by James Thompson

As I drove through my working-class neighborhood, I spotted a political sign standing by itself. I did not see any other political signs in my neighborhood.

The sign read “Vote for the greater good, not the lesser evil.” It was a slogan of the Jill Stein campaign for president. This simple slogan was very inspiring.

In the chaos of the current political circus, the flaws of the system are thrust in every working person’s face. It is still unclear whether working people in the USA will be able to rise to the occasion and reject the arrogance and buffoonery of the Democratic and Republican parties.

On the one hand, we have a male chauvinist, misogynistic, xenophobic, anti-immigrant, pro-war billionaire. On the other hand, we have a mendacious, warmongering, anti-labor woman. These two leading candidates are a disgrace to the United States and the rest of the world. They are vying for the position of the President of the United States.

Some people have pointed out the paucity of political signs and/or bumper stickers in this current electoral cycle. These people have surmised that people are not exhibiting signs because they are ashamed to publicly support either candidate from the major political parties.

Working people need to remember that they do not have to vote for the lesser evil. There are third-party candidates, to include Jill Stein for president. Dr. Stein is a pro people, antiwar candidate and she stands in stark contrast to the two War Party candidates of the bourgeoisie.

We must accept the fact that the bourgeoisie are about to impose one of two possible fascists into the office of the President of the United States.

Since the CPUSA has deteriorated into a pathetic lapdog of the imperialistic Democratic Party, working people must find other ways of opposing impending fascism.

Working people can oppose the race to fascism by voting for Green Party candidates. A vote for the Green Party is a vote against imperialistic wars, international genocide, anti-communism and oppression of working people. A vote for the Green Party is a vote for universal healthcare, universal access to education, and housing for all.

There is no reason for progressives in the USA to vote for imperialism. There is every reason to vote against imperialism and for the Green Party. The future of humanity depends on the working class in the USA.

AfricaFocus Bulletin
October 26, 2016 (161026)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

Central Africa’s largest and most populous country, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), is bordered by nine countries: the
Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, South Sudan,
Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Angola. With the
exception of Zambia and Tanzania, none can claim to be a
consolidated competitive democracy. But most have at least managed
to hold presidential elections within the last two years. In
contrast, with this month’s postponement of the scheduled election
for 2016, the DRC has joined South Sudan and Angola in extending a
“no elections” scenario.

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/drc1610.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
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Few, if any, observers would venture to predict the next few months
and years, as domestic protest plus international criticism and
mediation has been met with state violence and continued stalling.
But the consensus view is “not good”; veteran commentator on central
Africa Colette Braeckman, for example, notes that “the milk has been
spilled” and warns that there is danger of “breaking the bottle” or
even “butchering the cow.”

This issue of AfricaFocus contains a diverse set of recent articles
and other links providing summaries, analyses, and background on the
current situation, without venturing into predictions or solutions.
Included below is an editorial from The Observer, the very short
commentary by Braeckman (in French), a report on a $413 million
bribery case judgement against the New York hedge firm Och-Ziff,
brief excerpts from an extensive Washington Post feature article on
“The cobalt pipeline: From dangerous tunnels in Congo to consumers’
mobile tech,” and a commentary from African Arguments raising the
question whether President Joseph Kabila can trust his security
forces.

Breaking News

Poll shows Kabila support at only 7.8%, October 25, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/jpzvg77

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/congokin.php

Other sources particularly worth following for updates and
commentary

http://reliefweb.int/country/cod

http://allafrica.com/congo_kinshasa/

http://congoresearchgroup.org/category/congo-siasa/

http://www.lemonde.fr/congo-rdc/

Additional links of related interest

UN Human Rights Report, October 21, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/hl7b8xr

Statement by European Union, October 17, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/jsho57n

MONUSCO statement to UN Security Council, October 11, 2016
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55266

Le Monde background on violence in September, September 21, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/j84nb46

Reviews of The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Hope and Despair,
by Michael Deibert. African Arguments, 2013.
http://tinyurl.com/zt4t2jm and http://tinyurl.com/j39mhj2

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

The Observer view on Congo and the failure of democracy in Africa

Observer editorial

The Democratic Republic of Congo is the latest country
disintegrating because a leader wants to hang on to power

22 October 2016

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree – Direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/hx8mrtk

Two decades ago, the Democratic Republic of Congo, sub-Saharan
Africa’s largest country, was engulfed in what became known as
Africa’s Great War, a conflict that drew in half-a-dozen
neighbouring countries and raged for five years from 1998.

The conflict and its aftermath cost the lives of an estimated 5.4
million people, mainly from starvation and disease. This epic
disaster was largely ignored outside Africa, even though it was the
developed world’s insatiable demand for the DRC’s mineral riches
that helped to fuel it.

The war was halted, in part, by the introduction of a new
constitution and a democratic system of governance, replacing
decades of Mobutu Sese Seko’s brutal dictatorship. In 2006 Joseph
Kabila was confirmed as DRC president by popular vote, although the
fairness of the election was widely disputed. In 2011 he was re-
elected. Again, the results were hotly contested. A key factor in
their acceptance was his pledge to honour the constitution and
refrain from seeking a third term.

The DRC’s next presidential election is due next month. It isn’t
going to happen. A court last week upheld a request by the election
commission that the poll be postponed, ostensibly because voter
rolls are incomplete. A “national dialogue” by the ruling coalition
and involving fringe parties and civic groups, but boycotted by the
main opposition and Catholic church, also agreed a delay until at
least April 2018. In effect, Kabila and his security force backers
have compromised the constitution and the judiciary and engineered a
silent coup. His solemn 2011 promise has been broken.

This shameless subversion of the democratic process (parliamentary
and provincial polls have also been put off) was condemned by the
main opposition party, the UDPS, as a “flagrant violation”.
Rassemblement (Gathering), the multi-party opposition organisation,
reacted with fury and called a general strike last Wednesday.
Kabila’s attempt to cling to power threatens the DRC’s hard-won and
still precarious stability. Worse, it risks a return to national and
regional upheaval, violence and war. At least this time the world is
paying more attention. Maman Sambo Sidikou, the senior UN official
in the country, warned the UN security council last week that
“large-scale violence is all but inevitable” if the impasse is not
resolved. “The tipping point could be reached very quickly.” After
related clashes in Kinshasa last month, in which at least 50 people
died, the US imposed limited sanctions on army generals implicated
in human rights abuses. On Monday EU foreign ministers also agreed
to pursue possible punitive measures.

Matters are not as clear cut as they might seem. Kabila denies he
wanted the delay. Analysts suggest the president, thrust into office
after his father was assassinated in 2001, is a frontman for the
security apparatus. The opposition is fragmented and its readiness
to resort to protests often leads to violence. Concerns over
stability by countries such as France and Belgium are not wholly
disinterested, commercially speaking. But that the leadership of
another African country appears ready to ride roughshod over
democracy and laws is clear. The DRC has never had a peaceful
transition of power since independence in 1960. This is why term
limits are so important. Last year the presidents of Burundi, Rwanda
and Congo-Brazzaville overrode constitutional requirements that they
step aside. In Burundi’s case, violence and displacement resulted.
In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni looks determined to go on for ever.
Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwean “presidency for life” and José Eduardo
dos Santos’s Angolan ascendancy provide further examples of endemic
disregard for democratic principles.

It would be a mistake to think Africans care less about self-
serving, corrupt and irresponsible politicians than Europeans or
Americans. The African Union has repeatedly stressed peaceful
political transitions in embedding democratic habits. Studies show
African voters value democratic systems but are increasingly
frustrated at their malfunctioning and wilful subversion.

Nigeria demonstrated last year how it could be done. But South
Africa, ruled since apartheid’s end by a single, overpowerful party,
is less of a shining light. Its reported decision to renounce the
International Criminal Court is another sign that too many African
politicians would rather jettison democratic and legal norms than
subject themselves to scrutiny and public judgment.

***********************************************************

Le Carnet de Colette Braeckman, Le Soir

Le lait est renversé

http://blog.lesoir.be/colette-braeckman/ – Direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/hrvsb8y

October 18, 2016

On le pressentait, c’est désormais confirmé: le lait est renversé.
Les élections n’auront pas lieu cette année, ni même l’an prochain.
Ce qui a manqué? L’argent peut-être, la préparation sérieuse sans
doute, mais surtout la volonté politique. Le pouvoir est à blâmer
car tout a été fait (ou pas fait … ) pour qu’il soit impossible
d’organiser le scrutin dans les délais constitutionnels et qu’un
‘rabiot’ de deux ans au moins soit accordé au président Kabila.

Le lait est renversé, car la population gronde, qu’en septembre déjà
le sang a coulé. Poussés dans la rue, des jeunes ont brûlé vifs deux
policiers et entamé des pillages. Appelés en renfort, des militaires
ont tiré à bout portant et fait, au moins 50 morts. Et demain, que
va-t-il se passer? Le dialogue qui vient de se conclure avec une
partie de l’opposition fera-t-il rentrer le lait dans la bouteille,
réussira-t-il à calmer les esprits, repartira-t-on comme si de rien
n’était ? Certainement pas: les délais sont inacceptables, les
signataires ne représentent pas la totalité de la classe politique
et même l’inclusion des absents ne garantira l’apaisement. Comment
croire que l’association d’Etienne Tshisekedi, qui, l’été dernier
encore, négociait pour son fils le poste de Premier Ministre et qui
fut depuis Mobutu l’homme de toutes les volte face, suffirait à
calmer le jeu ?

