We are talking about race and the fight against racism.
Race seems to be short hand for all of us –the human race.
Race suggests some kind of totality among people.
Racism, on the other hand, necessarily implies segments of the race that are hostile towards one another.
So, racists are hostile segments of the people. For example, some racists hate all of the human race.
These are called misanthropes. Misanthropes hate and often want to destroy everybody. They often want to destroy the human race merely because members of the human race are human.
Other races hate and often want to destroy only half of the race.
These are called misandrists. They hate and often want to destroy boys and men simply because they are boys and men.
Another type of racist hates and often wants to destroy girls and women who constitute half of the race. These are called misogynists.
How can we fight the racism whether it aims to destroy the totality of the human race or the destruction of only the males or only the females?
Today, perhaps a doctor can give them a pill or an injection or lock them up or lie them on an injection table or hang them. In Texas, it is not feasible to electrocute all the racists because it would drain all the electricity. Texas administers so many lethal injections that it sometimes has to deal with shortages of the poison that it pumps into the veins of its people so it is not a viable option.
By the way, in the USA, a misogynist can become President and reside in the White House, Donald Trump.
At some point, it became obvious to even the racists that a racism based on gender was unsatisfactory. A gender based racism requires racists to destroy some of their parents and some of their siblings. So, the racists modified their racism to be based on color more than on gender in order to protect their kinfolk.
The racists then imagined that there is a multiplicity of racists based on color chiefly of the skin. The racists thereby discovered blacks, whites, yellows and later on during the latter 19th and 20th centuries, browns and reds.
Initially, the division of humanity consisted of blacks and whites. Later on the racists added the yellows. The prevalence of these sexual mixtures (miscegenation)made it difficult to determine whether an individual was this color or that color. Sometimes blacks who look like they were white insisted that they were black. Vice versa, sometimes whites who look like they were white insisted they were black. When the yellows entered the mixture, the problem of determination of racial identity grew more complex and hopeless. Nobody could tell whether somebody else was white or black. Among the whites, people discovered that other whites were the principle foe, for example, yellow haired and blue eyed people who were white hated some other people who did not have yellow hair and blue eyes even though they were white. So clearly color was an inadequate basis for racism.
In order to fight racism progressive people fought a legal struggle-both judicial and legislative-in which laws were passed to prohibit racist acts called discrimination, e.g. in the USA the civil rights act in 1964 and the voting rights act in 1965. The state in the USA mildly enforced these legal measures against racism over the last 50 years but the state in the USA did not enforce these anti-racist laws with the vigor to eradicate racism.
Around the middle of the 19th century the form of racism based on skull shape became popular among the intelligentsia and almost replaced color based racism.
Skull based racism known as phrenology became popular, advocating that there was a relationship between skull shape and psychological characteristics. Almost all phrenologists insisted that non-whites lacked the kind of skull shape that results in the development of strong and smart individuals.
People relied on other scientists to debunk the non-sense of the phrenologists and after the defeat of the Nazi racists who were enthusiastic phrenologists, people widely saw that skull based racism was non-sense. So, to fight skull based racism and the residues of color and gender racism requires war.
This brings us up to the present time where the original basis of racism, the emergence of an economic surplus or deficit, generates race hatred mostly of the misanthropic form. There is a group of highly trained racists who argue that at least 80% of the world population must be exterminated so that the 20% can strive and survive. These are basically misanthropes. These misanthropes claim that they only want to get rid of about 80% of the world’s population.
If these racists were successful in wiping out 80% of the world’s population, they would then attempt to get rid of the remaining 20%. These racists so far believe that pestilence and famine are the best ways to get rid of the 80%, but these modern day racists do not overlook the Nazi contribution to racism. This racism can be described as industrialized genocide.
Contemporary racists primarily rely on the manufacture and distribution of lethal germs to produce the pestilence that can wipe out the 80%.
And this pestilence in turn produces the famine that greatly contributes to wiping out the 80%. Research institutes around the world are developing the viruses that will accelerate the rate of mass murder that is underway.
For decades, these institutes were mostly interested in the research of deadly biological agents but today their focus is mainly on the development of these agents.
There is a consideration that impedes the use of these deadly biological agents to attack the 80%. That consideration is the existence or absence of a highly effective antidote that will cure members of the 20% if they are inadvertently infected by the biological agents distributed by modern day racists.
People who talk about the conspiracy to wipe out 80% of the world population are ridiculed as hopeless and incurable paranoids.
The information concerning wiping out the 80% has been hacked but what do you do with the documentation that demonstrates that imperialists are conspiring to wipe out the 80%? Anyone who has possession of the data that proves the imperialists are wiping out the 80% would get the same kind of treatment as Edward Snowden. You cannot take the data hacked from biological research institutes to the bourgeois media because under bourgeois law they are required to notify the state.
AfricaFocus Bulletin
January 23, 2017 (170123)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor’s Note
“Eskom, accused of overly cozy ties with the Guptas featured heavily
in the report, with 916 mentions. … it’s Eskom’s chief executive,
Brian Molefe, who comes out looking the worst. According to cell
phone records, Molefe had 58 phone calls with the eldest of the
Gupta brothers, Ajay Gupta, between August 2015 and March 2016, just
before the Guptas purchased South Africa’s Optimum coal mine for
2.15 billion rand ($160 million). Eskom, which prepaid the Gupta’s
Tegeta Exploration and Resources 600 million rand for coal, had been
accused of helping to finance the Guptas’ coal mine deal through
preferential treatment.” – Quartz Africa
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In South Africa, as elsewhere in countries both large and small, the
debates about government energy policy are often framed in terms of
what is best for the “national interest.” But few doubt that behind
these choices between renewable energy options and others (fossil
fuels or nuclear energy), there are also private interests, whose
roles in the management of the state are not new but are becoming
more and more blatant (see below on links on the common stakes of
the incoming Trump administration and Russia’s Putin in promoting
fossil-fuel interests).
Concentrating on this aspect of what is termed “state capture” in
South Africa, this AfricaFocus Bulletin includes (1) brief excerpts
from the 355-page report on “State of Capture” from Public Protector
Thuli Madonsela; (2) an article with a summary of the report from
Quartz Africa, and (3) an article from The Conversation on the state
capture issue and its effects on plans for nuclear energy.
