friends with
members of the Gupta  family. Mr A. Gupta admitted during my
interview with him on 4 October 2016 that  Mr Molefe is his “very
good friend” and often visits his home in Saxonwold.

5.7. The New Age newspaper has also secured contracts with some
provincial  government departments and state owned entities, most
notably Eskom and South  African Airways (“SAA”).

5.8. The Gupta family recently purchased shares in an entity called
VR Laser Services  (“VR Laser”). VR Laser has major contracts with
Denel SOC Limited (“Denel”), a  State owned armaments manufacturing
company. VR Laser has also partnered with  Denel to apparently seek
business opportunities abroad.

5.9. During March this year, Mr Jonas issued a media statement
alleging that he was  offered the position of Minister of Finance by
members of the Gupta family in  exchange for executive decisions
favourable to the business interests of the Gupta  family, an offer
which he declined. The Gupta family has denied the allegations  made
by Mr Jonas.

5.10. At the time Mr Jonas is alleged to have been offered a Cabinet
post as Minister of  Finance, Mr Nene was occupying the post. Mr
Nene was removed from his post on  9 December 2015 by President Zuma
and replaced with Minister Van Rooyen.  Minister Van Rooyen was
replaced by Minister Gordhan on 14 December 2015 as  Minister of
Finance, 4 days after his appointment.

5.11. Following Mr Jonas’ statement, Ms Mentor also issued a
statement to the press  alleging that she was also offered a Cabinet
post by members of the Gupta family in  exchange for executive
decisions favourable to their business interests, an  allegation
denied by the Gupta family.

5.12. The former CEO of Government Communication and Information
System (“GCIS”),  Mr Themba Maseko also issued a statement alleging
that members of the Gupta  family pressured him into placing
government advertisements in the New Age  newspaper. Mr Maseko
further alleged that President Zuma asked him to “help” the  Gupta
family.

**********************************************

What the “State Capture” report tells us about Zuma, the Guptas, and
corruption in South Africa

Lynsey Chutel and Lily Kuo

Quartz Africa, November 2, 2016

What the “State Capture” report tells us about Zuma, the Guptas, and corruption in South Africa

It’s the report that confirms South Africa’s worst fears about
corruption: that the state has been captured. In 355 pages, former
public protector Thuli Madonsela and her team of investigators
outline in detail just how much control the Gupta family, a wealthy
Indian immigrant family, has over South Africa’s resources. The
Guptas’ close friend, president Jacob Zuma, as well as two ministers
implicated in the report, went to court to stop its release. But it
was finally released on Nov. 2, after protests and a court battle.

The report is potentially damning for Zuma, offering proof that he
sanctioned the use of state companies for personal enrichment. But
now the real reckoning begins, as a web of corruption around Zuma,
the Guptas, and at least three ministers begins to unravel.

Hiring and firing ministers in the Guptas’ house

The report contains a detailed interview with deputy finance
minister Mcebisi Jonas, who alleges that the Guptas offered him the
finance minister’s post weeks before Zuma was to shuffle three
finance ministers in one week. Jonas was driven to the Guptas’ home
by the president’s son Duduzane Zuma, where he was met by Ajay
Gupta.

Ajay Gupta allegedly told Jonas they’d been keeping tabs on him and
wanted him to be their man in the treasury. Ajay Gupta revealed that
they’d already made 6 billion rand ($443 million) from dealings with
the government, and wanted to make at least 2 billion rand more
(about $147 million). When Jonas refused, they tried to sweeten the
deal with 600 million rand (about $44 million) and an extra 600,000
rand ($44,318) in cash, right there. Jonas declined the money, and
months later became the whistle-blower that launched this
investigation when he revealed his story in March.

Vytjie Mentor, who came out after Jonas with an account of how the
Guptas tried to offer her the job of minister of public enterprises,
in charge of state-owned companies, also details her exchange with
the family. According to the report (p.89), Mentor was told during a
meeting in October last year at the Guptas’ home that she would go
from an ordinary parliamentarian to cabinet minister in a week. All
she had to do was make sure South African Airways dropped their
route between Johannesburg and Mumbai, making way for the Gupta-
linked carrier Jet Airways. Mentor declined. She was surprised to
see the president himself emerge from an adjacent room, who said
“it’s okay girl…take care of yourself,” as he personally escorted
her out.