Ce qui est sûr, c’est que si le lait est renversé, la confiance
rompue, il faut aujourd’hui veiller à ne pas briser la bouteille. Et
surtout ne pas risquer de dépecer la vache elle-même, ce Congo si
convoité, qui n’a pas encore échappé aux risques d’implosion et de
rebellions diverses. Les progrès enregistrés depuis quinze ans sont
loin d’être irréversibles, les acquis peuvent encore être annulés,
par la révolte populaire sinon par la guerre.

La tâche du futur Premier Ministre s’apparentera à celle de Sisyphe:
auprès du président Kabila, il devra exiger un engagement clair,
avec une promesse de retrait assortie de dates précises, et surtout
il devra avoir les mains libres pour diriger en toute indépendance.
Ce qui supposerait, au minimum, que des technocrates sans allégeance
politique soient nommés aux postes clés: les finances, l’économie,
l’Intérieur, la banque nationale. Rétablir la confiance, c’est aussi
assécher les réseaux mafieux, redistribuer plus équitablement les
ressources, privilégier le ‘social’. Même au bord du précipice, il
n’est pas interdit de rêver.

***********************************************************

The Och-Ziff Files: Who are The Congolese Who Benefitted?

Congo Research Group | Groupe d’Etude Sur le Congo

September 30, 2016

http://congoresearchgroup.org/ – Direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/jopx7xg

This week, big news from the financial world. Och-Ziff, a leading
New York hedge fund that at its height managed $48 billion, has been
fined $413 million for over $100 million in bribes it paid to
government officials in Libya, Guinea, Chad, Niger, and the DR
Congo. Yes, that seems a paltry fine given the abuse involved and
how much it affected the countries involved––its CEO Daniel Och, who
is worth several billion dollars, will pay a mere $2.2 million, and
no one except a consultant will face jail time for now.

The story is huge for several reasons: It is a rare occasion the US
government is enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for
corruption in the Congo, and it is a huge blow to one of the
behemoths of the hedge fund world. It is also the first time, to my
knowledge, that we have a solid paper trail proving that the senior
Congolese officials, including the Congolese president himself, were
direct beneficiaries of over $100 million in bribes from foreign
companies.

As part of their deal with the US Justice Department, Och-Ziff
provided a public plea of guilt (aka “deferred prosecution
agreement.”) You can read it at http://tinyurl.com/je3lhmr (please,
read it). It include Hollywood-ready details of how Och-Ziff dealt
with Congolese officials. It features three protagonists: DRC
Partner, DRC Official 1 and DRC Official 2 and says they both
received millions in bribes from Och-Ziff. For reasons that will
become obvious, you can substitute those names with Dan Gertler,
Joseph Kabila, and Katumba Mwanke.

Here’s an example of the detail of the document. In 2008, when Dan
Gertler was trying to wrest control of a mining concession from
Africo, a Canadian firm, one of Gertler’s associates texted him:

Hi [DRC Partner], … im with the main lawyer … in the Africo
story, he has to arrange with supreme court, attorney gemal [sic]
and magistrates, he wants 500 to give to all the officials and 600
for 3 lawyers cabinets that worked on the file in defense[lawyer]and
batonnier [lawyer]. the converstaion is vey tough. (while talking I
said to ask money to [one of the Akam shareholders], [the Akam
shareholder]said he cant because most of the money has to go to
·[DRC Official 2] . . . i dont know if he wants to provoke me or it
was something [the Akam shareholder]invented …) but they are now
at 1. 1 in total.

He’s talking about about thousands of dollars.

Shortly afterward, Gertler responds: “We can’t ‘accept a mid result
… Africo must be screwd and finished totally!!!!”

All in all, the legal document says that Gertler transferred $23.5
million of Och-Ziff’s money to Katumba Mwanke between 2008 and 2012,
and $10.75 million to a person who is most likely Joseph Kabila.
Bloomberg reported that Gertler (“DRC Partner”) paid a total of over
$100 million in bribes to Congolese officials.

How do I know that those are the people involved?

Bloomberg’s article clearly identifies Gertler through other sources
familiar with the case, and the document itself is fairly clear: “an
Israeli businessman [with] significant interests in the diamond and
mineral mining industries in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

It says that “DRC Official 2,” was “a senior official in the DRC and
close advisor to DRC Official 1. Since at least 2004, DRC Official 2
was an Ambassador-at-Large for the DRC government and also a
national parliamentarian.” It goes on to say, citing an Och-Ziff
employee, that he was Gertler’s “guy in the DRC.” Finally, it says
he died on February 12, 2012. There is no doubt that is Katumba
Mwanke.

As for DRC Official 1, it says that Katumba was his closest aide and
advisor. When Katumba died, Gertler sent a text message to an Och-
Ziff employee saying: “I’m fine … sad but fine … I will have to
help [DRC Official 1] much more now … tomorrow the burial will
take· place.” Again, I cannot imagine that being anyone but
Kabila––Katumba was not an aide to anyone else in the Congolese
government during this time. In private, US government officials
have confirmed this to me.

***********************************************************

The cobalt pipeline: From dangerous tunnels in Congo to consumers’
mobile tech

By Todd C. Frankel

The Washington Post

September 30, 2016

Direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/zo63cws

The sun was rising over one of the richest mineral deposits on
Earth, in one of the poorest countries, as Sidiki Mayamba got ready
for work.

Mayamba is a cobalt miner. And the red-dirt savanna stretching
outside his door contains such an astonishing wealth of cobalt and
other minerals that a geologist once described it as a “scandale
geologique.”

This remote landscape in southern Africa lies at the heart of the
world’s mad scramble for cheap cobalt, a mineral essential to the
rechargeable lithium-ion batteries that power smartphones, laptops
and electric vehicles made by companies such as Apple, Samsung and
major automakers.

But Mayamba, 35, knew nothing about his role in this sprawling
global supply chain. He grabbed his metal shovel and broken-headed
hammer from a corner of the room he shares with his wife and child.
He pulled on a dust-stained jacket. A proud man, he likes to wear a
button-down shirt even to mine. And he planned to mine by hand all
day and through the night. He would nap in the underground tunnels.
No industrial tools. Not even a hard hat. The risk of a cave-in is
constant.

“Do you have enough money to buy flour today?” he asked his wife.

She did. But now a debt collector stood at the door. The family owed
money for salt. Flour would have to wait.

Mayamba tried to reassure his wife. He said goodbye to his son. Then
he slung his shovel over his shoulder. It was time.

The world’s soaring demand for cobalt is at times met by workers,
including children, who labor in harsh and dangerous conditions. An
estimated 100,000 cobalt miners in Congo use hand tools to dig
hundreds of feet underground with little oversight and few safety
measures, according to workers, government officials and evidence
found by The Washington Post during visits to remote mines. Deaths
and injuries are common. And the mining activity exposes local
communities to levels of toxic metals that appear to be linked to
ailments that include breathing problems and birth defects, health
officials say.

The Post traced this cobalt pipeline and, for the first time, showed
how cobalt mined in these harsh conditions ends up in popular
consumer products. It moves from small-scale Congolese mines to a
single Chinese company — Congo DongFang International Mining, part
of one of the world’s biggest cobalt producers, Zhejiang Huayou
Cobalt — that for years has supplied some of the world’s largest
battery makers. They, in turn, have produced the batteries found
inside products such as Apple’s iPhones — a finding that calls into
question corporate assertions that they are capable of monitoring
their supply chains for human rights abuses or child labor.

[For continuation of this feature story: http://tinyurl.com/zo63cws]

**************************************************************

DR Congo in crisis: Can Kabila trust his own army?

September 20, 2016 by James Barnett

African Arguments

http://africanarguments.org – Direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/jopdtcy

James Barnett is currently a Boren Scholar in Tanzania, having
previously researched at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at
the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. You can follow
him on Twitter @jbar1648. All views expressed are his own.

Despite protests intensifying with outbreaks of violence and deaths,
President Joseph Kabila has yet to call on his armed forces to
maintain order. He might regret it if he did.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is in the midst of a
protracted political crisis as President Joseph Kabila manoeuvres to
stay in power past the end of his second term, which expires this
December.

Kabila’s undemocratic machinations – most notably le glissement
(‘slippage’) or delaying of elections due to “logistical” issues –
have drawn the ire of much of the population with frequent protests
and strikes rocking the country since early 2015.

Yesterday, these reached a new pitch as protesters took to the
streets, angry at Kabila’s recent efforts to promote a “national
dialogue” – a move the opposition sees as a cynical ploy to
legitimise le glissement. In Kinshasa and Goma, violence erupted as
heavily armed police confronted protesters, leading to the deaths of
at least 17 according to the government and more than 50 according
to the opposition. Four people also reportedly died when the
headquarters of three different opposition parties were burnt down
in the night.

With further protests sure to follow and the possibility of
continued violence looming large, it is worth asking why Kabila has
yet to deploy the military. The answer lies in a deep history of
mistrust.