Two recent articles with background on the energy debate include:
le Cordeur, Matthew, “5 reasons why Eskom is wrong about renewables
costs – CSIR,” Jan 12, 2017 http://www.fin24.com – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/jmpts84
“Eskom delaying R50 billion renewable energy plan to push nuclear
goals,” Jan 10, 2017, http://businesstech.co.za – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/zcqku94
Watch live on youtube January 25
Zitamar News and Africa Research Institute present:
A Webinar on Mozambique’s Debt Crisis
Wednesday 25 January – 15:00 Maputo / 13:00 London / 08:00 New York
The Trump Election: Intersecting Explanations
http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/trump-win-reasons.php
Observations (second installment), Jan 23, 2017
In the period between the election and the inauguration, the
highest profile debate about reasons for the Trump electoral win was
about Putin’s intervention. But that debate produced more heat than
light, while key issues such as the common interests of Putin and
the Trump administration in promoting the fossil-fuel industry
received only marginal attention.
See http://noeasyvictories.org/usa/putin-intervention.php for short
observations and database entries for 31 sources to date.
Articles on the fossil-fuel connection in particular include:
Joe Romm, “Did Putin help elect Trump to restore $500 billion Exxon
oil deal killed by sanctions?,” ThinkProgress, Jan 8, 2017
http://tinyurl.com/z6d45ub
Rachel Maddow, 5-minute video on ExxonMobil & Russia deal, Dec. 20,
2016 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n60SzMzjXog
Alex Steffen, “Trump, Putin and the Pipelines to Nowhere
You can’t understand what Trump’s doing to America without
understanding the ‘Carbon Bubble’,” Dec 15, 2016, http://medium.com
– Direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/hb2xnc6
“State of Capture”: A Report of the Public Protector
14 October 2016
Full 355-page report in pdf available at http://tinyurl.com/jffpskt
5. Evidence and Information Obtained
Introduction
5.1. The Gupta family, originating from India, arrived in South
Africa in 1993. They established businesses in South Africa with
their notable business being a computer assembly and distribution
company called Sahara Computers. The family is led by three
brothers Ajay Gupta who is the eldest, Atul Gupta and Rajesh Gupta
who is the youngest. Rajesh is commonly known as “Tony”. According
to a letter submitted to my office, total revenues from their
business activities for the 2016 financial year amounted to R2,6
billion, with government contracts contributing a total of R235
million of the revenues.
5.2. They later diversified their business interests into mining
through the acquisition of JIC Mining Services, Shiva Uranium and
Tegeta Exploration and Resources, Optimum Coal Mine and
Koornfontein Coal Mine. They also started a media company called
TNA Media, which publishes a newspaper called The New Age and owns
a television channel called ANN7.
5.3. The Gupta family are known friends of the President Zuma.
President Zuma has openly acknowledged his friendship with them,
most notably during a discussion in the National Assembly on 19
June 2013 where he admitted that members of the Gupta family were
his friends. Mr Ajay Gupta (“Mr A. Gupta), also admitted to being
friends with President Zuma when I interviewed him on 4 October
2016.
5.4. President Zuma’s son, Mr Duduzane Zuma (“Mr D. Zuma”) is a
business partner of the Gupta family through an entity called
Mabengela Investments (“Mabengela”). Mabengela has a 28.5% interest
in Tegeta Exploration and Resources (“Tegeta”). Mr D. Zuma is a
Director of Mabengela.
5.5. Members of the Gupta family and the President Zuma’ son, Mr D.
Zuma, have secured major contracts with Eskom, a major State owned
company, through Tegeta. Tegeta has secured a 10 year coal supply
agreement (“CSA”) with Eskom SOC Limited (“Eskom”) to supply coal
to the Majuba Power station. The entity has also secured contracts
with Eskom to supply coal to the Hendrina and Arnot power stations.
5.6. Eskom CEO, Mr Brian Molefe (“Mr Molefe”) is friends with
members of the Gupta family. Mr A. Gupta admitted during my
interview with him on 4 October 2016 that Mr Molefe is his “very
good friend” and often visits his home in Saxonwold.
5.7. The New Age newspaper has also secured contracts with some
provincial government departments and state owned entities, most
notably Eskom and South African Airways (“SAA”).
5.8. The Gupta family recently purchased shares in an entity called
VR Laser Services (“VR Laser”). VR Laser has major contracts with
Denel SOC Limited (“Denel”), a State owned armaments manufacturing
company. VR Laser has also partnered with Denel to apparently seek
business opportunities abroad.
5.9. During March this year, Mr Jonas issued a media statement
alleging that he was offered the position of Minister of Finance by
members of the Gupta family in exchange for executive decisions
favourable to the business interests of the Gupta family, an offer
which he declined. The Gupta family has denied the allegations made
by Mr Jonas.
5.10. At the time Mr Jonas is alleged to have been offered a Cabinet
post as Minister of Finance, Mr Nene was occupying the post. Mr
Nene was removed from his post on 9 December 2015 by President Zuma
and replaced with Minister Van Rooyen. Minister Van Rooyen was
replaced by Minister Gordhan on 14 December 2015 as Minister of
Finance, 4 days after his appointment.
5.11. Following Mr Jonas’ statement, Ms Mentor also issued a
statement to the press alleging that she was also offered a Cabinet
post by members of the Gupta family in exchange for executive
decisions favourable to their business interests, an allegation
denied by the Gupta family.
5.12. The former CEO of Government Communication and Information
System (“GCIS”), Mr Themba Maseko also issued a statement alleging
that members of the Gupta family pressured him into placing
government advertisements in the New Age newspaper. Mr Maseko
further alleged that President Zuma asked him to “help” the Gupta
family.
**********************************************
What the “State Capture” report tells us about Zuma, the Guptas, and
corruption in South Africa
It’s the report that confirms South Africa’s worst fears about
corruption: that the state has been captured. In 355 pages, former
public protector Thuli Madonsela and her team of investigators
outline in detail just how much control the Gupta family, a wealthy
Indian immigrant family, has over South Africa’s resources. The
Guptas’ close friend, president Jacob Zuma, as well as two ministers
implicated in the report, went to court to stop its release. But it
was finally released on Nov. 2, after protests and a court battle.
