AfricaFocus Bulletin
May 26, 2016 (160526)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

At the World Humanitarian Summit (https://www.worldhumanitariansummit.org/) in Istanbul on May 23-24,
the informal consensus was that the system of humanitarian response
to today’s crises is “broken.” The calls to “leave no one behind”
highlighted the particular vulnerability of the displaced. But it is
clear that such non-binding resolutions will only be implemented by
extensive mobilization on many fronts, including both those most
affected and their allies.

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Each issue of AfricaFocus requires selection from a wide array of
sources. Normally this is for reposting of excerpts from a small
number of sources, with a few additional links to additional
resources. Sometimes, as for this Bulletin, that choice is just
overwhelming, and I have opted for a roundup of links or very short
excerpts, to include a much wider set of sources that have been
called to my intention.

I hope this will serve as a resource for readers who can pick and
choose what to followup. I particularly urge readers to view the
multimedia resources highlighted at the beginning, and to pass them
on to others who may be interested, by email and through social
media links.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains a roundup of links on migration
issues, particularly related to protection of rights of refugees,
other international migrants, and internally displaced people.
Although it is far from comprehensive, the range of sources included
show increasing recognition, in Africa and globally, that migration
and forced migration creating extreme vulnerability is a complex
phenomenon, closely linked to other economic, social, and political
and to fundamental human rights of all people.

In addition to the wide range of sources below, previous AfricaFocus
Bulletins on migration are available at
http://www.africafocus.org/migrexp.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

Multimedia Perspectives on Migration

Rosebell Kagumire at World Economic Forum for Africa, Kigali, May
13, 2016
http://wef.ch/1rG1lhL

20 minute video. Good questions from audience & good thoughtful
nuanced answers about African ?#?migration? from this leading
Ugandan journalist, who formerly worked at International
Organization for Migration in Geneva. Migration is not just to
Europe but also within Africa and with Middle East and Asia as well.
Fortunately most of the time with questions and actions. Goes far
beyond the stereotypes.

“New York Immigrant Advocates Launch Black Immigrant Engagement
Initiative,” May 11, 2016

15 minutes interview on BRIC TV, the first 24/7 television channel
created by, for, and about Brooklyn. Hadiyah Harrison, Project
Manager at the New York Immigration Coalition, and Carl Lipscombe,
Policy & Legal Manager at Black Alliance for Just Immigration
(BAJI).

[For additional recent articles from BAJI, visit
http://blackalliance.org/category/blog/

Op-ed by Opal Tometi of BAJI in Time magazine
Black Lives Matter Co-Founder: The Immigration Challenge No One Is Talking About

Grassroots call to decriminalize the U.S. immigration system, #Fix96
on-line petition -  http://tinyurl.com/h2lfbyx]

Laeila Adjovi, “The Town of Women,” BBC, 2 December 2015
http://tinyurl.com/zwmc539 – photo essay on the town of Beguedo in
Burkina Faso and migration to Italy. For more on the photographer,
see http://laeila-adjovi.com/

Anne Paq, “Migrant domestic workers take to the streets in Beirut.
Demonstrators called for basic rights, including a minimum wage and
at least one day off per week.”, photo essay, Al Jazeera, 7 May 2016
http://tinyurl.com/j2vk7b3

New Blog and Facebook Page

AfricaMoves: A Pan African Migration Platform

http://www.africamoves.org/
On Facebook at http://tinyurl.com/h22qj3u

Organizations contributing to the establishment of Africa Moves
include: Priority Africa Network; Black Immigration Network;
PanAfrican Network in Defense of Migrants’ Rights; Consortium for
Refugees & Migrants in South Africa; Africa Speaks 4 Africa. Edited
by Nunu Kidane.

Kenya’s Refugees in Kenya & Beyond

Samar Al-Bulushi, “Kenya’s Refugee ‘Problem'”
Africa Is a Country, May 25, 2016

Kenya’s Refugee “Problem”

“Integrally tied to this pending humanitarian crisis is the global
architecture of counter-terrorism. The Kenyan government is but one
actor among many who produce, and profit from, the specter of
terrorist threat, which allows for the discursive slippage from
civilian, to potential Al-Shabaab sympathizer, to potential
terrorist.”

Chico Harlan, “For many Somali refugees, this industry offers hope
— then takes it away,” Washington Post, May 25, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/jdnq4a4

Feature article: “Though meatpacking plants have long relied on
labor by immigrants, particularly Hispanics, major companies have
moved to hire Somalis, who have the dual advantage for employers of
being legal and relatively cheap. In one slice of a changing low-
wage America, these are the new ideal workers.”
Lucy Hovil, “Why is the cost of hosting refugees falling on the
world’s poorest states?,” The Guardian, May 13, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/zs9wdeh

“The government of Kenya says it plans to close Dadaab, the world’s
largest refugee camp, which hosts approximately 330,000 people, as
well as shutting the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA). The
announcement, on Friday 6 May, was no doubt a pre-election stunt of
Trump-like proportions that plays to an electorate’s fear of
generating instability and outsiders taking jobs, playing to the
same xenophobic narrative that has become commonplace in election
campaigns across the world. [but] As long as rich nations pay lip
service to meeting the needs of the world’s displaced, they cannot
blame Kenya for closing refugee camps like Dadaab”

Jina Moore, “Kenya Is Trying To Close The World’s Biggest Refugee
Camp And This Is Why,” Buzzfeed, May 13, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/huyof93

“Kenya says the camps are a security threat, but the move comes at a
time when refugees are big business. … When Europe began panicking
over its growing refugee population, Kenya took notice. A very
noticeable feature of that crisis is that Europe is willing to spend
cash — lots of cash — to end its refugee problems. … This is not
the first time Kenya has said it will close the camps. Last time it
issued this threat, it got $45 million more in U.S. aid.”

Amnesty International, “New ‘Refugees Welcome Index’ shows Kenyan
government out of touch with public on refugees,” 19 May 2016
http://tinyurl.com/jrdmc7v

“The new Refugees Welcome Index, based on a global survey of more
than 27,000 people carried out by the strategy consultancy
GlobeScan, found that 65% of Kenyans would personally welcome
refugees and that 62% thought their government had not yet done
everything in its power to help refugees. ‘This report, coming at a
time of heightened anti-refugee rhetoric from the Kenyan government,
shows that Kenyans are not as unaccepting as their government would
make the world believe,’ said Muthoni Wanyeki, Amnesty
International’s Regional Director for East Africa, the Horn and the
Great Lakes. ‘It shows that a majority of Kenyans would welcome
refugees into their country and that the government’s decision to
shut down Dadaab refugee camp is not backed by popular opinion.'”

Stephanie Schwartz, “Why Kenya’s threat to close its refugee camps
is even worse than you think,” Washington Post, May 11, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/z8vy8q7

“Many observers are already questioning whether Kenya will really
follow through on the closure, whether the camps really are a haven
for terrorists, and whether this action violates international law.

An equally important question is: Do these refugees have homes to
which they could return? Probably not. And the reasons aren’t just
that Somalia and South Sudan won’t magically become peaceful.

Why else can’t they return? Let me explain by telling you what I’ve
found among Burundian refugees in Tanzania.”

New International Reports

Amnesty International, “Refugees Welcome Index shows government
refugee policies out of touch with public opinion, 19 May 2016
http://tinyurl.com/hbp5nhy

“The vast majority of people (80%) would welcome refugees with open
arms, with many even prepared to take them into their own homes,
according to a global survey commissioned by Amnesty International.

The new Refugees Welcome Index, based on a global survey of more
than 27,000 people carried out by the internationally renowned
strategy consultancy GlobeScan, ranks 27 countries across all
continents based on people’s willingness to let refugees live in
their countries, towns, neighbourhoods and homes.

The survey shows people say they are willing to go to astonishing
lengths to make refugees welcome. It also shows how anti-refugee
political rhetoric is out of kilter with public opinion.”

Bronwen Manby, “Who Belongs? Statelessness and Nationality in West
Africa,” Migration Policy Institute, April 7, 2016
http://www.migrationpolicy.org – direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/htzplps

[Full article contains extensive background and analysis. Brief
excerpt below by permission of Migration Policy Institute.]

“At least 10 million people around the world are stateless,
according to estimates from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), but the real number may be much higher.
Statelessness severely limits a person’s human rights, including
access to basic services such as health care and education. Often
deemed to be illegally present in their country of birth and
residence–even if their parents were also born there–stateless
individuals may be unable to work in the formal economy, open a bank
account, or buy land. A person without identity documents, usually
dependent on nationality, is unable to cross international borders
through regular channels. …

Although those lacking documents are generally among the poorest and
most marginalized, an undocumented person who is a member of the
dominant ethnic or religious group and comes from a settled
community and stable family is far less likely to be refused when
applying for a nationality document. Those most at risk of
statelessness are members of social groups facing discrimination,
migrants (especially irregular migrants) and their descendants,
refugees, and children born out of wedlock, separated from their
parents, or vulnerable in other ways. They are left stateless not
only by discrimination in practice and weak administrative systems,
but also by laws that provide very limited rights based on birth in
the territory and that restrict transmission of nationality from
parent to child on the basis of gender or other grounds.

…

At the regional level, West Africa has moved furthest to address
statelessness, as a result of advocacy from UNHCR and the existing
policies and institutional frameworks of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS). In February 2015, the 15 ECOWAS Member
States adopted the Abidjan Declaration on the Eradication of
Statelessness, agreeing “to prevent and reduce statelessness by
reforming constitutional, legislative and institutional regimes
related to nationality in order to include appropriate safeguards
against statelessness, in particular to ensure that every child
acquires a nationality at birth and that all foundlings are
considered nationals of the State in which they are found.” Of
course, the declaration is just that–a declaration–and does not
necessarily mean the promised action will take place. Nonetheless,
it is a remarkable recognition at the regional level that the
question of nationality in Africa needs to be addressed.

Based on a study commissioned by UNHCR and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) and presented at the February 2015
Abidjan conference, this article explores the factors contributing
to statelessness in West Africa, including the region’s colonial and
migration history and nationality laws, as well as the social groups
particularly at risk. The article then examines the ECOWAS
framework, steps taken to implement the Abidjan Declaration, and the
way forward to eradicating statelessness in West Africa.”

Marie-Laurence Flahaux and Bruno Schoumaker, “Democratic Republic of
the Congo: A Migration History Marked by Crises and Restrictions,”
Migration Policy Institute, April 20, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/j58yztj

Article provides historical overview as well as analysis of current
situation.