Preferred instruments of intimidation

The DRC is among the most heavily militarised states in Africa, with
its 70,000-strong Congolese armed forces (FARDC) deployed within the
country to combat various low-intensity threats. However, thus far
it has not been the army that Kabila has called upon on to “restore
public order” but the national police (PNC), the civilian
intelligence service (ANR), and, most notably, the Republican Guard
– Kabila’s personal security outfit.

According to an October 2015 report by the UN’s Joint Human Rights
Office, there were 142 human rights violations against members of
the political opposition that year. Tellingly, 69 of these were
carried out by the PNC, 24 by the ANR, and just 9 by FARDC. The
actual number of FARDC violations is lower, however, as the report
fails to note that the Republican Guard operates outside the army’s
chain of command.

Since he came to office in 2001, Kabila has steadily built up
civilian security forces, over which he exercises direct control, at
the expense of FARDC, the loyalty and effectiveness of which are in
doubt.

He has built the PNC into a veritable paramilitary force, most
notably in the capital city and opposition stronghold of Kinshasa
where the police chief, Kabila’s longtime ally Celestin Kanyama, has
earned the moniker espirit de mort (‘spirit of death’). He has
managed to effectively purchase the ANR’s loyalty, which has its
roots in the intelligence agencies of Mobutu Sese Seko’s rule
(1965-97).

And, most crucially to the survival of his regime, Kabila has
buttressed his presidency with a disproportionately formidable
Republican Guard. Nominally a simple presidential security outfit,
the Republican Guard enjoys full-division strength and receives
superior weapons and training than FARDC. The unit’s top officers
hail from the president’s home state of Katanga, an obvious ploy to
ensure the unit’s loyalty.

The existence of a disproportionately sized and financed
presidential guard is generally considered to be indicative of a
weak security sector and poor governance, and Kabila’s Republican
Guard is no exception.

FARDC’s patronage politics

The Congolese military took its current name and structure in 2002
in the midst of the Second Congo War. As part of the Sun City
Agreement, which sought to end the conflict through a power-sharing
arrangement, the largest rebel groups were incorporated into the
armed forces, including the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma, the Ugandan-
backed RCD-Kinsangani and MLC groups, and various Mayi-Mayi ethno-
nationalist militias. In 2009 the CNDP, a formidable rebel group
formed to defend Congolese Tutsis, joined FARDC’s ranks as well.

FARDC thus acts as an instrument of political patronage to co-opt
rivals more than as a fighting force to provide security. By one
estimate, 65% of the FARDC are officers, 26% of whom are high-
ranking, creating an absurdly top-heavy organisation that begets
unnecessary bureaucracy and promotes impunity.

Combined with poor training, low pay, a critical lack of espirit de
corps, and a culture of corruption and politicisation that dates
back to independence – the Congolese military has attempted nine
coups since 1960 – the result is one of the least professional
armies in Africa.

Furthermore, despite pledging loyalty to the president, former
rebels brought into FARDC have frequently maintained separate chains
of command. The danger of this arrangement came to a head in April
2012, when former CNDP rebels defected en masse and took up arms
against the government, calling themselves the M23 movement.

With the help of the Force Intervention Brigade – the first UN
peacekeeping force in history with a strong offensive mandate –
FARDC eventually defeated the rebels in October 2013, but the
counterinsurgency highlighted strong turf wars within FARDC which
frequently hampered operational effectiveness.

Speculation remains that one of the FARDC’s most competent officers,
Col. Mamadou Ndala, was assassinated by rival commanders during the
counterinsurgency, highlighting the mistrust that permeates FARDC’s
ranks.

Wary of another rebellion, Kabila ordered a significant reshuffle of
FARDC in October 2014. The reshuffle is unlikely, however, to have
significantly tightened the president’s grip on the fractious
military. Many of those who benefited from the reshuffle were former
rebel commanders who had remained loyal to FARDC during the M23
rebellion. But these commanders sided with government not because
they felt any strong allegiance to Kabila, but rather because the
M23’s grievances were very specific to former CNDP combatants.

In the reshuffle, some of Kabila’s fellow Katangans also secured top
commands. Such moves exacerbate the debilitating patronage which
lies at the core of FARDC’s institutional weakness. Members of the
Republican Guard reportedly even threatened to stage a coup out of
disapproval of their new commander, forcing the president to hastily
reassign the general in question.

Who can restore order?

This week’s events suggest that Kabila will not be able to maintain
the status quo through half-hearted “dialogue”. This being the case,
we can expect the opposition to seek to resolve matters on the
streets through protests of a more frequent, widespread, and violent
nature than the country has heretofore experienced.

Regardless of whether Kabila can fully trust the Republican Guard
(and history from Caligula to Kabila’s late father teaches us not to
depend too heavily on bodyguards), the force would be too small to
confront a nationwide crisis, even with support from the police and
ANR. Indeed, reports indicate that in the latest round of clashes,
protestors managed to overwhelm police barricades, killing two
officers.

Kabila may thus be left with little choice but to call on the armed
forces. Such a deployment is liable to make matters worse for
everyone. Given the abysmal record of human rights abuses by FARDC
in the eastern Congo, such a deployment would almost inevitably lead
to wanton bloodshed. Given the fractious state of the Congolese
military, it could also backfire on Kabila’s regime itself.

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
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AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
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AfricaFocus Bulletin
October 18, 2016 (161018)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“Ghana is in a debt crisis. Despite having had significant amounts
of debt canceled a decade ago, the country is losing around 30% of
government revenue in external debt payments each year. Such huge
payments are only possible because Ghana has been able to take on
more loans from institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), which are used to pay the interest on debts to previous
lenders, whilst the overall size of the debt increases. ”

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/gh1610.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=
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The downward spiral of debt, whether for individuals or for
countries, is commonly driven by loans that are risky and
unrealistic, a phenomenon for which both lenders and borrowers bear
responsibility. Structural vulnerability and misleading expectations
fuel a cycle in which interest payments increase the debt while
payments become increasingly difficult. A new report from the
Jubilee Debt Campaign, UK, with a coalition of non-governmental
organizations in Ghana, provides a clear illustration from a country
that is in many other respects a positive model for African
political and economic progress.

Nevertheless, the report documents, Ghana is again falling into a
debt trap. The causes include 1) continued dependence on primary
commodities with volatile pricing on international markets and (2)
bad judgement by both the Ghanaian government and by international
lenders pitching high-interest loans which can only be paid under
optimistic and unrealistic economic scenarios for the period of the
loan. For example, according to the report, there were three
successive $1 billion bond issues from 2013 to 2015, the latest at
an interest rate of 10.75%. Strikingly, the World Bank provided a
guarantee for the latest bond despite its own rules blocking such
risky loans.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin includes selected excerpts from the press
release, executive summary, and full report. The full report is
available at  http://tinyurl.com/zb8rm7u

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Ghana, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/ghana.php

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on debt and related issues of
international capital flows, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/intro-iff.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

“World Bank broke its own rules over high-interest loans to Ghana,”
Excerpt from Jubilee Debt Campaign, UK, press release, October 9,
2016

http://tinyurl.com/hcgx8mg

According to Sarah-Jayne Clifton, Director of the Jubilee Debt
Campaign, UK:

“The underlying causes of Ghana’s new debt crisis are that neither
borrowers nor lenders have learned from past mistakes, and that its
economy remains reliant on primary commodities, leaving it extremely
vulnerable to the recent global commodity price crash. The people of
Ghana should not have to suffer through yet another debt crisis
while lenders who speculated on their economy reap huge profits out
of high interest loans guaranteed by the World Bank.

Ghana’s debts need to be reduced or restructured to escape another
prolonged debt trap, while regulation of lending, more responsible
borrowing, and tax justice are essential to end this cycle of debt
crises once and for all.”

******************************************************

The fall and rise of Ghana’s debt : How a new debt trap has been set

October 2016

Integrated Social Development Centre Ghana, Jubilee Debt Campaign
UK, SEND Ghana, VAZOBA Ghana, All-Afrikan Networking Community Link
for International Development, Kilombo Ghana and Abibimman
Foundation Ghana.

[Full report and executive summary available for download at
http://jubileedebt.org.uk – direct URL:  http://tinyurl.com/zb8rm7u]

Executive Summary [excerpts]

Ghana is in a debt crisis. Despite having had significant amounts of
debt canceled a decade ago, the country is losing around 30% of
government revenue in external debt payments each year. Such huge
payments are only possible because Ghana has been able to take on
more loans from institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), which are used to pay the interest on debts to previous
lenders, whilst the overall size of the debt increases.

Ghana’s crisis is the result of a gradual increase in lending and
borrowing off the back of the discovery of oil and high commodity
prices. More money was then borrowed following the fall in the
price of oil and other commodities since 2013, to try to deal with
the impact of the commodity price crash, whilst the relative size
of the debt also grew because of the fall in the value of the
Ghanaian currency (the cedi) against the dollar ($).

The underlying causes of the return to a debt crisis are therefore
the continued dependence on commodity exports, as well as borrowing
and lending not being responsible enough, meaning that new debts do
not generate sufficient revenue to enable them to be repaid.

At the moment, all the costs of the crisis are being born by the
people of Ghana, and none by the lenders. This is unfair. Lenders
should carry their share of the cost of any irresponsible lending,
and of the change in circumstance caused by the fall in commodity
prices.