The report is potentially damning for Zuma, offering proof that he
sanctioned the use of state companies for personal enrichment. But
now the real reckoning begins, as a web of corruption around Zuma,
the Guptas, and at least three ministers begins to unravel.
Hiring and firing ministers in the Guptas’ house
The report contains a detailed interview with deputy finance
minister Mcebisi Jonas, who alleges that the Guptas offered him the
finance minister’s post weeks before Zuma was to shuffle three
finance ministers in one week. Jonas was driven to the Guptas’ home
by the president’s son Duduzane Zuma, where he was met by Ajay
Gupta.
Ajay Gupta allegedly told Jonas they’d been keeping tabs on him and
wanted him to be their man in the treasury. Ajay Gupta revealed that
they’d already made 6 billion rand ($443 million) from dealings with
the government, and wanted to make at least 2 billion rand more
(about $147 million). When Jonas refused, they tried to sweeten the
deal with 600 million rand (about $44 million) and an extra 600,000
rand ($44,318) in cash, right there. Jonas declined the money, and
months later became the whistle-blower that launched this
investigation when he revealed his story in March.
Vytjie Mentor, who came out after Jonas with an account of how the
Guptas tried to offer her the job of minister of public enterprises,
in charge of state-owned companies, also details her exchange with
the family. According to the report (p.89), Mentor was told during a
meeting in October last year at the Guptas’ home that she would go
from an ordinary parliamentarian to cabinet minister in a week. All
she had to do was make sure South African Airways dropped their
route between Johannesburg and Mumbai, making way for the Gupta-
linked carrier Jet Airways. Mentor declined. She was surprised to
see the president himself emerge from an adjacent room, who said
“it’s okay girl…take care of yourself,” as he personally escorted
her out.
According to the report, the Guptas also have the power to fire
ministers seen as stumbling blocks to their plans. Former finance
minister Nhlanhla Nene’s insistence on sticking to the rules cost
him his job. As did Barbara Hogan, former minister of public
enterprises, who refused to allow outside influence in appointments
of board members of state-owned South African Airways, Transnet, the
national rail, and Eskom, the state power utility (p. 89, 90). On an
official visit to India, Hogan said she was shocked to find the
Guptas running proceedings. She was relieved of her duties a few
months later.
Des van Rooyen, the unknown parliamentarian who became finance
minister for a few days after Nene, went to court in a bid to delay
the report, fearing it would implicate him. And it has. His phone
records show that van Rooyen visited the Guptas’ home seven days in
a row before he was appointed as finance minister. He was later
moved to a less prominent ministry. Van Rooyen has denied any
wrongdoing.
Negotiating on behalf of the Guptas
Mining minister Mosebenzi Zwane also tried to have the report
delayed, saying it was hastily prepared and that he had not been
given time to respond. According to the report (p. 124, 125), Zwane
travelled to Switzerland on behalf of the Guptas to smooth over
their acquisition of a troubled coal mine from multinational
commodity trader Glencore, helping the Guptas become one of the main
coal suppliers for state utility Eskom. Zwane allegedly helped
facilitate the deal by accompanying delegates from a Gupta resources
company, Tegeta, to Zurich, according to a flight itinerary obtained
by the public protector. Zwane could not be interviewed in time for
the report, but should be allowed to give his version in subsequent
investigations, the report says.
Eskom: Keeping the lights on for the Guptas
Eskom, accused of overly cozy ties with the Guptas featured heavily
in the report, with 916 mentions. Lynn Brown, who became the
minister in charge of South Africa’s state owned enterprises, is
implicated in the report for allowing the appointment of a lame-duck
board that turned a blind eye to murky deals made at the energy
monopoly.
But it’s Eskom’s chief executive, Brian Molefe, who comes out
looking the worst. According to cell phone records, Molefe had 58
phone calls with the eldest of the Gupta brothers, Ajay Gupta,
between August 2015 and March 2016, just before the Guptas purchased
South Africa’s Optimum coal mine for 2.15 billion rand ($160
million). Eskom, which prepaid the Gupta’s Tegeta Exploration and
Resources 600 million rand for coal, had been accused of helping to
finance the Guptas’ coal mine deal through preferential treatment.
The report concludes (p, 20), “it appears that the sole purpose of
awarding contracts to Tegeta to supply Arnot Power Station, was made
solely for the purposes of funding Tegeta and enabling Tegeta to
purchase all shares in OCH [Optimum Coal Holdings]. The only entity
which appears to have benefited from Eskom’s decisions with regards
to [the Optimum coal mine deal] was Tegeta.” Cellphone records also
put Molefe in the Saxonwold area, where the Guptas live, 19 times
between August and November 2015 and phone calls between Molefe and
Ronica Ragavan, head of the Gupta’s holding company, Oakbay
Investments. Justifying these calls and visits, Ajay Gupta told
Madonsela in an interview last month that Molefe is his “very good
friend” who often visits the Gupta compound. But Madonsela says
these records show “a distinct line of communication between Molefe
of Eskom, the Gupta family and directors of their companies… These
links cannot be ignored as Mr Molefe did not declare his
relationship with the Guptas.” Eskom hasrefuted any allegations of
wrongdoing. “We do believe everything that we’ve done so far was
above board,” spokesman for the utility, Khulu Phasiwe, told a local
radio station.
Advertising with the Guptas
Themba Maseko, former chief executive of government’s communications
agency, in charge of a media buying budget of 600 million rand a
year, said he was pressured by the Gupta family to place government
ads in their newspaper the New Age. Maseko was also one of the
whistleblowers who took his story to the media in March.