According to the report, the Guptas also have the power to fire
ministers seen as stumbling blocks to their plans. Former finance
minister Nhlanhla Nene’s insistence on sticking to the rules cost
him his job. As did Barbara Hogan, former minister of public
enterprises, who refused to allow outside influence in appointments
of board members of state-owned South African Airways, Transnet, the
national rail, and Eskom, the state power utility (p. 89, 90). On an
official visit to India, Hogan said she was shocked to find the
Guptas running proceedings. She was relieved of her duties a few
months later.

Des van Rooyen, the unknown parliamentarian who became finance
minister for a few days after Nene, went to court in a bid to delay
the report, fearing it would implicate him. And it has. His phone
records show that van Rooyen visited the Guptas’ home seven days in
a row before he was appointed as finance minister. He was later
moved to a less prominent ministry. Van Rooyen has denied any
wrongdoing.

Negotiating on behalf of the Guptas

Mining minister Mosebenzi Zwane also tried to have the report
delayed, saying it was hastily prepared and that he had not been
given time to respond. According to the report (p. 124, 125), Zwane
travelled to Switzerland on behalf of the Guptas to smooth over
their acquisition of a troubled coal mine from multinational
commodity trader Glencore, helping the Guptas become one of the main
coal suppliers for state utility Eskom. Zwane allegedly helped
facilitate the deal by accompanying delegates from a Gupta resources
company, Tegeta, to Zurich, according to a flight itinerary obtained
by the public protector. Zwane could not be interviewed in time for
the report, but should be allowed to give his version in subsequent
investigations, the report says.

Eskom: Keeping the lights on for the Guptas

Eskom, accused of overly cozy ties with the Guptas featured heavily
in the report, with 916 mentions. Lynn Brown, who became the
minister in charge of South Africa’s state owned enterprises, is
implicated in the report for allowing the appointment of a lame-duck
board that turned a blind eye to murky deals made at the energy
monopoly.

But it’s Eskom’s chief executive, Brian Molefe, who comes out
looking the worst. According to cell phone records, Molefe had 58
phone calls with the eldest of the Gupta brothers, Ajay Gupta,
between August 2015 and March 2016, just before the Guptas purchased
South Africa’s Optimum coal mine for 2.15 billion rand ($160
million). Eskom, which prepaid the Gupta’s Tegeta Exploration and
Resources 600 million rand for coal, had been accused of helping to
finance the Guptas’ coal mine deal through preferential treatment.

The report concludes (p, 20), “it appears that the sole purpose of
awarding contracts to Tegeta to supply Arnot Power Station, was made
solely for the purposes of funding Tegeta and enabling Tegeta to
purchase all shares in OCH [Optimum Coal Holdings]. The only entity
which appears to have benefited from Eskom’s decisions with regards
to [the Optimum coal mine deal] was Tegeta.” Cellphone records also
put Molefe in the Saxonwold area, where the Guptas live, 19 times
between August and November 2015 and phone calls between Molefe and
Ronica Ragavan, head of the Gupta’s holding company, Oakbay
Investments. Justifying these calls and visits, Ajay Gupta told
Madonsela in an interview last month that Molefe is his “very good
friend” who often visits the Gupta compound. But Madonsela says
these records show “a distinct line of communication between Molefe
of Eskom, the Gupta family and directors of their companies… These
links cannot be ignored as Mr Molefe did not declare his
relationship with the Guptas.” Eskom hasrefuted any allegations of
wrongdoing. “We do believe everything that we’ve done so far was
above board,” spokesman for the utility, Khulu Phasiwe, told a local
radio station.

Advertising with the Guptas

Themba Maseko, former chief executive of government’s communications
agency, in charge of a media buying budget of 600 million rand a
year, said he was pressured by the Gupta family to place government
ads in their newspaper the New Age. Maseko was also one of the
whistleblowers who took his story to the media in March.