“DR Congo has long had both economic and humanitarian migration
exchanges. African countries host the vast majority of Congolese
migrants and refugees, whose numbers have increased significantly
over the last four decades, particularly since the wars of the late
1990s and early 2000s. The lack of recent censuses in several
destination countries (such as Angola) makes it difficult to
precisely evaluate the distribution of Congolese migrants and
changing patterns. Data from the United Nations Population Division
nevertheless show significant changes over the last 25 years. In
1990, an estimated 300,000 Congolese migrants and refugees resided
in one of the nine neighboring countries (Angola, Burundi, Central
African Republic, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan [now South
Sudan], Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia), representing three-quarters
of all migrants from DR Congo worldwide (see Table 1). Their number
had more than doubled by 2000 (to approximately 700,000), and by
mid-2015, had risen to more than 1 million in the neighboring
countries (1.2 million for Africa as a whole; see Table 1).

…

While Belgium was the main Western destination of Congolese migrants
prior to the 1980s, destinations have increasingly diversified.
France has become the preferred end point since the late 1990s
(Figure 2), possibly as a result of greater ease getting visas and
of obtaining asylum, and better labor market opportunities. Recent
estimates indicate that France and Belgium together host more than
100,000 Congolese migrants, and that more than 50,000 others live
elsewhere in Europe (including Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and
the United Kingdom; see Figure 2).

Outside Europe, the United States and Canada have also become
increasingly popular destinations since the 1990s (see Figure 2),
each now hosting nearly 30,000 Congolese immigrants. This growing
interest is also found among would-be migrants in surveys conducted
in Kinshasa. Congolese migration to the United States has taken off
since 2005, making the United States the second most popular
Congolese destination outside Africa.”

Additional recent international reports and sources

[Thanks to Evalyn Tennant, of Global Migration Policy Associates
(GMPA), for identifying these links and sharing them with me. As
with other global issues, the outcomes for Africa are closely
related to policies set at a global level. As the number of
refugees, migrants, and internally displaced people grows world-
wide, affecting countries in all regions, the global response is
more and more obviously falling short. The policy debates, both in
intergovernmental and non-governmental forums, are becoming more and
more intense.]

UN Summit Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants
Upcoming September 19, 2016
http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/high-level-meeting
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=90

Official UN pages. Second link above has multimedia resources as
well as news.

Secretary General’s Report for the Summit: “In Safety and Dignity:
Addressing large movements of refugees and migrants”
http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/reports-and-documents

Report includes assessment of current issues facing refugees and
migrants and the countries hosting them, as well as calls for global
compacts, one on “Responsibility-Sharing for Refugees” and the other
for “Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration.”

Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC), International Organization
for Migration (IOM)
http://micicinitiative.iom.int

Global Coalition Migration page on MICIC
http://gcmigration.org/micic/

Civil society coalition page related to MICIC, includes reports on
civil society consultations in West and Central Africa, North Africa
and Middle East, and Central and Southern Africa.

MICIC West and Central Africa regional consultation
http://tinyurl.com/zq6ejgw

MICIC North Africa and Middle East consultation
http://tinyurl.com/je4wzqz

MICIC East and Southern Africa consultation
http://tinyurl.com/hzlpltx

Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat for the Horn of Africa and
Yemen
http://www.regionalmms.org/index0b30.html?id=2.

Forced Migration Review
http://www.fmreview.org

This journal has a wealth of resources, including Africa-specific
resources. For example, the latest issue (
http://www.fmreview.org/solutions/contents.html) has articles
relating to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Uganda, Somalia-Yemen
relations, Burundi, and Tanzania.

Joint Labour Migration Program for Africa
http://tinyurl.com/zsdjyxk

The African Union Commission (AUC), the ILO, the IOM and the UNECA
are implementing the Joint Labour Migration Program (JLMP) for
Africa formally adopted in January 2015 by African Heads of State
and Government as a comprehensive programme on
labour migration governance for the region.

Global Detention Project
http://www.globaldetentionproject.org

Includes special reports on detention of migrants and asylum seekers
in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Gulf states, as well as in the
Americas. See http://tinyurl.com/z8rpb64 for reports.

Caritas Europa, “Migrants and Refugees Have Rights: Impact of EU
Policies on Accessing Protection,” February 2016
http://tinyurl.com/z6clnxj

Comprehensive 74-page report with background, policy analysis,
personal stories, photographs, and recommendations.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) GRID 2016: Global
Report on Internal Displacement, May 2016
http://www.internal-displacement.org/globalreport2016/

This is a fundamental report for understanding displacement,
whatever the cause. Brief excerpt from the foreword by Jan Egeland,
Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council:

“Much focus has been placed on the hundreds  of thousands of
refugees, asylum seekers and migrants who have put their lives at
risk to reach European shores. Their bravery and despair has drawn
much attention to the phenomenon of displacement. In reality though,
they represent only the tip of an iceberg.

There are now twice as many internally displaced people (IDPs) as
refugees worldwide. In some ways, the distinction between internal
and cross-border flight is unhelpful in a globalised world.

…

When displacement becomes inevitable, humanitarians attend to more
immediate needs, but they must work with the development sector if
sustainable solutions are to be achieved. There is a clear trend of
displacement becoming more protracted and more of a development
challenge.

To take some of these considerations into account, we are presenting
our estimates of internal displacement in 2015 in a radically new
way, with figures on people displaced by conflict, by violence and
by disasters in a single report.

The Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) aims to provide a
more holistic picture of the phenomenon, regardless of cause. … It
also discusses types of displacement that receive too little
attention, such as that associated with generalised criminal
violence, gradually-evolving crises such as drought, and development
projects.”

Additional articles of interest

African Film Festival (in Tarifa, Spain and Tangiers, Morocco)begins
today, May 26, and runs through June 4.
http://www.fcat.es/en/home-en-2/

Building links across the Mediterranean, this film festival is in
its 13th year.

Thomas Friedman, “Out of Africa,” New York Times, Apr 13,20,27, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/zzycjvq, http://tinyurl.com/hzjy6ck, and
http://tinyurl.com/gq8zx3m

Better than the usual from this New York Times columnist, reporting
from Niger and Senegal on African migration to Europe.

Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Briefing on “Fortress Europe,”
20 October 2015
https://www.odi.org/comment/9995-migration-policy-fortress-europe

Ugandan domestic workers in Saudi Arabia
http://allafrica.com/stories/201601280823.html

Detention centers in Libya
http://tinyurl.com/zl62eoe

Sudan crackdown on Eritrean migrants
http://tinyurl.com/hgsgtm3

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
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or to suggest material for inclusion. For more information about
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mentioned. For a full archive and other resources, see
http://www.africafocus.org

The Events in the Donbass

The Editorial Board of the “Proletarian Gazette” appeals to the progressive public all over the world, especially to the proletariat and the Marxist-Leninist forces, to provide support to the oppressed masses of Donbass, who have organized themselves into an armed people’s militia on the territory of the proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic, in the fight against direct military aggression of the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian nationalist gangs of the puppet Kiev regime, representing the interests of US imperialism and Western Europe, and at the same time help to expose the reactionary selfish class essence of the Russian imperialists and their puppets from among the bourgeois forces of Donbass, as well as “volunteers” from among Russian nationalists .

The Editorial Board of the “Proletarian Gazette” calls on the progressive public all over the world, especially the proletariat and the Marxist-Leninist forces, to use all available measures of public pressure on the United Nations and the governments of their respective countries in order to:

1. Take decisive action to end the hostilities in Donbass and the withdrawal of the Ukrainian army beyond the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. The agreed terms of the Minsk armistice agreements in the region are just temporary and unstable measures to end the bloodshed in the territory of Donbass. The next step in ensuring the transition from truce to peace, should be the withdrawal of the Ukrainian army and the expulsion of various “volunteer” armed gangs out of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions.
2. Compel the instigators of the devastating war in the Donbass, US and Western European imperialists, the Russian imperialists and their puppets, the Ukrainian government and the bourgeoisie of Donbass, to unconditionally and fully restore the war-shattered industrial and agricultural facilities of Donbass, housing and communal structures, repair the damage caused by war, and compensate the families of the killed and injured citizens of Donbass and the like.

The Editorial Board of the “Proletarian Gazette” recommends that the population of Donbass re-elect the authorities under the control of the People’s Militia without any outside interference. We recommend, in these elections, to deprive all the volunteers and those residents who at the time of the elections are out of the territory of Donbass and do not live there permanently of the right to vote and be elected. We recommend conducting elections according to the proportional social and class principle, that is, the organs of power must include the workers’ militia, the intelligentsia, the petty bourgeoisie, officials and other segments of the population in proportion to their quantitative presence as that would constitute real democratization of power in the Donbas.

“The Militia constitutes military formations, created during the war, of the civilian population which is not in military service…”  TSB, 3rd ed. 1974, Vol. 18, pp. 430.

The Editorial Board of the “Proletarian Gazette” recommends not to dissolve and disarm the people’s militia until a full and democratic resolution of the status of the Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic is achieved, and to form a people’s militia and other security forces on the basis of an armed people’s militia, as well as of fully armed troops for the protection of the borders of these People’s Republics.

The decision of the administrative and public affairs is an internal affair of the population and the newly elected government of Donbass.

Editorial Board of the “Proletarian Gazette”

E-mail: proletarskaya.gazeta.leningrad@gmail.com

AfricaFocus Bulletin
May 13, 2016 (160513)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“The loans from the Swiss bank Credit Suisse to the Mozambican state
companies EMATUM and Proindicus involved a gross conflict of
interest, since the banker who organized the loans immediately
afterwards went to work for the Lebanese businessman Iskander Safa,
who owns the ship yard that built 24 tuna fishing vessels and six
patrol boats for EMATUM. … Together these three loans amounted to
over two billion dollars, and added 20 per cent to Mozambique’s
foreign debt, making it clearly unsustainable. … As more
information is becoming available, so it is becoming clear that the
guilty parties in this saga are not to be found only in Maputo.” –
Mozambique News Agency

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The debt crisis is most directly a crisis for the economic and
political future of Mozambique, where it comes together with the
resurgence of conflict between the opposition party and former
insurgent force Renamo, which has never fully disarmed. But it is
also a dramatic illustration of the transnational interconnections
between debt, corruption, and illicit financial flows. As such, it
is no surprise that a number of the international actors involved
turn up in the Panama Papers, including companies based in
Switzerland and Abu Dhabi and nationals of Lebanon, Britain, New
Zealand, and the United States.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains several recent articles on
different aspects of the debt crisis, including two from the
Mozambique News Agency (Agencia de Informaçao de Moçambique), one by
Joseph Hanlon, and one by University of Copenhagen economist Sam
Jones. As always, AfricaFocus selections are only a small selection,
and readers interested in more details and deeper analysis are
invited to dig deeper through the links provided.