Additional action is also needed in order to prevent a repeat of
Ghana’s crisis, including changes on the part of the government and
lenders to ensure that loans are well used, and that more of the
revenue generated by the economy is turned into government revenue
by taxation.

Commodity dependence

Ghana’s dependence on commodities dates back to colonialism. …
[almost 60 years after independence] the country’s economy remains
dependent on the export of just three primary commodities – gold,
cocoa and now oil, which together make up over 80% of Ghana’s
exports.

Debt crisis and debt cancellation

This dependence on commodities was the central factor underlying a
debt crisis which was common to much of the global South in the
1980s and 1990s. Global commodity prices fell at the start of the
1980s, rapidly increasing the size of foreign debt payments which
could only be paid out of foreign earnings such as exports. As
commodity producers across the world expanded production in order
to pay debts, on the advice of the IMF and World Bank, commodity
prices stayed low for over 20 years.

From the mid-1990s the global Jubilee movement called for debt
cancellation, which led to the creation and enhancement of two debt
relief schemes run by the IMF and World Bank, the Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative.

As a result of this debt cancellation, Ghana’s government external
debt fell from $6.6 billion in 2003 to $2.3 billion in 2006.
Significant improvements in education and healthcare followed, due
to money being saved and invested, alongside good government
policies, enhancing basic service provision. …

Commodity and lending boom, and manufacturing decline

However, Ghana’s dependence on commodities continued, and as prices
rose, this created more willingness for lenders to give loans off
the back of a growing economy.

Gold and cocoa prices began to increase from the mid- 2000s, as part
of a global boom in primary commodity prices heavily influenced by
Chinese growth and demand, on top of continued high consumption in
rich North American, European and Asian economies. Furthermore,
Ghana discovered oil, and began to produce and export it from 2011.
Collectively these changes led to a booming economy. Between 2006
and 2013 Ghana’s GDP per person grew by 44%. However, over the same
time period the number of people living below the national poverty
line only fell by 10%, a slower rate than in the previous seven
years when growth had been far lower. The reason was that much of
the proceeds of growth went to those with the highest incomes. For
every 1 cedi increase in income for the poorest 10%, the incomes of
the richest 10% increased by more than 9 cedi.

This rapid economic growth led to an increased willingness and
desire of various institutions to lend to Ghana, with a
corresponding willingness to borrow. Loans increased steadily from
2008 to 2011. In total, between 2007 and 2015 there were $18.2
billion of external loans and $8.7 billion of debt payments,
leaving $9.5 billion of the additional borrowing to be spent within
Ghana.

There is little transparency on what the loans were used for, from
both the government and lenders. The IMF figures on public capital
formation show no relationship with the increase in lending,
suggesting that whilst some loans could have been used for
investment, the increase in lending did not lead to an increase in
investment.

One of the more transparent lenders is the World Bank. Whilst they
provide little information before loans are agreed – preventing
civil society, media and politicians from holding the government
and the World Bank to account – they do publish details during and
after projects. Our analysis of these reports shows that 25% of
outstanding debt from Ghana to the World Bank is for projects where
the World Bank judged its own performance to be less than
satisfactory.

Moreover, between May 2007 and February 2015 Ghana was assessed by
the IMF and World Bank to be at moderate risk of debt distress, and
since March 2015 of high risk. The World Bank is only meant to give
half its support to moderate-risk countries as loans, and the other
half as grants; to high-risk countries it is only meant to make
grants. Yet between May 2007 and February 2015, 93% of World Bank
funding to Ghana was in the form of loans. And since March 2015
when the World Bank was meant to stop giving Ghana loans, it has
agreed $1.16 billion of new loans or loan guarantees.

With high commodity prices and the beginning of oil production,
export revenues increased rapidly from 2008 to 2012. Yet there is
evidence that manufacturing was crowded out. As a share of GDP,
manufacturing production halved from over 10% in 2006 to 5% by
2014.

Commodity price crash and the new debt trap

A combination of the recent fall in the price of commodities and the
loans not being used well enough to ensure they could be repaid has
now pushed Ghana back into debt crisis.

In early 2013 the price of gold fell significantly, as did the price
of oil from the start of 2014. Since the start of 2013 the value of
the cedi against the dollar has fallen by 50%. This has caused the
dollar-denominated size of Ghana’s economy to fall from $47.8
billion in 2013 to $36 billion in 2015.  Because external debts are
owed in dollars or other foreign currencies, this has in turn
increased the relative size of the debt and debt payments. External
debt has grown from $14.7 billion in 2013 to $21.1 billion in 2016
(an increase of 44%), yet because of the depreciation external debt
has gone up from 30% of GDP in 2013 to an expected 56% in 2016 (an
increase of 87%). One response to these economic shocks has been
for the government to borrow more money, most visibly through $1
billion of bond issues each in 2013, 2014 and 2015, all under
English law. This money has mainly been used to make external and
domestic debt interest and principal payments, and to fund ongoing
government costs, plugging the gap created by dollar revenue being
lower than expected. Less visibly, there has also been significant
borrowing directly from external financial institutions.

The interest rates on the new debts are high, rising from 7.9% for
the 2013 bond issue to 10.75% for the October 2015 one. For the
October 2015 bond issue, the World Bank once again broke its own
rules by guaranteeing $400 million of payments if the Ghanaian
government fails to make them. The World Bank is not meant to give
such guarantees for governments assessed as at high risk of debt
distress, which Ghana had been for the previous seven months. The
high interest rate and guarantee mean that if the Ghanaian
government were to pay the interest every year until 2024, then
default on all other payments from 2025, including the principal,
the bond speculators would still have made $90 million more than if
they had lent to the US government. This means that the speculators
lent to Ghana believing that there was a high chance they would not
be fully repaid.

However, for the moment those speculators are being paid, in part
because since April 2015 the IMF has been lending more money which
is being used to meet debt payments, effectively bailing out
previous lenders. In return, the Ghanaian government has to cut
government spending and increase taxes, a process which is expected
to intensify further after the December 2016 elections. Under
current plans, government spending per person (adjusted to account
for inflation) will fall by 20% between 2012 and 2017.

The IMF estimates the Ghanaian government’s external debt payments
in 2016 will be 29% of revenue, well above the 18-22% it normally
regards as the upper limit of sustainability. Payments are expected
to stay well above 20% of revenue until at least 2035. This is only
considered possible due to a combination of very optimistic
expectations and requirements for large spending cuts and tax
increases, the very things the IMF has been criticising the
European Union for in the case of Greece.

The IMF predicts:

* Dollar GDP growth averaging 8.2% a year from now until 2035. Yet,
from 2008 to 2015 Ghana’s economy grew at less than half this rate
despite the discovery of oil. * Growth in government revenue in
line with GDP, collecting 19-21% a year. Yet, Ghana has only once
collected 19% of GDP in government revenue in a year (in 2011)
since IMF records began in 1980. …

* A fall in the average interest rate paid on external debt from
5.1% to 4.1%. Yet, interest rates on external private and
multilateral debt have been increasing, and dollar interest rates
are expected to increase as and when the US Federal Reserve
continues to raise rates. * A large primary budget surplus by 2017,
and continuing surpluses from then on. Yet, this will mean
continuing government spending cuts and tax increases, and will
take demand out of the economy, thereby reducing growth and risking
a classic debt trap where austerity leads to less growth, which in
turn increases the relative size of the debt, which leads to more
austerity and less growth, and so on.

Escapes from the trap

Debt is already placing a significant burden on Ghana’s economy and
society, and the country is at risk of falling back into an
extended debt trap, with an economic stagnation and possible
increases in poverty rates and failure to implement the Sustainable
Development Goals. Today’s crisis has resulted from a multitude of
factors: failure to diversify away from commodities, the government
and lenders failing to ensure loans were used productively enough,
falling global commodity prices, particularly gold and oil, and the
opportunism of speculators lending at high interest rates seeking
large profits.

The people of Ghana should not have to bear all the suffering of a
crisis caused by government policy, irresponsible lenders, and
global economic shocks, especially when speculators continue to
extract large profits from the country.

…

Additional excerpts from full report

Slowing progress in reducing poverty and increased inequality

During the ‘boom’ up until 2013, progress in reducing poverty slowed
down, and inequality increased.

The most recent data on poverty and inequality in Ghana comes from
the Ghana Living Standards Survey in 2013. This shows that the
number of people living in poverty fell from 7 million in 2006 to
6.3 million in 2013. The proportion of people living in poverty
fell from 31.9% to 24.2%. Poverty is defined as not having enough
income to meet all basic food and non-food needs, and was set at
1,314 cedi per adult per year for 2013 ($1,460 a year in Purchasing
Power Parity terms, 32 or $4 a day). According to a report for
Unicef, this means the average annual rate of poverty reduction
slowed to 1.1 percentage points a year from 2006 to 2013, down from
1.8 percentage points in the 1990s.

In total, the number of people living in poverty fell by 10% between
2006 and 2013. In contrast, over the same time period GDP per
person grew by 44%. In the previous seven-year period from 1999 to
2006, the number of people living in poverty fell by 14% whilst the
economy only grew by 18%. There has been an increasing divergence
between the pace of economic growth and the pace of poverty
reduction.