In an interview with Madonsela in August, Maseko said he was on his
way to a meeting with the Guptas in late 2010 when the president
called him on the phone to say, “The Gupta brothers need your help,
please help them.” During the meeting with Ajay Gupta, Gupta told
Maseko that he wanted government advertising channeled to his new
newspaper, the New Age. According to Maseko’s account, the
government official told Gupta that he could not decide where
government departments advertise. Gupta responded that this was not
a problem. He would instruct the departments to advertise in the
newspaper
According to Maseko’s account, Gupta instructed Maseko to tell him
“where the funds are and inform the departments to provide the funds
to you and if they refuse, we will deal with them. If you have a
problem with any department, we will summon ministers here.” Later
when Maseko refused to take a meeting with a New Age staff, Gupta
told Maseko, “I will talk to your seniors in government and you will
be sorted out.” Maseko was fired a few months later.
A bright spot: Integrity in the Treasury
The report shows how the Guptas’ plans were repeatedly thwarted by
officials in the treasury (p. 131, 132, and 94). The National
Treasury, in charge of approving deals linked to state-owned
enterprises, stuck to the rules of procurement and public finance.
Treasury officials questioned the Eskom coal deal with Tegeta.
Unable to stop the initial deal, they succeeded in blocking an
extension of the Tegeta contract. These obstructions appear to have
frustrated the Guptas and cost Nene his job. Many speculate that
current finance minister Pravin Gordhan’songoing legal battles are
related to the treasury’s resistance to the Guptas influence.
What next?
Zuma, the ministers, and the Guptas have yet to respond to the
damning allegations in the report. Madonsela has since left office,
with state capture report serving as her parting shot in a seven-
year battle against corruption. Still, she’s left instructions on
how to use with her findings. Her successor, who has already
started, should bring potentially criminal accusations in the report
to the National Prosecuting Authority and the police’s Directorate
for Priority Crime Investigation, better known as the Hawks.
Madonsela has also recommended that the report be taken further by a
commission of inquiry, headed by a judge appointed by the chief
justice of South Africa’s constitutional court, Mogoeng Mogoeng.
There are concerns that the prosecuting authority and the Hawks have
been compromised. (They have spearheaded the fraud case against
finance minister Gordhan.) But the public’s hopes lie in the chief
justice, who has spoken out harshly against the abuse of power
before.
“Public office bearers ignore their constitutional obligations at
their peril. This is so because constitutionalism‚ accountability
and the rule of law constitute the sharp and mighty sword that
stands ready to chop the ugly head of impunity off its stiffened
neck,” Mogeng said in March when he ruled against the president over
his use public funds used to renovate his personal compound in
Nkandla.
How the state capture controversy has influenced South Africa’s
nuclear build
Harmut Winkler
The Conversation, May 26, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/jgrjcz8
South Africa is facing a critical decision that could see it
investing about R1 trillion – or US$60 billion to $70 billion – in a
fleet of new nuclear power stations. Proponents argue that it will
greatly increase electrical base-load capacity and generate
industrial growth. But opponents believe the high cost would cripple
the country economically.
What should be an economic decision has now been clouded by
controversy, with political pressure to push through the nuclear
build and the increasingly apparent rewards it would bring to
politically linked individuals.
The nuclear expansion programme needs to be considered exceptionally
carefully given that the required financial commitment is roughly
equal to the total South African annual tax revenue. Loan repayments
could place a devastating long-term burden on the public and on the
economy as a whole.
South Africa’s energy needs
South Africa is in the process of massively expanding and
modernising its electricity generation capacity. The government-
driven Integrated Resource Plan aims to increase total capacity from
42,000MW (peak demand of 39,000MW) to 85,000MW (peak demand of
68,000MW) in 2030. A key component of this plan is the construction
of facilities to produce 9,600MW of nuclear power. However, this
aspect of the plan has been challenged.
The biggest concern is that nuclear power is too expensive for the
country. The debate gained momentum when the 2013 update to the
2010-2030 electricity plan found that electricity demand is growing
slower than originally anticipated. Peak demand in 2030 is now
expected to range between 52,000 MW and 61,000 MW. There is
consequently widespread belief that new nuclear power stations can
be delayed considerably.
South Africa’s energy generation options
South Africa has had remarkable success with speedy, cost-effective
installation of renewable energy power plants. In addition to this,
technologies for harvesting South Africa’s plentiful wind and solar
energy resources are rapidly becoming cheaper, raising the question
of whether the country should not invest more in these options
rather than in going nuclear.
The argument that nuclear energy provides a stable base load,
independent of weather conditions, is mitigated by improvements in
energy storage technologies. But also by the fact that South Africa,
with its large coal power production, has a proportionally higher
base load than many highly developed industrialised countries. The
pro-nuclear option is therefore not unavoidable, as nuclear
proponents suggest, but rather a matter for thorough economic
consideration.
Zuma and the Russians
The nuclear debate gained a political dimension when President Jacob
Zuma and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, started to develop
an unusually close relationship. It culminated in an announcement
that the Russian nuclear developer, Rosatom, had been awarded the
potentially highly lucrative contract to build the new reactors. The
agreement was later denied.
Rosatom was considered the preferred contender, with other bidders
only there to lend the process legitimacy, according to some
observers. The lack of transparency surrounding the process, coupled
with a history of corruption in South African mega-projects like the
arms deal, has made the whole scheme seem suspicious to the broader
public.
A thickening plot
A crucial thread in this saga involves the Shiva uranium mine, about
30km north-west of Pretoria, the country’s executive capital. It
originally belonged to a company called Uranium One, a subsidiary of
Russia’s Rosatom. It was sold in 2010 to Oakbay Resources, a company
controlled by members of the politically connected Gupta family and
the president’s son, in a deal that greatly surprised economists.
The mine was deemed unprofitable and thus unattractive to other
mining companies. But it was still considered worth a whole lot more
than the R270 million paid by Oakbay. The mine would, however,
become highly profitable if it became the uranium supplier to the
new nuclear power stations. Oakbay and its associates therefore have
a very strong incentive for this nuclear build to happen.
It is here that the nuclear build drama feeds into the recent major
controversy surrounding alleged state capture, meaning a corrupt
system where state officials owe their allegiance to politically
connected oligarchs rather than the public interest. This was
highlighted by the shock dismissal of Finance Minister Nhanhla Nene,
a reported nuclear build sceptic, but also by subsequent allegations
of ministerial positions being offered to people by members of the
Gupta family.