See also, for additional detailed revelations, today’s new
Africa Confidential article at http://tinyurl.com/zong2oo

For regular English-language updates on this topic, see in
particular,

(1) Mozambique’s Secret Debt Triggers Economic Crisis
http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00042683.html

(2) Mozambique News Reports & Clippings, 2016, Edited by Joseph
Hanlon http://tinyurl.com/hqcr8bu

(3) Mozambique News Agency AIM Reports
http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Mozambique, see
http://www.africafocus.org/country/mozambique.php

For AfricaFocus coverage of illicit financial flows, debt, and
related issues, see http://www.africafocus.org/intro-iff.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

Mozambique: Loans From Credit Suisse Involved Conflict of Interests

Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique (Maputo)

11 May 2016

http://allafrica.com/stories/201605120019.html

Maputo — The loans from the Swiss bank Credit Suisse to the
Mozambican state companies EMATUM and Proindicus involved a gross
conflict of interest, since the banker who organized the loans
immediately afterwards went to work for the Lebanese businessman
Iskander Safa, who owns the ship yard that built 24 tuna fishing
vessels and six patrol boats for EMATUM.

EMATUM in 2013 issued loan titles for 850 million dollars,
guaranteed by the Mozambican government, that were sold on the
European bond market by Credit Suisse, BNP Paribas and the Russian
bank VTB. Credit Suisse and VTB granted a loan to Proindicus, also
in 2013, and also guaranteed by the Mozambican government, for 622
million dollars. Much of this money was also supposed to be spent on
military vessels to protect oil and gas companies working in the
Rovuma Basin, off the coast of the northern province of Cabo
Delgado.

A third loan, for 535 million dollars, went to Mozambique Assets
Management (MAM), a company virtually nobody had heard of until last
month, and which was supposedly formed to provide repair and
maintenance services for shipping in the Mozambique Channel.

Together these three loans amounted to over two billion dollars, and
added 20 per cent to Mozambique’s foreign debt, making it clearly
unsustainable.

Although the bond issue in Europe ensured that EMATUM became well
known, the Proindicus and MAM loans were not disclosed either to the
Mozambican public or to the country’s partners. The result has been
a crisis in relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the group of 14 donors and financial agencies who provide direct
support for the Mozambican state budget. All are withholding further
financial support for the Mozambican government.

As more information is becoming available, so it is becoming clear
that the guilty parties in this saga are not to be found only in
Maputo. Indeed, the loans would likely never have happened without
what looks like massive corruption and conflict of interest at
Credit Suisse.

According to an investigation by the independent agency Zitamar
News, the banker at Credit Suisse who helped structure the EMATUM
and Proindicus loans was a New Zealand national named Andrew Pearse,
who went into business with Iskander Safa, immediately after the
loans had been arranged.

Safa is managing director and CEO of Abu Dhabi Mar, a shipbuilding
group based in the United Arab Emirates, which owns 100 per cent of
Constructions Mechaniques de Normandie (CMN), the shipyard in the
French port of Cherbourg where the EMATUM vessels were built. Abu
Dhabi Mar is owned by the Abu Dhabi royal family and by Safa’s
company Privinvest Shipbuilding.

Zitamar says that, once the loan arrangements had been finalized,
Pearse took up directorships in companies owned by Safa, and trading
under the name Palomar. For example, in September 2013 (much the
same time that the EMATUM loan was becoming public knowledge in
Mozambique). Pearse established “Palomar Natural Resources”, with an
American oil and gas executive named John Buggenhagen.

The next month he was appointed director of a Zurich-based financial
advisory company, Palomar Capital Advisers. He became chairperson of
this company in November, taking over from Christopher Langford, a
British lawyer, who is a director of several other Iskander Safa
companies, including Abu Dhabi Mar Europe and Abu Dhabi Mar UK.

Among its various activities Palomar Capital Advisers advises on
debt restructuring ­ including the Proindicus debt, which suggests
that Pearse still has ties, albeit indirectly, to Credit Suisse.

Pearse and Langford are also mentioned in the now notorious “Panama
Papers”, the mass of documents leaked from Panama based law firm
Mossack Fonseca. These documents show that they are directors and
shareholders of Palomar Holdings Ltd, registered in the tax haven of
the British Virgin Islands. Other shareholders include Safa’s
company Privinveste Shipbuilding, one of the owners of Abu Dhabi
Mar.

Zitamar has also seen the EMATUM accounts, which show that the vast
bulk of the 850 million dollars was speedily dispatched to Abu Dhabi
Mar in September and October 2013. Abu Dhabi Mat received 836.3
million dollars from EMATUM. The rest of the money – 13.7 million
dollars – apparently filled bankers’ pockets, being spent on bank
fees and commissions.

But these accounts are very suspicious. For when the French press
reported on EMATUM, it said that the 30 boats cost 200 million
euros, which is about 230 million dollars. But the amount paid by
EMATUM to Abu Dhabi Mat is well over three times that amount.

The Mozambican government did not query the figures given by the
French press. In December 2013, opposition deputies in the
Mozambican parliament, the Assembly of the Republic, citing the
figure of 200 million euros, asked the government what had happened
to the rest of the money.

Far from disputing the figure, the then Fisheries Minister Victor
Borges said the rest of the EMATUM money (about 620 million dollars)
had been spent on such items as training, satellite communications,
radars, on-shore installations, licences and the like.

In 2015, Finance Minister Adriano Maleiane schematically divided the
EMATUM loan into 350 million dollars for fishing assets, and 500
million for the defence component. But if the figures cited by
Zitamar are correct, then most of the 850 million dollars was spent
on fishing assets.

We do not have an exact breakdown of how much each boat cost ­ but
even if each of the six patrol boats cost three times as much as
each of the 24 fishing boats, the fishing assets would still cost
608 million dollars, and the defence assets 228 million.

An alternative explanation, of course, is that the EMATUM figures
given to Zitamar are fictitious, and much of the money was siphoned
off.

**********************************************

Mozambique: Mozambican Public Debt Now ‘Unsustainable’

Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique (Maputo)

3 May 2016

http://allafrica.com/stories/201605040005.html

Maputo — The Mozambican Debt Group (GMD), a civil society
organization that has been working on debt issues for many years,
has denied the government’s repeated claim that the country’s public
debt is still sustainable.

On Friday, according to a report in Tuesday’s issue of the
independent newssheet “Mediafax”, the GMD held a conference on the
debt, at which the main guest was Finance Minister Adriano Maleiane,
and, using the official figures, calculated that the debt was now
way over the sustainability levels.

The government had claimed that in 2015, the debt had reached  39.9
per cent of Gross Domestic Product. The limit of sustainability is
regarded as 40 per cent, and so Mozambique was just 0.1 per cent
away from this threshold.

But those figures were calculated before the revelations last month
that the previous government, led by President Armando Guebuza, had
not disclosed government guaranteed loans contracted by two state
companies – Proindicus (622 million dollars) and Mozambique Asset
Management (MAM – 535 million dollars).

The GMD pointed out that the government’s own figure for total
public debt, of 11.64 billion dollars, given by Prime Minister
Carlos Agostinho do Rosario at a press conference last Thursday,
meant that the debt now stood at 69 per cent of GDP. The foreign
debt is over nine billion dollars, and is equivalent to 53 per cent
of GDP.

This is a conservative estimate: the ratings agency Fitch last week
put the debt at 83 per cent of GDP, and warned that, if the
Mozambican currency, the metical, continues to depreciate, the ratio
could go to over 100 per cent of GDP later in the year.

The sustainability variables are clearly out of control, warned the
GMD. Its document to the conference, cited by the paper, said “74
per cent of the debts contracted since 2012 are not concessional.
The grant element (in foreign aid) has fallen from 80 per cent in
2005, to 52 per cent in 2012, and to less than 40 per cent in 2015.
The period of grace has also fallen – from an average of 10 years in
2005, to an average of six years in 2012, and to less than five
years in 2015”.

The GMD added that the period of maturity had shrunk dramatically –
from an average of 37 years in 2005, to an average of 22 years in
2012, and to less than 20 years in 2015.

The GMD warned that this unsustainable level of public debt would
have damaging effects, particularly on the poorest strata of the
population, because the weight of debt servicing in the budget will
lead to a substantial reduction in the amount of money available for
public investment.

The GMD asked if the current government has any intention of holding
anyone responsible for the undisclosed loans and the consequent
dramatic expansion in public debt. Maleiane replied that there are
strong legal provisions to punish those responsible, if it can be
shown that they acted illegally.

It was in the interest of the government, he added, to explain as
clearly as possible the question of the public debt and, if anyone
is found guilty, he will receive “exemplary punishment”. But for
this to happen it was important to allow the institutions of the
administration of justice to do their job.

It was these institutions that must decide whether any crime had
been committed and must then sentence the guilty parties. The
Attorney-General’s Office has already announced that it is
investigating Proindicus and MAM. A separate investigation began
last year into the Mozambique Tuna Company (EMATUM), which acquired
a government guaranteed loan of 850 million dollars in 2013.

**********************************************

Frelimo under pressure on debt: parliament, party elders, US, other
donors

Mozambique News reports & Clippings by Joseph Hanlon

319, 11 May 2016

[Received by email. Archive will be available soon at
http://tinyurl.com/hqcr8bu]

Two parliamentary commissions will quiz the government on the secret
debt. The parliamentary Standing Commission agreed Monday (9 May)
that the both Plan and Budget Commission and the Defence and Public
Order Commission would question the government. The parliament
session is scheduled to resume in June, but commissions meet during
recesses so the hearings could be soon. The secret debt was taken
without parliamentary approval (thus the Budget Commission) and is
said to be for patrol boats and others arms (thus the Defence
Commission). Renamo boycotted the Standing Committee session.

This is a total reversal of the position of Frelimo in parliament,
which last month rejected a debate on the debt. More than $2
billion in secret loans and bonds were taken on in 2103-14 by a
small group around the then President Armando Guebuza. Many MPs are
seen as aligned to Guebuza, and the reversal of position is an
indication of increasing pressure on Guebuza and Frelimo.

On Saturday the politically influential Veterans Association
(Associacao dos Combatentes da Luta de Libertacao Nacional, ACLLN)
said the government should investigate possible conflicts of
interest of the still secret individual investors in the three
companies whose debts were guaranteed by the state- Ematum,
ProIndicus and MAM. It also said that the state should only accept
the military part of the debt and not that of the three companies.
Last month the Frelimo Central Committee had demanded a public
explanation of the secret debt.

In a speech to the Mozambican Bar Association on 4 May, Rui Baltazar
said the country is going through “a profound political, economic
and social crisis.” In an obvious reference to the Guebuza
government, he said Mozambique has gone through “a prolonged period
of exercise of political power with an authoritarian nature and
great opacity.” He cited “deepening corruption, misuse of state
property, nepotism, [and] an assault on public goods that should be
exploited for the benefit of the people. … Politics seems to be
only about the conquest and preservation of power as a means to
have unauthorized access to resources, promoted by a premature and
dangerous euphoria based on energy El Dorados, encouraging
wastefulness and megalomania, with all the harmful consequences
that now we will have to face.”

AIM (6 May) calls Baltazar “a moral beacon for Mozambican society”.
An anti-fascist in the late colonial period, he was one of the few
lawyers who defended Mozambican nationalists. After independence he
became Justice Minister and then Finance Minister. Eventually he
became the first chair of the Constitutional Council.