This divergence is because more of the financial benefits of growth
have been going to richer people. Average adult consumption for
Ghana’s richest 10% increased by 1,246 cedi between 2006 and 2013,
almost ten times more than the increase of 135 cedi for the poorest
10%. The ‘richest’ 10% is still a relative term however – the
average income of the richest 10% in 2013 of 5,789 cedi a year was
equivalent to $6,500 in Purchasing Power Parity terms. Within the
richest 10% there are still huge disparities in income and wealth.
Overall, inequality has been increasing on almost all measures (see
Table 1 below).

…

The New Debt Trap

Ghana is now at risk of entering an extended debt trap in which
government spending continues to fall with negative impacts on
poverty, inequality and economic growth, while debt stays high.
Meanwhile, high interest rates on private loans mean speculators
continue to take large profits out of the country.

The fall in oil prices from the middle of 2014 led to significant
falls in expectations of government revenue collection in Ghana, on
the part of the government, foreign speculators and the IMF. This
in turn led to sharp falls in the value of the cedi against the
dollar, thus increasing the relative size of debt payments.

Meanwhile, external debt payments began to increase from 2012 as
interest payments needed to be made on the recently taken out
private external debt, whilst interest and principal payments on
the multilateral and bilateral loans increased because of the
increase in such debts, and because grace periods 80 on loans given
after HIPC and MDRI came to an end (see Graph 14 below).

Initially these increased debt payments were met by more borrowing
of both external and domestic debt. In addition, in April 2015, an
agreement was reached with the IMF for $930 million of loans from
2015 to 2018, all of which are effectively being used to help meet
debt  payments, including the interest to private speculators.
These have been added to by other similar loans from the World Bank
and African Development Bank.

…

Projections beyond 2017.

The IMF is only able to predict that Ghana will be able to keep
paying its debt by making very optimistic predictions about the
future.

The IMF and World Bank DSA projects that external debt service will
continue to stay high for many years, still being almost one-
quarter of government revenue in 2035. However, it also projects
that overall external debt and total public debt will gradually
fall as a percentage of GDP. This assumes that growth in GDP
measured in dollars is high, averaging over 8% in nominal terms. It
also assumes there is a primary surplus every year, from a height
of 2.3% of GDP in 2017 to 0.9% by 2025 and 0.1% in 2035.

However, the predictions for dollar-GDP growth in the DSA have
already proven over-optimistic compared to the more recent April
IMF World Economic Outlook for 2016 and 2017, which, as noted
above, indicates that external debt will continue to rise.

The only way the IMF can predict Ghana’s debt will keep being paid
is by assuming:

* high growth in dollar GDP, averaging 8.2% a year

* the government collecting around 19-21% of GDP in revenue every
year, ie, revenue growing in line with GDP

* a fall in the average interest rate paid on external debt from
5.1% to 4.1% over the medium term

* a large primary surplus by 2017 of 2.3%, and continual surpluses
after, albeit at a falling proportion of GDP

Any significant failure in these assumptions could cause debt to
increase further out of control, ultimately costing the people of
Ghana more if it continues to be paid. Yet all of these assumptions
are either optimistic or require significant sacrifices.

…

Escapes from the debt trap

Urgent action is needed to ensure Ghana does not fall into a debt
trap in which government spending continues to fall with negative
impacts for poverty, inequality and economic growth, while debt
stays high.

To avoid this trap debt payments need to be cut. At the moment, all
the costs from irresponsible lending and borrowing, and the decline
in oil and other commodity prices, are falling on the people of
Ghana, and none of them on the lenders. Below we make
recommendations on how the debt trap can be avoided through lenders
sharing in the burden of failed lending and the external economic
shock of falling commodity prices.

In addition, to prevent this trap being created again, there needs
to be greater transparency and accountability in relation to debt
on the part of the government of Ghana and lenders, tax justice to
ensure that more of the revenue generated in Ghana stays in the
country and is available for social spending and public investment,
and a reorientation of the Ghanaian economy away from reliance on
primary commodities.

Below are proposals which we believe the government, political
parties and lenders should discuss with civil society both before
and after the elections in December 2016.

Conduct a debt audit

In this report we have attempted to identify how much debt there is,
who the loans were given by, what they were for and on what terms.
However, the lack of transparency with many loans means this is
difficult to do and much information is not publicly available.
Both the government and all lenders should release details of how
much is owed, to whom, on what terms, and what the money was meant
to be used for (if specified). This could be done through
establishing an independent debt audit commission.

…

Make lending and borrowing more productive and accountable

Ghana’s debt has increased rapidly without it being clear what the
loans were for, and how projects they were funding were being
monitored and evaluated.

…

Make adjustment fair

Any reduction in debt payments from measures below will help prevent
Ghana getting further stuck in a debt trap. But government finances
will still need to be improved to ensure sustainable finances which
allow poverty and inequality to be reduced and the Sustainable
Development Goals to be met.

The Ghanaian government should:

* Protect all vital public spending, such as on healthcare and
education, social services and welfare protections, and key
economic infrastructure.

* Increase tax revenues from large companies and rich individuals,
including by ceasing to grant tax waivers, including for public-
private partnership projects, and increasing the capacity of tax
collection authorities to ensure existing laws relating to issues
such as transfer mispricing are implemented.

…

Hold a debt conference

The change in oil price means that Ghana cannot make debt payments
wthout significant cuts in vital government expenditure, high
economic growth and continued high borrowing. It is unfair for the
suffering caused by the change in global economic conditions to be
born entirely by the people of Ghana and none by the lenders.

The Ghanaian government could call a conference of all its creditors
to negotiate the debt down to a level consistent with meeting the
Sustainable Development Goals. A UN body such as UNCTAD could be
contracted to advise on what a sustainable level of debt would be.
Negotiations have been held between the government and local banks
and some power sector debts, 98 but a much more comprehensive
approach is now needed across external debt.

…

Default or threaten to default on some of the debt

The Ghanaian government could stop paying some or all of the debt.
For most if not all creditors, it is the threat (or reality) of not
paying which will incentivise them to renegotiate the terms of the
debt. For instance, if some lenders did not respond to requests for
a debt conference, threatening to default or defaulting could make
them more willing to do so. Defaults on different types of debt
come with different implications which we discuss below.

…

Cancel unjust debts

The details of many loans are unknown, so no assessment can yet be
made of how well the money was spent and how responsibly the
lenders acted to ensure it was invested well. However, this report
has uncovered that the World Bank broke its own rules by disbursing
93% of its money to Ghana as loans when it should have been giving
half grants and half loans. Furthermore, at least $540 million of
debt owed to the World Bank is for projects where the World Bank
itself has said its performance was less than satisfactory (25% of
debt where there is an assessment).

…

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
write to this address to subscribe or unsubscribe to the bulletin,
or to suggest material for inclusion. For more information about
reposted material, please contact directly the original source
mentioned. For a full archive and other resources, see
http://www.africafocus.org

AfricaFocus Bulletin
October 11, 2016 (161011)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“The high proportion of immigrants with criminal records who are
targeted for immigration enforcement is the result of an intentional
and pervasive reliance on the machinery of the criminal enforcement
system to identify people for deportation. The criminal enforcement
system–each stage of which has been shown to target Black people
disproportionately–has become a funnel into the immigration
detention and deportation system. ” – The State of Black Immigrants
2016

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/migr1610.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=
http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/migr1610.php

A report from the Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI) and
the Immigrant Rights Clinic, New York University School of Law,
released in September, provides new well-documented data and policy
analysis on Black immigrants in the United States, primarily
Caribbean and African immigrants. Based on the latest available
statistical data and a careful analysis of migration policies and
their implementation, this report is a basic resource for scholars
and for activists. It includes an informative and detailed glossary
that is essential for those of us who are not specialists in
immigration law and related issues.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains brief excerpts. The full report,
including footnotes, tables, and more detailed analysis and specific
policy recommendations, is available in two parts on-line in pdf
format (http://tinyurl.com/jvaqolo and http://tinyurl.com/jzg9d97).

Two recent articles with related reflections on African immigrants
in the United States are:

“Intersecting Criminalization: What Killed Ugandan Refugee Alfred
Olango,” Michelle Chen, Truthout, October 6, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/h3y6vhg

“African immigrants and race in America,” Anakwa Dwamena, Africa is
a Country, October 9, 2016 http://tinyurl.com/j2z2wvj

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on migration issues, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/migrexp.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

The State of Black Immigrants

Black Alliance for Just Immigration

Immigrant Rights Clinic, New York University School of Law

Juliana Morgan-Trostle, Kexin Zheng, and Carl Lipscombe

[Brief excerpts only: full text available at
http://tinyurl.com/jvaqolo (Part I) and http://tinyurl.com/jzg9d97
(Part II)]

Introduction

In an era where #BlackLivesMatter and #Not1More have become rallying
cries for racial justice and immigrants’ rights activists
respectively, it’s important that we uplift the common challenges
that cross both movements – mass incarceration, policing, immigrant
detention, deportations, deprivation of civil rights and civil
liberties, economic inequality, and the destruction of families and
communities. These problems are prevalent in all communities of
color in the U.S. But unlike Black Americans and immigrants of other
backgrounds, Black immigrants face the aforementioned challenges in
ways that are unique and consequential.