Political, legal and civil opposition
The nuclear build’s association with the Zuma faction in the ruling
African National Congress (ANC) will be a political hot potato for
decades to come. The whole scandal also offers potential opportunity
to opposition parties. With increasing evidence of individuals
benefiting, opposition parties have found another spot to exploit,
as they did with Nkandla. A post-Zuma government would find it most
convenient to simply dissociate itself from the whole scheme.
The South African courts have been used very effectively by pressure
groups in the past. Already a number of environmental groups have
initiated legal applications, and these might end up being escalated
to the Supreme and Constitutional Courts. This will delay any
building initiative by years.
The South African experience with the 2010 World Cup has shown that
mega-projects can come to fruition when there is broad overall
support for the initiative. At the same time, South Africans can be
very disruptive and obstructive when this is not the case. For
example, the public opposition to e-tolling, an electronic toll
collection on certain roads.
The two leading opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance and the
Economic Freedom Fighters, have already expressed their strong
criticism of the planned nuclear build. Their supporters and civil
society in general have demonstrated their capacity for mobilisation
around specific issues. So the potential for an anti-nuclear protest
movement cannot be discounted.
A negative nuclear outlook
Building these plants is a risky business proposition, especially
for Rosatom, which is implicated in the developing scandal. The
recent political mood swing against state capture and a likely
credit rating downgrade add to the risk.
Rosatom has suggested a nuclear build financing option that
effectively amounts to it providing a loan. It is, however,
conceivable that a future government may not honour debt repayments
if there is a view that the construction deal was secured
irregularly.
The narrow public support base and downright hostility in some
quarters to a nuclear build has already effectively stalled local
nuclear construction plans. The level of controversy, high costs and
potential for further disruption mean that the planned
implementation could only proceed under severe social strain.
Such a scenario could very well cost the ruling ANC the 2019
national elections. And the party is becoming increasingly aware of
this. As such, it is posited that the nuclear build will not happen
any time as soon as planned.
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A common misconception is that post-colonial Africa has been a failure and its natural resources are squandered by incompetent or corrupt African despots. Not quite.
What we do have is ethnic-African bank managers dressed up as presidents and prime ministers. The natural and human resources of the largest of the earth’s continents are today plundered more than at any time in the history of the Dark Continent.
Recent research reveals that companies listed on the London Stock Exchange control over $1 trillion worth of Africa’s resources. These key resources are just five in number; oil, gold, diamonds, coal and platinum. There are many other forms of natural and human resource exploitation.
Recent research reveals that 101 companies, most of them British registered but not necessarily British owned, control $305 billion worth of platinum, $276 billion worth of oil and $216 billion worth of coal at current market prices.
Mark Curtis, the report’s author, says “the ‘scramble for Africa’ is proceeding apace. The result is that African governments have largely handed over their treasure to the great corporations of the Western alliances.â€
Tanzania’s gold, Zambia’s copper, South Africa’s platinum and coal and Botswana’s diamonds are dominated by London-listed companies. Corporate slave drivers own mines or hold mineral licences in 37 African countries. The corporations of the West control vast swathes of African territory. Their concessions cover a staggering 1.03 million square kilometres on the Dark Continent.
African territory controlled by London-based corporations is more than four times the size of the United Kingdom. With remarkable chutzpah, an appropriate term in the circumstances, the People’s Republic of China has been much chastised for their interest in Africa’s resources.
Many African governments depend on mineral resources for tax revenues. However, the extent of foreign ownership means that most tax wealth is milked along with the mineral resources wealth of Africa.
African governments themselves are minority shareholders in the West’s mining operations. Corruption among the political elite is endemic and the source of the corruption is in London’s Square Mile and Wall Street. Company tax payments are minimal due to low tax rates while governments often provide companies with generous incentives such as corporation tax holidays.
Corporation slave owners are able to avoid paying taxes by their use of tax havens. Of the 101 London-listed companies, 25 are actually incorporated in tax havens. These fiscal hideouts are mostly to be found lurking in the colonised British Virgin Islands.
It is estimated that Africa loses around $35 billion a year in illicit financial outflow of the continent. Africa loses a further $46billion a year in multinational company profits taken from their operations in Africa.
British registered companies’ play an increasingly dominant role in Africa. This form of modern slavery is facilitated by both Conservative and Labour governments; given the nod by Britain’s royalty and aristocracy.
Whitehall has long been a fierce advocate of ‘liberalised’ trade and investment regimes in Africa that provide access to markets for foreign companies. London is largely opposed to African countries putting up regulatory or protectionist barriers to foreign investment. Yet, such policies adopted by nations in East Asia are successful and to a larger extent their peoples benefited.
British corporate and banking sectors do not challenge the use of tax havens by multinational companies using tax havens. The harsh truth is that the global infrastructure of tax havens is largely a British creation.
British governments permit corporations to self-regulate, which again has a negative impact on human values and rights. As an entity the combined corporations stand in the way of internationally legally binding curbs against human rights abuse.
Recent research calculated the financial wellbeing of sub-Saharan Africa. Its purpose was to discover whether Africa is being helped or exploited by the rest of the world. The findings were abysmal.
It found that only $134 billion flows into Africa annually, mainly in the form of high interest loans, foreign investment and recoverable aid. However, $192 billion is extracted, mainly in profits made by foreign companies and tax dodging scams. The result is that Africa suffers a net loss of $58 billion a year.
The outcome is that Africa, potentially the world’s richest continent in terms of natural resources, is the poorest territory on earth. Modern Africa has been Bolshevised as was Imperial Russian from 1922. The same corporations that invested in Stalin’s Five Year Plans and the Gulag slave plantations now control Africa’s resources. Instead of Trotsky’s White Negroes we have Africa’s ethnic slaves.
Corporate London’s policy to keep corporate taxes low means Africans are reduced to an existence on a par or worse than they endured during the American era of cotton plantations. As a consequence of corporation slavery sub-Saharan Africans become refugees and flood Europe to escape their harsh conditions.