Donors and lenders tighten the screws

The United States said on Monday that it “endorsed the recent
decision by the group of 14 countries (G14) providing general
budget support to suspend such assistance until they are provided
more clarifications and accountabilities.” It also said it was
“reviewing our aid, in particular any aid to the government.” The
US has never been a budget support donor, and provides its largest
support to the health sector. “Most of this assistance directly
benefits the people of Mozambique, and the United States does not
wish to reduce this assistance.” The US says it is the largest
bilateral donor to Mozambique.
http://portuguese.maputo.usembassy.gov/dividademocambique.html

Donors and lenders met with the government last week and laid down a
hard line. They stressed that it is for the government to present a
clear roadmap or preliminary action plan, built around three key
phrases: transparency, corrective measures and accountability. The
first two of these were emphasised by the US in its statement
Monday: “the government must now act quickly to publicly account in
a full and transparent way for these loans and how the funds were
used, as well as outlining a plan to mitigate its impact on the
economy of Mozambique.”

Transparency means providing a complete list of government
guaranteed debts – it is believed that there are more which have
not been revealed – and documenting in detail what the money has
been used for. With Ematum, donors were satisfied when the IMF
forced the loan onto the government books, without actually asking
for an accounting of how the money was used. But with two new
secret loans revealed, this is no longer enough, and donors are
demanding that government at least reveal in some detail what the
money was used for.

Corrective measures mean filling the financial hole (of which more
below), and a range of measures to make public enterprises more
accountable, make sure procurement follows the rules, and ensure
that there are more public and detailed evaluations of future
investments.

Accountability is more complex. Some donors and lenders want
forensic audits, which would identify corrupt payments and where
they money went. In past corruption cases, Mozambique has only
allowed one forensic audit and it was never allowed to be used (of
which more below). Some donors want Guebuza named, shamed and
prosecuted, while others realise this is unlikely. There are
rumours that some in Frelimo want to offer former Finance Minister
Manuel Chang as the scapegoat.

Some donors now argue that there has been such good will toward
Mozambique that the country has been allowed to get away with past
corruption scandals. One admitted: “donors have not wanted to
accept that this is not a success story. So much has been invested
that they do not want to lose face – or their own hopes.” But many
donor representatives feel personally offended – government
ministers and officials lied to them about low levels of military
spending and about investments. They say the Mozambique leadership
does not yet realise how serious has been the smashing of trust,
and how this will have in impact in their home capitals.

A full renewal of aid will be dependent on Mozambique having an IMF
programme. The previous one was based on misleading data from the
government, so the IMF will want to start from scratch, and this
could take more than a year. But the IMF will surely demand harsh
austerity measures and tight controls of both government spending
and the money supply. Investment will be frozen, wages might be
cut, and devaluation will continue, raising Maputo food prices
(which in the past has caused riots).

**********************************************

How Mozambique can contain its debt crisis and avoid long-term
damage

May 12, 2016

Sam Jones, Associate Professor in Development, Economics, University
of Copenhagen

http://theconversation.com – direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/z9ubo34

[Disclosure statement: Sam Jones works for the University of
Copenhagen, which provides technical assistance in economic research
and analysis to the Ministry of Economy & Finance in Mozambique. The
present article is written in his personal capacity only.]

[Note: original version at link above includes further links to
additional sources]

Mozambique’s return to the international limelight reads like a John
le Carré novel. The elements of a bestseller are all present:
growing internal instability, unexplored natural gas deposits,
international loans to purchase weapons disguised as lending to fund
tuna boats, and hidden public loan guarantees to private companies
owned by the secret services. And, of course, there are legions of
international bankers and diplomats wringing hands in late-night
meetings.

Unfortunately, this is not fiction. The debts are real and the costs
of these decisions will hang over Mozambique for decades. This
article provides a summary of what we know about Mozambique’s
external debt situation and proposes measures to contain the current
situation and avoid longer-term damage.

The scale of the debt burden

After weeks of rumour, some clarity about Mozambique’s external debt
position recently emerged following an emergency visit of the
government to the International Monetary Fund in Washington. [table
of rough estimates by author available as image in original article]

The country’s officially reported external debt stock at the end
2014 was more than US$6.5 billion, excluding $500 million taken on
to government accounts in 2014 associated with the infamous Ematum
deal for the tuna fleet.

Even before the current crisis this was a cause for concern.
Mozambique had been a major beneficiary of various debt relief
initiatives in the late 1990s and 2000s. At the beginning of this
century the country’s debt stock was about $1 billion. In 2010 the
same stock was $3.3 billion. By 2014 it had doubled.

Then there’s what is owed on the controversial “new” debts:

Ematum, for the controversial tuna fleet;

ProIndicus, which is aimed at providing security, especially for gas
and oil operations; and

Mozambique Asset Management, which was set up for maritime
maintenance and repairs.

Due to the heavy financial burden of the Ematum deal, originally due
in 2020, it was recently restructured. The repayment period was
extended from 2020 to 2023, increasing the annual interest rate from
6.305% to 10.5%, and switching to a “bullet” repayment. This means
that the full principal amount is only repaid at the end of the
period.

The two other loans, ProIndicus and Mozambique Asset Management, are
standard private loans and must be repaid in the next five years.

Together, the immediate annual costs of these three debts are
expected to be more than $300 million per year, double the total
external debt service costs in 2014.

Another point that has been neglected in the debate around these
three controversial loans is additional public debt taken on since
2014. According to government declarations, the external debt stock
stood at $9.89 billion in May 2016. Basic arithmetic means that,
even excluding the controversial loans, a further $1.4 billion of
public external debt has been incurred since 2014. This continues a
worrying trend of rapid indebtedness.

What it all adds up to

Putting all this together, annual debt service costs are likely to
be in the region of $500 million over the next few years, of which
more than $200 million are in interest costs alone. These costs
could be higher, depending on the structure of these other more
recent debts.

A total of $500 million is equivalent to about 33% of conventional
merchandise exports – excluding the contribution of mega-projects
such as aluminum and coal – or 25% of net international reserves.
This will create significant pressures on public finances.

Moreover, news that a set of major donors, including the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, are reviewing their
lending to Mozambique means that access to hard currency will become
even more scarce in the short term. Further depreciation of the
currency is likely, which would only add to the local currency cost
of the debt burden.

What action can be taken

How can Mozambique contain this situation and avoid a downward
spiral?

There are no simple solutions. But calls by donors for full
transparency and accountability around the debt situation must be
taken more seriously. The government could start by opening its
books to a credible and thorough external audit of the external
debt, as well as of its relationships with private companies through
loan guarantees and private-public partnerships.

Admittedly, a legal investigation into the controversial loans has
begun. This is welcome but needs to be more than a pro forma
exercise and must be free from political interference.

Substantive actions in these two domains would go some way to
restoring donor confidence.

A further set of immediate actions should be to deal with the
companies associated with the controversial loans. Under current
circumstances, it is difficult to envisage any plausible scenario
under which these companies become viable. A sensible option is to
avoid further losses now.

One strategy here starts by recognising that some of the rights
owned by these companies are valuable, as are the existing assets of
Ematum. An international auction to these rights or to an exclusive
management contract would serve two purposes. First, it would raise
money to pay off the loans, thereby reducing their social costs.
Second, it would provide a transparent commercial valuation of the
businesses opening the way for renegotiation with creditors.

In my view, if the private lenders to ProIndicus and Mozambique
Asset Management were excessively optimistic in their valuation of
these businesses, they should bear some losses.

Temptations to be avoided

An unavoidable consequence of the current crisis will be some form
of austerity. Here the government needs to maintain a cool head and
avoid rash decisions that undermine long-term growth and fiscal
health. It will be tempting to seek a new round of loans from
abroad, perhaps from China where Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi
will be making an official visit in May.

Of course, some short-run relief would be handy. But there is a
major risk that this is not transparent and will incur new fiscal
liabilities or high long-run opportunity costs. Moreover, this
approach could alienate other donors and therefore jeopardise
critical sources of financing for social sectors.

The general point is that a more serious and rational approach to
public debt is needed, in which loan decisions based on vanity or
political preferences are avoided. Rather, rigorous analysis of
project viability and the profile of their net benefits is needed.
It would be helpful to enact in law stricter requirements and
transparency around all new debt issues and guarantees.

Another temptation is to hand out attractive tax breaks to foreign
companies to kick-start delayed natural resource investments. Again,
this might provide temporary relief but this would be the public
finance equivalent of selling the family silver to a pawn shop. It
is critical that the long-run public value of these assets is not
squandered due to poor policy decisions by a previous government.

Finally, it is essential that the government continues to invest in
the foundations for sustained growth. This means that public
investment in infrastructure, agricultural development and human
capital (education, health) should be the main priorities. So these
budgets need to be ring-fenced in some way. This is easier said than
done, especially given ongoing internal conflict. Solving this
political standoff is vital to get out of the current economic mess.

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
write to this address to subscribe or unsubscribe to the bulletin,
or to suggest material for inclusion. For more information about
reposted material, please contact directly the original source
mentioned. For a full archive and other resources, see
http://www.africafocus.org

AfricaFocus Bulletin
May 5, 2016 (160505)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“After two decades spent fighting in the bush, Dominic Ongwen, a
senior commander in the notorious Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA),
faces trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC) on seventy
counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. … the first time
that a former child soldier will be prosecuted at the ICC and the
first time that an accused faces charges for the same crimes
perpetrated against him. As such, the Ongwen trial raises myriad
questions and poses difficult dilemmas regarding the prosecution of
child soldiers.” – Justice in Conflict symposium

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/uga1605.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/uga1605.php

The demands of justice, accountability, and healing after any
conflict are all imperative. But satisfying any of these demands,
much less all three, is far from easy, particularly in the case of
child soldiers. The role of the International Criminal Court is
controversial in many ways. But the issues raised in this symposium
would remain difficult, regardless of whether the decisions were being made
by any other international or national court, governmental body, or truth
commission.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains the introduction and excerpts
from three of the commentaries in an on-line symposium on the
Dominic Ongwen Trial and the Prosecution of Child Soldiers.
Commentaries included are by Ledio Cakaj, Rosebell Kagumire, and
Mark A. Drumbl. Additional commentaries in the symposium are
available at http://tinyurl.com/havs44v

For additional background, analysis, and sources on the Lord’s
Resistance Army and the conflict in Northern Uganda, widely
publicized in the “Kony 2012” on-line campaign, see in particular:
http://www.africafocus.org/docs12/kon1203a.php and
http://www.africafocus.org/docs12/kon1203b.php

For other previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Uganda, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/uganda.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

The Dominic Ongwen Trial and the Prosecution of Child Soldiers – A
Justice in Conflict Symposium

by Mark Kersten

Justice in Conflict, April 11, 2016

http://justiceinconflict.org – Direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/havs44v

After two decades spent fighting in the bush, Dominic Ongwen, a
senior commander in the notorious Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA),
faces trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC) on seventy
counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. In early 2015,
Ongwen was surrendered to the ICC via another rebel army, the Séléka
rebel coalition and US forces ‘hunting’ for LRA combatants in the
Central African Republic. To date, Ongwen is the only alleged
perpetrator from northern Uganda to find himself facing judges at
the ICC. Ongwen’s trial is momentous for many reasons. It marks the
first time that a former child soldier will be prosecuted at the ICC
and the first time that an accused faces charges for the same crimes
perpetrated against him. As such, the Ongwen trial raises myriad
questions and poses difficult dilemmas regarding the prosecution of
child soldiers.