For over a decade, the Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI)
has sought to raise the public consciousness around issues impacting
Black immigrants through education, advocacy, grassroots organizing,
and storytelling. Despite our successes, which include consolidating
Black immigrant power and mobilizing the Black diaspora around the
human rights issues that transcend our communities, Black Americans
and Black immigrants remain at the margins of society.

When it comes to Black immigrants, terms such as “marginalization”
and “oppression” understate the difficulties faced by this
community. Simply put, Black immigrants are invisible. They are
absent from the mainstream and media representation of immigrants.
Their narratives are merged with the stories of other communities of
color in the United States. Research and readily available data on
Black immigrants is scant.

Even the notion of “Black immigrants” as an identity group is
foreign to most. For this reason, we recognized that any research
report about Black immigrants – and this report in particular – must
serve two purposes: (1) to provide basic demographic information
about Black immigrants and (2) to highlight the unique social and
economic challenges facing this immigrant group.

This report confirms our hypothesis: Black immigrants, one of the
fastest growing demographic groups in the U.S., face a myriad of
challenges that parallel those of Black Americans. While this report
is substantive, it is only the beginning. Our hope is that we will
be able to build on the body of research available on the Black
immigrant experience in the U.S. and that this report, in particular
the recommendations toward the end, will lay the groundwork for a
Black immigrant policy agenda over the coming years.

**************************************************************

Part I: A Statistical Portrait of Black Immigrants in the United
States

The last four decades have represented a period of significant
demographic change in the United States. Now more than ever, Black
immigrants compose a significant percentage of both immigrant and
Black populations in the U.S. overall. This report presents a
statistical snapshot of the Black immigrant population, drawing upon
recent studies and original analysis.

I. Size and Growth of Black Immigrant Population

Size and growth of the overall population.

The number of Black immigrants in the United States has increased
remarkably in recent decades. Population data on Black immigrants is
difficult to ascertain, as the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services does not track immigration data by race. Some studies
suggest that there are as many as 5 million Black immigrants in the
U.S. According to our analysis of the 2014 American Community Survey
(ACS) data, a record estimate of 3.7 million Black immigrants live
in the United States. While this analysis is conservative, it still
represents a four-fold increase when compared to the number of Black
immigrants who lived in the U.S. in 1980 (which was only about
800,000) and a 54% increase from 2000 (roughly 2.8 million).

Percentage of Black population.

The overall growth of the Black immigrant population represents a
significant change in the demographics of both the Black population
and the immigrant population more broadly in the United States.
First, Black immigrants represent an increasing percentage of Black
people in the United States as a whole. The ACS data shows that
while Black immigrants accounted for only 3.1% of the Black
population in the U.S. in 1980, Black immigrants now account for
nearly 10% of the nation’s Black population. This growth is
particularly significant in states with the largest number of Black
immigrants. For example in New York, Black immigrants make up almost
30% of the total Black population in the state, making it the top
state for Black immigrants in the U.S. Florida seconds the list with
over 20% of its Black population being foreign-born. The Census
Bureau projects that by 2060, 16.5% of America’s Black population
will be foreign-born.

Percentage of the foreign-born population.

Second, Black immigrants make up a significant portion of the
overall immigrant and non-citizen population in the U.S. According
to the 2014 one-year estimates from ACS, the estimated total of
foreign-born population in the U.S. was 42 million, within which
8.7% were Black immigrants. In addition, about 22 million of the
U.S. foreign-born population were non-citizens, among whom 7.2% were
Black.

II. Characteristics of the Black Immigrant Population

Diversity based on country or region of origin.

While Black immigrants in the U.S. come from diverse backgrounds and
regions of the world, immigrants from African and Caribbean
countries comprise the majority of the foreign-born Black
population. According to the 2014 ACS data, Jamaica was the top
country of origin in 2014 with 665,628 Black immigrants in the U.S.,
accounting for 18% of the national total. Haiti seconds the list
with 598,000 Black immigrants, making up 16% of the U.S. Black
immigrant population.

Although half of Black immigrants are from the Caribbean region
alone, African immigrants drove much of the recent growth of the
Black immigrant population and made up 39% of the total foreign-
born Black population in 2014. The number of African immigrants in
the U.S. increased 153%, from 574,000 in 2000 to 1.5 million in
2014, with Nigeria and Ethiopia as the two leading countries of
origin. Besides African and Caribbean regions, an estimated 4% of
Black immigrants are from South America, another 4% are from Central
America, 2% are from Europe and 1% from Asia.

Length of residency in the U.S.

Black immigrants tend to have lived in the U.S. for long periods of
time, although there are some regional differences in length of
residency. As more African immigrants are recent arrivals, those
from the Caribbean have generally lived in the U.S. longer. …

Geographic dispersion in the U.S.

The geographic dispersion of Black immigrants is highly
concentrated. New York State is home to 846,730 (23%) Black
immigrants, making it the top state of residence. Florida has the
second largest foreign-born Black population (18%), followed by
Texas (6%) and Maryland (6%). Some Black immigrant communities tend
to cluster together around certain metropolitan areas. For example,
according to the Pew study of 2013 ACS data, New York City is home
to nearly 40% of all foreign-born black Jamaicans in the U.S.; Miami
has the nation’s largest Haitian immigrant community; Washington
D.C. has the largest Ethiopian immigrant community; and Somalian
immigrants concentrate in metropolitan areas of Minnesota and
Wisconsin.

III. Educational Background of Black Immigrants

A significant percentage of Black immigrants have obtained degrees
through higher education, but the percentage remains lower than the
U.S. population as a whole. According to the ACS 2014 data, more
than a quarter (27%) of Black immigrants age 25 and older have a
bachelor’s degree or higher, three points below the percentage of
the overall U.S. population. However, the proportion with an
advanced degree is similar among all Americans (11%) and Black
immigrants (10%). When comparing Black immigrants with Asian and
Hispanic immigrants, the differences are more apparent. About 30% of
Asian immigrants age 25 and older have completed at least a four-
year degree, whereas only 11% of Hispanic immigrants have done so.
Within Black immigrants, educational attainment also varies among
different regions of birth. About 34% of African immigrants age 25
and older have at least a bachelor’s degree, including 14% with an
advanced degree. In comparison, only 6.2% of Caribbean immigrants
age 25 and older have an advanced degree. Nonetheless, education
attainment for Black immigrants from Africa is still lower than
those from Europe and Asia, with 16.7% and 18.6% of them have an
advanced degree respectively.

IV. Economic Snapshot of Black Immigrants Household income.

Black immigrants have a lower median annual household income than
the median U.S. household and all immigrants in the U.S. Based on
the Pew study of ACS 2013 data, the median annual household income
for foreign-born blacks was $43,800. That’s roughly $8,000 less than
the $52,000 median for American households and $4,200 less than that
of all U.S. immigrants. While the median household income for Black
immigrants is higher than it is for Hispanic immigrants ($38,000),
both groups’ numbers are substantially below that of Asian
immigrants, whose median household income is $70,600. …

According to a 2011 study by the Economic Policy Institute,
Caribbean women earn 8.3% less than U.S. born non-Hispanic white
women; African women earn 10.1% less. When we consider subsets of
Black immigrants, the differences become even more dramatic. For
example, Haitian women earn 18.6% less than U.S. born non-Hispanic
white women.

Similarly, Black immigrant men earn lower wages than U.S. born non-
Hispanic white men. Caribbean men earn 20.7% less than U.S. born
non-Hispanic white men and African men 34.7%. Notably, as of 2011
Black immigrant men also earned lower wages than African American
males. While earnings for Caribbean men were just 1% less than those
of African-Americans, African men earned nearly 15% less than US
Born Black men.

Black Immigrants in the Workforce.

Black immigrants are more likely to participate in the labor force
than the overall immigrant population. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics reports that 70.8% of Black immigrants participate in the
civilian labor force.

Black immigrants maintain higher rates of employment in service and
sales positions than their counterparts of other immigrant
backgrounds. Other areas of employment for Black immigrants include
management, finance, and construction.

Unionization.

The percentage of unionized Black immigrants has nearly doubled over
the last 20 years from 7% in 1994 to 15.4% in 2015. Black immigrants
are more likely than Black Americans to be unionized. 16.9% of Black
immigrants are union members, compared to 13.8% of Black Americans.
Unionization has proven to have a positive impact on the livelihood
of Black workers. On average Black union members, earn nearly $7
more per hour than non-union Black workers. 71.4% of Black union
members have employer-provided health care, compared to 47.7% of
non-union Black workers. 61.6% of Black union members have employer-
sponsored retirement plans, compared to 38.2% of non-union Black
workers.

V. Immigration Status and Means of Entry

The majority of Black immigrants are living in the U.S. with formal
immigration authorization. According to a Pew study, about 84% of
the Black immigrant population are living in the U.S. with
authorization. This section of the report presents details about
Black immigrants by immigration status.

A. Undocumented Community Members

When compared with the overall share of undocumented immigrants in
the country–about a quarter of the total immigrant population–
Black immigrants are less likely to be in the U.S. unlawfully. An
estimated 575,000 Black immigrants were living in the U.S. without
authorization in 2013, according to the Pew Research Center study,
making up 16% of all Black immigration population. Among Black
immigrants from the Caribbean, 16% are undocumented immigrants and
as are 13% of Black immigrants from Africa. …

When compared with the increase of undocumented immigrant population
from other regions of the world, African and Caribbean unauthorized
immigrants are growing at a lower rate since 2000 than those from
Central America (194% without Mexico) and Asia (202%), but faster
than those from South America (39%) and Europe (62%).