AfricaFocus Bulletin
January 16, 2017 (170116)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor’s Note
Ghana, Gambia, and Gabon are all small African countries with names
beginning with the letter “G,” which held presidential elections in
2016. But neither the electoral landscapes nor the electoral
outcomes can fruitfully be analyzed without giving greater weight to
the contrasts than to the similarities. The same applies to the even
wider set of 14 African countries with presidential elections last
year, or the 8 so far scheduled to hold elections in 2017.
For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/afr1701.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”
To share this on Facebook, click on
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As this Bulletin is published in mid-January, the most pressing
uncertainty about Africa’s elections is for Gambia, where outgoing
President Yahya Jammeh reversed his decision to accept his election
defeat in December (see
http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/gamb1612.php), meeting with
widespread condemnation both internationally and domestically.
And for the latest news as of this morning, see
http://tinyurl.com/h2p3vzn and follow this Gambian news site
(http://jollofnews.com).
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains several summary commentaries on
Africa’s elections in 2016 and 2017: Vera Songwe on the contrasting
outcomes in Gabon, Ghana, and Gambia; Abdi Latif Dahir on five
elections to watch in 2017; Kim Yi Dionne reviewing public opinion
on the wide variations in the extent of freedom to organize in 36
different African countries. Also included are several links to
additional recent analyses worth noting.
Also of related interest
Two videos of particular relevance, given the nomination of
ExxonMobil executive Rex Tillerson for U.S. Secretary of State. Both
Chad and Equatorial Guinea held elections in 2016, with leaders who
have been in power for 26 and 37 years respectively continuing
in their positions.
Rachel Maddow on Chad and ExxonMobil December 13, 2016 – 16 minutes
video: http://tinyurl.com/jp57m7z
transcript: http://tinyurl.com/gn5yqvh
Rachel Maddow on Equatorial Guinea and ExxonMobil January 12, 2017 –
4 minutes
video: http://tinyurl.com/hqwc73m
transcript not yet available
List of Africa’s rulers longest in office, updated for 2017
https://qz.com/852384/
For general reference and news related to African elections
Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
Resources includes an election calendar for each year beginning in
2005
* 21 relevant explanations, any of which arguably sufficient to have
tipped the balance of the narrowly decided electoral college outcome
* As of January 15, 2017: 244 recommended articles, 23 books for
deeper background
* Voter suppression is among the most important factors, but also
among the least prominent in the public debate. See
http://www.noeasyvictories.org/usa/voter-suppression.php
Africa’s mixed political transitions in the 3 Gs: Gabon, the Gambia,
and Ghana
Vera Songwe
Brookings Institution blog, December 22, 2016
http://www.brookings.edu – Direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/j3reoma
Africa has gone through a number of leadership transitions in 2016
and with each one the edifice that will shape Africa’s leadership
and political transition process is being molded. 2016 has been
another of year progress on the African leadership transition front.
This year there have been 16 elections, in seven of the elections
there was an effective leadership transition and over 60 percent of
the elections were conducted in a free and transparent manner with
satisfactory citizen involvement and little or no unrest–such as in
Ghana or Cabo Verde. Overall, the leadership transitions have been
largely peaceful, constitutional, and transparent. However, the
experiences across countries and sub-regions have been quite varied
and provide us with many lessons for the future. I will use Gabon,
Gambia, and Ghana (the “three Gs”) to illustrate these experiences.
Three elections, in Gabon in August, and the Gambia and Ghana in
December, are shaping the narrative of this dynamic process and
providing important lessons for the transition process. First, the
struggle for change continues: While Africa is slowly moving towards
more participatory political transitions, the fight has not
completely won. In addition, the growing importance and maturity of
electoral commissions; citizens’ increasing awareness that their
votes matter; the slow but certain move away from tribal politics to
issues politics; and now regional, rather than foreign, ownership
around leadership transitions all contribute towards the deepening
of democracy on the continent. Each of the countries–Gabon, the
Gambia, and Ghana–have tackled these issues differently.
However, in a number of countries the old has not given way to the
new, and the evolution of democracy is still in motion with too-
often deadly consequences for the citizens in Burundi, Gabon, and
the Gambia to name a few. These examples demonstrate that the
concept of leadership transition has not yet been fully adopted. A
number of lessons can be drawn from these latter experiences. The
populations are increasingly more vocal about transparency of
elections. Both sides incumbent and opposition have increasingly
equal chances of getting their voices heard and results tend to be
closer in these countries. There is still a need for vigilance, and
the tendency to slip remains. Peaceful leadership transitions are
not yet the norm.
Election Commissions: Strong, Credible, and Independent Institutions
are Emerging
In the three Gs, the role of the electoral commissions has been a
determining factor. In fact, electoral commission heads are
increasingly becoming the new villains and/or heroes in the African
struggle for peaceful leadership transitions.
In Gabon, the head of the electoral commission’s independence was
largely questioned primarily by the opposition and the people of
Gabon, as well as international election observers. Notably, the
final results of the election were not announced by the head of the
electoral commission, as constitutionally stated, but by the
minister of the interior–an institution with no independence from
the incumbent. Gabon’s incumbent President Ali Bongo won by 49.9
percent over 48.2 percent for his rival Jean Ping, less than a 6,000
vote difference and suspiciously high turnout in Bongo’s home
province. Violence and protests erupted not long after the
announcement.
The Gambia’s electoral commission performed and fared much better:
Three months before the election, the head of the electoral
commission Alieu Momarr Njai pledged in a memorable but unpublicized
speech to uphold the integrity of the commission and protect the
integrity of the process. During the launch of the electoral
process he said:
Election results may be rigged to predetermine who will win or lose,
and election may be disrupted, casting doubt on the legitimacy of
the process, but I stand here today to pronounce to you that, as far
as our concerted efforts are in play, this will never be the case in
our dear country. The Independent Electoral Commission believes that
an election without integrity subverts the purpose of a democratic
election, and cannot be considered fair and equitable. The IEC will
ever concentrate on conducting free and fair elections. This, I
believe we will ever achieve by upholding governing principles such
as: respect for principles of electoral democracy; ethical conduct;
accuracy and transparency.