To examine these issues, Justice in Conflict is honoured to host an
online symposium on The Dominic Ongwen Trial and the Prosecution of
Child Soldiers. …

Symposium contributions include:

The Life and Times of Dominic Ongwen, Child Soldier and LRA
Commander, by Ledio Cakaj

Rupturing Official Histories in the Trial of Dominic Ongwen, by Adam
Branch

The Ongwen Trial and the Struggle for Justice in Northern Uganda, by
Rosebell Kagumire

What Counts against Ongwen – Effectiveness at the Price of
Efficiency?, by Danya Chaikel

There is Nothing Extraordinary about the Prosecution of Dominic
Ongwen, by Alex Whiting

We Need to Talk About Ongwen: The Plight of Victim-Perpetrators at
the ICC, by Barrie Sander

Shifting Narratives: Ongwen and Lubanga on the Effects of Child
Soldiering, by Mark A. Drumbl

Press Release: Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Speaks
on the Trial of Dominic Ongwen, by Mark Kersten

**************************************************************

The Life and Times of Dominic Ongwen, Child Soldier and LRA
Commander

by Ledio Cakaj

April 12, 2016

[Ledio Cakaj is a researcher working on conflict in East and Central
Africa. His book, When the Walking Defeats You; One Man’s Journey as
Joseph Kony’s Bodyguard, will be published in November 2016 by Zed
Books.]

It must be strange being in Dominic Ongwen’s shoes. Suited up in a
large room in a foreign country with fancy lawyers and judges
staring him down, accusing him of unspeakable crimes. No wonder he
seems amused, bewildered and confused. The legal proceedings must be
particularly outlandish to a man, who, snatched from his family as a
child, tried to excel at whatever life threw at him, only for life
to change the script over and over again. And it must be
particularly frustrating for him to be compared to Joseph Kony, a
man whose clutches Ongwen has tried to escape for at least the last
decade.

At ten or so, Ongwen excelled at school and was expected to go far,
become a teacher like his parents, a lawyer or a doctor. When
fighters from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) abducted him in the
early 1990s, he was too small to walk long distances or fight, even
though children already fought in the LRA ranks. It was Ongwen’s
perseverance and his desire to do well and make the adults proud
that saw him not only survive the hostile environment but also
become a noted fighter. Had the country of its birth provided him
with basic security, he might have become a noted lawyer or perhaps
a doctor.

At fifteen Ongwen was exposed to – and allegedly forced to
participate in – the massacre of over 300 people in the village of
Atiak, masterminded by Vincent Otti, Ongwen’s mentor in the LRA.
Under Otti’s guidance, Ongwen had to punish civilians who did not
help the LRA, fight Ugandan soldiers, and abduct more youths to fill
the ranks. Refusal brought beatings and death.

While in the first years of his life as a rebel Ongwen might have
acted under duress, he was taught, and likely convinced, that the
LRA’s struggle was just. Kony addressed assemblies of LRA members in
true Sunday Mass style saying that the LRA fought for the rights of
the Acholi people, who were abused by the Ugandan army. He swore
that the Holy Spirit had forced him to save the Acholi. Kony was
fond of a line from the Old Testament: “If you are led by the
Spirit, you are not under the law.”

Apart from fighting for his people, Ongwen was also told he was
lamony — a soldier. The world that Ongwen-the-soldier inhabited was
different to the one Ongwen-the-child left behind. Being alive was
contingent on killing others. To take their food, clothes, or their
ability to shoot back. Survival chances increased with promotion
into officer ranks as low-level fighters were the first to die from
bullets or pervasive shortages of food. Ongwen obeyed orders, fought
hard, and excelled in the way of the rebels. By his late teens he
was a commander with bodyguards, ‘wives’ and young servants.

Ongwen was good at fighting and killing. But he never was a top
commander, certainly not on par with those who had joined Kony from
the start, like Kenneth Banya, Vincent Otti or Okot Odhiambo. Sadly,
there were many others like Ongwen in the LRA, young men abducted as
children who were eager to please the Lapwony Madit (Big Teacher)
Kony. Many of them like, Ochan Bunia, Vincent ‘Binany,’ or Otim
‘Ferry,’ have died fighting for Kony. Others, like Patrick Agweng or
Jon Bosco Kibwola were killed on Kony’s orders, mostly as sacrifices
to appease his ego. Of the surviving ones, Okot George ‘Odek,’ who
left the LRA in February 2016, told me, he worried he would be
charged by the ‘World Court (a reference to the International
Criminal Court (ICC)),’ like Ongwen. Similarly, Opiyo Sam, another
LRA commander who returned to Uganda two years ago, claimed he does
not know or understand why Ongwen was singled out by the ICC.

Growing older made Ongwen wiser to Kony’s ways, which in turn made
him lose his commander status and its associated benefits handed out
by Kony as he saw fit. Ongwen became openly critical with Kony and
was demoted. In his mid-20s Ongwen seemed interested in leaving the
LRA but he was too scared to do so, feeling trapped. He was
terrified of the bad spirits he had unleashed and worried that they
would haunt him if he left the rebels – and the protection of the
Holy Spirit – to become a civilian once again. He was also concerned
with being thrown in prison or being killed by the Ugandan
authorities – a common fear for many LRA members.

Ongwen tried more than once to find a way out of the LRA, discussing
defection with local clergy, fellow fighters and his ‘wives.’ In
early 2006 as he contemplated surrender once more, Otti called from
Congo’s Garamba Park. The LRA leaders prepared for peace talks -the
Juba Talks – and Kony wanted to show full strength. He wanted all
the fighters to assemble in Congo but openly suspected Ongwen, who
led one of the last remaining small groups in Northern Uganda, of
wanting to quit. Otti said that a new World Court – a reference to
the ICC – wanted to capture and kill Ongwen but that the peace talks
offered a way out. Ongwen agreed, reluctantly leaving Uganda in
August 2006, the last LRA commander to make it to Congo.

As the peace talks stalled, Ongwen became reportedly depressed and
resorted to alcohol, particularly after Kony allowed its consumption
in the spring of 2007. In November 2007 Kony had Otti killed,
effectively ending the peace process and any possibility of making
the ICC arrest warrants go away, as Otti had promised Ongwen.

At the end of 2008, after the Ugandan army launched Operation
Lightning Thunder against LRA bases in Garamba Park, LRA groups
carried out retaliatory attacks against Congolese civilians, leaving
more than a thousand dead in a few weeks. Ongwen was reportedly in
charge of a group that attacked Doruma, killing many as they
celebrated Christmas. Throughout 2009 and until 2014, he operated in
northeastern Congo, often following river Duru into South Sudan
where his troops attacked civilians, mostly to secure food. He
continued to lead his own group, often refusing to liaise with
Kony’s messengers or respond to Kony’s radio messages. Kony remained
suspicious and critical of Ongwen. On three different occasions, he
threatened to have Ongwen killed, including in October 2007 when
Ongwen was the only commander to protest Otti’s execution.

In late 2014, a Kony bodyguard stumbled upon Ongwen’s group -at that
point acting independently of Kony – near the Congo – Central
African Republic (CAR) border. Ongwen was somehow convinced to join
Kony in Kafia Kingi, a Sudanese Army controlled area in Southern
Darfur, where Kony had him tortured and put under house arrest. As
in previous instances, Kony said he did not want to kill him because
his sister, also abducted at a young age, was one of Kony’s favorite
wives. With the help of a fighter who was supposed to guard him,
Ongwen managed to escape before Kony could do much worse.

Ongwen reportedly left the LRA camp barefoot and barely clothed and
walked for days towards the CAR border where he was helped by cattle
keepers, who took him to a Seleka group, near the town of Sam
Ouandja, CAR. Not understanding Ongwen’s importance, the Seleka
commander reached out, via a local merchant and an NGO worker, to
the American Special Forces in Obo, CAR. A US helicopter was
dispatched to transport Ongwen from Sam Ouandja to Obo where he was
later handed over to the Ugandan army. After a few days in Obo at
the Ugandan army base, Ongwen was flown to Bangui and then to The
Hague.

***************************************************************

The Ongwen Trial and the Struggle for Justice in Northern Uganda

by Rosebell Kagumire

April 14, 2016

[Rosebell Kagumire is a Ugandan journalist, communications
specialist, public speaker and award-winning blogger. She has over
10 years experience working at the intersection between media and
rights in crisis, women’s rights, peace and security.] For previous
posts in the symposium, click here.

My first trip to northern Uganda was in 2005. I was working at a
newspaper in Kampala and went on an assignment. The air was still
and tense, our hosts warned us not to stay late at the bar in Gulu
town, the biggest town in the province of Acholiland. I had many
interviews, comprising of countless horror stories from children as
young as five on what they had gone through during the war. They
were still ‘night commuters’ – children would leave their homes in
the rural areas to spend a night in the relative safety of Gulu town
where the army could protect them from being abducted. I was one of
the Ugandans privileged enough not to have any direct experience
with war. My parents weren’t. Post-independence Uganda saw many
turbulences and the struggle for power continued. In the vacuum and
absence of national consolidation, resistance and rebel movements
mushroomed.

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) were one of the last rebel
movements to emerge and put up the longest rebellion, well known for
their horrendous tactics and the terrible crimes they committed
against the populations of Northern and North Eastern Uganda. The
children I spoke with on that 2005 trip lived in a totally different
world than me, even though we were from the same country. Besides
the LRA’s violence, they also witnessed other children, as well as
their siblings, parents and relatives either mutilated or die of
preventable disease in internally displaced peoples camps set up by
the Government of Uganda to ‘protect’ them. You didn’t have to know
international criminal law to know these were crimes against
humanity.

One of the teenage boys I interviewed was Simon. Simon had been
recently released after a few months at a rehabilitation centre. But
it wasn’t really rehabilitation, as the sheer volume of children
either rescued or escaped from the LRA was too high for the
available centres to provide adequate psychosocial support.