In an interview with Madonsela in August, Maseko said he was on his
way to a meeting with the Guptas in late 2010 when the president
called him on the phone to say, “The Gupta brothers need your help,
please help them.” During the meeting with Ajay Gupta, Gupta told
Maseko that he wanted government advertising channeled to his new
newspaper, the New Age. According to Maseko’s account, the
government official told Gupta that he could not decide where
government departments advertise. Gupta responded that this was not
a problem. He would instruct the departments to advertise in the
newspaper

According to Maseko’s account, Gupta instructed Maseko to tell him
“where the funds are and inform the departments to provide the funds
to you and if they refuse, we will deal with them. If you have a
problem with any department, we will summon ministers here.” Later
when Maseko refused to take a meeting with a New Age staff, Gupta
told Maseko, “I will talk to your seniors in government and you will
be sorted out.” Maseko was fired a few months later.

A bright spot: Integrity in the Treasury

The report shows how the Guptas’ plans were repeatedly thwarted by
officials in the treasury (p. 131, 132, and 94). The National
Treasury, in charge of approving deals linked to state-owned
enterprises, stuck to the rules of procurement and public finance.
Treasury officials questioned the Eskom coal deal with Tegeta.
Unable to stop the initial deal, they succeeded in blocking an
extension of the Tegeta contract. These obstructions appear to have
frustrated the Guptas and cost Nene his job. Many speculate that
current finance minister Pravin Gordhan’songoing legal battles are
related to the treasury’s resistance to the Guptas influence.

What next?

Zuma, the ministers, and the Guptas have yet to respond to the
damning allegations in the report. Madonsela has since left office,
with state capture report serving as her parting shot in a seven-
year battle against corruption. Still, she’s left instructions on
how to use with her findings. Her successor, who has already
started, should bring potentially criminal accusations in the report
to the National Prosecuting Authority and the police’s Directorate
for Priority Crime Investigation, better known as the Hawks.

Madonsela has also recommended that the report be taken further by a
commission of inquiry, headed by a judge appointed by the chief
justice of South Africa’s constitutional court, Mogoeng Mogoeng.
There are concerns that the prosecuting authority and the Hawks have
been compromised. (They have spearheaded the fraud case against
finance minister Gordhan.) But the public’s hopes lie in the chief
justice, who has spoken out harshly against the abuse of power
before.

“Public office bearers ignore their constitutional obligations at
their peril. This is so because constitutionalism‚ accountability
and the rule of law constitute the sharp and mighty sword that
stands ready to chop the ugly head of impunity off its stiffened
neck,” Mogeng said in March when he ruled against the president over
his use public funds used to renovate his personal compound in
Nkandla.

*******************************************************

How the state capture controversy has influenced South Africa’s
nuclear build

Harmut Winkler

The Conversation, May 26, 2016

http://tinyurl.com/jgrjcz8

South Africa is facing a critical decision that could see it
investing about R1 trillion – or US$60 billion to $70 billion – in a
fleet of new nuclear power stations. Proponents argue that it will
greatly increase electrical base-load capacity and generate
industrial growth. But opponents believe the high cost would cripple
the country economically.

What should be an economic decision has now been clouded by
controversy, with political pressure to push through the nuclear
build and the increasingly apparent rewards it would bring to
politically linked individuals.

The nuclear expansion programme needs to be considered exceptionally
carefully given that the required financial commitment is roughly
equal to the total South African annual tax revenue. Loan repayments
could place a devastating long-term burden on the public and on the
economy as a whole.

South Africa’s energy needs

South Africa is in the process of massively expanding and
modernising its electricity generation capacity. The government-
driven Integrated Resource Plan aims to increase total capacity from
42,000MW (peak demand of 39,000MW) to 85,000MW (peak demand of
68,000MW) in 2030. A key component of this plan is the construction
of facilities to produce 9,600MW of nuclear power. However, this
aspect of the plan has been challenged.

The biggest concern is that nuclear power is too expensive for the
country. The debate gained momentum when the 2013 update to the
2010-2030 electricity plan found that electricity demand is growing
slower than originally anticipated. Peak demand in 2030 is now
expected to range between 52,000 MW and 61,000 MW. There is
consequently widespread belief that new nuclear power stations can
be delayed considerably.