The people of the Gambia and many others did not expect such clarity
of vision from the head of the electoral commission, and many
dismissed this as normal election propaganda. However, Njai kept his
word. He pronounced the elections results in favor of the opposition
candidate Adama Barrow and called for President Yahya Jammeh, who
has been in power for over 22 years, to step down, eliciting pride
and jubilation from the people of the Gambia. The Gambia’s troubles
have instead come from Jammeh’s withdrawal of his concession and
determination to stay in power.
In Ghana, the head of the election commission benefitted from a
robust and solid system, which has a history of inclusion,
transparency, and most of participation by all members of the
political exercise. The continuous process undertaken by the
Ghanaian electoral commission to continuously educate the electorate
and the political parties is clearly a lesson for the rest of the
continent on how to build trust and interact with the population.
However, even in Ghana there are lessons to learn from the election,
such as how to manage delays in the announcement of the election
results and or glitches in the system on election day. In Ghana the
commission needed more time to ensure everyone eligible to vote had
voted and to count the votes. Tensions began to mount as the
population waited for the elections results to be proclaimed, both
sides began proclaiming victory and the supporters of each candidate
began filling the streets.
This could have led to severe unrest. However, the communication of
the election committee head asking the people for patience while all
the votes were counted was an example of good election management.
The people could only heed to this request because of the trust
built by the commission and a legitimate sense of ownership of the
commission. Therefore, while independently elected, the first task
of every election commission is to build trust with the people. As
African countries prepare for more elections this should be an area
that gets special attention.
Ownership: The People’s Voice, The Continent’s Voice
Ethnic politics is slowly giving way to issues politics. The economy
is taking center stage in elections. In Ghana, as in the Gambia, the
last few years have seen citizens suffer under the weight of
weakening currencies, erosion of purchasing power by over 50
percent, increasing poverty, joblessness, and interest rates above
25 percent. Similarly, the rise of corruption, noted by Ghanaian
President John Mahama in his concession speech, undermined all the
achievements of Mahama presidency–and most of all his struggle to
give affordable and reliable power to the people of Ghana. The
results of these elections increasingly show that while there will
always remain a thread of local politics in elections, the
electorate is becoming more sophisticated and are voting on issues
broader than ethnic origins. Citizens are more engaged and are
owning the election agenda.
As the Ghanaians celebrate the peaceful election of new President
Nana Akufo Addo, as President Bongo of Gabon settles into his second
term, and as the Gambians wait anxiously for a resolution, the
continent must heed the lessons of these three transitions and begin
putting in place systems that allow citizens more ownership of the
process, ensure that election commissions are truly independent and
equipped to build trust with citizens, and encourage candidates that
acknowledge the increasing sophistication of the electorate so
campaign messages must have content and can no longer rely solely on
identity politics.
Last year, a public survey of elections by the Pan-African research
network Afrobarometer showed Africans distrusted national electoral
commissions and the quality of their elections. Just over 40% of
Africans in 36 countries believed that the last elections in their
country were free and fair; 25% said they trusted their electoral
commissions “a lot”; and many described elections where bribery was
rampant, media bias persisted, and voters were often threatened with
violence at the polls.
Yet elections across the continent are always markers of important
democratic milestones and are followed closely by observers and
citizens alike. In 2016, congratulations poured into Ghana after the
country elected Nana Akufo-Addo as its new president. Several
incumbent presidents, including Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, Zambia’s
Edgar Lungu and Ali Bongo Ondimba of Gabon all won re-election too–
despite protests from opposition members, violence, and internet
shutdowns. And after 22 years in power, The Gambia’s Yahya Jammeh,
who once said he will rule for “one billion years” conceded defeat
live on television, only to reject the outcome of the elections a
few days later.
In 2017, more African countries will pursue the democratic path by
conducting presidential, legislative and municipal elections. Some
281 sworn lawmakers–they are 347 legislators in total–will kick
things off in Somalia by voting for a president later on Jan. 24.
Incumbent president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is considered a
frontrunner and is among dozens of candidates who are vying for the
presidency.
Here are the key elections to watch as millions of people head to
the polls.
1. Rwanda
When: Aug. 4, 2017
President Paul Kagame will be seeking a third, seven-year term since
winning the country’s second election in 2010 with 93% of the vote.
Dubbed as the “global elite’s favorite strongman” and the “darling
tyrant,” Kagame is a media-savvy politician who uses his sleek
website and over 1.5 million Twitter followers to propagate his
message of progress and development. Kagame is also credited with
transforming the landlocked nation’s economic development, boosting
youth employment and trade, reducing poverty and advocating for
technology as a tool for prosperity.
Yet, the country’s transformation under Kagame has come with a
catch. Kagame is accused of muzzling the press, restricting free
speech, and silencing dissidents–in some cases, even allegedly
assassinating opponents who fled to Uganda and South Africa.
But the upcoming election will point more to the future of Rwanda
than to its troubled past. In 2015, a constitutional amendment
allowed Kagame to run for this new term and two more five-year terms
after that, meaning that he could stay in power till 2034. The
controversial move was criticized by many in the international
community and questioned whether Kagame was even interested in
fostering a new generation of leaders to take on the mantle of
leadership. “I don’t think that what we need is an eternal leader,”
Kagame said when he announced his candidacy early last year. And in
2017, he will have to work hard to prove to his critics that he
doesn’t count on being one.
2. Kenya
When: Aug. 8, 2017
Kenyans will go to the polls to elect almost 1900 public officials
including the president, senators, county governors, members of the
national and county assemblies, and women county representatives.
This is yet another high-stakes election, which is tilted in favor
of incumbent president Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto.
The two, however, will go into election facing an energized
opposition who have used the administration’s failings as a rallying
point.
Since Kenyatta came to power in 2013, the country has been bedeviled
with deadly terrorist attacks; teachers, nurses and doctor strikes;
failing banks; and several corruption scandals that have drained
tens of millions of dollars from government coffers.
Even though the opposition is yet to pick a candidate, Kenyatta will
likely face Raila Odinga, a longtime opposition figure who has been
angling to become president for almost 20 years. The opposition has
also accused the country’s Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission of being inept and biased, with a British court recently
convicting two British businessmen of bribing election commissioners
to get contracts for printing ballots.