Simon had passed through one of those centres and so we sat down to
hear his story. As with the heinous acts many children recounted to
me, it was hard not to feel pressure rise in your chest listening to
these stories. Simon was forced to kill his parents with a machete
before he was abducted. The rebels threatened to kill the whole
family if he wouldn’t do it. Forcing Simon to kill his parents began
the process of mutating him into a child soldier. Simon spent many
years with the LRA, during which he knew he couldn’t return. How
could he come back to a community that knew he had killed his own
parents? And what was home? His siblings, his relatives, could he
ever be forgiven? These were questions that Simon couldn’t move
past.

Like many child soldiers, Simon would go on to kill many more people
during his time in the LRA. Finally, after five years in the bush at
the age of 20 he was returned to his surviving relatives in the camp
after a rescue by the Ugandan army in 2005. But the family didn’t
want anything to do with him and, in the absence of proper
government run shelters and psychosocial services, Simon still
battled trauma and nightmares when I visited him again in 2008.

Simon’s life comes to mind when considering the proceedings against
Dominic Ongwen. Ongwen was abducted by the LRA as a child and rose
through the ranks of the rebel group. When he was surrendered to the
ICC in early 2015, my thought was that any of the children I had
interviewed could have become an Ongwen. If they hadn’t been
rescued, some could have gone on with their fear of return replaced
with the power that the gun and rebel hierarchy bring.

We are told that Ongwen’s trial is about justice. But what does that
mean for the local communities who have to heal? This includes those
families whose children were abducted just like Ongwen and families
whose children were abducted by Ongwen. The calls for forgiveness
from some victims are not a surprise. Many know their own children
are still struggling to overcome the trauma and cope with the crimes
they were forced to carry out.

While some believe Ongwen’s trial will go a long way to holding LRA
accountable and bring some form of justice to victims (evidenced by
the more 2,000 victims who have agreed to support the trial), other
victims have called for local justice measures and reconciliation.
This has precedence, they claim, as top former LRA commanders were
granted amnesty by the Government even though they could easily be
charged with hundreds of counts of war crimes themselves. The
commanders live freely in northern Uganda and many argue that, given
that he was abducted, Ongwen, deserves the same pardon.

On the other hand, the ICC trial will be important for both victims
and the country as a means to understand and confront what really
happened in northern Uganda. Ongwen faces 70 counts of war crimes
and crimes against humanity include murder, persecution, torture,
pillaging, conscription of child soldiers, and sexual and gender-
based crimes, which he allegedly committed between 2003 and 2005 in
the internally displaced camps of Lukodi, Pajule, Abok and Odek in
the north. But in Uganda, while many condemn the LRA and the crimes
committed, missing is the role of government which many in the north
would have wanted to see interrogated — and investigated.

For the people of northern Uganda, the charge of forced marriage
will be of particular significance. The Rome Statute doesn’t cover
it as a crime but the prosecutor has charged it as cruel inhuman
treatment. Through the prosecution of forced marriage, the sexual
crimes against many women who were abducted and given as rewards for
men fighting will uniquely bring out the plight of women during this
war. The trial will also have to dig deeper into how one transitions
from victim to perpetrator and how capable one can be, if abducted,
in forming the necessary intent to commit the crimes Ongwen is
charged with. The trial in general will hopefully highlight the
complexity of the 20-plus year war where the lines between victim
and perpetrator are sometimes blurred.

Many also hope that Ongwen’s ICC appearance and his possible trial
will move the Government and other actors to finally tend to the
real needs of the communities on the ground who still have no
reparations programs nor reconciliation and truth-seeking processes.
The communities are still in need psycho-social support and it is
largely wanting. If the proceedings against Ongwen at the ICC can
help increase the chances that the people of northern Uganda receive
the attention and services they deserve, it holds out the
possibility of being a success.

***********************************************************

Shifting Narratives: Ongwen and Lubanga on the Effects of Child
Soldiering

by Mark A. Drumbl

April 20, 2016

[Mark A. Drumbl is the Class of 1975 Alumni Professor of Law &
Director, Transnational Law Institute, Washington & Lee School of
Law.]

On March 23, 2016, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) II issued its
decision confirming charges against Dominic Ongwen. PTC II confirmed
many charges, including for sexual and gender-based crimes. Ongwen
will be tried for some crimes that he had himself endured. These
include the war crime of cruel treatment, conscription and use as a
child soldier, and the crime against humanity of enslavement.

Ongwen was abducted into the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) at the age
of 9 while walking home from school. He was bullied, brutalized, and
indoctrinated as a child soldier. He rose through the ranks. He
ascended to the upper echelons of power, although these remained
tightly controlled by LRA leader Joseph Kony.

Irrespective of how high he ascended, however, Ongwen’s point of
entry remains fixed as a young, kidnapped, orphaned, and abused
child. Ongwen’s defense team invoked this point of entry in its
submissions. Defense counsel did so to make two specific legal
points. First, that the ongoing and continuous nature of the crime
of child soldiering means that Ongwen left the LRA – nearly thirty
years later – still as a child soldier and, thereby, that he should
be entitled to the evacuation of individual criminal responsibility
that hortatorily inheres in the international legal regime that
protects child soldiers. Second, the defense team submitted that
coming of age in the LRA amounts to a kind of institutionalized
duress that excludes criminal responsibility under Rome Statute
article 31(1)(d) rather than just mitigating sentence. According to
the defense, Ongwen “lived most of his life under duress (i.e. from
the age of 9.5 years old)” and his “so-called rank was demonstrative
of one thing: that he was surviving better than others while under
duress”.

When making both arguments, the Ongwen defense team extensively (yet
unsuccessfully) invoked the findings of Dr. Elisabeth Schauer, a
court-appointed expert whose testimony on the dissociation and
trauma arising out of the child soldiering experience had been
dispositive to the Lubanga case. In Lubanga, child soldiers were the
victims and Lubanga the adult perpetrator; in Ongwen, the accused is
a former child soldier and many of his alleged victims were children
at the time.

PTC II perfunctorily dismissed Ongwen’s first argument without
providing any reasons. PTC II also dismissed the second argument,
although not quite as perfunctorily. One judge, moreover, will
append in due course a separate, concurring opinion.

Reasonable minds can disagree as to whether the defense arguments
have merit. The point of my commentary is not to revisit these
arguments. …

Instead, my point is to emphasize that international criminal law
should proceed in consistent and predictable ways. Here, PTC II
slipped. Its understanding of the agency of actual and former child
soldiers in Ongwen departs from the understanding previously
deployed by the Lubanga Trial and Appeals Chambers, in particular in
the sentencing judgments.

Lubanga cast the linkage between the past as a child soldier and the
present as a former child soldier as linear and continuous. The
child soldiering experience was constructed as ongoing and assured:
it rendered the children as victims damaged for life, with their
reality today as derivative of their previous suffering. Once a
child soldier in fact, always a child soldier in mind, body, and
soul. In Ongwen, however, the linkage between the accused’s past as
a child soldier and his present as a former child soldier was seen
as discontinuous and contingent.

In his opening statement in the Lubanga trial, then Chief Prosecutor
Luis Moreno-Ocampo portrayed the former child soldiers as indelibly
wounded and recurrently traumatized.

“They cannot forget the beatings they suffered; they cannot forget
the terror they felt and the terror they inflicted; they cannot
forget the sounds of their machine guns; they cannot forget that
they killed; they cannot forget that they raped and that they were
raped.”

The 2012 Lubanga sentencing judgment (confirmed on appeal in
December 2014) had prioritized and excerpted from Dr. Schauer’s
expert submissions that the Ongwen defense team sought
unsuccessfully to invoke. Elements of Dr. Schauer’s work pertinent
to the Lubanga sentencing analysis include her submissions that
“children of war and child soldiers […] often suffer from
devastating long-term consequences of experienced or witnesses acts
of violence” and that conflict experiences “can hamper children’s
healthy development and their ability to function fully even once
the violence has ceased.” …

In Ongwen, however, a different narrative emerges. This narrative
contemplates agency, choice, and action. In response to the
defense’s emphasis on Ongwen’s entry into the LRA as an abducted
child, PTC II held that “the circumstances of Ongwen’s stay in the
LRA […] cannot be said to be beyond his control… [.]” PTC II
concluded that “escapes from the LRA were not rare.” It underscored
that Ongwen “could have chosen not to rise in hierarchy and expose
himself to increasingly higher responsibility to implement
policies.” It added that the evidence demonstrates that Dominic
Ongwen “shared the ideology of the LRA, including its brutal and
perverted policy with respect to civilians”. PTC II noted that
Ongwen could “have avoided raping” forced wives, “or, at the very
least, he could have reduced the brutality of the sexual abuse”.

PTC II thereby shied away from the Lubanga narrative of the
pernicious, ongoing effect of being compelled as a child into a
violent armed group and socialized therein. Whereas the defense
sought to link Ongwen’s conduct as an adult to his horrid
experiences as a child, PTC II only examined his agency as an adult
– as if he had never been a child, let alone a child in the LRA. In
rejecting the duress submissions in Ongwen, PTC II elides Ongwen’s
status as a former child soldier. It’s as if he lost that status, or
ceded it. Hence, there is a proper way to be a victim. Victimhood is
contingent, so to speak, even aleatory.

In truth, the Ongwen narrative reflects the diverse experiences of
actual and former child soldiers and the complexities of survival
and social navigation in invidious circumstances. After all,
problematic essentialisms abound in the Lubanga criminal judgments.

That said, in the push to confirm charges against Ongwen, PTC II
invokes language that should perturb child rights activists. The
Ongwen confirmation of charges decision conflicts with a tenet of
post-conflict rehabilitation and reintegration. This tenet
approaches all persons (regardless of age) who had become associated
with armed groups and armed forces while under the age of 18 as
former child soldiers and accords them entitlements and treatment
that hinge upon this status.

The contrast between Ongwen and Lubanga vivifies how narratives of
agency, choice, and constraint may become instrumentalized by judges
to suit the prosecutorial impulse. This contrast additionally
reflects the clumsiness of the criminal law in conceptualizing child
soldiering specifically and, in Ongwen’s case, victim-perpetrator
circularity generally.

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a
particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
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http://www.africafocus.org

Nigeria: Shapes of Violence, 2

AfricaFocus Bulletin
April 27, 2016 (160427)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

“It has been two years since the world’s deadliest terrorist
organization – Boko Haram – abducted 271 girls from their high
school in the town of Chibok – a tragedy that would shine much
needed international attention on conflict in northeastern Nigeria.
Sadly, the Chibok girls are only one part of a much larger story of
violence against women and girls in the northeast. … the needs of
all those whom the Chibok girls symbolize – thousands upon thousands
who have suffered gender-based violence at Boko Haram’s hands – are
being unaddressed.” – Refugees International

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for
printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/nig1604b.php, and
click on “format for print or mobile.”

To share this on Facebook, click on
https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/nig1604b.php

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from a new report by
Refugees International, documenting the failures of humanitarian
assistance to address gender-based violence in northeastern Nigeria,
both by Boko Haram and among those who have been displaced by the
violence. Also included is an Amnesty International report on an
entirely separate case of violence, in which Nigerian security
forces in December last year perpetrated “mass slaughter of hundreds
of men, women and children …and the attempted cover-up of this
crime,” against followers of a Shiite Muslim group in Zaria in
north-central Nigeria.