South Africa’s energy generation options

South Africa has had remarkable success with speedy, cost-effective
installation of renewable energy power plants. In addition to this,
technologies for harvesting South Africa’s plentiful wind and solar
energy resources are rapidly becoming cheaper, raising the question
of whether the country should not invest more in these options
rather than in going nuclear.

The argument that nuclear energy provides a stable base load,
independent of weather conditions, is mitigated by improvements in
energy storage technologies. But also by the fact that South Africa,
with its large coal power production, has a proportionally higher
base load than many highly developed industrialised countries. The
pro-nuclear option is therefore not unavoidable, as nuclear
proponents suggest, but rather a matter for thorough economic
consideration.

Zuma and the Russians

The nuclear debate gained a political dimension when President Jacob
Zuma and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, started to develop
an unusually close relationship. It culminated in an announcement
that the Russian nuclear developer, Rosatom, had been awarded the
potentially highly lucrative contract to build the new reactors. The
agreement was later denied.

Rosatom was considered the preferred contender, with other bidders
only there to lend the process legitimacy, according to some
observers. The lack of transparency surrounding the process, coupled
with a history of corruption in South African mega-projects like the
arms deal, has made the whole scheme seem suspicious to the broader
public.

A thickening plot

A crucial thread in this saga involves the Shiva uranium mine, about
30km north-west of Pretoria, the country’s executive capital. It
originally belonged to a company called Uranium One, a subsidiary of
Russia’s Rosatom. It was sold in 2010 to Oakbay Resources, a company
controlled by members of the politically connected Gupta family and
the president’s son, in a deal that greatly surprised economists.

The mine was deemed unprofitable and thus unattractive to other
mining companies. But it was still considered worth a whole lot more
than the R270 million paid by Oakbay. The mine would, however,
become highly profitable if it became the uranium supplier to the
new nuclear power stations. Oakbay and its associates therefore have
a very strong incentive for this nuclear build to happen.

It is here that the nuclear build drama feeds into the recent major
controversy surrounding alleged state capture, meaning a corrupt
system where state officials owe their allegiance to politically
connected oligarchs rather than the public interest. This was
highlighted by the shock dismissal of Finance Minister Nhanhla Nene,
a reported nuclear build sceptic, but also by subsequent allegations
of ministerial positions being offered to people by members of the
Gupta family.

Political, legal and civil opposition

The nuclear build’s association with the Zuma faction in the ruling
African National Congress (ANC) will be a political hot potato for
decades to come. The whole scandal also offers potential opportunity
to opposition parties. With increasing evidence of individuals
benefiting, opposition parties have found another spot to exploit,
as they did with Nkandla. A post-Zuma government would find it most
convenient to simply dissociate itself from the whole scheme.

The South African courts have been used very effectively by pressure
groups in the past. Already a number of environmental groups have
initiated legal applications, and these might end up being escalated
to the Supreme and Constitutional Courts. This will delay any
building initiative by years.

The South African experience with the 2010 World Cup has shown that
mega-projects can come to fruition when there is broad overall
support for the initiative. At the same time, South Africans can be
very disruptive and obstructive when this is not the case. For
example, the public opposition to e-tolling, an electronic toll
collection on certain roads.

The two leading opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance and the
Economic Freedom Fighters, have already expressed their strong
criticism of the planned nuclear build. Their supporters and civil
society in general have demonstrated their capacity for mobilisation
around specific issues. So the potential for an anti-nuclear protest
movement cannot be discounted.

A negative nuclear outlook

Building these plants is a risky business proposition, especially
for Rosatom, which is implicated in the developing scandal. The
recent political mood swing against state capture and a likely
credit rating downgrade add to the risk.

Rosatom has suggested a nuclear build financing option that
effectively amounts to it providing a loan. It is, however,
conceivable that a future government may not honour debt repayments
if there is a view that the construction deal was secured
irregularly.

The narrow public support base and downright hostility in some
quarters to a nuclear build has already effectively stalled local
nuclear construction plans. The level of controversy, high costs and
potential for further disruption mean that the planned
implementation could only proceed under severe social strain.

Such a scenario could very well cost the ruling ANC the 2019
national elections. And the party is becoming increasingly aware of
this. As such, it is posited that the nuclear build will not happen
any time as soon as planned.

*****************************************************

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