************************************************

Part II: Black Immigrants in the Mass Criminalization System

I. Targeting Immigrants with Criminal Convictions

“Good” vs. “Bad” Migrants

In creating a “good” versus “bad” migrant binary, President Obama
sought to justify a detention and removal campaign that oversaw the
deportation of a record 438,421 immigrants in fiscal year 2013 –an
increase that has led some to refer to President Obama as “deporter-
in-chief.” Since the start of Obama’s administration in 2008, 2.9
million immigrants have been deported from the United States, a
majority of whom (58%) have a criminal record.

“Felons” vs. “Families”

In a national address in November 2014, President Obama announced
that he would focus immigration enforcement resources on individuals
with criminal records–“felons, not families.” This phrase has been
widely criticized as devaluing and dehumanizing individuals with
criminal convictions. After all, “felons” have families, too.

Anti-Blackness

The government’s increasing focus on immigrants with criminal
records disproportionately impacts Black immigrants, who are more
likely than immigrants from other regions to have criminal
convictions, or at least to be identified through interactions with
local law enforcement, because of rampant racial profiling.

Tougher Enforcement

President Obama’s address to the nation coincided with the
Department of Homeland Security’s release of a memo outlining new
immigration enforcement priorities. DHS noted that it would continue
to prioritize national security, border security, and public safety,
and went on to rank certain classes of immigrants in order of
enforcement priority, with a significant focus on targeting people
with criminal records.

Intensification of ICE Removals

Following the November 2014 DHS memo, ICE implemented the revised
Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities (CIEP) in FY 2015, which
intensified the focus on removing people with criminal convictions
and recent entrants. The highest priority for enforcement resources,
known as “Priority 1,” groups together immigrants “engaged in or
suspected of terrorism or espionage” along with individuals
“apprehended at the border while attempting to unlawfully enter the
United States.” This includes asylum seekers, immigrants convicted
of a felony offense and immigrants convicted of an “aggravated
felony” as defined in section 101(a) (43) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. The term “aggravated felony” includes offenses that
are neither aggravated nor felonies and has been expanded over time
to include, for example, a single theft offense with a suspended
one-year sentence involving no actual jail time. The memo’s second-
highest priority for detention and deportation, “Priority 2,”
includes immigrants convicted of three or more misdemeanor offenses,
individuals with a “significant misdemeanor” including drug
“distribution” offenses, and people who entered the United States
unlawfully after January 1, 2014. The final category, “Priority 3,”
includes immigrants who were ordered deported after January 1, 2014.
ICE continues to remove individuals who do not fall under these
revised categories if their removal would serve an important
“federal interest.”

Blacks are Disproportionately Represented in the Criminal
Enforcement System

Black people are far more likely than any other population to be
arrested, convicted, and imprisoned in the U.S. criminal enforcement
system–the system upon which immigration enforcement increasingly
relies. Black people are arrested at 2.5 times the rate of whites.
They are more likely than whites to be sentenced to prison, and less
likely to be sentenced to probation. According to the FBI Criminal
Justice Information Services Division, of the total individuals
arrested in 2014, 69.4% were white, 27.8% were Black or African
American, and 3% were of another race. These arrest rates
demonstrate that Black and African American individuals are arrested
at a higher rate than their overall percentage in the population.
These disparities exist even when crime rates are the same; for
example, although Blacks and whites use marijuana at roughly equal
rates, Black people are 3.7 times more likely than whites to be
arrested for marijuana possession.

Targeting Immigrants with Criminal Records

Despite racial disparities in criminal enforcement, the federal
government prioritizes the deportation and detention of individuals
with criminal records. In FY 2015, ICE deported 139,368 people with
criminal convictions, which represented 59% of all ICE removals. The
percentage of people targeted for deportation by ICE based on their
criminal records rose from 82% in FY 2013 to 91% in FY 2015. Many of
their records involved drug-related convictions. In FY 2003-2013,
drug offenses, including simple drug possession, accounted for
almost a quarter of all criminal removals.

Three federal agencies are tasked with enforcing immigration laws:
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS).

Although immigration law is federal, the U.S. government has
instructed state and local law enforcement agencies to assist with
immigration enforcement.

The high proportion of immigrants with criminal records who are
targeted for immigration enforcement is the result on an intentional
and pervasive reliance on the machinery of the criminal enforcement
system to identify people for deportation. The criminal enforcement
system–each stage of which has been shown to target Black people
disproportionately–has become a funnel into the immigration
detention and deportation system.

Stops

Immigrants are exposed to more risks and vulnerability when they are
stopped by the police for minor offenses, such as broken taillights
and traffic violations. When the police decide to take on the duties
of federal immigration enforcement, they often use these stops to
question people about their immigration status and to turn
immigrants over to ICE. Several federal programs have made it easier
for police to expose immigrants with past criminal records.

Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the
Department of Homeland Security to partner with state and local law
enforcement agencies. The 287(g) Program’s Jail Enforcement Teams
interview arrestees regarding their immigration status. … The
National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP) was established on
January 25, 2002. Immediately following the events of September 11,
2001, the Justice Department increased efforts to deport immigrants
with old removal orders.  … Many individuals identified and
deported through this program lived in the United States for many
years and have significant family and community ties. NFOP also
dispatches Fugitive Operations Teams (FOTs) across the country to
arrest “fugitives” and specifically focuses on “residential
operations.” In late 2006, FOTs began conducting raids more
aggressively and demanding document checks on long-distance buses
and trains. They also arrest people on the streets, in their homes,
and at their workplaces if they cannot produce status documents. FOT
practices have been challenged, especially for home raids, based on
the lack of judicial warrants or probable cause. The program was
still in effect at the time of this report’s publication.

Arrests

When an individual is arrested and booked by a police officer, his
or her fingerprints are sent to the FBI. Through the Priority
Enforcement Program (PEP), state and local law enforcement agencies
share data with immigration enforcement. PEP replaced its
predecessor program, Secure Communities, in July 2015. Under PEP,
this same information is sent to the Department of Homeland
Security, which checks its own databases to determine whether the
individual is a “priority for removal” as described in Secretary Jeh
Johnson’s November 20, 2014 memorandum. ICE will then ask the law
enforcement agency to notify ICE of the individual’s release–or
detain the individual past the time that he or she otherwise would
have been released–so ICE may pick the individual up, resulting in
his or her immediate transfer to ICE custody. …

Many jails and prisons also participate in the Criminal Alien
Program (CAP), which seeks to identify, arrest, and deport
individuals who are incarcerated in federal, state, and local
prisons and jails, as well as “at-large criminal aliens that have
circumvented identification.” Law enforcement agencies notify ICE’s
office of Detention and Removal Operations, which administers CAP,
of foreign-born detainees in their custody. ICE then attempts to
secure their final orders of removal before they are released from
criminal custody.

The programs described in this section employ the use of
“detainers,” also known as “immigration holds,” to facilitate ICE’s
capture of the immigrants that the agency identifies. Detainer use
peaked in March 2011 and then fell steadily; however, it stabilized
as of October 2015, with ICE issuing approximately 7,000 detainers
per month. …

Criminal Charges and Disposition

Immigration enforcement is increasingly present in local jails.
Often, an ICE officer will try to interview noncitizens while in
custody and then initiate paperwork for the removal process if an
individual is determined to be deportable. After an individual or
person charged with a crime, he or she may be confronted with a
choice to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Immigrants are
particularly vulnerable to guilty pleas that may later lead to
removal proceedings. …

A criminal conviction could trigger mandatory detention, deportation
and ineligibility to reenter the United States. It may also serve as
a bar to U.S. citizenship, eligibility to obtain a green card, and
various forms of relief from deportation, such as asylum or
withholding of removal. A conviction will remain permanently in an
individual’s immigration file unless it can be “vacated,” that is
removed, by a judge on the basis of some error in the underlying
criminal proceeding.

Post-Conviction

Serving a sentence may result in further immigration scrutiny or
even removal prior to release. The Institutional Removal Program
(IRP) is a nationwide Department of Homeland Security initiative
that purports to identify removable immigrants who are incarcerated,
ensure they are not released into the community, and remove them
upon completion of sentences. IRP has the effect of forcing
incarcerated noncitizens into deportation proceedings from within
the very prisons to which they are confined, often in the form of
“video hearings” that take place from a room within prison. As a
result, inmates are isolated from all other parties, including the
judge, the prosecutor, the interpreter, witnesses, and sometimes
even their own lawyer. …

IV. Recommendations

W e have concluded from the overwhelming amount of data that the
racialized criminalization evident in the immigration enforcement
system has an acute impact on the state of Black immigrants in the
U.S.. This result is partially due to discriminatory policing
practices and criminal penalties that adversely affect all Black
people. Simultaneously, our analysis of the data suggests that
racial inequities, evidenced by disproportionate, negative outcomes
for Black people, in removal proceedings, also persist in the
immigration enforcement system.