As these examples show, the realities of violence, whether in
Nigeria, other African countries, or indeed in rich countries such
as the United States as well, are often far more complicated than
the stereotypes that often prevail among those observing them from a
distance. Thus, violence in Nigeria is often simplistically
characterized as “religious conflict” between Muslims and
Christians. A new collection of empirical studies released this year
by Nigeria Watch, based in Ibadan, Nigeria, provides a more complex
perspective, documenting, for instance, that intra-Muslim conflict
is more common that conflicts between Muslims and Christians, and
that much of the conflict involving both Muslims and Christians is
based on secular rather than religious motives.

Another AfricaFocus Bulletin, available on the web but not sent out
by email, contains excerpts from one of the chapters in this new
report, focused specifically on violence involving Christians and
Muslims in Nigeria. The full 216-page report is available at
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/37759

Other recent articles with relevant background on Boko Haram in
particular include the following from the Washington Post and the
New York Times.

“Here’s why so many people join Boko Haram, despite its notorious
violence,” by Hilary Matfess, Washington Post, April 26, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/hqw6og4

“Failure to Share Data Hampers War on Boko Haram in Africa,” by Eric
Schmitt and Dionne Searcey, New York Times, April 23, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/jzsmla7

“Women Who Fled Boko Haram Tell of Devastation and, Rarely, Hope,”
by Helene Cooper, New York Times, April 22, 2106
http://tinyurl.com/z48hplw

“Abducted Nigerian Girls Have Not Been Abandoned, U.S. Says,” by
Helene Cooper, April 20, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/z4bj6md

“Boko Haram still a threat months after ‘technical victory,’ by
Bradley Klapper|AP, Washington Post, April 19, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/h3dfy48

“What’s Worse Than a Girl Being Kidnapped?,” by Adaobi Tricia
Nwaubani, New York Times, April 15, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/hcak5ch

“Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls two years ago. What happened to
them?,” by Kevin Sieff, Washington Post, April 14, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/zj57sxg

“Boko Haram Turns Female Captives Into Terrorists,” by Dionne
Searcey, New York Times, April 7, 2016 http://tinyurl.com/jqyxw2d

“They were freed from Boko Haram’s rape camps. But their nightmare
isn’t over,” by Kevin Sieff, Washington Post, April 3, 2016
http://tinyurl.com/zxcpob3

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Nigeria, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/nigeria.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++

Nigeria’s Displaced Women and Girls: Humanitarian Community at Odds,
Boko Haram Survivors Forsaken

Refugees International, April 21, 2016

http://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2016/nigeria

It has been two years since the world’s deadliest terrorist
organization – Boko Haram – abducted 271 girls from their high
school in the town of Chibok – a tragedy that would shine much
needed international attention on conflict in northeastern Nigeria.
Sadly, the Chibok girls are only one part of a much larger story of
violence against women and girls in the northeast. But the attention
on this remote corner of the Sahel has not translated into sustained
humanitarian assistance for all those that have been affected.
Humanitarian stakeholders are under tremendous strain due to the
enormity of the emergency, conflicts between aid agencies, limited
resources, and an ineffective partner in the Nigerian state. As a
result, the needs of all those whom the Chibok girls symbolize –
thousands upon thousands who have suffered gender-based violence at
Boko Haram’s hands – are being unaddressed. Moreover, the lackluster
humanitarian response is placing women and girls affected by Boko
Haram at further risk of gender-based violence.

Background

Northeast Nigeria has been the primary theater for the militant
group Boko Haram’s insurgency since 2009. Violence has ebbed and
flowed over the years as the insurgents evolved from a homegrown
uprising against the police in three states to a more sophisticated
and ruthless extremist Islamist group, which pledged allegiance to
ISIS in 2015. The sheer brutality of Boko Haram, marked by mass
abductions, indiscriminate killings, suicide bombings, sexual
violence, and slavery, has earned it the unsavory designation as the
world’s deadliest terrorist group. The toll is not certain, but
reportedly 20,000 have been killed as a result of the insurgency. In
2014, Boko Haram intensified its attacks, resulting in a sudden
growth in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) arriving
in Maiduguri, the capital city of the northeastern state of Borno.

Much criticism, both domestic and international, has been leveled at
the Nigerian government for its perceived failure to deploy a more
robust strategy to eliminate the scourge of Boko Haram. Muhammadu
Buhari made the defeat of Boko Haram a central pillar of his
successful campaign for the 2015 presidential elections. He assumed
power in May 2015, and in December announced that Nigeria had
technically defeated Boko Haram – a declaration found to be
outlandish by many Nigeria watchers, as violence continues. Although
the validity of this statement is arguable, the Nigerian Army (NA)
did intensify its campaign against Boko Haram in 2015, “liberating”
– in their words – areas that were under the militants’ control.
This campaign resulted in further displacement in Borno, including
into Maiduguri.

Multiple reports document the horrors that women and girls have
experienced under Boko Haram. Further, a recent report documents the
difficulties that abducted women and girls have reintegrating back
into their families and communities, particularly for those labeled
as “Boko Haram wives.” Yet there is a dearth of information on what
and how humanitarian assistance is serving the very specific needs
of these women and girls.

In February 2016, Refugees International (RI) conducted a mission to
Nigeria to assess the needs of those displaced in Borno State, and
how the humanitarian community can best serve women and girls. The
RI team met with federal and state authorities, the UN,
international non-governmental organizations (INGO) and community-
based organizations, human rights defenders, local volunteers,
members of the donor and diplomatic communities in Abuja and
Maiduguri, and IDPs and host community members in Maiduguri. The
humanitarian crisis facing the aid community in the northeast is
nothing short of daunting.

The Humanitarian Panorama

The humanitarian crisis facing the aid community in the northeast is
nothing short of daunting. According to the 2016 Humanitarian Needs
Overview (HNO), 14.8 million people are affected in four states of
the northeast. 7 The UN estimates that of this number, seven million
are in need, three million of whom are estimated to be entirely
inaccessible. It is worthwhile to note, however, that precise
numbers are difficult to attain due to the humanitarian access
constraints. This is especially the case for Borno, where nearly 70
percent of the territory was inaccessible at the time of the HNO.
Consequently, most humanitarians believe that the numbers of people
in need are much higher.

Overall, there are an estimated 2.2 million displaced in the
northeast, according to the International Organization for
Migration’s most recent displacement tracking exercise. 9 This is a
sharp increase from the much more modest figure of 261,000 in
December 2014, as per the HNO. The vast majority of the displaced –
1.3 million – are in Maiduguri and its environs. Their arrival more
than doubled the population of the city in a single year. Only
approximately eight percent of the IDPs are in government-run IDP
camps or settlements. The Nigerian authorities only deliver
humanitarian assistance to those in camps, which are managed by the
National and State Emergency Management Agencies (NEMA and SEMA,
respectively). The remainder must fend for themselves, depending on
the kindness of relatives and hosts among the local population –
hosts that are increasingly exhausting their limited resources – as
well as local faith-based institutions that have neither the
resources nor the expertise to deliver humanitarian aid. A very
small percentage of IDPs are being served by the small INGO
community.

Access to food – both in and out of the camps – was the primary
concern cited by IDPs with whom RI spoke. According to figures
released in March 2016 by the UN Office for Affairs (OCHA), an
estimated 2.5 million children are malnourished. Within the
government-run camps, the number of displaced far outstrips the
number of water, sanitation, and hygiene facilities that
international standards call for in camp settings, forcing women and
girls to wait for hours in lines, with many ultimately opting for
open urination and defecation. One INGO working in the host
communities in Maiduguri asserts that nearly every household is
housing IDPs, in some cases multiple families, and host families are
now selling their assets to be able to feed displaced people under
their care. Livelihood opportunities are grossly limited for those
living both inside and outside of camps. Finally, several
displacement sites have been targeted by Boko Haram suicide bombers,
leading to restrictive policies involving basic human rights such as
freedom of movement, which impact both IDPs’ protection and their
ability to participate in income-generating activities.

Against this backdrop, at the time of RI’s visit, there were only a
handful of UN agencies, with very limited personnel, and less than
ten international organizations operating in Maiduguri. At time of
writing, the 2016 UN humanitarian appeal for Nigeria is dangerously
underfunded. As of April, only $33.7 million of the $248 million
proposed for the UN humanitarian response plan—just 14 percent—has
been met.

Boko Haram’s survivors, in the shadow of humanitarian action

Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Alert,
UNICEF, and several journalists have all reported on the horrors of
life under Boko Haram and the very specific needs of women they have
interviewed – medical, psychological, livelihood, and community
reconciliation opportunities. Yet it is RI’s assessment that there
has been minimal effort to identify and/or address these women and
girls’ needs, much less target them as priority beneficiaries for
any programming. The humanitarian crisis in Borno State has led to
infinite protection risks for women and girls. Boko Haram has
abducted countless women and girls throughout its campaign in the
northeast. No one is entirely certain how many women and girls have
been abducted to date, in part because the Nigerian authorities have
yet to respond to civil society’s desperate calls for a survey in
the northeast, by which families could register the data of their
missing. Whatever the figure, it is surely dwarfed by the number
that have been exposed to Boko Haram’s brutality during its campaign
to overrun and control territory, of which gender-based violence
(GBV) has been a feature. Definitive counts of those who have been
subjected to Boko Haram’s rule in this manner are difficult to come
by, but it is reasonable to believe that it figures in the
thousands. As IDP numbers swell in Maiduguri, so do the number of
women and girl survivors of Boko Haram’s horrifying GBV tactics. As
the NA clears Boko Haram from territory, it rescues people who had
been trapped, the majority of them women and girls, and takes many
of them to displacement sites. In the month of March 2016 alone,
troops had rescued 11,595 hostages from Boko Haram, according to NA
Spokesman, Colonel Sanu Usman.

According to humanitarians with whom RI spoke, Nigerian authorities
share little to no information on its process for vetting women and
girls and releasing them. Some humanitarians, however, believe that
it is quite simply because there is no formal process. Further,
there is no process for identifying women and girls that have
escaped and fled to Maiduguri without the assistance of the
military. And there is no mechanism by which the military and
humanitarians can coordinate to identify women and girls so they can
benefit from much-needed services. RI interviewed one 14-year-old 14
who exemplified the protection risks this situation creates. She was
abducted during an attack on her village of Baga and taken as a wife
by a Boko Haram IDP women and children living in a host community in
Maiduguri.