Like previous elections in the past two decades, the fear of
violence, ethnic polarization, and escalating political tensions
looms large. Kenya walks a tight rope and depending on how the IEBC
conducts the election, might see it maintain its fragile democracy
or slide into yet another gloomy post-election period.
3. Angola
When: Aug. 2017
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos arrives for an EU Africa Summit in
Lisbon, Sunday Dec. 9, 2007. European and African leaders are
scheduled to sign a strategic partnership agreement on Sunday, after
a two-day summit marked by tensions over human rights in Zimbabwe.
In Dec. 2016, president Jose Eduardo dos Santos surprised many
observers by announcing that he will step down as president before
the 2017 elections. The ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation
of Angola party has elected João Lourenco, a former defense
minister, as vice president ahead of the next parliamentary
elections. In Angola, the leader of the winning party automatically
becomes president.
But Angola is still dominantly a one-party state, ruled by dos
Santos and his family, who have amassed wealth and power over the
last four decades. Yet, the fourth elections in the country since it
gained independence from Portugal in 1975, come at a time when the
country has been hit by the slump in global crude prices–
diminishing its foreign exchange revenues. The 2017 elections will
test the maturity of Angola’s democracy and if successful, confer a
measure of legitimacy on its government
4. Liberia
When: Oct. 10, 2017
After 10 years in office, it is the end of the road for Ellen
Johnson-Sirleaf, Liberia, and Africa’s first female president.
Sirleaf leaves office after winning the Nobel Peace Prize, dealing
with the Ebola crisis, passing a Freedom of Information bill, and
taking on the taxing effort of rebuilding a country ravaged by war.
But by Oct. 25, 2017, Liberia will have a new president-elect, who
will take the mantle of an economy battered by low global commodity
prices and post-Ebola decline in official inflows.
Former Liberian soccer player and current Senator George Weah smiles
after addressing thousands of supporters of the Congress for
Democratic Change (CDC) party who petitioned him to contest
Liberia’s Presidential elections in 2017, at Party headquarters in
Monrovia, Liberia, 28 April 2016. George Weah contested the 2005 and
2011 Presidential elections, but lost to incumbent Ellen Johnson
Sirleaf on both occasions. Sirleaf’s second term in office will end
in 2017.
More than 1.9 million registered voters will elect presidential and
legislative candidates from 22 political parties, according to the
National Elections Commission. A key contender in the elections is
George Weah, an ex-footballer who is considered by Fifa as the
highest-ranking African footballer of the 20th century, and whose
first presidential bid failed after he lost to Sirleaf. The former
AC Milan footballer and current senator has promised to increase the
national budget, work on religious harmony and support vocational
education.
Weah could also face off with Jewel Howard-Taylor, the ex-wife of
former Liberian president and warlord Charles Taylor. Jewel,
considered the second most powerful woman in Liberian politics, is a
twice-elected senator from Bong County, which has the third-highest
number of registered voters in Liberia. Vice president Joseph Boakai
will also run for president on the government’s record.
5. The Democratic Republic of Congo
When: TBD 2017
Moise Katumbi, governor of Democratic Republic of Congo’s mineral-
rich Katanga province, arrives for a two-day mineral conference in
Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo March 24, 2014.
On New Year’s Eve, the government and opposition members in the DR
Congo appeared to have signed a deal that could see president Joseph
Kabila step down after the next election. The agreement came after
deadly protests, arrests and internet shutdown that followed the end
of Kabila’s constitutionally-mandated second term on Dec. 19.
As part of the deal, a transitional government will be appointed by
March, and the elections will take place before the end of the year.
If this does take place, it will be the first peaceful transfer of
power since independence in 1960. A peaceful election will also
avert a return to war in the populous, mineral-rich country, where
some five million people lost their lives in the civil war that
lasted between 1994 and 2003. Moise Katumbi, a popular politician
and opposition member, is expected to run to replace Kabila.
The challenge to hold the vote in 2017 will also be enormous, given
that the electoral commission once said that it needed at least 17
months to complete registration processes and hold the elections.
Beyond the election, a new government and president will face the
task of addressing economic, humanitarian and political
instabilities that persist all across the country.
Only 7 percent of citizens in this African country [Swaziland] feel
free to join political organizations
Kim Yi Dionne, Afrobarometer Blog, Dec. 16, 2016
http://www.afrobarometer.org – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/hdk9rlc
“Afrobarometer measures citizens’ perceptions of freedom to assemble
by asking: “In this country, how free are you to join any political
organization you want?” Survey participants could answer completely
free, somewhat free, not very free or not at all free.
On average, across the 36 African countries where Afrobarometer
conducts its nationally representative public opinion surveys, a
majority (58 percent) reported that they feel “completely free” to
join any political organization they want.
But citizens’ perceptions of freedom to assemble varied across the
continent. While 85 percent of Senegalese felt completely free to
join political organizations, only 7 percent felt that same way in
Swaziland.
Why is Swaziland so far below its peers in Africa in protecting its
citizens’ freedom to assemble?
Plainly, Swaziland is not a democracy. It holds elections and has a
parliament, but real power is vested in the last absolute monarch in
Africa, King Mswati III. King Mswati III has ruled Swaziland since
1986, a couple of years after the death of his father, King Sobhuza
II.”
Brett L. Carter, “Congo President Denis Sassou Nguesso’s
embarrassing attempt to ingratiate himself to Donald Trump,” Jan 9,
2017
http://africasacountry.com – direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/jnthw78
Nic Cheeseman, “Africa’s real story of 2017 will be of close
elections and activists struggling to hold governments accountable,”
Jan 10, 2017
http://www.africanarguments.org – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/jtgt2tb
Sarah Brierley and George Ofosu, “What will Ghanaians expect from
their new president,” Afrobarometer blog, Jan 6, 2017
http://tinyurl.com/zxb5kfz
Jesse Weaver Shipley, “The market decides if we are free,” Africa is
a Country, Jan. 16, 2017
On President Nana Akufo-Addo’s inauguration speech in Ghana
http://tinyurl.com/hqz7msy
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