It is the Black Alliance for Just Immigration’s view that the
immigration system must be upended and redesigned to ensure that
those entering the U.S. seeking work, refuge or reunification with
their families and communities, are treated fairly and with dignity.
This transformation can begin by divorcing the U.S. mass
criminalization and immigration enforcement regimes. For this
reason, the repeal of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (“IIR-IRA”) and Anti-terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), commonly known as the “1996 immigration
laws,” in favor of policies that shift the focus away from criminal
contact as the deciding factor as it pertains to one’s immigration
status in the US by Congress, is BAJI’s primary policy
recommendation.

The 1996 immigration laws expanded the grounds for deportation,
broadened classes of mandatory detention, stripped away judicial
discretion and the right to due process and retroactively punished
those who already served time for their offenses. As this report has
highlighted, Black immigrants have been disproportionately affected
by these laws. The 20th anniversary of IIR-IRA and AEDPA, along with
the current political climate, presents an opportunity to
reinvigorate the movement to upend the nation’s immigration
enforcement system.

V. Conclusion

Just as African-Americans suffer disproportionately high arrest,
prosecution and incarceration rates, so too are Black immigrants.
This occurs despite no evidence that they engage in more
criminalized activities in comparison to any other racial group.
Black immigrants are also disproportionately impacted by the
compounding impact of the immigration enforcement system. Numerous
federal agencies and programs work in conjunction with local law
enforcement to criminalize, detain and deport immigrants. The racism
present in the criminal legal system spills over and informs the
immigration enforcement system, and thus it naturally and unjustly
targets Black immigrants at all stages of the process. As the number
of Black immigrants living in the United States continues to rise,
debates around immigration must acknowledge and rectify the
injustice inherent in these enforcement and deportation systems.

*****************************************************

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Today, October 8, the world recognizes the most famous and prominent revolutionary of the 20th century, Ernesto “Che” Guevara de la Serna. In Cuba, the site of his final resting place, this day is known as “The Day of the Heroic Guerilla.” Argentinean born, the doctor met Cuban revolutionaries in exile in Mexico. After meeting Dr. Fidel Castro, he signed up to be the 2nd member of Castro’s revolutionary army (the 1st was Castro’s brother, Raul Castro) and returned to Cuba in a poorly equipped ship called the Granma in 1956 to wage a guerilla war.

They set up a rebel base in the Sierra Maestra Mountains. At first, Che was the field unit’s doctor but after volunteering for some of the more daring missions, he grew in prominence. Despite his severe asthma, Che grew from a soldier to a military commander. In the final stages of the revolutionary war, he captured the strategic city of Santa Clara which facilitated the fall of Havana to the rebel army. A true internationalist, he resigned from the Cuban government to go fight for revolution in first Africa and then Bolivia. On October 8, 1967, he was captured alive by Bolivian armed forces, who were trained in anti-guerilla warfare by the American CIA. Anyone who knows Guevaran history can conclude that he was not one to be taken alive. In fact, his rifle had become incapacitated and thus, he did not have the option to die fighting and was captured alive. He was executed the next day.

The Bolivian authorities buried his body in a secret location because they feared that people would build a shrine on his final resting place and that it would turn into a pilgrimage site. His martyrdom, nevertheless, survived and his revolutionary message grew to be bigger in death than in life, so much so, that they even made songs dedicated to him on the other side of the globe. After restoring diplomatic ties with one another, Cuba sent an excavation team to Bolivia in 1997 and retrieved Che’s body and brought it back to Cuba and buried it in the city that he captured in the revolutionary war, Santa Clara. 38 years after his death, his tomb is Cuba’s main tourist attraction and is an international pilgrimage site. Che certainly left behind a living legacy of resistance.

Farewell letter from Che to Fidel Castro

Year of Agriculture

Havana, April 1, 1965.

Fidel:

At this moment I remember many things: when I met you in Maria Antonia’s house, when you proposed I come along, all the tensions involved in the preparations. One day they came by and asked who should be notified in case of death, and the real possibility of it struck us all. Later we knew it was true, that in a revolution one wins or dies (if it is a real one). Many comrades fell along the way to victory.

Today everything has a less dramatic tone, because we are more mature, but the event repeats itself. I feel that I have fulfilled the part of my duty that tied me to the Cuban revolution in its territory, and I say farewell to you, to the comrades, to your people, who now are mine.

I formally resign my positions in the leadership of the party, my post as minister, my rank of commander, and my Cuban citizenship. Nothing legal binds me to Cuba. The only ties are of another nature  those that cannot be broken as can appointments to posts.

Reviewing my past life, I believe I have worked with sufficient integrity and dedication to consolidate the revolutionary triumph. My only serious failing was not having had more confidence in you from the first moments in the Sierra Maestra, and not having understood quickly enough your qualities as a leader and a revolutionary.

I have lived magnificent days, and at your side I felt the pride of belonging to our people in the brilliant yet sad days of the Caribbean [Missile] crisis. Seldom has a statesman been more brilliant as you were in those days. I am also proud of having followed you without hesitation, of having identified with your way of thinking and of seeing and appraising dangers and principles.

Other nations of the world summon my modest efforts of assistance. I can do that which is denied you due to your responsibility as the head of Cuba, and the time has come for us to part.

You should know that I do so with a mixture of joy and sorrow. I leave here the purest of my hopes as a builder and the dearest of those I hold dear. And I leave a people who received me as a son. That wounds a part of my spirit. I carry to new battlefronts the faith that you taught me, the revolutionary spirit of my people, the feeling of fulfilling the most sacred of duties: to fight against imperialism wherever it may be. This is a source of strength, and more than heals the deepest of wounds.

I state once more that I free Cuba from all responsibility, except that which stems from its example. If my final hour finds me under other skies, my last thought will be of this people and especially of you. I am grateful for your teaching and your example, to which I shall try to be faithful up to the final consequences of my acts.

I have always been identified with the foreign policy of our revolution, and I continue to be. Wherever I am, I will feel the responsibility of being a Cuban revolutionary, and I shall behave as such. I am not sorry that I leave nothing material to my wife and children; I am happy it is that way. I ask nothing for them, as the state will provide them with enough to live on and receive an education.

I would have many things to say to you and to our people, but I feel they are unnecessary. Words cannot express what I would like them to, and there is no point in scribbling pages.

Written: April 1, 1965 *********************************************

On the Day of the Heroic Guerilla, we remember Che Guevara

Oct 09, 2012 http://pflp.ps/english/2012/10/09/on-the-day-of-the-heroic-guerilla-we-remember-che-guevara/

On October 8, 2012, the Day of the Heroic Guerilla, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine remembers Comandante Ernesto “Che” Guevara, revolutionary leader, fierce fighter, and principled struggler whose true commitment to internationalism and liberation lives on in the struggles of peoples around the world for freedom, justice and socialism.

Following the revolutionary victory in Cuba in 1959, Che’s commitment to international revolution did not diminish, and he joined Bolivian revolutionaries in 1966. On October 8, 1967, Che and his comrades were captured and surrounded by the US-backed Bolivian military, and executed.

Nine days later, Fidel Castro spoke, memorializing Che and commemorating October 8 as the Day of the Heroic Guerilla, saying “Che died defending no other interest, no other cause than the cause of the exploited and oppressed of this continent. Che died defending no other cause than the cause of the poor and humble of this earth. Before history, people who act as he did, people who do and give everything for the cause of the poor, grow in stature with each passing day and find a deeper place in the heart of the people with each passing day.

In Palestine, Che’s spirit, his commitment to liberation, rises in the streets of our occupied homeland. We mourn and honor our Guevara Gaza, Mohammad al-Aswad, and the thousands of Palestinian Guevaras, the eternal martyrs, who have struggled, fought, sacrificed and died for the liberation of Palestine, and the thousands of Palestinian Guevaras still to come, to hold high the banner of the resistance until the day of victory is ours.

On the 45th anniversary of Che’s death, we remember him as one of the martyrs of Palestine, a great martyr for the freedom of the oppressed of the world. And we continue to live his words: “Let us sum up our hopes for victory: total destruction of imperialism by eliminating its firmest bulwark: the oppression exercised by the United States of America and if we were all capable of uniting to make our blows stronger and infallible and so increase the effectiveness of all kinds of support given to the struggling people, how great and close would that future be.” Wherever death may surprise us, let it be welcome, provided that this, our battle cry, may have reached some receptive ear and another hand may be extended to wield our weapons and other men be ready to intone the funeral dirge with the staccato singing of the machine-guns and new battle cries of war and victory.

Che Guevara Presente! Viva viva Palestina!

— Freedom Archives 522 Valencia Street San Francisco, CA 94110 415 863.9977 www.freedomarchives.org

By James Thompson

There has been a lot of discussion about the projected devastation of hurricane Matthew. Some reports indicate that essential personnel have been evacuated from Guantanamo naval base in Cuba. Those reports suggest that only personnel assigned with the task of defending the naval base remain. One must ask if their task is to defend Guantanamo, which is located in Cuba, from the Cuban people?

Another question comes to mind which is “What is to become of the detainees at the prison at Guantanamo?” Some may ask what difference does it make. However, if any semblance of humanitarianism is left in the USA, the safety and humane treatment of foreign prisoners should not be taken lightly.

It will be interesting to see if news reports in the coming days address this important international legal question.

PHill1917@comcast.net