…

During RI’s mission, only one humanitarian agency told the RI team
that procedures were in place to identify and provide services to
women and girls associated with Boko Haram, or for the women and
girls that are brought to Maiduguri on a near-daily basis by the
military. …

However, life for a woman or girl in the host communities is not
necessarily more secure. All of the displaced women living in host
communities whom RI interviewed spoke of the risks of violence. IMC
carried out a safety audit in the seven host communities where they
implement programs, and the three top concerns women expressed, in
order of priority, were domestic violence, rape, and denial of
resources. According to the women IMC serves, domestic violence has
become a serious issue due to food insecurity. Women suffer beatings
when they cannot provide food or when they ask for money to buy
food. On the third month of IMC programming, volunteers were
recording as many as twenty rapes per week in the seven communities.
Women are also reporting that they are often denied resources to
purchase medicines or food. When asking a group of women in a focus
group what self-care they practice to alleviate their trauma, RI
learned that women and girls are reportedly purchasing and drinking
bottles of cough syrup to “go to sleep and forget.”

There is no meaningful integrated GBV-prevention and response
programming in Maiduguri. …  To RI’s knowledge, at the time of
RI’s visit, only one INGO – International Medical Corps (IMC) – had
a holistic GBV prevention and response program that included
sensitization, referrals for medical care, and psychosocial
counseling, but the reach was limited to only seven host communities
and three IDP camps. However, this short-term U.S. government-
funded program is coming to a close, pending the acquisition of
alternative funding sources. Several other organizations were doing
psychosocial counseling for women and children, but they did not
specifically fall under the rubric of GBV.

…

Further, medical interventions designed specifically for survivors
of sexual violence across the board are limited due to an
unanticipated reason: the global displacement crisis. The pressures
on the global humanitarian system are reverberating in northeast
Nigeria: the agency mandated with procuring Inter-Agency
Reproductive Health kits, the United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA), has been unable to secure a shipment of Kit 5, the medical
kit designed to treat STIs. UNFPA’s suppliers in Denmark, China, and
the Netherlands informed the country office that they were unable to
fulfill the purchase order due to the overwhelming global demand;
their supplies are exhausted. Kits are currently under production
and should be made available to UNFPA Nigeria at the end of April
2016.

…

RI is also concerned that traditional humanitarian psychosocial
support programming may not be of the caliber that the context
warrants. The trauma endured by the Boko Haram-affected populations
cannot be underestimated. Community based organizations told RI that
apart from the suffering resulting from abduction, sexual violence,
the loss of partners and children, the violence of war, and loss of
all assets, Nigerian women in the northeast are also facing a
profound gender identity crisis. It is not the woman’s traditional
role to “bury one’s husband” or to be the head of a household, and
the rapidly shifting role is compounding the trauma they have
endured and imperiling their resilience capabilities.

According to service providers and some IDP women who chose to speak
about their mental health, women feel helpless, fear men, feel they
have lost all self-worth, and are hopeless when facing the
uncertainty of the future. When asking a group of women in a focus
group what self-care they practice to alleviate their trauma, RI
learned that women and girls are reportedly purchasing and drinking
bottles of cough syrup to “go to sleep and forget.” Upon further
investigation, RI learned that this is not a pre-existing coping
mechanism amongst women and girls. In fact, demand for cough syrup
in camps has increased such that supplies have become scarcer,
driving the price up from 60 Naira per bottle to 150-200 Naira.
Meanwhile, multiple international and local aid workers expressed
concern that some current UN and INGO psychosocial support
interventions may not be staffed adequately, contrary to what their
own literature might otherwise indicate. Aid workers highlighted
that several women’s safe spaces – tents – erected by one UN agency
are often empty. IDP women from several sites confirmed to RI that
they are unaware of trauma support programming and that the tents
are going unused.

The fact that GBV programming does not figure among core
humanitarian programming is a failure to global commitments to both
prioritize women and girls, and place GBV prevention and response
programming in its much-deserved category of a “lifesaving”
activity. On the contrary, one senior UNFPA staff member told RI
that a request to access UN Central Emergency Response Funds (CERF)
to hold a GBV referrals pathway workshop was denied on the basis
that “CERF funds can only be used for life-saving activities.”

…

**********************************************

Nigeria: Military Cover-Up of Mass Slaughter at Zaria Exposed

Amnesty International Press Release

22 April 2016

http://www.amnesty.org – Direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/jnafcom

Mass slaughter of hundreds of men, women and children by soldiers in
Zaria and the attempted cover-up of this crime demonstrates an utter
contempt for human life and accountability, said Amnesty
International as it publishes evidence gathered on the ground
revealing how the Nigerian military burned people alive, razed
buildings and dumped victims’ bodies in mass graves.

The true horror of what happened over those two days in Zaria is
only now coming to light. Bodies were left littered in the streets
and piled outside the mortuary. Some of the injured were burned
alive Netsanet Belay, Amnesty International

The report, Unearthing the truth: Unlawful killings and mass cover-
up in Zaria, contains shocking eyewitness testimony of large-scale
unlawful killings by the Nigerian military and exposes a crude
attempt by the authorities to destroy and conceal evidence.

“The true horror of what happened over those two days in Zaria is
only now coming to light. Bodies were left littered in the streets
and piled outside the mortuary. Some of the injured were burned
alive,” said Netsanet Belay, Amnesty International’s Research and
Advocacy Director for Africa.

“Our research, based on witness testimonies and analysis of
satellite images, has located one possible mass grave. It is time
now for the military to come clean and admit where it secretly
buried hundreds of bodies.”

More than 350 people are believed to have been unlawfully killed by
the military between 12 and 14 December, following a confrontation
between members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and
soldiers in Zaria, Kaduna state.

IMN supporters – some armed with batons, knives, and machetes – had
refused to clear the road near their headquarters, the Hussainiyya,
for a military convoy to pass. The army has claimed that IMN
supporters attacked the convoy in an attempt to assassinate the
Chief of Army Staff. IMN members deny this.

Following an initial confrontation the military surrounded other
locations where IMN supporters had gathered, notably at the
residential compound of IMN leader Ibrahim Al-Zakzaky. Some people
were killed as a result of indiscriminate fire. Others appeared to
have been deliberately targeted.

All available information indicates that the deaths of protesters
were the consequence of excessive, and arguably, unnecessary use of
force.

Children injured and killed

Zainab, a 16-year-old schoolgirl, told Amnesty International: “We
were in our school uniforms. My friend Nusaiba Abdullahi was shot in
her forehead. We took her to a house where they treated the injured
but, before reaching the house, she already died.” A 10-year-old boy
who was shot in the leg told Amnesty International how his older
brother was shot in the head as they tried to leave the compound.
“We went out to try to shelter in a nearby house but we got shot.”

Shot and burned alive

On 13 December, two buildings within Ibrahim Al-Zakzaky’s compound,
one of which was being used as a makeshift medical facility and
mortuary, were attacked by soldiers. Alyyu, a 22-year-old student,
told Amnesty International that he was shot in the chest outside the
compound and was taken inside for treatment: “There were lots of
injured people in several rooms. There were dead bodies in a room
and also in the courtyard. Around 12-1pm soldiers outside called on
people to come out, but people were too scared to go out. We knew
they would kill us. Soldiers threw grenades inside the compound. I
saw one soldier on the wall of the courtyard shooting inside.”

One mother described a phone conversation with one of her 19-year-
old sons before he was killed alongside his twin brother and their
step brother and sister in the compound. “They are shooting those
injured one by one,” he told her.

As soldiers set fire to the makeshift medical facility in the
compound that afternoon, Yusuf managed to escape despite serious
gunshot wounds: “Those who were badly injured and could not escape
were burned alive,” he told Amnesty International. “I managed to get
away from the fire by crawling on my knees until I reached a nearby
house where I was able to hide until the following day. I don’t know
how many of the wounded were burned to death. Tens and tens of
them.”

Footage believed to have been shot on mobile phone by IMN supporters
after the incident shows bodies with gunshot wounds as well as
charred bodies strewn around the compound.

Cover-up

After the incident the military sealed off the areas around al-
Zakzaky’s compound, the Hussainiyya and other locations. Bodies were
taken away, sites were razed to the ground, the rubble removed,
bloodstains washed off, and bullets and spent cartridge removed from
the streets.

Witnesses saw piles of bodies outside the morgue of Ahmadu Bello
University Teaching Hospital in Zaria. A senior medical source told
Amnesty International that the military sealed off the area around
the morgue for two days. During that time he saw army vehicles
“coming and going”.

A witness described to Amnesty International what he saw outside the
hospital mortuary on the evening of 14 December: “It was dark and
from far I could only see a big mound but when I got closer I saw it
was a huge pile of corpses on top of each other.  I have never seen
so many dead bodies. I got very scared and run away. It was a
terrible sight and I can’t get it out of my mind.”

Another witness told the organisation how he had seen diggers
excavating holes at the site of the suspected mass grave: “There
were five or six large trucks and several smaller military vehicles
and they spent hours digging and unloading the trucks’ cargo into
the hole they dug and then covered it again with the earth they had
dug out.  They were there from about 1 or 2 am until about 5 am.  I
don’t know what they buried. It looked like bodies, but I could not
get near.”

Amnesty International identified and visited the location of a
possible mass grave near Mando. Satellite images of the site taken
on 2 November and 24 December 2015 show disturbed earth spanning an
area of approximately 1000 square metres. Satellite pictures also
show the complete destruction of buildings and mosques.

“It is clear that the military not only used unlawful and excessive
force against men, women and children, unlawfully killing hundreds,
but then made considerable efforts to try to cover-up these crimes,”
said Netsanet Belay.

“Four months after the massacre the families of the missing are
still awaiting news of their loved ones. A full independent forensic
investigation is long overdue. The bodies must be exhumed, the
incident must be impartially and independently investigated and
those responsible must be held to account.”

On Monday 25 April, the military are expected to give evidence to
the Judicial Commission of Inquiry established by the Kaduna State
Government in January 2016. On 11 April, a Kaduna State government
official told the Judicial Commission of Inquiry that the bodies of
347 members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) were collected
from the hospital mortuary and an army depot in Zaria and buried
secretly in a mass grave near Mando (outside the town of Kaduna) on
the night of 14-15 December. The IMN claim a further 350 people who
went missing during the incidents in Zaria remain unaccounted for.

During field research carried out in Kaduna state and Federal
Capital Territory (FCT) in February 2016, Amnesty International
delegates interviewed 92 people, including victims and their
relatives, eyewitnesses, lawyers and medical personnel. Attempts
were made to interview members of the military.

IMN leader Al-Zakzaky and his wife Zeinat Al-Zakzaky were arrested
and held incommunicado. They were only allowed access to their
lawyer for the first time on 1 April 2015, three and a half months
after their arrest. Amnesty International has not had access to
those who remain in detention but has received information from
medical sources that some of the detainees were not allowed access
to necessary medical care for several weeks after their arrest.

Amnesty International is calling for those IMN supporters charged in
connection with this incident to be tried promptly and fairly and
for those still held in detention without charge to be either
immediately charged or released.

*****************************************************

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